Ravinder Jeet Singh (Deceased) Through Lr vs Kanta Vadhera & Anr

Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J

These Rent Control Revision Petitions, all under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, by three tenants of the respondents/landlords,

impugn the orders of dismissal of the applications filed by the petitioners/tenants for leave to defend the petitions for eviction filed by the

respondents/landlords under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act for eviction of the petitioners from the shops in their tenancy under the respondents/landlords.

RC.REV. No.68/2015 and RC.REV. No.69/2015 impugn the orders both dated 14th October, 2014 in E-485/14/13 and E-485/14/13, both of the

Court of Additional Rent Controller (ARC) (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi and the consequent order of eviction of the petitioner therein from shop

No.2296-B and shop No.2296-C respectively, at Chatta Punjabian, Bahadurgarh Road, Delhi-110006.

RC.REV. No.362/2016 impugns the order, also dated 14th October, 2014 in E-489/14/13, also of the Court of ARC (Central), Tis Hazari Courts,

Delhi and the consequent order of eviction of the petitioner therein from shop No.2298-B, Chatta Punjabian, Bahadurgarh Road, Delhi-110006.

The petitions were entertained and notice thereof ordered to be issued and subject to the petitioners in RC.REV. Nos.68/2015 & 69/2015 paying

user charges to the respondents/landlords @ Rs.9,000/- per month and Rs.7,000/- per month respectively, from the date of the eviction order, the

eviction of the petitioners/tenants therein stayed during the pendency of those petitions. However, in RC.REV. No.362/2016, the execution of the

order of eviction of the petitioner/tenant therein was stayed without providing for payment of any user charges.

While RC.REV. Nos.68/2015 & 69/2015 have always been taken up together, on RC.REV. No.362/2016 being filed, though belatedly, all the three

petitions are being listed together.

The counsel for the petitioner/tenant in RC.REV. Nos.68/2015 & 69/2015 and the counsel for the petitioner/tenant in RC.REV.No.362/2016 and

the senior counsel for the respondents/landlords in all the three petitions have been heard.

The respondents/landlords filed petitions for eviction with respect to all the three shops subject matter of the three petitions on the same facts and

which are as under:

(i) that the tenant in Shops No.2296-B and 2296-C (subject matter of RCR No.68/2015 and RCR No.69/2015) as well as the tenant in Shop No.2298-

B (subject matter of RCR No.362/2016) are old tenants, with the rent of the shop subject matter of RC.REV. No.68/2015 being Rs.20/- per month,

rent of shop subject matter of RC.REV. No.69/2015 being Rs.30/- per month and the rent of shop subject matter of RC.REV. No.362/2016 also being

Rs.20/- per month;

(ii) that the shops subject matter of RC.REV. Nos.68/2015 & 69/2015 are without any electricity connection and are used by the petitioner/tenant for

dumping waste and useless articles; the petitioner/tenant therein is otherwise carrying on his business from shop No.2308-09, 2217-B, Teliwara, Sadar

Bazar, Delhi-06 and has employed more than 20 employees in the said premises; that though shop subject matter of RC.REV. No.362/2016 has an

electricity connection but with a huge outstanding and the petitioner/tenant therein is also using the premises as a godown for rejected and other waste

materials/articles;

(iii) that the two respondents/landlords namely Kanta Vadehra and Naivedya Sharma are owners landlords of the three shops having purchased the

same vide Sale deed dated 2nd May, 2005; vide the said sale deed, nine shops as mentioned therein were acquired by the respondents/landlords in

terms of family settlement with other siblings with respect to parental properties; as per the said family settlement, the value of the share of two sisters

of the respondent No.1/landlady in the parental properties was to be paid by the two respondents/landlords and which the respondents/landlords paid

by disposing of six out of nine shops subject matter of the said sale deed, leaving only three shops subject matter of the three petitions in the ownership

and landlordship of the respondents/landlords;

(iv) that the respondent No.1/landlady, since August, 2012 has been running a ladies beauty parlour, earlier from rented shop No.4169/2 and now from

shop No.4169/3, both in property No.4169, Gali Bahuji, Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazar, Delhi-06 and for which the respondent No.1/landlady is paying rent

of Rs.7,000/- per month; a copy of the registered rent agreement was filed with the petitions for eviction;

(v) that the respondent No.1/landlady is educated and possesses good knowledge in skin and hair care products/business and intends to have her own

business in cosmetics and related items from the three shops which are more suitable for the said business, being situated in a market which is thriving

in trading of cosmetics, local as well as imported.

