Raziuddin vs K. Zainulabuddin

Dr. B. Siva Sankara Rao, J.—The appellants 1 and 2, who are unsuccessful plaintiffs in the suit being O.S. No. 4 of 1996 filed by them on the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge at Bodhan, Nizamabad District, against defendants 1 to 14/respondents 1 to 14 herein (defendants 9 to 14 are subsequently added as per the orders in I.A. No. 311 of 2000, dated 28.02.2001), for partition of plaint schedule properties (Ac. 1-12 guntas of land bearing Sy. No. 435 situated at Banswada village and Taluk, Nizamabad District, now converted into house sites) into 45 equal shares and separate possession of 4/45 shares to two plaintiffs, for costs and to set aside the sale deeds of even date 30.08.2000, preferred this appeal against the dismissal judgment and decree dated 07.09.2001 by impugning the same.

The appellants are plaintiffs and the respondents are defendants in O.S. No. 4 of 1996. For the sake of convenience, in this appeal, the parties are referred to as they are arrayed in the suit before the trial Court.

The case of the plaintiffs through plaint is that K. Burhanuddin, who is the grandfather of plaintiffs and defendants 3-7, died intestate (1970) leaving behind plaint schedule property with his three sons, by name Zainulabuddin (1st defendant), Kutbuddin (2nd defendant) and late Rafiuddin (father of plaintiffs 1 and 2, defendants 3 to 7 and husband of the defendant No. 8 (of whom the defendants 6 and 7 are daughters of Rafiuddin and 8th defendant and others are their sons), who died in the year 1984; that as per Muslim Law, the plaintiffs put together are entitled to 4/45 share i.e., each 2/45th from out of the plaint schedule property, which is in joint possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs and defendants; that after the death of Rafiuddin, the 1st defendant tried to get approval of a lay out for the plaint schedule property, that having come to know about the same, plaintiff No. 1 and defendants 2 and 8 herein filed suit being O.S. No. 133 of 1987 (originally numbered as O.S. No. 76 of 1985 on the file of the District Munsif at Bodhan and subsequently transferred and renumbered) on the file of learned District Munsif at Banswada against the 1st defendant for permanent injunction restraining him from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property, which was ended in dismissal holding that the plaintiffs failed to show that they are in exclusive possession of the suit schedule property and also observing that they ought to have filed suit for partition; that since the plaint schedule property is under management of the 1st defendant, the plaintiffs requested him to partition the same for separate possession of their each 2/45th share, which the defendants did not comply, as defendants 2 to 8 are also entitled for similar shares and did not come to join as co-plaintiffs, they are also impleaded as co-defendants.

The suit is contested only by 1st defendant by filing written statement, saying the suit is a collusive outcome between the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 8, who remained ex parte to harass the 1st defendant and, while denying most of the plant averments, including on pedigree, with the contention that the 1st defendant is the owner and in actual possession of the plaint schedule property; that the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 8 are not entitled to get any share in the suit property; that the calculation made by plaintiffs 1 and 2 and defendants 2 to 8 with respect to their shares in the suit property is imaginary.

The 1st defendant filed additional written statement, while reiterating above contentions, stating that he sold part of the suit property since he is old aged, sick and illiterate and he was badly in need of money to discharge the debts and said sales will not have any effect on the suit.

The averments of the written statement filed by the defendants 10 to 14 (defendant No. 9 adopted the same) are that they are not aware about the family pedigree and as to the suit schedule property belongs to the grandfather of the plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 7 and any earlier litigation between them and 1st defendant in O.S. No. 133 of 1987; that the 11th defendant is in possession of the suit schedule property since long; that the defendants 2 to 8 and plaintiffs 1 and 2 were never in possession of the suit schedule property; that the defendants 9 to 11, 13 and 14 purchased the plots out of the suit schedule property by seeing the lay out granted to the 1st defendant and his actual possession of the suit schedule property for valuable consideration and that they are bona fide purchasers and hence, to dismiss the suit.

On the strength of the pleadings supra, the trial Court on framing of five issues viz., 1) Whether the suit schedule property is originally the property of Burhanuddin and the pedigree filed by the plaintiffs is correct? 2) Whether the 1st defendant holds absolute right over schedule property? 3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to 2/45th share each in the suit schedule property? 4) Whether the suit schedule property can be partitioned and preliminary decree can be granted as pleaded by the plaintiffs? and 5) To what relief? and also additional issue framed on 21.6.2001 as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled for set aside the sale deeds mentioned by the plaintiffs?, conducted trial, wherein the 1st plaintiff himself was examined as P.W. 1 and one Abdul Salam was examined as P.W. 2 and got marked documents viz., Ex. A.1 certified copy of patta passbook, Exs. A.2 to A.4--certified copies of land revenue receipts, Exs. A.5 and A.6--certified copies of pahanis for the years 1980-81 and 1981-82 respectively, Ex. A.7--certified copy of petition filed by the plaintiffs before the Gram Panchayat Office and Ex. A.8--certified copy of judgment dated 27.11.1995 in O.S. No. 133 of 1987 on the file of the learned District Munsif, Banswada; and on behalf of the defendants, 1st defendant was examined himself as D.W. 1 and others by name A, B, C, D, E as D.Ws. 2 to 6, including for defendants 10 to 14, and cause marked Exs. B.1 to B.9 viz., plan, permission issued by the E.O. Gram Panchayat, Banswada, dated 15.01.1985, receipt issued by E.O. Gram Panchayat, Banswada, certified copy of plaint in O.S. No. 133 of 1987, certified copy of deposition of P.W. 1 K. Raziuddin in O.S. No. 133 of 1987 and four registered sale deeds dated 30.08.2000.

