Ravi vs State

G. Rajasuria, J.—Challenging and impugning the judgement dated 22.11.2006 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge(Fast

Track Court No. II), Coimbatore, in C.A. No. 496 of 2005 confirming the judgment dated 25.10.2005 passed by the District Munsif cum Judicial

Magistrate, Palladam, in C.C. No. 168 of 2002, this criminal revision case is focussed.

Compendiously and concisely, the facts which are absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this case would run thus:

The police laid the police report in terms of Section 173 of Cr.P.C. for the offence under Sections 279 and 304(A) of IPC as against the accused

on the ground that on 24.4.2002, at about 20.00 hours, the van bearing registration No. 39-B-5319 was driven by the accused in a rash and

negligent manner along Nal Road, Cencheri, Kamanayakapalayam, from North to South and dashed as against the deceased Karuppusamy

grounder, who was standing near the bus stop. Since the accused pleaded not guilty, trial was conducted.

(b) During trial, on the prosecution side P.W.1 to P.W.9 were examined; Exs.P1 to P7 were marked. On the accused side, no oral or

documentary evidence was adduced.

(c) Ultimately, the trial Court convicted the accused and imposed the following sentence.

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Case No. Offence Punishment imposed

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C.C. No. 168 of 2002 279 IPC Three months rigourous imprisonment and

fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, one month

rigourous imprisonment.

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304-A IPC Rigourous imprisonment for six months, and

fine of Rs. 4000/-, in default, one month

rigourous imprisonment.

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(d) As against which, C.A. No. 496 of 2005 was filed before the Additional District and Sessions Judge(Fast Track Court No. II), Coimbatore,

which Court confirmed in toto the conviction recorded and sentence imposed by the lower Court.

Impugning and challenging the judgements of both the Courts below, this revision is focussed on various grounds, the nitty-gritty of them would

run thus:

There is no coherence between the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 on the one side and P.W.7-the Motor Vehicle Inspector on the other side.

There are also contradictions in the evidence of the alleged eyewitnesses. Accordingly, the revision petitioner prays for setting aside the judgement

of the lower Court and for acquitting the accused.

Heard both sides.

The point for consideration is as to whether there is any perversity or illegality in interpreting the evidence and recording the conviction and

imposing the sentence.

A plain reading of the judgement of the lower Court, coupled with the records available, it is clear that P.W.1 and P.W.2 are the eyewitness to

the occurrence, who supported the case of the prosecution. The deceased, Karuppusamy Gounder, at the relevant time of the accident was only a

by-stander near the bus stop and in such a case, by no stretch of imagination, it could be held that the driver of the van was justified in knocking

him down. In fact, after the accident, the van got stopped only on the mud portion of the road, where the deceased''s dead body was lying. In fact,

P.W.1 himself is a by-stander along with Karuppusamy Gounder and hence, his deposition cannot be doubted. P.W.2-Rathinasamy also would

bear out the testimony of P.W.1. Both the Courts below, taking into consideration the relevant facts, arrived at the conclusion.

The opinion of the Motor Vehicle Inspector that the offending vehicle got damaged on its right side would not in any way falsify the evidence of

P.W.1 and P.W.2. The fact that the front right side indicator glass of the van got broken did not falsify the testimony of the eyewitness that the left

side of the van dashed as against the deceased.

In the process of accident, various things might have happened and simply because the right side indicator glass was found broken in the

offending vehicle, one cannot jump to the conclusion that the driver did not cause the accident at all. The first and foremost crucial question arises

in this case is as to what necessitated the offending vehicle''s driver to dash as against the by-stander. Even during examination u/s 313 of Cr.P.C.,

the accused did not choose to whisper anything.

At this juncture, my mind is reminiscent and redolent of the provisions as contained in Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, which would

contemplate that when there is any fact within the exclusive knowledge of the accused, it is for him to disclose. But, in this case, he had not chosen

to utter out anything.

At this juncture, I would like to call up and recollect the following decisions of the Honourable Apex Court:

(i) 2002 Scc (Crl) 1448 - Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias B.P. Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and Anr.; an excerpt from it

would run thus:

The instant case is not one where any such illegality was committed by the trial court. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the

procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has

repeatedly been held that the High Court should not reappreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial court. In the absence of

manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.

We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction

at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that

of the trial court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction u/s 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a

judgment of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed

out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial

vitiating the trial itself.

(ii) 2005 Scc (cri) 276 � Sathyajit Banerjee and Ors. v. State of W.B. and Ors., an excerpt from it would run thus:

The cases cited by the learned Counsel show the settled legal position that the revisional jurisdiction, at the instance of the complainant, has to

be exercised by the High Court only in very exceptional cases where the High Court finds defect of procedure or manifest error of law resulting in

flagrant miscarriage of justice.

A bare perusal of those decisions would exemplify and demonstrate that the High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction is not

expected to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by both the Courts below simply because one other view is possible or a different view

could be taken.

Both the Courts below correctly appreciating the evidence on record, arrived at the factual finding, warranting no interference, and there is no

perversity or non application of law in interpreting the evidence.

Regarding the sentence portion is concerned, the trial Court awarded six months rigourous imprisonment for the offence u/s 304A IPC.

At this juncture, I would like to cite the following decision of the Honourable Supreme Court:

2002(2) Supreme 500 � State of Karnataka v. Sharanappa Basnagouda Aregoudar, an excerpt from it would run thus:

We are of the view that having regard to the serious nature of the accident, which resulted in the death of four persons, the learned Single Judge

should not have interfered with the sentence imposed by the Court below. It may create and set an unhealthy precedent and send wrong signals to

the subordinate courts which have to deal with several such accident cases. If the accused are found guilty of rash and negligent driving, courts

have to be on guard to ensure that they do not escape the clutches of law very lightly. The sentence imposed by the courts should have deterrent

effect on potential wrong-doers and it should commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. Of course, the Courts are given discretion in the

matter of sentence to take stock of the wide and varying range of facts that might be relevant for fixing the quantum of sentence, but the discretion

shall be exercised with due regard to larger interest of the society and it is needless to add that passing of sentence on the offender is probably the

most public face of the criminal justice system.

(emphasis supplied)

It is therefore clear that the Honourable Apex Court deprecated the practice of some of the Courts awarding lenient punishment in accident

cases involving Section 304-A IPC.

However, taking into consideration the fact that the accused was 31 years old, at the time of accident, so to say a man of young age, I am of

the view that the sentence could be reduced to three months simple imprisonment, leaving intact the fine imposed.

Similarly, for the offence u/s 279 IPC also, I would like to modify the sentence of three month rigourous imprisonment imposed by the trial

Court to one of three months simple imprisonment and accordingly, the same is converted. I made it clear that the sentences imposed under both

the Sections shall run concurrently.

In the result, the criminal revision case is partly allowed. The lower Court, on receipt of a copy of this order, is directed to issue warrant, to

secure the presence of the revision petitioner and commit him to jail so as to make him to undergo the sentence imposed in this revision, if he has

not already undergone. Any pre-trial detention is there, as per Section 428 of Cr.P.C., the same could be set off proportionately. Consequently,

connected miscellaneous petition is closed.