Ravinder alias Binder vs State of Haryana

Virender Singh, J.—Vide this judgment I shall be disposing of Criminal Appeal No.273-SB of 1992, Ravinder alias Binder v. State of

Haryana and Criminal Revision No.98 of 1993, Sheela Devi v. Ravinder alias Binder and another, as both are arising out of the one and the same

judgment dated 3.7.1992 of Additional Sessions Judge, Jind.

The appellant was booked in a case FIR No. 132 dated 10.5.1991 u/s 376 IPC registered at Police Station Sadar Jind for allegedly committing

rape upon the daughter of the complainant namely Khazani Devi PW-8.

I am not disclosing the name of the prosecutrix in the light of the judgment rendered by Hon''ble the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v.

Puttaraja, 2004(1) CCC 567 (S.C.): 2004(1) RCR(Cri.) 113 (SC). She will be hereinafter referred to as prosecutrix only.

On the date of occurrence, the date of birth of the prosecutrix as emerges from her birth certificate Ex.PN is 26.8.1975. This is an admitted

fact. The date of occurrence is 8.5.1991. The exact age of the prosecutrix on the date of occurrence, thus, comes to 15 years 9 months and 12

odd days. The age of the appellant was approximately 21 years. Even in the impugned judgment itself, the learned trial Court indicates the age of

the appellant as 21 years. Both were unmarried at that stage.

The appellant after suffering conviction has now been sentenced to undergo RI for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.250/-, in default of

payment of fine to further undergo RI for three months. Hence, this appeal.

Mr. Mohunta has not joined any issue on merits of the case and instead has confined his arguments with regard to quantum of sentence only.

Dwelling upon his arguments, Mr. Mohunta contends that the prosecutrix during the pendency of the appeal has entered into a compromise with

the appellant with the intervention of the Village Panchayat and other respectables. A Criminal Misc. Application for placing on records the said

compromise has already been allowed by this Court vide order of even date. He then contends that in the compromise which is otherwise in the

shape of affidavit of the complainant, (mother of the prosecutrix) it is stated that she and the appellant are living in the same vicinity; there is cordial

atmosphere presently prevailing between both the sides and she had no grievance against the appellant as both the sides have developed good

relations and for this reason she and her daughter (prosecutrix) do not want to proceed with this case any more and have no object if the appellant

is acquitted. It has been brought to my notice by the learned counsel for the appellant and even by the learned counsel for the complainant that the

appellant and the prosecutrix have got married by now and are having minor children as well.

Mr. Mohunta makes a statement at the bar with regard to the period of detention already undergone by the appellant by now. He states that

during the trial, the appellant remained in custody for 40 days and after conviction for 5 months and 10 days. The total period, thus, comes to six

months and a few odd days. This fact is not controverted by the learned-counsel for the complainant or even the learned State counsel.

Mr. Mohunta in order to strengthen his arguments has relied upon a judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court rendered in Jamail Singh v. State of

Punjab, 1999 (1) ACJ 231 (S C.): (1998) 8 SCC 629. In the aforesaid case, the appellant was convicted u/s 376 IPC. The prosecutrix in the said

case was below 16 years of age. In fact she was around 15 years. The finding of the Court was that she was the willing party to whole of the affair.

The appellant was also of the young age. keeping in view the facts and circumstances, the Hon''ble Supreme Court reduced the sentence of

imprisonment to the period already undergone by the appellant. However, the period of detention is not described in the aforesaid judgment.

Drawing my attention to the impugned judgment, Mr. Mohunta contends that in this case the categoric finding of the trial Court is that the

prosecutrix was a consenting party but die appellant has suffered conviction mainly on the ground that the prosecutrix was less then 16 years of

age. According to Mr. Mohunta, the aforesaid judgment squarely covers the case of the present appellant as well.

Mr. Mohunta then relies upon another latest judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court rendered in Bankat v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 (1)

CCC 931 (S.C.): 2005(1) RCR (Cri) 306 (SC), in the aforesaid case the Hon''ble Supreme Court while declining die prayer to compound the

offence u/s 326 IPC, reduced the sentence of the appellant to the period already undergone.

On the basis of the aforesaid judgments, Mr. Mohunta prays for a lenient view with regard to quantum of sentence.

Mr. Vivek Singla, learned counsel for the complainant confirms die factum of compromise. He makes this statement at the bar on the basis of

the latest instruction from his client (complainant). Mr. Singla then contends that he has no objection if the instant appeal is decided considering the

aforesaid compromise.

However, the State counsel has opposed the submissions of Mr. Mohunta, stating that the compromise now arrived at between the parties

cannot be taken into account for the purpose of acquittal of the appellant. However, Mr. Brar very fairly states that the said compromise can

certainty be taken into consideration with regard to quantum of sentence. He, however, contends that keeping in view the seriousness of the

offence, the appellant does not deserve any concessional tilt with regard to reduction in the quantum of sentence,

After hearing the learned counsel for the sides and perusing the entire record, I find force in the submissions made by Mr. Mohunta with regard

to quantum of sentence.

Although the instant appeal has not been argued on merits by learned counsel for the appellant, yet after perusing the entire record being Court

of first appeal, upheld the conviction of the appellant for the charge.

Adverting to quantum of sentence.

No doubt, it has been authoritatively held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that the cases of sexual crime against women are to be seen with

utmost sensitivity and to be dealt with sternly. But at the same time, it is also observed that it is to be kept in mind that the sentencing process can

be tempered with mercy where it so warrants. As stated the appellant was of the age of 21 years at the time of occurrence. The prosecutrix was

also nearing 16 years. The appellant has since settled down in his life after getting married. As stated, he has now become a reformed citizen. The

victim likewise is also comfortably placed in her lift having minor children. Sending the appellant to jail at this juncture, in my opinion, would amount

to re-opening the wounds which are already heated up by efflux of time. The compromise which is already taken on record reflects die same.

Furthermore, any whispering campaign by gossip peddlers after 14 years may not raise its ugly head to dislodge the families concerned, is also to

be avoided in the instant case.

The appellant, at the same time has also remained in jail for a reasonable period. On merits also, the finding is that the prosecutrix was a consenting

for a reasonable period On merits also, the finding is that the prosecutrix was a consenting party. This again a mitigating circumstance in favour of

the appellant. Without setting a precedent, in my view, in this particular case, the ends of justice would be adequately met if the sentence awarded

to the appellant by the learned trial Court is reduced to the period already undergone (about six months). It is ordered accordingly.

Drawing the support from Jarnail Singh''s case (supra), wherein, while reducing the sentence of the appellant to the period already undergone,

the Hon''ble Supreme Court had imposed a fine of Rs. 12,000/- to the appellant which was ordered to be paid to the prosecutrix as

compensation. I also, hereby, direct the appellant to deposit Rs. 10,000/- as fine before the trial Court within one month from today and the same

in turn shall I paid to the complainant, the mother of the prosecutrix by the trial Court as compensation after giving due notice to her. In default of

payment, the appellant shall undergo the period already awarded by the trial Court on this count.

Resultantly while upholding the conviction of the appellant, the appeal stands dismissed except with the modification in the quantum of sentence

as indicate hereinabove.

Criminal Revision No. 98 of 1993, titled ""Sheela Devi v. Ravinder alias Binder and another"", also stands disposed of accordingly.

Trial Court be also informed without any delay.