The petitioner/tenant in RC.REV. Nos.68/2015 & 69/2015 applied for leave to defend stating (a) that the respondent No.1/landlady, prior to filing of

the subject petitions for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act also, filed petitions for eviction under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act i.e. on the ground

of non-payment of rent and had not disclosed the said fact and the petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act was not maintainable for this reason; (b)

that the respondent No.1/landlady does not require the premises; (c) that the respondent No.1/landlady was also having other commercial properties at

Bahadurgarh Road, Sadar Bazar, Delhi and other properties in Delhi; (d) that the respondent No.1/landlady was having 52 shops in property No.2318,

Punjabi Chhatta Bahadurgarh Road, Sadar Bazar, Delhi-06 which were given on rent to other tenants; (e) that the respondents/landlords were owners

of property No.2299, Chatta, Punjabian, B.G. Road, Sadar Bazar, Delhi-06; (f) that the respondents/landlords could not seek eviction of the

petitioner/tenant from both the shops in his tenancy and could at best seek eviction with respect to only one of the shops; (g) that the

respondents/landlords had also filed petition for eviction against tenant in another shop i.e. subject matter of RC.REV.No.362/2016; (h) that the

petitioner/tenant had been a tenant in the shops for more than 30 years; (i) that the respondent No.2/landlord is running a business of metal and the

respondent No.1/landlady has no requirement; (j) that the respondent No.1/landlady has a MIG Flat in Sarita Vihar, Delhi and is having a luxury car

and has retired from British Council and is getting handsome pension and does not need to carry on any business as of a beauty parlour; (k) that the

beauty parlour mentioned by the respondent No.1/landlady is in fact being run by the sister-in-law (bhabhi) of the respondent No.1/landlady; (l) that

the respondent No.1/landlady was working at a high post as Regional Manager, Asia, Global School, in partnership with British Council; (m) that the

respondent No.1/landlady is also running business with her brother Raj Kumar Vadehra of sale purchase of property; and, (n) that the respondent

No.1/landlady is an unmarried lady with no dependants and does not need any income from beauty parlour or from trading in cosmetics.

The petitioner/tenant in RC.REV. No.362/2016 sought leave to defend pleading (I) that the respondents/landlords had admittedly sold six shops and

the petition for eviction was thus not maintainable; (II) that in the sale deed dated 2nd May, 2005, copy whereof was filed by the respondents/landlords

along with petition for eviction, there was no reference of any family settlement; (III) that the wife of the respondent No.2/landlord is the sister of the

respondent No.1/landlady and the respondents/landlords sold shop No.2298A to Mohini Dhamija, another sister of respondent No.1/landlady vide sale

deed dated 22nd August, 2005; (IV) the plea, that the respondents/landlords, under the family settlement were required to pay any amount to the other

sisters, is false; (V) that the sale deed dated 2nd May, 2005 records that the respondent No.1/landlady and the wife of the respondent No.2/landlord

had relinquished their shares in favour of their brothers Jiwan Kumar Vadehra and Raj Kumar Vadehra and there was thus no occasion for the

respondent No.1/landlady to pay any amount to her sisters, as the other sisters had also relinquished their shares in favour of the brothers; (VI) that

the respondent No.1/landlady is having vacant possession of shops No.2299A and 2299B, Chatta Punjabian, Bahadurgarh Road, Delhi electricity bills

whereof were in the name of the respondent No.1/landlady; (VII) that the respondent No.1/landlady was also having vacant shop No.2321B; (VIII)

that the respondents/landlords are carrying on business in partnership and have alternate suitable commercial premises i.e. metal factory in Uttar

