Ravi Bharti Siksha Samittee vs Mr. Madhukar Gupta and Others

Anil Kumar, J.—The petitioner has invoked the contempt jurisdiction of this Court for alleged violation of order dated 16th November, 2004 passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3643/2004.

The Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3643/2004 was disposed by order dated 16th November 2004 on the basis of agreement arrived at between the parties. It was agreed between the parties that DDA would fence the area, possession of which is to be offered to the petitioner and the entire cost for fencing would be borne by the petitioner. The respondent/DDA had to indicate the cost of fencing which was not to be challenged by the petitioner and which the petitioner was liable to deposit. After fencing, the area was to be measured by the parties and within 30 days after the measurement, the petitioner had to pay the amount within 30 days thereafter. Two weeks after the receipt of the amount, the respondent had to handover the possession of the area to the petitioner.

The petitioner has contended that he has deposited a sum of Rs. 55,77,646/- in compliance with the order dated 16th November 2004 and the understanding arrived at between the parties; however, the respondent has failed to fence the area and handover the possession of the site to the petitioner. In these circumstances, petitioner has claimed initiation of contempt of court proceedings against the respondents, who are Vice Chairman of DDA, Director (Land) and Executive Engineer (ED-III) of Delhi Development Authority.

The respondents have contended that they have the highest regard for the orders passed by this Court and there is no deliberate or intentional violation of the orders passed by this Court. It is contended that the area could not be fenced nor the possession of the area could be handed over to the petitioner on account of the status quo order passed in respect of the same land in another writ petition being W.P.(C.) No. 3064/2005. It is also contended that the construction of boundary wall could not be commenced on account of time required for inviting tenders for the purpose of construction of the boundary wall. Thereafter, status quo order has been obtained by the Resident''s Welfare Association in a separate writ petition where the Delhi Development Authority has been directed to maintain status quo. This cannot be disputed by the petitioner that in Writ Petition No. 3064/2005, a status quo order was passed on 24th May, 2005. The petitioner has also sought his impleadment in the said writ petition and he had impleaded as a party. Though there was delay in inviting tenders for construction of the fence/boundary wall, however, that per se will not amount to committing contempt of this Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Thereafter, the land and possession of which is to be handed over to the petitioner, has not been fenced and handed over to the petitioner, on account of status quo order passed by this Court, this will not be violation of the order passed by this Court pursuant to an agreement/understanding arrived at between the parties.

Exercise of power under Contempt of Courts Act of 1971 is comparatively a rarity and has to be used sparingly and in the larger interest of society and for proper administration of justice. Mere disobedience of an order may not be sufficient to amount to a "Civil Contempt" within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act of 1971. The element of willingness and intention is an indispensable requirement to take action. If two interpretations are possible and the action of alleged contemnor pertains to one of such interpretations which will raise doubts about the willful nature of conduct, if raised, contempt will not be made out. The Supreme Court of India in the case Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra, has observed at page 230, inter alia thus:

The summary jurisdiction by way of contempt must be exercised with great care and caution and only when its exercise is necessary for the proper administration of law and justice." (Per Grover, J.) Contempt of Court is essentially a matter which concerns the administration of justice and the dignity and authority of judicial Tribunals. It is not a right of a party to be invoked for the redress of his grievances. It is not also a mode by which the rights of a party, adjudicated upon by a Tribunal can be enforced against another party. Moreover, if the matter, as in the present case, requires a detailed inquiry, it must be left to the Court which passed the order and which presumably is fully acquainted with the subject-matter of its own order. When the matter relates to mere infringement of an order, as between parties, it is clearly inexpedient to invoke and exercise contempt jurisdiction as a mode of executing the order, merely because other remedies may take time or are more circumlocutory in character. Contempt jurisdiction should be reserved for what essentially brings the administration of justice into contempt or unduly weakens it (vide (1964) 68 CWN 148, Bukhtiarpur Bihar Light Rly. Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and Others, , A. Ramalingam Vs. V.V. Mahalinga Nadar, and Ram Rup Pandey Vs. R.K. Bhargava and Others, ).

Having carefully considered the allegations made in the contempt petition, it is apparent that the action of the respondent does not fall within the ambit of Contempt of Courts Act. No undertaking was given to or accepted by the Court. The order was passed detailing the different steps which were to be taken by the parties pursuant to an agreement/understanding arrived at between the parties. The reason for not starting the construction of fencing wall has been explained by the respondent. This will not constitute committing contempt of this Court. The possession of the property has not been given to the petitioner on account of status quo order passed by this Court in another petition filed by the Resident''s Welfare Association where the petitioner has also been impleaded as a party. In the circumstanced no grounds have been made out for initiating Contempt of Court proceedings against the respondent. The petition in the facts and circumstances is misconceived and it is, therefore, dismissed. Notice issued to the respondent is discharged and the parties are left to bear their own costs.