Ravi Narayan vs State of M.P. and Others

R.S. Garg, J.

By this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner seeks to challenge the initiation and continuation of the proceedings recorded by the Sub-Divisional Officer and registration of Revenue Case No. 138/A-23/96-97.

Brief facts necessary for disposal of the present petition are that the present Petitioner after seeking permission of the Collector purchased particular survey numbers belonging to Smt. Belmati Wife of Sindhu Nagwanshi. The Collector by his order dated 3.1.73 permitted said Smt. Belmati to sell Survey No. 806, 8080, 809, 810/2, 817/2, 817/1, 829 and 810/3 (total eight survey numbers) admeasuring 2.073 hectares for a consideration of Rs. 10,360/-. A registered document was executed by Smt. Belmati in favour of the Petitioner on 8.1.1973.

After coming into force of Section 170-B of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (''Code'' for the sake of brevity) Case No. 202/A-23/87-88 was registered against the Petitioner and others. The S.D.O. by order dated 18.8.88 came to the conclusion that as property was sold by Smt. Belmati after securing sanction from the Collector of the District the transaction was in accordance with the provisions of the Code and there was no scope to hold that it was fradulent. He accordingly dropped the proceedings.

On 31.7.97 i.e. almost after eight years of the first order, the S.D.O. on strength of certain reports submitted by the Patwari recorded that the earlier order passed on 18.8.88 was not in accordance with law. It did not take into consideration as to whether proper consideration was paid to the original holder or not and what would be the effect of non-submission of the information by the present holder in accordance with Section 170-B (1) of the Code, proposed review of the earlier order. For the said purpose, he referred the matter with records to the Collector. The Collector by his order dated 24.9.97 considered the proceedings and granted permission to the S.D.O. to review the earlier order. The Petitioner is aggrieved by resumption of the proceedings, initiation of review proceedings and grant of the permission by the Collector.

Shri Diwakar, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that If the case was closed in the year 1988 after a long lapse of almost nine years, the S.D.O. was not justified in resuming the proceedings for exercising his powers of review. According to him, the earlier order passed on 18.8.88 was in accordance with law and the proceedings recorded by the S.D.O. do not show any ground for exercising the powers of the review. He further submits that the Collector without application of the mind has granted the permission sanction, therefore the said order also deserves to be quashed.

Shri Agrawal, learned Counsel for the State, submits that as the provisions of Section 170-B of the Code have been enacted for securing proper benefits in favour of the aboriginal and downtrodden people, therefore when ever an illegality is brought to the notice of the State and their officer they are entitled to reopen the proceedings by way of review. According to him, the State has to achieve its goal in favour of the weaker section of the society, therefore this Court should not interfere at this stage.

Shri Ambedkar, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 4 submits that the earlier order dated 18.8.88 was not in accordance with law. The then S.D.O. did not try to appreciate that even if the permission of Collector was sought for transferring the lands then too the S.D.O. was obliged to make an enquiry. He further submits that the present S.D.O. having found that the earlier order was contrary to law was certainly justified in initiating the proceedings and the Collector was justified in according the sanction. He submits that the Petitioner still would have a chance before the S.D.O., therefore the petition deserves to be dismissed. I have heard the parties at length.

Section 170-B of the Code reads as under-

Reversion of land of member of aboriginal tribe which was transferred by fraud-

(1) Every person who on the date of commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act of 1980) is in possession of agricultural land which belonged to a member of a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under Sub-section (6) of Section 165 between the period commencing on the 2nd October, 1959, and ending on the date of the commencement of Amendment Act of 1980 shall, within two years of such commencement, notify to the Sub-Divisional Officer in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, all the information as to how he has come in possession of such land.

(2) If any person fails to notify the information as required by Sub-section (1) within the period specified therein it shall be presumed that such person has been in possession of the agricultural land without any lawful authority and the agricultural land shall, on the expiration of the period aforesaid revert to the person to whom it originally belonged and if that person be dead, to his legal heirs.

(3) On receipt of the information under Sub-section (1) the Sub-Divisional Officer shall make such enquiry as may be deemed necessary about all such transactions of transfer and if he finds that the member of aboriginal tribe has been defrauded of his legitimate right he shall declare the transaction null and void, and-

(a) where no building or structure has been erected on the agricultural land prior to such finding pass an order revesting the agricultural land in the transferor and if he be dead, in his legal heirs;

(b) where any building or structure has been erected on the agricultural land prior to such finding, he shall fix the price of such land in accordance with the principles laid down for fixation of price of land in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (No. 1 of 1894) and order the person referred to in Sub-section (1) to pay to the transferor the difference, if any, between the price so fixed and the price actually paid to the transferor:

Provided that where the building or structure has been erected after the 1st day of January, 1984 the provisions of Clause (b) above shall not apply:

Provided further that fixation of price under Clause (b) shall be with reference to the price on the date of registration of the case before the Sub-Divisinal Officer.