Pradesh with office at 284, East Loni Road, New Delhi; (IX) that the petitioner is a tenant since the year 1964; (X) that the respondents/landlords

have sold shops No.2294, 2297 and 2298A which were lying vacant; (XI) that the subject shop is located in a highly congested dingy and polluted

locality and no business of beauty parlour can be run therein and all the premises therein are being used for storage purposes; (XII) that the

respondent No.1/landlady is not running any ladies beauty parlour in property No.4169/3, Gali Bahuji, Pahari Dheeraj, Sadar Bazar, Delhi and in fact

Rama Vadehra, wife of Raj Kumar Vadehra, brother of the respondent No.1/landlady is running the beauty parlour under the name and style of

“Blessings Beauty Parlourâ€​ therefrom.

The respondents/landlords, in reply to the applications for leave to defend of the petitioner/tenant in RC.REV. Nos.68/2015 & 69/2015 pleaded,

(A) that the respondents/landlords have no other commercial properties in Bahadurgarh Road, Delhi-06; (B) that the other properties in Delhi, merit no

cognizance; (C) that the respondents/landlords do not own any 52 shops in property No.2318, Punjabi Chatta, Bahadurgarh Road, Delhi; (D) that the

respondents/landlords do not have any right to property No.2299, Chatta Punjabian, Bahadurgarh Road, Delhi; (E) that the only property which had

come to the share to the respondents/landlords in the family settlement were the nine shops and of which six shops have been sold for fulfillment of

obligations qua other family members; (F) that the flat in Sarita Vihar is the residence of the respondent No.1/landlady and cannot fulfill the

requirement for which eviction is sought; (G) that the respondent No.1/landlady is no longer in employment of British Council and wants to establish

her business, after retirement from British Council and is engaged only in the business of running a beauty parlour.

The ARC, vide identical orders impugned in RC.REV. Nos.68/2015 & 69/2015, has dismissed the applications of the petitioner/tenant therein for

leave to defend and passed order of eviction, finding / observing / reasoning / holding (i) that the six shops were sold in the years 2005, 2009, 2010,

2011 & 2012; (ii) that it was not in dispute that now the respondents/landlords were owning only three shops qua which petitions for eviction were

filed; (iii) that the petitioner/tenant had not denied the title of the respondents as owners and relationship of landlord and tenant with the respondents;

(iv) that as per the pleas of the petitioner/tenant himself, the respondent No.1/landlady was not in any financial constraint and had retired from British

Council; (v) that the respondent No.1/landlady was only 58 years old and cannot be expected to sit idle for the rest of her life; (vi) that the plea of the

petitioner/tenant, that the business of beauty parlour was being run by the respondent No.1/landlady as a camouflage, only to obtain order of eviction,

had no merit as the protection of Section 19 of the Act is always available, if the respondent No.1/landlady, after eviction of the petitioner/tenant and

receiving possession of the premises, does not use the same for own purposes; (vii) the plea, that the respondent No.1/landlady being unmarried, was

not required to carry on any business, was not acceptable; (viii) that the petitioner/tenant had failed to show that the respondent No.1/landlady owns

any alternate suitable accommodation; (ix) that though the petitioner/tenant had not shown any document to show ownership of the

respondents/landlords of 52 shops in property No. 2318, Punjabi Chhatta Bahadurgarh Road, Sadar Bazar, Delhi but according to the petitioner/tenant

also, none of the said shops were vacant but in occupation of various tenants; (x) that the respondent No.1/landlady could not be compelled to carry on

her business from her residence at Sarita Vihar, Delhi; and, (xi) that the petitioner/tenant could not dictate terms to the respondent No.1/landlady.

The order impugned in RC.REV. No.362/2016 is the same as in RC.REV. Nos.68/2015 & 69/2015.

