High CourtsSingle Bench(2008) 06 MAD CK 0055

Razeena Begum and Farsana Begum vs Pudukottai Municipality

Madras High Court · Decided on 20 June 2008 · Citation: (2009) 1 MLJ 42 : (2008) WritLR 804

HON’BLE JUDGES
P. Jyothimani, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition (MD) No''s. 5176 and 5177 of 2008 and M.P. (MD) No''s. 1 and 1 of 2008

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

104 paragraphs · 2,300 words

P. Jyothimani, J.—Heard Mr. V. Babu, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as Mr. Pala Ramasamy, learned Special

Government Pleader appearing for the respondents.

2.

The issue involved in these cases is about the property demand notices issued to the petitioners concerned by the first respondent Pudukkottai

Municipality in the form of prosecution notice dated 14.02.2008 as contemplated under Rules 30 to 34 of Schedule IV of the Tamil Nadu District

Municipalities Act, 1920 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''). As per the said prosecution notice dated 14.02.2008, the petitioners are directed

to pay an amount of Rs. 1,52,893/- and Rs. 3,00,922/- respectively, being the amount of tax due on the basis of escaped assessment for the

period from second half of 2002-03 to the first half of 2007-08.

3.

The impugned order is challenged by the petitioners mainly on the ground that as per Section 345 of the Act, wherein the limitation of three

years period is prescribed for recovery of the dues to the municipality and beyond the said period, the Municipality is not entitled to recover the

dues after the expiration of the said period of three years from the date on which distraint order first have been made.

4.

In the present case, according to the petitioners, the notice dated 9-7- 2007 should be taken as a distraint and the said notice goes back to the

year 2002-2003 first half and therefore, the claim of the first respondent Municipality itself is hit by the period of limitation u/s 345 of the Act. It is

also further case of the petitioners that the assessment itself has not been properly done by way of revision. Even though, a show cause was given

in respect of the said assessment and pursuant to which, the petitioners have made their objections on 20.10.2007, the first respondent has not

taken note of various objections and passed orders thereof and therefore, the claim made by way of the prosecution notice, is not sustainable in

law.

5.

No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the first respondent. However, the learned Special Government Pleader, appearing for the

respondents Municipality, on instructions, would submit that the claim was made in the impugned prosecution notices based on an earlier demand

notice dated 09.07.2007. Thereafter, giving 15 days time as contemplated under the provisions of the Act and considering the objections made by

the petitioners, the final orders came to be passed in December, 2007. Since the amount was not paid by the petitioners, the impugned prosecution

notices were issued by the first respondent Municipality. Further, it is his contention that the assessment is permissible for a period of six years from

the date of order. As per Section 117-A of the Act, as amended in the year 1997, and this is treated as ''escaped assessment'' and on this basis,

impugned notices were issued against the petitioners. He would also submit that as per the said provision, the assessment made is valid for a period

of six years. In any event, according to him, as against any order of assessment, an appeal lies to the Taxation Appeals Committee, u/s 89 of the

Act. He would also rely upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in M.L. Krishnamoorthy (died) and M.K. Sathyamurthy Vs. The

Government of Tamilnadu and The Gudiyattam Municipality, to substantiate his contention. In the said decision, the right of the petitioners to file

appeal as per District Municipalities Act, especially, u/s 89 of the Act, has been discussed by the Division Bench of this Court. The relevant

portion of the Division Bench judgment is extracted as follows:

4.

It is not denied by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the provisions of District Municipalities Act provides for an Appeal remedy to the

Taxation Appellate Committee u/s 89 of the District Municipalities Act and further Appeal to the District Court. On the face of the availability of an

alternative remedy, the plea taken by the appellant that the entire building has to be taken as one unit and different numbers allotted to the adjacent

premises could not be viewed as independent units could effectively be agitated before the Taxation Appellate Committee. On the face of the

assessment made, the proper course for the appellant herein is to seek the Appeal remedy.

6.

Therefore, according to him, the petitioners have an effective alternate remedy by way of appeal available u/s 89 of the Act and accordingly,

without exhausting such remedy, the petitioners approached by way of the writ petitions and therefore, the writ petitions are not maintainable.

7.

Section 81 of the Act empowers the Municipality to impose property tax. The provision contemplates various procedures to be followed for the

purpose of assessment of the property tax and the said provision has also been explained in Section 82 of the Act, wherein, the Municipality, while

assessing the property tax, is bound by the prescription of minimum and maximum rates fixed by the State Government. Against any order of

assessment u/s 89 of the Act, a Taxation Appeals Committee is constituted to which, an appeal can be filed. The constitution of the Taxation

Appeals Committee is u/s 89 of the Act, which also provides for further appeal to the District Judge after the order of Taxation Appeals

Committee. Section 89 of the Act reads as follows:

89.

Taxation Appeals Committee-(1) There shall be a Taxation Appeals Committee for hearing and disposing of an appeal preferred by any

person who is not satisfied with the assessment order made by the executive authority under this Act other than the orders relating to the duty on

transfer of property,:

(i) for every Third Grade municipality consisting of the Chairman of the municipal council who shall be the Chairman of the Taxation Appeals

Committee and such number of members as may be notified by the State Government from among the members of the Third Grade municipality;

(ii) for every municipality, consisting of the Charmian of the municipal council who shall also be the Chairman of the Taxation Appeals Committee

and four councillors elected by the council.

(2) The business of the Taxation appeals Committee shall be transacted in accordance with the rules made by the State Government in this behalf.