According to Sub-Section 1 of Section 170-B, a person in possession of the agricultural land which originally belonged to a member of tribe has to submit the information to the S.D.O. in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed. If such a person fails to notify the information as required by Sub-Section 1 then according to Sub-section (2) the land shall revert to the person to whom it originally belogned and it shall be presumed that such person was in possession of the property without any lawful authority. On receipt of the information under Sub-Section 1, the S.D.O. is required to make necessary enquiry as it is deemed necessary.

By Section 3 of M.P. Act No. 19 of 1982 provisions were made for removal of difficulties. Section 3 of the Act No. 19/82 declares that the "(1) consequences ensuing under Sub-Section 2 of Section 170-B of the Principal Act shall, in respect of any person who failed to notify information as required by Sub-Section 1 of Section 170-B within the period specified therein, be and shall always be deemed never to have ensued, and the agricultural land never to have reverted to the person to whom it originally belonged.....etc. From perusal of Section 3 of Act No. 19/82, it would clearly appear that the land would not automatically revert in favour of the original holder.

In the matter of Atmaram Vs. State of M.P., , a Division Bench of this Court has held that even if the necessary information is not furnished by the present holder of the land, the S.D.O. cannot straight way pass a declaratory order but he has to make an enquiry.

From perusal of the order of S.D.O. dated 18.8.88 it would clearly appear that he was satisfied that proper consideration was paid and present was not a case of fraudulent transfer. If these two points were decided in favour of the present Petitioner when it cannot be held that the S.D.O. was unjustified in dropping or closing the original proceedings.

Submission of Shri Diwakar, learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that initiation of the proceedings on 31.7.97 almost after nine years of the closure of the first proceedings is misuse and abuse of legal provisions. According to him the authority who even have powers to exercise suo-motu review powers must exercise the said powers within a reasonable time. According to him, nine years period cannot be termed as reasonable time. Shri Agrawal and Shri Ambedkar learned Counsel on the other hand submit that exercise of the powers is to be considered qua the information and date of the information. According to them, as the report was submitted in the year 1997 the S.D.O. was justified in initiating the proceedings.

In the matter of The State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, considering the question of suo motu revisional powers and the period within which such powers should be exercised, the Supreme Court observed that looking to the nature of the deeming fiction and the nature of the fiction which was likely to lead a belief in favour of the owner that he was entitled to raise construction, such suo motu revisional powers could be exercised within few months. Following the said judgment a Full Bench of this Court in the matter of Usha Devi v. State of M.P. ( 1990 RN 77) has observed as under:

We have, however, no hesitation in accepting the submission of Shri Bhargava that power of revision suo motu contemplated u/s 42 of the Act can be, and has to be, exercised within a reasonable time and that is the meaning to be attributed to the term ''at any time'' used therein. Counsel''s reliance on The State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, in support of that contention is indeed well merited. There can be no dispute with that proposition because of the Constitutional imperative requiring statutory authorities to act reasonably and not arbitrarily. However, what should be the reasonable time for exercise of the power, as held in P. Raghav (Supra), must be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised.

In the matter of Hamir Singh v. State of M.P. (1196 RN 80) following the judgment of State of Gujrat (Supra), this Court observed that exercise of suo motu jurisdiction after a lapse of more than six years was belated. This Court observed that the powers can be exercised within reasonable time.

In the matter of Pratap Singh and Anr. v. State of M.P. (1997 RN 219) appreciating the provisions of Section 50 of the Code, this Court observed that suo motu revisional powers cannot be exercised after seven years without any explanation for delay.

In the matter of Mohamad Kavi v. Fatmabal Ibrahim (reported as a short note in 1998 1 M.P. WN 26), the Supreme Court has observed that even if period of limitation is not provided under the statute then too the exercise must be started within a reasonable time. Referring to Section 50 of the Code, the Supreme Court observed that suo motu revisional powers may be exercised within reasonable time and even in a given case one year may be unreasonable.

Section 50 of the Code relates to revision. According to Section 50 the authority may at any time on its/his own motion or on the application made by any party call for any examine the record of any case pending before the subordinate or disposed of by such subordinate and may pass such orders in reference thereto as it/he thinks fit. Section 51 relates to powers of Review. Section 51 provides that the Board and every Revenue Officer may either on its/his own motion or on the application of any party interested; review any order passed by itself/himself or by any of its/his predecessors in office and pass such order in reference thereto as it/he thinks fit. If the Commissioner, Settlement Commissioner, Collector or Settlement Officer thinks it necessary to review any order which he has not himself passed, he shall first obtain the sanction of the Board, and if an Officer subordinate to a Collector or Settlement Officer proposes to review any order, whether passed by himself or by any predecessor, he shall first obtain the sanction in writing of the authority to whom he is immediately subordinate.