The counsel for the petitioner/tenant in RC.REV. Nos.68/2015 & 69/2015 has contended that the petitioner/tenant was entitled to leave to defend

merely on the ground of the admitted sale by the respondents/landlords between the years 2005 to 2012 of six of the shops. It is further argued that

the reason given for such sale, of the respondents/landlords being required under the family settlement to make any payment to other sisters, is without

any basis and requires trial. Reliance is placed on Inderjeet Kaur Vs. Nirpal Singh 89 (2001) DLT 27 (SC) to contend that on such plea, triable issues

arise.

Per contra, the senior counsel for the respondents/landlords contends that neither the petitioner/tenant in RC.REV. Nos.68/2015 & 69/2015 nor the

petitioner/tenant in RC.REV. No.362/2016 has denied the family settlement or the fact that the respondent No.1/landlady is retired; since the

respondent No.1/landlady is retired, she is well entitled to set up business of cosmetics from the premises in the tenancy of the petitioners/tenants, as

she is already carrying on the business of a beauty parlour.

The counsel for the petitioner/tenant in RC.REV. No.362/2016 has argued, (a) that the ARC, in the impugned order, has not discussed the pleas

taken in the application for leave to defend and has merely followed the impugned order subject matter of RC.REV. Nos.68/2015 & 69/2015; (b) that

though the petitioner/tenant sought review on the said ground but the said review application was also dismissed, without stating any reasons; (c)

reliance is placed on Harcharan Singh Vs. Neeraj Sahu 190 (2012) DLT 625, Kusum Tyagi Vs. Satish Gupta 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4660 and Vijay

Nayyar Vs. Om Prakash Malik 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2821.

I have considered the rival contentions and the judgments cited and am unable to hold that the orders of eviction impugned in these petitions are

contrary to law, within the meaning of Section 25B(8) of the Act or require any interference, parameters whereof have been laid down in Shiv Sarup

Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78. The

Legislature having deemed appropriate to bar any appeal against the order of eviction of the ARC and having only permitted this Court to revise the

same, if finds it to be contrary to law, the revisional jurisdiction cannot be as wide as the appeal, which has been barred and does not allow the High

Court to re-appreciate facts and only entitles the High Court to satisfy itself that the order of Rent Controller is in accordance with law. A mere

difference of opinion with the ARC, when two views are possible, does not entitle this Court to interfere.

It cannot be lost sight of that each of the petitioner is a tenant for over half a century and at rents which do not even cover the cost of collection

thereof. Each of the petitioner/tenant is a trade person, carrying on business, and earning handsomely and does not require the protection from eviction

under the Delhi Rent Control Act. Supreme Court in Malpe Vishwanath Acharya Vs. State of Maharashtra (1998) 2 SCC 1 and the Division Bench

of this Court in Raghuvandan Saran Ashok Saran (HUF) Vs. Union of India (2002) 95 DLT (DB) has held that with the passage of time, the rent

legislations which were enacted in an era where the landlord was strong and powerful and tenant weak, have lost their efficacy and that the tables

have now turned, with the tenants taking advantage of the protection, having become big and powerful and the landlord having become weak.

Be that as it may, what is not in dispute is that (I) that the respondents/landlords are the owners and landlords of the shop in the tenancy of each of

the tenant; (II) that the respondent No.1/landlady for whose requirement the petition for eviction is filed, though earlier employed with the British

Council, has retired; (III) that the respondent No.1/landlady requires all the three shops, subject matter in these petitions for setting up business of

trading in cosmetics.

I will now take up the pleas, which according to the petitioners/tenants raise triable issue.

One such plea is that the requirement of the respondent No.1/landlady cannot be for all the three shops subject matter of these petitions.