The findings of the trial Court in dismissing the suit against all the defendants are, while holding that the suit schedule property entire extent originally belonged to Burhanuddin, the father of defendants 1 and 2 and the grand-father of plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 7, and pedigree is correct and also while holding that 1st defendant contest of absolute owner of the entire suit schedule property is not correct, however, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of partition as there was already a partition between three brothers (sons of Burhanuddin and after death of Burhanuddin) that also evidenced from No. 3 Revenue Adangals of the year 1980-81 and 1981-82 showing Ac.0.18 gts out of it to the share of D-1 and remaining in Ac.0.17 gts each to the other 2 brothers, and thereby the alienations by 1st defendant are not liable to be set aside. As against said judgment and decree, the plaintiffs preferred the appeal.

It is important to note the events pending the appeal that:

(i.) (a). The 1st respondent (1st defendant) died and his legal representatives have been brought on record as respondents 15 to 22 vide order of this court Dt. 07-07-2011 in ASMP 2514 of 2011; (b). the 2nd respondent (2nd defendant) also died and his legal representatives have been brought on record as respondents 23 & 24 vide order of this court Dt. 12-11-2013 in ASMP 1338 of 2011; (c). the 10th respondent (10th defendant) one of the pendent alienees died and his legal representatives have been brought on record as respondents 25 & 26 vide order of this court Dt. 12-11-2013 in ASMP 1428 of 201. Thus, as on date there are 26 respondents and 2 appellants on record.

(ii.) The appeal was by allowing the expeditious disposal application in ASMP 1073 of 2012 Dt. 12-11-2013, heard in part and posted for continuation of arguments to Dt. 29-11-2013 and again to Dt. 11-12-2013 and before the further hearing finally, the events taken place are the below.

(iii.) It is meanwhile the appellants filed ASMP 3020 of 2013 to receive additional evidence viz., two declarations Dt. 10-03-1980 given by the three brothers including defendants 1&2 of the plaint schedule land in S. No. 435 of Ac.1-12 gts jointly belongs to them and owed Rs. 72,000/- and agreed to dispose of the same to clear the same and distribute whatever the sale proceeds remain and else to bear any balance insufficient equally; copy of application Dt. 17-10-1984 given by the 1st plaintiff and 2nd defendant to Panchayat, not to approve the layout submitted by the 1st defendant as it is their joint property and not exclusive of him (In fact the same was exhibited as Ex. A7 in the suit as per memo of evidence of lower Court''s judgment); Copy of Registered sale deed in name of father of defendants 1&2, No. 381/dt. 16-02-1963; Copy of sanctioned layout, Dt. 09-05-1977 and copies of revenue pahanies for the schedule land of the years 1974-75, 1978-79 &1980-81.

(iv.) It is meanwhile equally the respondents filed ASMP 3029 of 2013 to receive additional evidence viz., certified copy of pattadar pass book standing in the name of defendants 1 & 2 of the plaint schedule land in S. No. 435 of Ac. 1-12 gts; five land revenue receipts in the name of 1st defendant; copies of revenue pahanies for the schedule land of the years 1983 & 1984; notice received by 1st defendant from the Panchayat; copy of approved layout (In fact the same was it appears exhibited as Ex. B2 in the suit as per memo of evidence of lower Court''s judgment); copy of objections filed by 1st defendant before the Panchayat; family settlement said to be between the, three brothers including defendants 1 & 2 and declarations given by defendant No. 2 and father of plaintiffs Dt. 10-03-1980; petition Dt. 12-04-1985 filed by 1st defendant before the Tahsildar for correction of revenue records; copy of plaint in OS 133 of 1987 (In fact the same was exhibited as Ex. B4 in the suit as per memo of evidence of lower Court''s judgment); copy of written statement in OS 133 of 1987; copy of deposition of P.W. 1 in OS 133 of 1987 (In fact the same was exhibited as Ex. B5 in the suit as per memo of evidence of lower Court''s judgment), needless to say living persons deposition is not admissible to read in evidence but for subject to confronting any aspects therefrom in cross examination under Sections 145 & 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act; copy of deposition of D.W. 1 in OS 133 of 1987, needless to say living persons deposition is not admissible to read in evidence but for subject to confronting any aspects therefrom in cross examination under Sections 145 & 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act and the 1st defendant having been alive in the suit trial and also after that appeared in the appeal, for the suit purpose it is not admissible either under Sections 32 or 33 of the Indian Evidence Act for not confronted in his life time on any aspects specifically therefrom in cross examination under Sections 145 & 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act, to use even for purpose of corroboration under Sections 157 of the Indian Evidence Act and the other is judgment and decree in OS 133 of 1987 (In fact the same was exhibited as Ex. A8 in the suit as per memo of evidence of lower Court''s judgment).

(v.) (a). These two applications are having been heard there on also at length with the appeal, since allowed to receive the documents as additional evidence save those are already exhibited to avoid repetition and for the other to exhibit in course of evidence, subject to any objections while marking left open to raise to decide ultimately with final hearing, but for any requirement of stamp duty and penalty to decide instantaneously as without that compliance under Section 34 & 35 of the Stamp Act not at all to admit for any purpose and likewise for want of registration, if at all for collateral purpose within the scope of Section 49 r/w. 17 of the Registration Act and from the very contents prove transfer or relinquishment or conveyance or partition by contents of the document/s to be inadmissible, all other objections on admissibility, relevancy and proof, for the reasons stated below and as per the expression of the Apex Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, .

(v.) (b). The documents petitions though not coming within the scope of the parties right to file by showing entitlement for asking to receive, but for, within the court''s power for its ability to pronounce the judgment effectively and efficaciously to put an end to the lis, this additional evidence is required to be received pursuant to its discretionary power vested by Order 41, Rule 27(i)(b) as laid down by the Apex Court reported in K.R. Mohan Reddy Vs. Net Work Inc. rep. Tr. M.D., , Thus, though under Order 41 Rule 27(1)(a)(a), the applicant must show the ingredients as conditions precedent required for adducing additional or further evidence, so far as the power of the court concerned under Order 41 Rule 27(1)(b) CPC, it is the duty of the appellate court to consider the entire case on record and come to an independent conclusion in arriving at a just decision where felt necessary, the adducing of the additional evidence, no doubt to do justice between the parties and not to patch up the weakness of the evidence of the unsuccessful party. It is because ability to pronounce Judgment satisfactorily to the mind of the Court, when requiring any additional evidence, the court will not be precluded from permitting such additional evidence.

