Rattan Lal vs Mst. Laxmi Devi

H.R Sodhi, J.—This revision petition arises out of ejectment proceedings.

A house situate in Guli Dharamshala Mangali wali inside Nagori Gate, Hissar, was owned by one Niranjan Dass Jain who let out a room therein to Rattan Lal at a monthly rent of Rs. 8/8/-.A rent note Exhibit A. 3, was executed between the parties on 18th August, 1950. The tenancy was originally from August 1, 1960 to June 30, 1961. In the very beginning of the rent note, the room was stated to be built like a godown and in the body of the rent note, Rattan Lal gave an undertaking to the effect that he would keep the godown for his own use and not sublet the same to any other person. The use of the word ''godown'' in this context is again very significant.

Niranjan Dass died and his heirs sold their share in the house to Smt. Lakshmi Devi, respondent, who is the wife of Sukh Chand, Cashier in the State Bank of India, Hissar She made an application u/s 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter called the Act), before the Rent Controller for eviction of Rattan Lal on various grounds alleging inter alia that the petitioner had not paid rent for three months nor electricity charges, and that he had misused the rented premises thereby damaging its utility. It was also pleaded that she required the room for her personal use The arrears of rent with interest and costs were paid to Smt. Lakshami Devi on the first date of hearing. The petitioner in his written statement before the Rent Controller pleaded that the room was being used as his godown and being a non-residential building could not be got vacate on the ground of personal necessity. The other allegation against him about the misuse of the premises was denied. On the pleadings of the parties, the only issue that required determination was whether the respondent (now petitioner) was liable to eviction on the ground mentioned in the petition.

The Rem Controller on a consideration of the documentary and oral evidence come to the conclusion that the room let out to the petitioner was a godown and being a non-residential building could hot be got vacated on the ground of personal necessity. It was, of course, held by him that the respondent did require the house for her own use. The application was accordingly dismissed.

On an appeal being taken to the appellate authority, the finding on the question of personal necessity was affirmed but it was held that the room in dispute was a residential building and that personal necessity for the respondent having been found to exist, the petitioner was liable to be ejected. The appeal was, thus, allowed and Rattan Lal has now come up in revision.

The finding of the Rent Controller, affirmed as it is by the appellate authority, about the existence of personal necessity has not been challenged before me The only question agitated is that the room was a non-residential building and the appellate authority erred in law in directing ejectment of the petitioner I find there is force in this contention Mr. R.A Saini learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to that part of the judgment where the appellate authority observed that there was no dispute between the parties that the room was being used as a godown by Rattan Lal To the same effect is the finding by the Rent Controller as well This is a building of fact and it must, therefore, be held that the room leased out to the petitioner was being used as a godown. A non-residential building has been defined in Section 2 (d) of the Act and it means "a building being used solely for the purpose of business or trade". As observed by Mehar Singh C.J in Shri Arjan Singh Chopra v. Sewa Singh and Ors. 1967 Cur. L.J. 408, it is not necessary that the activity described as business or trade must have a profit motive. The definition is comprehensive enough to cover any activity connected with business and it may include storage of goods for the purposes of trade and business. "Building", as defined in the Act, includes part of a building as well and in order to determine whether a building is a residential or non-residential one, the fact that portion let out forms part of a residential building or that the main building is situate in a residential locality, will be irrelevant, if there is evidence to show that the portion leased out is being used solely for the purposes of business or trade. It is the main and substantial purpose of letting and how the let out portion is being used which are material to resolve the question about the nature of the building for the purposes of the Act. The instrument of tenancy is often helpful as sometime the purpose of tenancy is declared therein. When the purpose is so declared very seldom a difficulty can arise and the property will be deemed to be residential or non residential one according to the use intended to be made thereof as per the said instrument. In the instant case, the rent note, Exhibit A. 3, throughout describes the room leased out to the petitioner as a godown and the obvious intention was that the same was to be so used. It is in evidence that the petitioner has a business shop close-by and quite likely that he was keeping his goods in this room.

In my opinion, the Rent Controller took a correct view of law in holding that the petitioner was not liable to ejectment since the demised premises constituted a non-residential building The appellate authority was in error in reversing this finding on conjectural reasons. What seems to have weighed with the appellate authority was that there was residence of the firmly of the landlady Smt. Lakshami Devi in the other portion of the building though it found that the petitioner as tenant was using the room in dispute as a godown. This was a patiently erroneous approach and not warranted by law. The room let out to the petitioner must be held to be a non residential building with the result that he could not be ejected therefore on the ground of personal necessity of the landlady.

For the foregoing reasons, the revision petition is allowed, the order of the appellate authority reversed and that of the Rent Controller dismissing the ejectment application restored with costs. Counsel''s fee is fixed at Rs. 100.