A perusal of the site plan filed with the petitions for eviction gives an inkling of the size of the shops. The two shops in the tenancy of petitioner in

RC.REV. Nos.68/2015 & 69/2015 admeasures 8‟ X 11‟.9†and 9‟6â€X11‟9†and the shop in the tenancy of petitioner in RC.REV. No.362/2016

admeasures 16‟X8‟6â€. It is thus quite obvious that any one of the shop alone is not of such a size which can be said to be enough for the respondent

No.1/landlady to set up her business and the petitioners/tenants cannot be heard to contend that the respondents/landlords should squeeze themselves

in a small portion, inspite of being able to be comfortable. Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta supra and Siddalingamma Vs. Mamta Shenoy (2001) 8

SCC 561 has held that the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life; an approach,

either too liberal or pedantic must be guarded against; if the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or

compel him to squeeze himself and dwell in lesser premises so as to protect the tenant‟s continued occupation in tenancy premises.

As far as the plea of the petitioners/tenants, of the business of beauty parlour being of the sister-in-law of the respondent No.1/landlady and not of

the respondent No.1/landlady is concerned, the respondents/landlords have filed before the Court the registered rent agreement to show the

respondent No.1/landlady to be the tenant in the premises from which the business of beauty parlour is admittedly being run. Though the

petitioner/tenant in RC.REV. No.362/2016 has filed photographs to contend that the sister-in-law of the respondent No.1/landlady was found in the

beauty parlour but mere presence of the sister-in-law of the respondent No.1/landlady in the beauty parlour being run by the respondent No.1/landlady

does not indicate that the business is of the sister-in-law of the respondent No.1/landlady. Moreover, the requirement pleaded is not for running the

beauty parlour but for setting up business of trading in cosmetics. Even if it were to be said that the business of beauty parlour is of the sister-in-law of

the respondent No.1/landlady, the respondent No.1/landlady would in any case be entitled to have her tenants evicted to set up the business of trading

in cosmetics.

In fact, I have wondered, what purpose grant of leave to defend, would serve in such circumstances. The respondent No.1/landlady in her

affidavit by way of examination-in-chief also would only depose about her intent and which she has already done in the affidavit accompanying

petitions for eviction and in opposition to the applications for leave to defend. The petitioners/tenants in their applications for leave to defend have not

taken any ground as of, the respondent No.1/landlady working elsewhere, on proof whereof, it can be said that there is no possibility of the respondent

No.1/landlady setting up business in cosmetics. The said plea thus does not raise any triable issue.

That brings me to the plea of sale of six shops which is again not in dispute. The only question is, whether such sales disentitle the respondent

No.1/landlady from seeking eviction of tenants in the other three shops.

It is not the plea of the petitioners/tenants that vacant possession of any of the said six shops was available to the respondents/landlords; unless it

was so available, sale of occupied premises, cannot be a ground for refusing eviction of tenants from other premises. The registered sale deed in

favour of the respondents/landlords also records each of the said six shops to be in possession of the old tenants and also names the said tenants. The

said sale deed is of the year 2005 i.e. more than eight years prior to the filing of the petitions for eviction and it is not even urged that the recital in the

said sale deed of the said six shops being in occupation of different tenants was not true. Once, it is held that the shops which were sold were also in

occupation of tenants, the said sale would not come in the way of the respondents/landlords seeking eviction of the petitioners/tenants.

Though, in view of the aforesaid, the plea challenging the family settlement is of no avail but I may record that the same is quite evident from a

perusal of the recital of the sale deed in favour of respondents / landlords and it is not in dispute that the respondent No.1/landlady has other sisters

who also have relinquished their share in favour of the brothers and it is not the case of the tenants that the said sisters got any other property. In the

absence of any such plea, the plea of the respondent No.1/landlady, of the respondents / landlords, in accordance with the family settlement, being

required to settle with other sisters, is not such which can be said to be untenable or the view taken with respect whereto by the ARC can be said to

be such which no reasonable person could have taken.