(v.) (c). In Bipin Shantilal Panchal (supra)-it was held that the objections relating to stamp duty has to be decided immediately before marking the documents and for all other objections the trial shall proceed with subject to objection on relevancy otherwise admissibility etc., to decide at final hearing of the matter. When Court marked the document in question, it doesn''t mean that the Court rejected the objection, unless there is a specific order of the Court to that effect. See also- K. Manavala Naicker Vs. K.R. Gopala Krishnaiah Chetti, and Ram Rattan (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Bajrang Lal and Others, .

(vi.) It is therefrom the appeal further arguments were heard at length on 18-11-2013, 02-01-2014 and on 20-01-2014."

It is also important to mention, before going into merits of the matter, the further events after filing of the appeal that, there was an interim injunction against alienations granted in favour of the appellants pending appeal and also granted stay of execution for recovery of costs awarded by the lower court to the defendants 1 & 9-14 by the dismissal decree and judgment, in CMP 2479 of 2002 & in CMP 11649 of 2002 Dt. 12-02-2002 against the defendants 1, 2 & 9-14, and the injunction order was made absolute on Dt. 12-02-2002 after hearing both sides and including later by dismissing the vacate petition on Dt. 20-07-2005 in ASMP 1158 of 2005. The same are still in force and also will continue its force, subject to observations in answering the appeal on merits here under, needless to say in case of any need for remand till disposal the interim orders supra continue its force, by this observation.

(i). (a). From this background now coming to decide the appeal, the contentions in the grounds of appeal are that, the trial Court failed to see that there was no plea either in the plaint or written statement of 1st defendant that the suit schedule property was already partitioned, that the trial Court failed to see that under Order VI Rule 1 CPC, the Court could not make out a new case not pleaded by the parties, that the trial Court failed to see that the 1st plaintiff in O.S. No. 133 of 1987 consistently denied any partition of suit schedule property at any point of time, that the trial Court failed to see that only issue that arise for consideration in O.S. No. 133 of 1987 was whether the plaintiffs therein were entitled to perpetual injunction and the aspect of partition was only incidentally considered and, therefore, the same is not conclusive, that the trial Court ought to have seen that after holding on issues 1 and 2 that the suit schedule properties are joint family properties, erred in not decreeing the suit for partition, that the trial Court''s finding that the suit properties were already partitioned, even assuming without conceding, is correct, it ought to have granted the relief of possession, as prayed for, by the plaintiffs, that the trial Court erred in holding that the plaintiffs father, defendants 1 and 2 are in separate possession of suit properties when the case of both plaintiffs and 1st defendant is that the 1st defendant is in possession of suit properties, that the trial Court erred in holding issue No. 4 against the plaintiffs, that the trial Court ought to have set aside the registered sale deeds executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of Defendants 9 to 14, while considering additional issue No. 1, and sought for setting aside the dismissal judgment and decree of the trial Court by allowing the appeal.

(i). (b). The learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellants-plaintiffs, strenuously contended, by reiterating the above, and in support of the contentions, he also relied upon the decisions in (1) K. Laxminarasimha Chary Vs. K. Satyanarayana, and (2) Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha Vs. Ujagar Singh and Others, .

(ii). Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents-defendants i.e., 1st defendant in particular and defendants 10 to 14 in general, sailing through 1st defendant, by additionally saying as bona fide purchasers for value, contended that the trial Court rightly come to the conclusion supported by reasons and the suit claim is also barred by res judicata and limitation and for this Court, while sitting in appeal, there is nothing to interfere, but for dismissal of the appeal.

In view of the rival submissions, the points that arise for consideration in the appeal lis are:

"(1) Whether plaintiffs 1 and 2, leave about defendants 3 to 8, are entitled to any share, much less 2/45th share each, for partition and separate possession of plaint schedule property and even this Court, if come to the conclusion of any earlier partition, can order delivery of possession respectively against 1st defendant and or other defendants and, if so, with what observations and also as to what equities to defendants 9 to 14 entitled if any, with what observations to adduce the additional evidence from the documents since received of both sides in ASMPs 3020 & 3029 of 2013 and with what observations and findings on the appeal lis?

(2) Whether the suit claim is barred by res judicata and, if not, whether the 1st defendant perfected his title to the suit property by adverse possession?

(3) How far the trial Court''s decree and judgment in dismissing the suit claim of the plaintiffs is unsustainable and requires interference by this Court, while sitting in appeal, and with what observations?

(4) To what result?"

In Re. Point Nos. 1 to 3:

