Rattan Kumar vs State of Haryana

S.S. Sodhi, J.

The challenge in this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is to the order of the trial magistrate allowing the application of the Government Food Inspector to adduce additional evidence in the trial against the petitioner for an offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

A preliminary objection has been raised to the maintainability of this petition on the ground that an order allowing additional evidence was merely an interlocutory order and no revision petition against it was thus competent in view of the provisions of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") and this hurdle could not be overcome by the simple device of giving the petition the label of it being one under Section 482 of the Code. Relied upon in this behalf being the judgment of Harbans Singh Rai, J. in Brij Mohan v. State of Haryana, 1987 (2) Recent Criminal Reports 646 , where it was held, "it is plain that an order to allow additional evidence is patently an interlocutory one, the bar of Section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is, therefore, apparently attracted. Obviously, to by pass the statutory hurdle, present petition is sought to be moved for the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The scope of exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is very restricted. It is to be exercised only when a finding can be arrived at that the order is the clearest abuse of the process of the court and this power is to be exercised very sparingly."

Question in Brij Mohan''s case (supra), like the case here, was the permission granted to the prosecution, in a trial under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, to adduce additional evidence to rebut the defence taken with regard to the alleged noncompliance with rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. This application for additional evidence had been moved at the close of the prosecution case when the case stood fixed for arguments. It was with the above quoted observations that the challenge to the impugned order under Section 482 of the Code was dismissed.

Confronted with the ruling of this Court, in Brij Mohan''s case (supra), Mr. Sanjay Bansal, counsel for the petitioner sought to question the correctness of it by adverting to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 47, to canvass the proposition that despite the bar under Section 397 (2) of the Code, the High court could exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 thereof, where the impugned order is illegal or without jurisdiction or would otherwise amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Counsel for the petitioner, in his behalf, sought to brand the impugned order as being illegal and without jurisdiction by adverting to the sketchy nature of the contents of the application for additional evidence on the basis of which it was allowed. The argument being that a vague application of the kind here which did not fully disclose the case for allowing additional evidence that the petitioner had to meet, violated the rules of natural justice and the order passed thereon, must thus be branded as being illegal and without jurisdiction. This is indeed an unsustainable contention. When an order is passed on the basis of a written application containing a clear and specific prayer and after hearing both parties and then a reasoned and wellconsidered order is passed, there is clearly no occasion provided thereby to impute any violation of the principles of natural justice to it.

Further, considering the circumstances and the purpose for which the additional evidence has been allowed, it can, by no means, be said to constitute an abuse of the process of the court. The present petition is thus clearly not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed as such.