As far as the plea, of the other properties owned by the respondents/landlords are concerned, the learned ARC has rightly held that the same are

vague and bald pleas and in any case vacant possession of the other properties also is not pleaded to be available. I have, in Ram Saroop Vs. Viney

Kumar Mahajan MANU/DE/3530/2017, held as under on the said aspect:-

“18. If leave to defend were to be granted on such vague pleas, the same would defeat the legislative intent of inserting Section 25B in

the Rent Act as summary procedure for dealing with petitions for eviction on the ground of requirement of the premises by the landlord for

his own use. A tenant, to be entitled to leave to defend has to disclose facts which would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of

eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. It is only such facts which when proved would so disentitle the landlord which can entitle the

tenant to leave to defend. Evidence in proof of such facts has to be confined to the pleas and cannot be beyond the pleas. If the tenant is

unable to make specific pleas, the Court cannot grant leave to defend on the premise that he will improve his case during trial. Leave to

defend is not to be granted to allow to the tenant time to improve his case.

Supreme Court in Baldev Singh Bajwa Vs. Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC 778, in the context of summary procedure under the East

Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 held that a heavy burden lies on the tenant and the tenant is called upon to give all the necessary

facts and particulars supported by documentary evidence, if available, to support his plea in the affidavit itself so that the Controller will be

in a position to adjudicate and decide the question of genuine or bona fide requirement of the landlord. A mere assertion on the part of the

tenant was held to be not sufficient. Similarly, in Rajender Kumar Sharma Vs. Leela Wati (2008) 155 DLT 383 it was held that Section 25B

was inserted as a special provision for eviction of the tenants in respect of specified category of cases as provided therein; where a

landlord seeks eviction on the basis of bona fide necessity, a summary procedure is provided and the tenant has to seek leave to defend

disclosing such facts which disentitle the landlord from seeking eviction; where a tenant, in leave to defend, pleads preposterous

propositions and makes such averments which are palpably false and the landlord in his reply to leave to defend is able to show the said

falsity, the Controller is not precluded from considering the falsity of such facts on the basis of material placed by the landlord before it.

Again, in Ramesh Chand Vs. Uganti Devi (2009) 157 DLT 450, it was held that mere assertions do not raise any triable issue and if these

bald assertions were entertained, then every tenant would get away with leave to defend, defeating the intent of legislature. It was further

held that only in those cases leave to defend can be granted where Controller finds some substance in the issues raised by the tenant. I have

also taken the same view in Sarwan Das Bange Vs. Ram Prakash (2010) 167 DLT 80.

Supreme Court in Busching Schmitz Private Limited Vs. P.T. Menghani (1977) 2 SCC 835 held that Controller’s power to give leave

to contest is cribbed by the condition that the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from

obtaining an order for recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in Section 14(1)(e) of the Act; disclosure of facts is a

sine qua non for grant of leave. It was further held in Kewal Singh Vs. Lajwanti (1980) 1 SCC 290 that it is a salutary provision in order to

prevent frivolous pleas taken by the tenants to avoid eviction. In Precision Steel & Engineering Works Vs. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal

(1982) 3 SCC 270 it was further expanded that while browsing through the affidavit, if there emerges averment of facts which on a trial, if

believed, would non-suit the landlord, leave ought to be granted; however leave to contest should not be granted unless the affidavit

discloses such facts. Ultimately in Prithipal Singh Vs. Satpal Singh (2010) 2 SCC 15 it was held that the dominant object of insertion of

Section 25B is to provide a speedy, expeditious and effective remedy for a class of landlords contemplated inter alia by Section 14(1)(e) and

for avoiding unusual dilatory process provided otherwise by the Rent Act and the application of Order XXXVII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (CPC) to Section 25B in force till prior thereto, was held to be bad.