12-A. As point No. 3 to be decided is with reference to point Nos. 1 and 2, all point Nos. 1 to 3 are to be taken up together to decide conveniently. Before coming to decide points 1 to 3 formulated above of the appeal lis, it is relevant, as part of point No. 3 to decide, to mention the settled law in dealing with the appreciation of evidence and scope of interference by the appellate Courts that, the 1st appellate Court must re-appreciate (appreciate afresh) the entire evidence in giving findings supported by cogent reasons as to decide the lis and therefrom to find out how far the decision of the trial Court on any of its findings and conclusions is correct or incorrect, including for confirmation or reversal of said findings of the trial Court. No doubt, the burden of showing that the judgment or even a finding therein under challenge in appeal is wrong or incorrect, either wholly or in part, lies on the appellants and same is also the proposition in the course of the cross-objections as the cross-objectors are at par with appellants so far as their contentions in the cross-objections concerned, in shifting the burden on them, from hearing the main appeal. It is needless to say that any finding to attack, which no way affects the relief granted or refused, no cross-objections are necessary to support the same, but for to say, without cross objections, the appellate Court cannot grant a higher relief though any alternative or other entitlement to accord, if not higher relief; needless to say in between defendants/respondents to grant reliefs, no cross-objections are in need. It is also a well-settled proposition of law that, though generally no plea, no evidence can be looked into and for no issue, no finding can be given, it is not always the static principle from the fact that even a plea not made specifically, if covered by implication and evidence let in, it can be looked into, and even to give a finding, no issue framed is of no bar to formulate a point and decide. Burden of proof in such matters, pales significance as what is necessary is that, the party shall aware of the pleadings and evidence for the Court to give a finding from the hearing covering the lis, but not outside the scope, vide decision reported in Bhagwati Prasad Vs. Shri Chandramaul, , wherein it was held that even alternative remedy though not pleaded, if entitled, the Court can grant it where it is appropriate to do so. One of the reference to the conclusion covered by the expression of the then Madras High Court in P.V. Karuppanan Ambalam Vs. Pandari Sundara Raja Aiyar, that where suit is based on title with or without prayer for possession, a decree can be passed on the strength of plaintiffs earlier possession or entitlement to possession even such possession is not specifically made the ground of the relief in the plaintiff and if the opposite party is not prejudiced therefrom.

In Bala Shankar Maha Shankar Bhattjee and others Vs. Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State, , at para-19, it was held that, burden of proof pales significance when both parties adduced evidence and it is the duty of the Court to appreciate the entire evidence adduced by both sides in deciding the lis, irrespective of the traits of burden of proof. It is also the settled proposition that, a party in possession of best evidence is bound to produce the same to throw light on the lis and to unfold truth and thereby cannot take shelter on the abstract doctrine of burden of proof, saying that the burden is not on him to prove by filing the same, as laid down in 1) National Insurance Co. Ltd., New Delhi Vs. Jugal Kishore and Others, ; 2) Lakhan Sao (Deceased) through Legal Heirs Vs. Dharamu Chaudhary, ; and 3) Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs. Mahomed Haji Latif and Others, .

12-B. It was also laid down in this regard that, the appreciation of evidence is no doubt from experience and knowledge of human affairs depending upon facts and circumstances of each case and regard must be had to the credibility of the witness, probative value of the documents, lapse of time, if any, in proof of the events and occurrences, for drawing inferences, from consistency to the material on record to draw wherever required the necessary inferences and conclusions from the broad probabilities and from preponderance from the overall view of entire case to judge as to any fact is proved or not proved or disproved. Coming to the proof of facts, out of the facts in issue, to the extent of relevant facts as to what is meant by proved, not proved or disproved with reference to Section 3 of the Evidence Act and nature of proof in civil matters, including the suit based on title concerned, in RVEE Gounder v. RVS Temple 2003 (8) Supreme Today 194 at paras 25-28, the Apex Court discussed that, in civil cases the proof is by preponderance of probabilities, including in suits relating to ejectment or declaration of title or for possession; and the onus shifts from initial burden on the plaintiffs if able to establish from preponderance of probabilities, the entitlement on the defendant to rebut the same, including with specific claim on their part, if any. It is in explaining the earlier propositions of law that, in a suit for ejectment, plaintiff shall win or lose his case only on his own strength principle, since it does not mean the onus of proof is statically always on the plaintiff or it shall never shifts on the defendant even if the plaintiff is able to establish his case from preponderance of probability with reference to Section 3 of Evidence Act. It was clearly held that in a suit for ejectment, once plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant, it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to prove the plaintiff''s title for entitlement of the relief.

12-C. Before coming to decide how far the trial Court was correct or not in arriving at the findings impugned in the appeal concerned, the basic principle of law that also to be kept in mind by the appellate Court is that, where trial Court rely on facts and probabilities basing on credibility also with opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, the findings of the trial Court when based on reasons and by consideration of the contents of the documents and oral evidence and on all facts and relevant circumstances, merely because some other view is also possible, the appellate Court shall not ordinarily or casually interfere with and reverse the trial Court''s judgment. In case the appellate Court desires to reverse the judgment and decree of the trial Court, it should discuss the findings and set aside the same, which are contrary to law or weight of evidence or probabilities of the case or perverse, arbitrary or superficial or capricious or unsustainable, either on fact or on law. Same are also the expressions in Veerayee Ammal Vs. Seeni Ammal, , State of Rajasthan Vs. Harphool Singh (Dead) Through His L.Rs., and Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) Thr. Lrs. Vs. Sohan Lal (Dead) By Lrs., .

From the above general principles in appreciation of evidence and the scope of the appeal lis vis-�-vis the powers of the appellate Court, coming to the factual matrix of the case on hand:

