Ravinder Singh vs State of Punjab and others

S.S. Dewan, J.—These two petitions Nos. Crl. Misc. 3288 M and 26--M of 1981 raise a common question and may be disposed of by this single order In these petitions u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 (for short, the Code), Ravindra Singh and Daljit Singh have sought quashing of the criminal proceedings initiated by Sadhu Singh complainant through a complaint dated April 10, 1980, in which they have been summoned by the Judicial Magistrate. Ferozepur, for the offence u/s 307 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, by his order dated December 11, 1981.

It is sufficient if facts in Crl. Misc. No. 3288--M of 1981 are stated. Sadhu Singh complainant lodged a report with the police alleging that on December 28, 1976 at about 10/11 a.m., he was cleaning the watercourse for irrigating the land of Jagjit Singh. At some distance from that place, he saw Laljit Singh, Ravinder Singh and some other persons quarrelling with Gurmeet Singh, Paramjit Singh and Jail Singh over the water course, and he asked Laljit Singh accused not to quarrel Laljit Singh, who was than armed with a double barrel gun fired a shot towards the complainant which hit the latter on his right leg. It is said that when Malkiat Singh intervened, Ravinder Singh petitioner fired a shot from his gun which hit Malkiat Singh on his right hand. After the investigation, the police submitted the final report that the evidence was insufficient. Thereafter, Sadhu Singh filed a complaint against the petitioners on November 3, 1979. After recording the statement of the complainant, the Magistrate adjourned the case to January 14, 1980. On January 9, 1980, the complainant moved an application in the Magistrate''s Court alleging there in that the investigation in the case was being done by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and he was assured that the police would do justice to him and as such he may be allowed to withdraw the complaint Consequently, the Magistrate dismissed that complaint as withdrawn The complainant than filed a second complaint against the petitioners on the same ground on April 10 1980. The Magistrate after recording the statements of the complainant and his witnesses, found prima facie case against the petitioners and summoned them for the offence u/s 197 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code By means of the present petitions, the complaint and the summoning order are sought to be quashed by the petitioners.

At the very outset the Learned Counsel appearing for the complainant has raised a preliminary objection that the present petitions u/s 482 of the Code are not maintainable. He submitted that if at all the petitioners were aggrieved, they could have gone up in revision before the Sessions Court against the summoning order of the learned Magistrate and that in a petition u/s 482 of the Code, the inherent power of the High Court could not be invoked for the purpose This submission was resisted by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners. He submitted that the power of the High Court u/s 432 of the Code is unfettered for securing the ends of justice. It is true that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent a use of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the point at issue in the present case is whether the petitioners could resort to the provisions of Section 482 of the Code when they had the option provided in the Code to go up in revision against the summoning order of the Magistrate. It is obvious that a revision lies against the summoning order u/s 397 of the Code. The Supreme Court of India has pointed out in the case of R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab, that the inherent power of the High Court under the Code cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can he exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at the initial stage. The Supreme Court further pointed out that it was not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. All the same, the position in law is clear that inherent power of the High Court cannot be invoked in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code In the instant case, as pointed out by me above, there is a specific provision made u/s 397 of the Code to enable the petitioners to go up in revision against the summoning order of the Magistrate That being so, it is not competent for them to invoke the inherent power of the High Court u/s 482 of the Code. The inherent power vested in the High Court could not be used to override the express provisions contained in the Code. The inherent power cannot be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code. Similar view was taken in Amar Nath and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, That being so, the petitions are not maintainable and are liable to be dismissed on this short ground.

Assuming that the present petitions are really in the nature of revision petitions submitted to this Court, than also there are no grounds on merits to interfere with the summoning order of the learned Magistrate.

It was contended that in view of the dismissal of the previous complaint, a fresh complaint on the same facts is not maintainable except on exceptional circumstances which have not been made out in this case and as such the proceedings should be quashed.

A similar question whether a second complaint is permissible and if so under what circumstances came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in a case reported in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar Vs. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, Their Lordships reviewed the decisions of different High Courts of India and held that an order of dismissal u/s 203, Criminal Procedure Code is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complainant on the same facts, but it can be entertained only in exceptional circumstances such as where the previous order passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or where new facts, which could not with reasonable diligence have been brought on record in the previous proceeding, have been adduced. It cannot be said to be in the interest of justice that after a decision has been given against the complainant on a full consideration of his case, he or any other person should be given another opportunity to have his complaint enquired into.

Keeping in view there principles, let us examine if any such exceptional circumstances have been made out in this case. The complainant withdrew his previous complaint on the assurance given by the Deputy Inspector General of Police that full justice shall be done to him. When the police took no action in the matter, then the complainant filed the second complaint. In the instant case it is abundantly clear from the record that while dismissing the first complaint, the Judicial Magistrate did not apply his mind to the merits of the case and merely allowed the prayer of the complainant by dismissing his complaint on the submission that in the circumstances the complaint be dismissed as withdrawn. In the premises exceptional circumstance for entertaining a second complaint have been made out. I shall not be taken to have expressed any opinion about the merits of the case at this stage since I am merely concerned with the question whether the entertainment of the second complaint was justified in the circumstances of this case.

Be that as it may, before invoking the inherent powers of this Court u/s 482 of the Code the petitioner is called upon to show some abuse of the process of Court or a case of gross injustice which is apparent on the record. Mo such thing is indicated in the present case. In the circumstances these petitions have no force and are accordingly dismissed. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate concerned on December 11, 1981. Rule discharged.