I am afraid making of vague pleas in the application for leave to defend and affidavit accompanying the same, without giving any

particulars, cannot be said to be disclosing facts which would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section

14(1)(e) of the Act.â€​

and in judgment dated 2nd August, 2017 in RCR No.352/2017 titled Lalta Prasad Gupta Vs. Sita Ram held as under:

“17. The word “discloses†in Section 25 B (5) of the Rent Act has to be understood as disclosing facts which if proved would

disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e). Unless the words “discloses such facts†in Section

25B(5) are understood and interpreted as placing before the Rent Controller facts which when proved will result in dismissal of petition for

eviction, the Rent Controller will be unable to apply summary procedure prescribed in Section 25B for such petitions for eviction. If it were

to be held that every plea in the application for leave to defend, howsoever vague and without particulars and without anything in support

thereof, should be permitted to be proved, the advocates for tenants, with their astute drafting skills, will not allow the summary procedure,

prescribed by legislature to be followed for petitions for eviction of tenants on the ground of requirement of the landlord of the tenancy

premises for self use, to be followed in any case and leave to defend will have to be granted and each case put to trial.

Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend controverting the requirement pleaded by landlord on the ground of the landlord, though at the

time of requirement having alternate premises, having not used the same and instead having commercially exploited the same, the tenant

must plead (a) the particulars of such premises; (b) the right / title of the landlord to the same; (c) that the said premises were vacant and

available for use at the time of the pleaded requirement of landlord; (d) how the said premises were suitable for the pleaded requirement;

and, (e) how the landlord has deprived himself thereof i.e. by sale or letting and support the said pleas with material on the basis whereof

such pleas will be proved. I say that it is essential to place such material before the Rent Controller because the purpose of trial, resulting

from grant of leave to defend, is to prove the said pleas and if the tenant has nothing from which he can possibly prove the said pleas, the

trial also will not result in the landlord being “disentitled from obtaining an order for recovery of possession of premises on the ground

specified in Clause (e) of proviso to sub Section (1) of Section 14†of the Act, within the meaning of Section 25B(5) supra. This is not to

say that the tenant should file fool proof documentary evidence at the stage of leave to defend. However there must be placed on record all

the requisite particulars. The onus on the tenant, at the stage of seeking leave to defend, is thus somewhere in between fool proof

documentary evidence and a totally vague, bereft of any particulars plea. Where, in between the said onus lies, depends on facts of each

case.â€​

It is not open to a tenant to contend that though the premises in his tenancy are suitable for his use but not suitable for use of the landlord. The

petitioners/tenants have admitted that business of beauty parlour is being run in congested area and have also not disputed that the market in which the

premises are situated is of cosmetics and the plea, of there being no likelihood of the respondent No.1/landlady setting up business of cosmetics

therein, is not material for a leave to defend to be granted thereon.

As far as the plea of the respondents / landlords having earlier filed petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(a) is concerned, it is settled law that

each ground of eviction under the Rent Act constitutes a separate cause of action. Reference can be made to (i) S. Rajdev Singh Vs. M/s. Royal

Studios AIR 1972 Del 150; (ii) Jai Kishan Balkishan Vs. Dr. M.B. Kagal (1972) 8 DLT 422; (iii) Abnash Kaur Vs. Dr. Avinash Nayyar ILR (1974)

II Del 133 (FB); and, (iv) Vijay Kumar Sharma Vs. Manoj Kumar Garg 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4030. Order II Rule 2 of the CPC does not bar the

filing of a petition for eviction on other grounds after the filing of the petition on one of the grounds stipulated in proviso to sub Section (1) of Section

14 of the Act. Moreover, the procedure prescribed for dealing with the petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) is special under Section 25B and

not applicable to other grounds of eviction and if the petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act is clubbed with any other ground, the

summary procedure under Section 25B would not be available. Thus no adverse inference can be drawn against the respondent/landlord for not

invoking ground under Section 14(1)(e) while filing the earlier petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act.

Though, there is some merit in the contention of the counsel for the petitioner/tenant in RC.REV. No.362/2016 of the learned ARC having adopted

the same order as impugned in RC.REV. Nos.68/2015 & 69/2015 vis.-a-vis. the petitioner/tenant in RC.REV. No.362/2016 also, though the leave to

defend application filed by him was different but having considered the pleas in the leave to defend application of the petitioner therein, no other view

can be taken with respect thereto.

There is thus no merit in any of the petitions. Dismissed. No costs.