13 (a). The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

"13 (a). (i). The plaint schedule property is an extent of Ac. 1.12 gts in Survey No. 435, situated at Banswada Village and Taluq/Mandal of Nizamabad District and originally it was an agricultural land and under the cultivation of original owner, by name K. Burhanuddin. It is also not in dispute of Zainulabuddin (1st defendant), Kutubuddin (2nd defendant) and late Rafiuddin, who died intestate on 16.07.1984 at Nizamabad (father of plaintiffs 1 and 2, defendants 3 to 7 and husband of the 8th defendant (of whom the defendants 6 and 7 are daughters of Rafiuddin and 8th defendant and others are their sons). It is also not in dispute that the original owner Burhanuddin died intestate in Banswada on 06.06.1970 leaving behind the plaint schedule, leave about any other property, three sons and a daughter. It is also not in dispute that plaintiff No. 1 and defendants 2 and 8 herein filed a suit originally numbered as O.S. No. 76 of 1985 on the file of the District Munsif, Bodhan, that was on transfer renumbered as O.S. No. 133 of 1987 on the file of the District Munsif at Banswada against the 1st defendant herein as sole defendant for the relief of permanent injunction restraining him from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the self same property, which was ended in dismissal with the conclusion in Para No. 12 of the judgment "-------so when the plaintiffs filed a suit against the defendant, who is paternal uncle, the plaintiff is not aware whether any partition took place among his father, plaintiff No. 1 and defendant, he knows only that suit land belongs to his grandfather. Further, there is a partition document filed by him, if really plaintiff and----have interest, both should have filed the suit for partition. For injunction suit, when he himself admitted in cross examination that the suit lands now in possession of the defendant and he does not know for what purpose the suit is filed, when he admitted that the suit is filed for partition, but in chief examination he has stated that he filed the suit against the defendant for perpetual injunction restraining him from interfering with his possession over the suit schedule land of Ac. 1.12 gts situated in S. No. 435 at Sivar Banswada; when plaintiff No. 3 himself is not definite for what purpose he filed the suit, even he ought to have examined the best witness that is plaintiff No. 1, when he is not in possession and enjoyment, he cannot seek for perpetual injunction against his own paternal uncle i.e., defendant as from his evidence D.W. 1 is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. When the defendant is in possession as per his own statement, indirectly it can be said that plaintiffs'' cross examination is helpful to the defendant; he has not examined any of the witnesses to support his case, or to strengthen his case. In view of the above reasons, the suit of the plaintiffs has to be failed. The issue is answered accordingly."

13 (a). (ii). A perusal of said judgment in answering issue No. 1 as to entitlement for permanent injunction as prayed for, from the evidence on record of the 3rd plaintiff--P.W. 1 (the trial Court in the above judgment portion in a wrong conception referred as if sole plaintiff, instead as 3rd plaintiff or P.W. 1, with reference to Ex. A. 1 to A. 11 and sole defendant as D.W. 1 with reference to Exs. B.1 to B.5 concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show that they are in exclusive possession of the suit site, having admitted by P.W. 1 of defendant is in possession, none other than his one of the uncles, the other is 1st plaintiff, who did not come to the witness box, with the observation that P.W. 1 could not say of the suit filed for injunction, but for partition and they ought not to have filed suit for injunction, but for partition."

13 (b). From the above, coming to the facts in dispute of the present case O.S. No. 4 of 1996 covered by the present appeal:

"13 (b). (i). As per the plaint, plaintiffs 1 and 2 and defendants 3 to 7 are children of 8th defendant and late Rafiuddin, the 2nd among the three brothers including the eldest 1st defendant and the youngest 2nd defendant, who are no other than sons of original owner K. Burhanuddin, not in dispute as referred supra; claiming in the suit for partition of 2/45th share each to them (equally needless to say to defendants 3 to 8) representing the share of the brother of defendants 1 and 2 with claim as in joint possession and enjoyment with these defendants after death of Rafiuddin as was and it is later the 1st defendant when tried to get a lay out approved for dividing the plaint schedule property into house plots, they opposed by filing the objection before the Panchayat and filed earlier suit for injunction and by virtue of the observation in dismissing the injunction suit, in seeking partition of their share with separate possession in this suit.

13 (b). (ii). At the cost of repetition, the contest of the 1st defendant, (for the other defendants 2 to 8 supra, remained ex parte, leave about the contest by the subsequently added defendants 9 to 14, who are the purchasers of some of the plots out of the plaint schedule property during pendency of the suit for injunction or the present suit in claiming through 1st defendant), in the written statement and in the additional written statement in nutshell is that the suit is a collusive outcome between the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 8 to harass the 1st defendant having not entitled to get any share in the suit schedule property of which he is the owner and in actual possession, that he sold part of the suit land since he is old aged, sick and illiterate and he was badly in need of money to discharge the debts and said sales will not have any effect on the suit. The other contest is, the cause of action for the suit shown is fictitious and false, except the date of dismissal of earlier suit O.S. No. 133 of 1987 (for injunction) and the suit of plaintiffs is barred by limitation, hence to dismiss the suit with costs in the ends of justice and equity. In the additional written statement, it is contended that the disposal of earlier suit gives any cause of action to the present suit, is denied. The written statement of defendants 9 to 14 is that D-13 has not purchased any extent, they are not aware that the suit schedule property belongs to the plaintiffs'' grandfather and the pedigree between plaintiffs and defendants and the litigation in O.S. No. 133 of 1987 and present suit O.S. No. 4 of 1996, they are in possession of the property being the bona fide purchasers for value and earlier 1st defendant is in possession and he obtained layout approval and on its verification they purchased and the sales in their favour are valid and not liable to be set aside and hence to dismiss the suit."

13 (c). It is important to note that there is no plea in any of the above referred written statements in contest of defendants 1, 9 to 14, for others did not chose to contest, that the suit for partition and separate possession is barred by principles of res judicata . Therefore, when there is no plea of res judicata , which is a mixed question of fact and law to decide and there is no issue much less leading of any evidence on this aspect, the contest of the respondents of the earlier dismissal judgment dated 27.11.1995 of permanent injunction suit O.S. No. 133 of 1987 covered by Ex. A8 and Ex. B.4--CC of plaint and Ex. B.5-CC of deposition of P.W. 1--3rd plaintiff (K. Raziuddin) therein, no other than P.W. 1 in this suit; operates as res judicata , is untenable. In fact, the earlier suit covered by Ex. A8--judgment from Ex. B4 and B5 plaint and P.W. 1 evidence of O.S. No. 133 of 1987 for permanent injunction on the claim of joint possession with a say that defendant (D-1 in present suit) tries to claim as if his own by attempting to obtain layout approval and to be restrained and the finding of the trial Court therein in para-12 of the judgment covered by Ex. A8--referred supra, no way dealt with the title, but for simply dismissed the suit from the very admission of P.W. 1 of defendant in possession, who is no other than his paternal uncle and remedy is a suit for partition which ought to have been filed from the claim of the property originally that of Burhanuddin. The Apex Court in the judgment relied upon by the appellants referred supra in Grampanchayat v. Ujagar Singh at para-10 held that as the earlier suit is only a suit for injunction and not one on title, no question of title was gone into nor decided and thus said decision cannot therefore be binding on the question of title as was also held in Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E.Edr. (D) By Lrs. Vs. Musa Dadabhai Ummer and Others, where, on a detailed consideration of law in India and elsewhere on this aspect, it was held that even if in an earlier suit for injunction, there is an incidental finding on title, the same will not be binding in a later suit or proceeding, where title is directly in question, unless it is established that the same was necessary in the earlier suit to decide the question of title for granting or refusing injunction and that the relief for injunction was found or based on the finding on title. Even mere framing of an issue on title may not be sufficient as pointed out in that case. The same was relied upon in'' a subsequent expression of Apex Court Ramchandra Dagdu Sonavane (Dead) by L.Rs. and Others Vs. Vithu Hira Mahar (Dead) by LRs. and Others, .

