High CourtsDivision Bench

Ravinder Singh vs State of Punjab and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 21 November 1996 · Citation: (1997) 115 PLR 555

HON’BLE JUDGES
R.S. Mongia, J · N.C. Khichi, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 307, 337, 452
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ Petition No. 10172 of 1996
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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 612 words

R.S. Mongia, J.—The petitioner was placed under suspension vide order at Annexure P.1 as a Criminal case arising out of FIR No. 42, u/s 307, 337, 452 IPC lodged at P.S. Sihana on August 30, 1993 was pending against him. After trial the petitioner was acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Barnala vide judgment dated March 25, 1994 (copy at Annexure P.2), the concluding portion of which reads as under :-

"Consequently, it is a case where there is absolutely no evidence with regard to the charges against the accused. Therefore, he is hereby acquitted of the charges. File be consigned to the record."

2.

It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there has been no appeal/revision against the aforesaid judgment and there is no departmental enquiry pending against him qua the charges in the criminal case. The grievance of the petitioner is that vide Resolution dated Nov. 02, 1994, passed by the Market Committee, Bhadour, it had been decided to reinstate the petitioner on acquittal and so far as the period of suspension was concerned, that was decided to be treated as the leave of the kind due. The petitioner is aggrieved against the second part of the resolution whereby, the suspension period has been ordered to be treated as the leave of the kind due.

3.

Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that once the petitioner was acquitted by the Court trying the criminal case, his suspension, which had been ordered because of the criminal case, had been rightly revoked and the petitioner reinstated. The suspension period had to be treated as on duty for all intents and purposes as the very basis of ordering suspension i.e. the pendency of the criminal case, did not exist any more after the petitioner had been honourably acquitted by the trial Court. The petitioner might have some leave to his credit with pay, half pay etc. the respondents cannot force that the suspension period be treated as leave of the kind due inasmuch as the petitioner would be deemed to be in actual service during the period of his suspension as the suspension is not justified under the circumstances. He cannot be forced to get his leave exhausted by treating the suspension period as leave of the kind due.

4.

Mr. Ravi Sodhi, however, submitted that since the petitioner had not worked during the period of suspension, he could not be allowed anything more than the suspension allowance and that to regularise that period the Committee ordered the suspension period to be treated as leave of the kind due.

5.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that there is substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is upto the employer as to whether despite pendency of a criminal case, an employee has to be put under suspension or not. If the suspension is on the ground, as aforesaid, i.e. the pendency of a criminal case and the employee is acquitted honourably, the suspension period should be deemed to be on duty for all intents and purposes and it cannot be forced upon the employee that the particular period is to be treated of the leave of the kind due.

6.

Consequently, we set aside the decision of the Committee dated November 2,1994 and direct the Committee to treat the suspension period as on duty for all purposes. The arrears of pay etc. be released to the petitioner within a period of two months of the receipt of a copy of this order either from this Court or a certified copy thereof from the petitioner, whichever is earlier.