The Scheme of Section 51 of the Code is that in case the Commissioner, Settlement Commissioner, Collector or Settlement Officer wants to review an order passed by him he can do it without seeking any sanction from the Board but it he/they want to review an order passed by any predecessor sanction of the Board is a condition precedent. But in case of an officer subordinate to a Collector or Settlement officer whether he has passed the order himself or wants to review an order passed by his predecessor, he is bound to seek written sanction from the authority to whom he is immediately subordinate.

The opening word of Section 50 and 51 of the Code would clearly provide that the powers of revision and review can be exercised by the authority on his own motion or on an application by the aggrieved party. What should be the period of limitation for exercising suo motu revision powers has been considered in number of cases while considering the revisional powers.

A power of Review is vested in the Court so that the said Court can correct the wrong which has been committed by it It may be a case where the same Court/authority after learning about the wrong committed by it wants to correct the wrong. It can exercise the powers either on an application or suo motu. In case of a revision the superior Court invested with powers of revision wants to correct the wrong committed by his subordinate. The superior Court may exercise these powers suo motu or on an application by the aggrieved party. The powers infact are such which can be exercised by the same court or by the revisional Court because each of the court wants to correct the wrong. In case of review the anxiety is of the same Court while in the case of revision the anxiety is of the superior Court. While granting permission for review the authority is not required to give a mechanical sanction. The order must show application of mind. It must appear form the order that the authority was not swayed away, but the order must show that it has considered the facts and after application of the mind has granted the permission, in the present case, when the papers were placed before the Collector seeking sanction for review, the Collector simply said ''agreed with the recommendations'' in the opinion of this Court such observation shows absolute and utter non-application of mind. It would not be proper for an authority to say that agreeing with the recommendations, he was granting permission for review. The order passed by the Collector is not in accordance with law. True it is that no form is prescribed for granting the sanction nor particular words are to be used for granting sanction but such an order, granting sanction, would not meet any requirement of law.

The words ''at any time'' used either in Section 50 or in Section 51 for exercise of the suo-motu powers would ordinarily mean that question of limitation would not arise. But the rule of prudence says that such power should be exercised within reasonable time. The principle of interpretation says that if the plain words are given their plain meaning and they lead to absurdity then such interpretation should be avoided. In all matters referred above, Supreme Court and this Court considering the totality of the circumstances and the facts before the said courts, came to the conclusion that the words ''at any time'' would not mean an indefinite period. In some of the cases period of months and in some of the cases period of one year was considered to be belated.

When the Courts are required to consider whether particular period is a reasonable period for exercising the suo-motu revisional powers or suo-motu review powers then the Courts are guided not only by the provisions of law or rule of prudence but are also guided by the principles of equity, fair play and justice. The Courts cannot ignore the fact that public at large deposes confidence in the Judicial system and they wish to say that some end should be brought to the litigation. Though from the plain language of Section 51 it does not appear that length of time would curtail or curb the powers of the authority to review its order but by the judicial dictum it has been circumscribed. The words ''at any time'' in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court, this Court and other Courts will have to mean within reasonable time''. The period in which powers can be exercised should be reasonable period. A man is entitled to feel that after a final order in his favour he is free and is entitled to use and enjoy his property and chattel. If it enters in his mind that some authority on some day may exercise suo-motu review or revisional powers then it would be almost impossible for such person to enjoy the property which is in his possession. There must be some end to the litigation. If the things are kept in suspension and no finality is attached even to a final order it is going to shatter the public faith in the system. The law nowhere provides that the things may be kept in animated suspension so that someone or the other whenever wants transfusion of life into the suspended article may bring it back to life. The law is to be respected and justice is to be done by those who have authority to dispense justice. One cannot forget that interpretation of the law should be in accordance with equity, fair play and justice. At some point somebody is entitled to say that enough is enough. Somebody must permit the deads to remain burried in their graves.

The resumption and initiation of the proceedings by the S.D.O. prima facie shows non-application of mind. It simply records that effect of non-submission of the information was not considered nor the authority had considered the payment of proper consideration, therefore present was a fit case for suo motu review. In the opinion of this Court the initiation of proceedings almost after nine years of the close of the first chapter is not in accordance with law nor can be approved under the provisions of law. Even for the sake of repetition, it is again observed that in the first order the S.D.O. had tacitly held that proper consideration was paid because the sale was effected after obtaining sanction from the Collector.

in the opinion of this Court, neither the Collector had any jurisdiction to grant sanction for review nor the S.D.O. had any authority to resume the proceedings which were closed in the year 1988. The proceedings pending before the S.D.O. deserve to and are accordingly quashed. The petition is allowed. There shall be no orders as to cost.