Further, this Court in K. Lakshminarasimha Chary (supra) by referring to Sajjadanashin Sayed (supra) and other expressions including Ishwardas Jain (supra), Kulwant Kaur and Others Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by Lrs. and Others etc., , Leela Soni and Others Vs. Rajesh Goyal and Others, , Rohini Prasad and Others Vs. Kasturchand and Another, , State of Rajsthan v. Harphool Singh (supra), Shri Bhagwan Sharma Vs. Smt. Bani Ghosh, and Mulla on CPC and also of Halsburry''s Laws of England Volume 16 para 1538, IV edition, held that a judgment is not a conclusive if any matter came collaterally in question or if any matter was incidentally cognizable and that Judicial approach today is justice oriented and no Court ought to base its decision on technicalities alone, to the conclusion in holding that the principles of res judicata applies in cases where findings on fact are given collaterally or incidentally on an issue in a suit. Therefore, Ex. A8--judgment and the observations therein no way operates as res judicata to the present appeal lis of the suit covered by O.S. No. 4 of 1996. Thus, point No. 2 is accordingly answered.

Coming to point Nos. 1 & 3, in addition to what is discussed supra, the evidence of 1st plaintiff (P.W. 1) is that the 1st defendant is managing the properties and even when they asked for partition, he did not and started selling the plots out of it to others though the suit property is not his self acquired, but for their grand-father and father of defendants 1 and 2, by name Burhanuddin, including from the patta stands in the name of Burhanuddin covered by Ex. A.1 and also from Exs. A.2 to A.4 tax receipts (a perusal of Ex. A.1 shows the pattadar Burhanuddin of Banswada, Ex. A.2 to A.4 all issued on 10.01.1977 towards payment of tax for the land in the three names of 1st defendant Zainulabuddin, 2nd defendant Kutbuddin and father of the plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 7 i.e., late Rafiuddin and the tax paid for the year 1976-77 is without any specific extents, but commonly for the entire extent. These documents were also marked as Exs. A.4 to A.6 among Ex. A.1 to A. 10 in O.S. No. 133 of 1987 and either in that suit or in the present suit, the contents of the documents and its genuineness is not in dispute by the defendants. Ex. A.5-No. 3 adangal of the year 1980-81 for the land also speaks that these three persons, as sons of Burhanuddin, were recorded of the schedule land in possession and enjoyment as pattadars, (no doubt there at the three persons names -the extents mentioned as 18, 17 and 17 to say from out of D.W. 1 in evidence, the respective extents in guntas they each got in a partition effected, however, his contest of the alleged partition in the year 1974, with no basis), same was also marked as Ex. A.7 in O.S. No. 133 of 1987 and either in that suit or in the present suit the contents of the documents and its genuineness are not in dispute by the defendants. Ex. A.6 is another pahani for the year 1981-82 for the land, which equally shown as in Ex. A.5 (supra). From that record, it discloses that even during the year 1981-82, all the three brothers are in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property of Ac. 1.12 gts in survey No. 435 and not exclusively in the possession of 1st defendant, who is elder of three brothers, but for if at all in his management, at best. What the 1st defendant herein (sole defendant in O.S. No. 133 of 1987) relied in his evidence as D.W. 1 in the suit among Exs. B.1 to B.5, Ex. B.1 the approved plan of Grampanchayat, Banswada of layout for house plots for the suit land of Ac. 1.12 gts in Survey No. 435, the approval was dated 15.01.1985 that is supported by Ex. B2--proceedings of even date of the layout approval as per the Ex. B. 1 plan and Ex. B.3 is the receipt for payment of amount of Rs. 887/- for that of even date, leave about Exs. B.4 and B.5 plaint and written statement in O.S. No. 133 of 1987 (O.S. No. 76 of 1985). As per Ex. A.8 judgment in O.S. No. 133 of 1987, Ex. A.10 layout plan is the present Ex. B.1 as per Ex. B.2 approval. Other documents filed therein were Ex. A.9 notice of the Panchayat and Ex. A. 11 objections submitted by the 1st plaintiff (P.W. 1), which is covered by Ex. A.7 herein dated 19.10.1984 not to approve the layout plan before its approval under Ex. B.2, dated 15.01.1985, in saying that it is the joint property of all the three brothers of applicant i.e., 1st defendant--Zainulabuddin, even as per the Revenue records and not his own and other signatory to it is Kutbuddin (1st plaintiff of earlier suit and 2nd defendant of present suit being the brother of 1st defendant--Zainulabuddin). There even, Ex. A. 1 was the ryot pass book issued in the name of Burhanuddin for the schedule property in his possession and enjoyment during the years 1968-70, the certified copy issued on 16.04.1976 (as referred supra, Burhanuddin died on 06.06.1970 admittedly), leave about the same later continued as per Exs. A.2 to A.6 (supra) in the name of his three sons i.e., father of the plaintiffs and defendants 1 and 2 after 1975 by showing that they are joint by joint payment of tax in particular in 1975, including as per the pahanies of the years 1980 and 1981, but for the little difference pointed out supra of noted at their three names as 18, 17 and 17 gts. respectively. The cross examination of P.W. 1 in this suit reads that the sister of D.1 and D.2, by name Haneefa Bee, is alive his father late Rafiuddin, before his death on 16.07.1984 at Nizamabad, shifted to Nizamabad and settled there. Though he deposed that there is no document to show that there is no joint possession of the suit property with the three brothers, the documents referred supra, particularly Exs. A.2 to A.6 are establishing the same. He denied the suggestion that the defendants 2 to 8 (his brothers, sisters and mother and junior paternal uncle) are not holding any share in the suit property, also denied the suggestion of father of the plaintiffs and 2nd defendant asked the 1st defendant, their share and he refused. He deposed that his father was having 0.17 gts of land of which himself and defendants 3 to 8 are the legal heirs of his father entitled. He deposed that it is only after death of his father, the 1st defendant converted the suit schedule into house sites. In fact, Exs. B.1 to B.3 (supra) establishes the same since dated 15.01.1985. P.W. 1 stated to have born in the year 1966, to say his grandfather died at the age of his 5th year in June, 1970. He deposed that the land is mutated in the names of his father and Dl and D2, even in the year 1976. In fact, it is establishing as it was so even in the year 1981, from the pahanies (Exs. A.5 and A.6) and land revenue receipts (Ex. A.2 to A.4) (supra). He denied the suggestion that there was no demand from 1st defendant for partition.

