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Judgment
13 paragraphs · 963 wordsV.S. Aggarwal, J.
By this common judgment both the petitions namely Criminal Miscellaneous Nos. 1567M of 1989 and 1568M of 1989 can conveniently be disposed of together. Common question is involved in both the petitions but for sake of facility facts are being mentioned of Criminal Misc. No. 1567M of 1989.
Ravinder Kumar and Smt. Kaushalya Devi petitioners have filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the order dated 29.10.1988 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karnal. By virtue of the impugned order, the learned trial court had summoned the petitioners as accused.
The relevant facts are that a complaint was filed against Ramesh Chand son of Hem Raj alleging that Food Inspector inspected the premises of Ramesh Chand. He was found in possession of about 21 x 24 bottles of Capri Cola for public sale. A sample was demanded by giving him a notice in form VI. 9 bottles of Capri Cola were purchased. After mixing the whole contents properly, it was divided into 3 equal parts. 18 drops of formalin were added. The bottles were labelled and then wrapped in a strong thick paper. The thumb impressions of Ramesh Chand were obtained. One representative sample was sent for public analysis. It was reported that sample contained saccharine and that it was adulterated.
During the course of trial, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karnal considered the application filed by the complainant in exercise of the powers under Section 29A, of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The manufacturer namely Ravinder Bottling Company was summoned as accused. The petitioners were partners of the same. Notices were issued to them. Hence, the present petition was filed seeking quashing of the order by virtue of which the petitioners were summoned as accused.
It had been contended that since Ramesh Chand was a dealer and was already an accused, Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was not attracted. Notice of the petition had been issued and in the reply, the same has been contested. It was pointed that during the course of trial it transpired that manufacturer could also be the accused and petitioners were the partners. On this petitioners had been summoned under Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The order of the trial Court was stated to be valid.
Learned counsel for the petitioners highlighted the fact that Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act would only be attracted if the manufacturer, distributor, dealer was not already an accused. If any one of them was an accused, the Court could not act under Section 20A of the said Act. In support of his argument, reliance was being placed by the learned counsel on certain precedents namely in the case of K.M. Misra v. State and N.D.M.C., 1972 Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases 476 and also the case of I.M. Nayak v. Kantilal Ambalal Shah and others, 1973 Prevention of Food Adulteration cases 148. However, the said contention must be held to be devoid of any merit. Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 reads :
"20A. Power of Court to implead manufacturer, etc. Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the court may, notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (3) of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in Section 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under Section 20."
The plain language reproduced above shows that under Section 20A, action can be taken during the course of the trial. It must appear that offence has been committed by a manufacturer, distributor or a dealer. The Court can proceed against that person notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (3) of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In fact the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of M.P. and others, 1995(3) RCR 583 : AIR 1996 SC 283 has set this controversy at rest. Therein one Laxmi Narain was selling Vanaspati ghee. The Food Inspector had purchased the articles of food. It was found to be adulterated. When it was brought to the notice of the trial court that Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. was the manufacturer, summons were issued to it. It was alleged that Laxmi Narain was a dealer and Section 20A will not be attracted. In paragraph 8, this argument was repelled with the findings which read :
"The further contention that Laxmi Narain being a dealer of the appellant, Section 20A has no application, as it speaks of trial of a person not being, inter alia, a dealer, has no merit, as the section has mentioned about trial of commission of the offence by any person, and, if that person be not the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, Section 20A permits trial of such manufacturer, distributor or dealer also, along with the person already before the court. So, the fact that the person being tried is a dealer would not make the section nonoperational."
Since the controversy has been set at rest by the Supreme Court, it becomes unnecessary to consider this question any further. The answer is clear that the trial court rightly summoned the petitioners being partners of the manufacturer concern. There is no ground to quash the impugned order.
For these reasons, the petitions being without merit fail and are dismissed.
Petitions dismissed.
