Rasheeda Beevi vs Raghavan Bindhiji, P.B. Anitha Bindhiji and Mubeena Basheer

Pius C. Kuriakose, J.—The tenant challenges in this revision the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court under Sub-section (3) of Section 11 (bona fide need for own occupation) and under Clause (v) of Sub-section (4) of Section 11 (Cessation of occupation for more than six months). The need projected by the landlord (the first Petitioner in the RCP; the second Petitioner being his own wife) was that the building is needed bona fide for the conduct of a furniture shop.

The bona fides of the need was disputed by the revision Petitioner, who contended that the first Respondent is conducting money lending business and is also conducting textile business. The tenant also claimed protection of the second proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 11. The evidence before the Rent Control Court consisted of Exts.A1 to A5, oral evidence of P Ws 1 to 4, Exts.B1 to B4 and DW1, Ext.C1 and C1(a) and witnesses Exts.X1 and X2. The learned Rent Control Court on evaluating the evidence came to the conclusion that both the eviction grounds stood established and accordingly ordered eviction on both grounds.

The learned Appellate Authority considering the appeal preferred by the revision Petitioner made a reappraisal of the evidence and concurred with all the conclusions of the Rent Control Court. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

In this revision various grounds are raised challenging the judgment of the Appellate Authority. Sri.A.A. Abul Hassan, learned Counsel for the Petitioner addressed us extensively on the basis of those grounds. Drawing our attention to paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Appellate Authority the learned Counsel submitted that the Appellate Authority''s view is that in the rent control petition where the landlord comes forward with a case of doing business for eking out livelihood even if it is brought out that he is having other business the same will not affect the bona fides of the need. This view is erroneous as the word ''bona fide'' means, in the context of Section 11(3,) an honest need involving an element of necessity. The learned Counsel further submitted that the judgment of the Appellate Authority is based on commission report alone and not on legal evidence. Mr. Hassan submitted that the defence was that the tenant was seriously ill for a pretty long period and was undergoing treatment from Ayurveda medical practitioner. The certificate issued by the doctor who treated the Petitioner was produced. Appreciation of the evidence by the statutory authorities has been erroneous, so submitted the learned Counsel. The learned Counsel requested us to interfere with the impugned judgment.

We cannot accept Mr. Hassan''s request. Persuasiveness of the submissions of Mr. Abdul Hassan notwithstanding, the present jurisdiction, in which we are sitting, is attenuated in nature. In this jurisdiction, this Court is not expected ordinarily to make a reappraisal of the evidence for the purpose of substituting the factual conclusions arrived at by the statutory facts finding authorities. Having gone through the impugned judgment of the Appellate Authority and the order of the Rent Control Court, we find that it is reasonable findings which have been entered by the two statutory authorities and those findings are based on evidence on record. It is true that the learned Appellate Authority has made an observation that there is nothing wrong in the landlord thinking in terms of conducting more than one business. But, the question is whether the tenant''s defence that the landlord is having other business has been established. As rightly noticed by the Appellate Authority elsewhere in its judgment, the tenant did not adduce any evidence to show that the landlord is conducting money lending business. No evidence is produced either by the Petitioner to show that the textile business is conducted by the landlord and not by the landlord''s father in law. In short, we do not find any justification for interfering with the concurrent findings entered by the authorities below that the need projected by the landlord is bona fide.

Same is the position regarding the finding in the context of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. It is trite by various decisions including the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Francis v. Sreedevi Varassiar (2003 (2) KLT 230(FB)) that the burden to show that the tenant satisfies the two ingredients of the second proviso is on the tenant. It has been correctly found by the two statutory authorities that the tenant was unsuccessful in proving either of the ingredients of the second proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 11.

In short, the revision has to fail and the same will stand dismissed.