13 (d). It is important to note that there was no plea in the written statement of the 1st defendant in the suit as stated supra of any agreement between him and his brothers to give up their rights or authorizing him to sell and to account for it. It is suggested in the cross examination of P.W. 1 and he denied said suggestion of agreement between them to make it a layout and sell the land and to get more amount as house sites. Even from that, there is no animus to the 1st defendant against the joint rights of his brother and late brother''s branch, but for as managing to say there is no ouster even. He denied the suggestion of the suit is filed not within limitation and not entitled to partition or it is a collusive outcome with D2 or its value is Rs. 500/- per sq. yd by the date of filing of suit. In this context, coming to the evidence of P.W. 2-Abdul Saleem of Desaipet that the suit schedule property was originally agricultural land of the three brothers after their father and in their cultivation that is converted into house sites now. In the cross examination, he could not say the boundaries of the plaint schedule land and denied the suggestion of deposing falsely at the instance of P.W. 1 and never presented at the time of partition between defendants 1 and 2 and father of plaintiffs. He, however, deposed that the bothers partitioned in the year 1963; that was not even the plea or contest of anybody. There is no more from his cross examination as to what made him to depose falsehood, in suggesting of deposing falsely. It is necessary to mention from the above that, it proves the plaint schedule property originally belonged to Burhanuddin and after his death in June, 1970, succeeded by his wife (who died within no time before her 2nd son in July, 1984) and his three sons, including defendants 1 and 2 and the father of the plaintiffs, and it shows from the record continued in their name and joint possession and enjoyment as per the Revenue records, including in the year 1981-82, and after death of the father of the plaintiffs, by name Rafiuddin, in July, 1984; the 2nd of the three brothers, including defendants 1 and 2, the 1st defendant applied for Panchayat layout approval as if his own that was even opposed by filing application with joint signatures of 2nd defendant and 1st plaintiff herein dated 19.10.1984 saying that the property belongs to the three brothers joint and not of 1st defendant, despite the Panchayat accorded layout approval on 15.01.1985 (and what the 1st defendant stated discussed supra of the approval to make layouts is with the consent of the other 2 brothers also for getting more amounts as house sites and not as his exclusive much less in so claiming), and with no lapse of time thereafter, the 2nd defendant herein, 1st plaintiff and 8th defendant as three plaintiffs filed O.S. No. 76 of 1985 for permanent injunction, as observed in the judgment of the suit dated 27.11.1995, instead of partition, wrongly filed for injunction and with no lapse of time thereafter filed the present suit for partition as O.S. No. 4 of 1996.

Before coming to the further evidence of defendant No. 1 in this suit, so also defendants 9 to 14; from the earlier suit covered by Ex. A.8, referring to the pleadings including plaint covered by Ex. B.4 and evidence of P.W. 1 covered by Ex. B.5; the observations of the judgment in reference to the same was also of admittedly the suit land originally belongs to Burhanuddin. It was observed therein that the contest of the defendant (1st defendant herein) as was partitioned between three sons and a daughter of Burhanuddin and at that time other properties fallen to the share of plaintiffs and 3rd plaintiff''s father. He did not even so far much less in evidence, besides no plea, stated what properties, if at all, his other brothers got. In fact, as discussed supra, his version is quiet inconsistent by changing colours without any consistency even to a single version, as joint, that while in joint to get more money with consent of the brothers get approved the layout to make it plots for sale, as divided in 1974 that is against to the Revenue record, as by relying of the adangals showing three names with respective extents mentioned thereat of the years 1981-82 and from the documents he placed reliance in the earlier suit, those not yet discussed admittedly, not even filed herein, for reasons better known in saying as if three brothers partitioned in 1989, even 2nd brother died in 1984 and as if in 1980 his other brother D2 herein executed documents for his share or as if two brothers and himself fallen due and two brothers for the same for each Rs. 36,000/- to discharge given up their rights and of which D2 herein i.e., 1st plaintiff in earlier suit, executed two separate deeds admitting said partition dated 10.03.1980 in concurrence to it. The Court therein went wrong in saying therefrom that the parties in respective possession and enjoyment, later as absolute owners and the defendant, converted with approved layout into house sites and plaintiffs objections were negated by the Panchayat in so approving and plaintiffs have no right to claim share and the defendant was burdened with family debt of Rs. 72,000/- to discharge by disposing of the plots of the suit land and to dismiss. There was no finding with reference to the written statement contest of the defendant therein, but for to say admittedly defendant in possession and instead of suit for partition the suit for injunction was filed.