(3) An appeal against the decision of the Taxation Appeals Committee may be filed within thirty days from the date of the order to the District

Judge.

(4) No appeal shall be entertained by the District Judge, unless the appellant deposits with the Third Grade municipality or municipality, as the case

may be, the entire amount of tax as decided by the Taxation Appeals Committee [and the appellant shall continue to deposit the property tax with

the Third Grade municipality or, municipality, as the case may be, as decided by the Taxation Appeal Committee with the disposal of the appeal by

the District Judge.].

(5) Where as a result of any order passed in an appeal any amount already deposited is in excess of the tax due, the difference, after deducting the

tax due, shall be adjusted towards the tax, and fine due in respect of any other period, by the municipality.

8.

A perusal of Section 89 of the Act makes it clear that any person, who is aggrieved by assessment of tax made by the Municipality, is entitled to

approach the Taxation Appeals Committee. As far as the filing of appeal to Taxation Appeals Committee is concerned, the Section does not

prescribe any condition for deposit of any amount and so on. On the other hand, Section 89(3) makes it clear that any appeal filed to the District

Judge against the order of Taxation Appeals Committee shall be within 30 days and on filing such appeal, the Appellant has to deposit the amount

of tax, which has been assessed by the Taxation Appeals Committee.

9.

Section 117(A) which empowers the Municipality to assess the cases of ''escaped assessments'' was inserted by Tamil Nadu Act 3 of 1997.

The said provision is as follows:

117-A. Power to assess in cases of escape from assessment:- Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained this Act or the rules made

thereunder, if, any reason, any person liable to pay any of the taxes order leviable under this chapter has escaped assessment to any half-year or

year or has been assessed to any half-year or year at a rate lower than the rate at which he is assessable or, to the case of property tax, has not

been duly assessed in any half-year or year consequent on the building or land concerned having escaped proper determination of its annual value,

the commissioner may, at any time within six years from the date on which such person should have been assessed serve on such person a notice

assessing him to the tax or fee due and demanding payment thereof within fifteen days from the date of such service; and the provisions of this for

and the rules made thereunder shall, so far as may be, apply as if the assessment was made in the half-year or year to which the tax or fee relates.

10.

Therefore, the municipality is entitled to make assessment of any tax which has been escaped from the attention of the authority for a period six

years from the date of assessment. The said Section 117-A which has been introduced in the year 1997 itself provides for a notice to be given to

the assessee by the Municipality giving 15 days time. This is relevant because in the order of demand made by the first respondent Municipality, a

reference to the Rules 9 to 10 of Schedule IV of Act has been made. Schedule IV of the Act which relates to the taxation and finance rules deals

with taxation rules in part I. The Rules 6 to 15 in the said Rules have been omitted by the Government in Tamil Nadu Act 45 of 1997. Even

though, the said rules have been omitted as early as in 1997, the first respondent Municipality has chosen to quote the said Rules 9 and 10 which

are no more in the statute book. But that itself is not sufficient to hold the impugned prosecution notice as invalid for the simple reason that Section

117-A as enumerated above is an inbuilt provision which itself contains the procedure to be followed for the purpose of deciding about the

escaped assessment. In the present case, it is not in dispute that a demand notice has been given and a prior notice giving more than 15 days as

contemplated u/s 117-A of the Act was also given and in fact, the petitioners have submitted their objections and only after considering the same,

final orders came to be passed in December, 2007. Therefore, merely wrong quoting of a Rule in the demand notice will not make the impugned

order of prosecution notice as invalid.

11.

As far as the next submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the demand made in the impugned prosecution notice is hit

by the limitation u/s 345 of the Act and the same is not sustainable. The Section 345 of the Act reads as follows:

345.

Limitation for recovery of dues:- No distraint shall be made, no suit shall be instituted and no prosecution shall be commenced in respect of

any sum due to the municipal council under this Act after the expiration of a period of three years from the date on which distraint might first have

been made, a suit might first have been instituted, or prosecution might first have been commenced, as the case may be, in respect of such sum.

12.

On a perusal of Section 345 of the Act, makes it clear that no distraint proceedings or suit can be initiated or no prosecution can be

commenced in respect of any sum due to the municipal council after expiration of three years from the date on which distraint might first have been

made.

13.

The meaning of the words ""distraint might first have been made"" is significant in the sense that the same has to be read along with the charging

provision, i.e., Section 117-A. When Section 117-A enables the Municipality to impose tax within six years from the date of assessment in respect

of the escaped assessment, there is no question by applying of the said words ""distraint might first have been made"", as Section 345 Makes it clear

that the claim made by the first respondent municipality is well within the time.

14.

In view of the aforesaid discussion and in view of the fact that an effective alternative remedy is available as against the impugned notices by

way of appeal, the writ petitions are dismissed, giving liberty to the petitioners to approach the Taxation Appeals Committee by way of filing

appeal u/s 89 of the Act. The petitioners shall file such appeal to the Taxation Appeals Committee within a period of 30 days from the date of

receipt of a copy of this order and on such appeal being filed, the Taxation Appeals Committee is directed to receive the same without rejecting it

on the ground of limitation and decide it on merits and in accordance with law, expeditiously in any event, within a period of eight weeks from the

from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. Pending such decision by the Taxation Appeals Committee, the impugned prosecution notices

issued against the petitioners shall be kept in abeyance by the first respondent Municipality on condition that the petitioners shall deposit 50% of

the amount with the first respondent Municipality, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.

Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed.