Raval Rameshbhai Khemabhai vs Executive Engineer

A.G.Uraizee, J

Rule returnable forthwith. Ms.Urmila Desai, learned AGP waives service of notice of Rule for the respondent State.

Heard Mr.A.V.Prajapati, learned advocate for the applicant and Ms.Urmila Desai, learned AGP for the respondents.

The present application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has preferred to condone the delay of 3646 days which has occurred in preferring

First Appeal to assail the impugned judgment and award of the Trial Court.

Mr.A.V.Prajapati, learned advocate for the applicant submits that the applicant was not able to pay the amount of court fees and hence, the appeal

was not filed in time. However, the State Authorities having deposited the decreetal amount in the year 2017 awarded by the Land Reference Court

and the same was received by the applicant in the year 2019, the present appeal has been filed and hence, there is delay in preferring the appeal.

He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of K. Subbarayudu vs. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) reported in (2017) 12

SCC 840. He submits that the term “sufficient cause†should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. He further submits

that the applicant is ready and willing to forgo the interest and consequential statutory benefits ensuing from the impugned judgment and order for the

period of delay, if the period of delay is condoned. He, therefore, urges that the delay may be condoned.

Ms.Urmila Desai, learned AGP has opposed this application and submits that the delay is inordinate and is not sufficiently and satisfactorily

explained, except stating that the applicant is a farmer having no knowledge of legal nicety. She, therefore, submits that the delay may not be

condoned.

I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made at bar. It is undisputed fact that the delay which has occurred in preferring first

appeal is huge delay i.e. delay of 3646 days.

At this stage, it is relevant to take into account the observations made by Supreme Court in paragraph Nos. 10 to 12 in case of K. Subbarayudu

(supra), which read as under:-

“10. Before the High Court, the appellants relied upon Yellasiri Sarojanamma’s case, in L.A.S.S. No.46 of 2015, in which the High

Court condoned the delay of 3386 days in filing the land acquisition appeal suit subject to the condition that in the event, the appellant/

claimant thereon succeed in appeal, she is not entitled to any interest in respect of the period of delay. The appellants contended that the

same approach ought to have been adopted in the case of appellants also. Insofar as, the reliance placed upon by the claimants in L.A.S.S.

No.46/2015, the High Court seems to have brushed aside the contention of the appellants on the puerile ground that the relevant fact

situation in the said case is not forthcoming in the said order. In our view, the High Court was not right in adopting a different yardstick in

the case of the appellants in not condoning the delay.

The term “sufficient cause†is to receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when no negligence, inaction or

want of bona fide is attributable to the appellants, the Court should adopt a justice-oriented approach in condoning the delay. In State of

Nagaland v. Lipok AO and Others (2005) 3 SCC 752: 2005 (4) JT 10, it was held as under:-

“Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the court has to go

into the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have been resulted from the cause which he had

adduced and whether the cause recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case is sufficientâ€​.

With the acquisition of lands, the lifeline of the agriculturist is lost. There may be omission on the part of the claimants to adopt extra

vigilance; but same need not be used as a ground to depict them with negligence or want of bona fide. In case of acquisition of lands of

agriculturists, the courts ought to adopt a pragmatic approach to award just and reasonable compensation and not pedantic in their

approach. In Dhiraj Singh (D) Thr. Lrs. Etc. Etc. v. Haryana State and Ors. Etc. Etc. 2014 (9) SCALE 441, it was held as under:-

“15. Equities can be balanced by denying the appellants’ interest for the period for which they did not approach the Court. The

substantive rights of the appellants should not be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds by taking hyper technical view of self-

imposed limitations. In the matter of compensation for land acquisition, we are of the view that approach of the Court has to be pragmatic

and not pedantic.â€​

In view of the above observations of the Supreme Court coupled with the fact that the applicant is willing and ready to forgo the interest on

enhanced compensation and the statutory benefits flowing on the enhanced compensation for the period of delay, if the appeal is allowed, I am of the

opinion that the delay needs to be condoned.

For the foregoing reasons, the application is allowed and delay of 3646 days caused in preferring first appeal is hereby condoned on condition that

the applicant shall not entitle to interest on enhanced compensation and consequential benefits on enhanced compensation for the period of delay, if the

appeal is allowed.

The application stands disposed of accordingly. Rule is made absolute.