In this context, coming to the present suit, the 1st defendant did not contest by referring to any of the so called partition documents and not even exhibited in this suit among Exs. B.1 to B.5 supra, at the cost of repetition, but for now filed to receive as additional evidence in ASMP 3029 of 2013 (allowed as detailed supra).

From this, coming to the defendants'' evidence in this regard, the 1st defendant deposed as D.W. 1 that the suit land was in the name of his father Burhanuddin, for saying, one year after death of his father (who died in 1970), there was a partition among the three brothers viz., plaintiffs'' father Rafiuddin get 0.17 gts middle, 2nd defendant--Kutbuddin get 0.17 gts western side and he got 0.18 gts on the east, admittedly there is no record or document filed. Even for saying that after said partition, in the year 1974 the two brothers were due to him an amount of Rs. 36,000/- each, there is no proof, so also to say as such they gave the land to him or since then the entire suit property was in his possession as owner. He did not file even a single Revenue record of the entire land stands in his name by mutation if true after, 1971 or at-least from 1974 and also to say his brothers were not in possession thereafter even date or therefrom in the year 1985 he applied and obtained Panchayat approved layout covered by Exs. B.1 to B.3. Importantly, he did not file an application for approved plan, to say whether mentioned as of himself and two brothers or of him, to say any animus from date of said application for plan approval, to claim adverse possession or ouster. The said evidence is, besides not consistent to his written statements defense and suggestions to P.W. 1 in this suit and in the earlier suit covered by Ex. B.5, contrary to the evidence placed on record by the plaintiffs discussed supra of the tax receipts Exs. A.2 to A.4 dated 10.01.1977 showing all the three brothers were in joint possession by paying tax jointly in their names. Had there been really partition effected, there could be change in the Revenue records and that too he was managing, the question of paying taxes by all the three brothers jointly even by 1977 does not arise and that could not be the outcome, but no partition and continued joint even by the year 1980. Exs. A.5 and A,6, which are No. 3 adangals of the year 1980-81 and 1981-82 also show that the property is in their joint names as joint owners, but for simply mentioning the extents at 1st defendant''s name as Ac.0.18 gts, at 2nd defendant''s name as Ac.0.17 gts and plaintiffs'' father''s name as Ac.0.17 gts. D.W. 1 denied the suggestion of it was never partitioned and still joint and he managing, being the elder of three brothers, and plaintiffs are entitled to partition. What D.W. 2-one Abdul Waheed, aged about 60 years of Banswada deposed is that he Burhanuddin and cultivating the suit land, died leaving behind his three sons and one year after death of Burhanuddin the three sons partitioned and the other two given their shares to D1 to the 1st defendant towards loan obtained by them from him. Said evidence is proving false from what is discussed supra and also for the fact that it was never the case of the 1st defendant including in his evidence as D.W. 1 of D.W. 2 is one of the persons present at the earlier partition or got any knowledge. In the cross examination, D.W. 2 admitted that he is not the elder of the village, though denied not even caste elder and deposing falsehood at the instance of 1st defendant.

There is nothing to say proof of such partition as to by what document and which side of the extent who got, and there is no field sub-division with demarcation to ascertain as could be true, but for the oral say developed in the evidence by D.W. 1 of eastern side of him, western side of D2 and middle of his late brother, had it been his plea that after, 1977 there was oral partition and had he filed any field sketch showing demarcation on land for so claiming to place reliance on the adangals as a piece of corroboration, there could be a finding on such preponderance as probable, but for to say miserably failed from the inconsistent pleas and from failure to substantiate any such pleas, even the burden lies on him to prove the plea of oral partition he sets up with quite inconsistent versions discussed supra. It can be even said that also proved false from his application to Panchayat in the year, 1985 as totally that of him, without proving source of title over the extents of his brothers by any registered instruments of transfer and for no iota of evidence of how his brothers fallen due any amount to him and what made in those days to incur such liability and with what record, that too while saying by suggestion with other version of obtained permission in his name from agreement by his brothers for making layout and to sell as house plots to get more amount any to share after clearing any debts or dues.

It is needless to say that in the absence of such proof but for any taking of the possession, respectively, for convenient enjoyment to cull out from the above Exs. A.5 and A.6--adangals of 1980-81 and 1981-82, there is no other basis and even to say so, there is no basis as he is in possession only to say as managing for all keeping undivided. In fact, it is contrary to what he pleaded in earlier suit as sole defendant referred supra of while they were in joint possession they partitioned only on 10.03.1980 by the so called Ex. B.3 document exhibited therein and the suit property entirely fallen to his share and other properties to his two brothers and he therefrom converted into house sites and thereby Panchayat ruled out the objection of his late brother''s son and brother, by further adding as if the defendant was burdened with discharge of some family debts of Rs. 72,000/- by disposal of the plots made of this land. This inconsistent plea also falsifies the earlier version to say, besides no pleading with any version among the two, he sets up the right to avoid share to his brother and late brother''s family to grab the valuable property after obtaining approval of layouts in 1985, no doubt subject to the additional evidence being let in to arrive a conclusion and this is subject to that tentative finding.

Thus the oral evidence proved falsely setup and it shows that he was managing the property for all and he cannot set up any ouster of the right over the property of his brother and late brother''s family - vide decision in Syed Shah Ghulam Ghouse Mohiuddin and Others Vs. Syed Shah Ahmed Mohiuddin Kamisul Quadri (Died) by Lrs. and Others, - holding that under Mohammedan Law, on the death of a Mohammedan, his estate devolves on his heirs who succeeded as tenants in common for specific shares and where the heirs of the deceased Mohammedan holds the estate as tenants in common without dividing the same, the possession by one is not by itself adverse to the other co-sharers or co-owners, much less any limitation to set up such adverse possession not from the death of the deceased, but at best, from the date of expressing ouster or denial of the title to the knowledge of the others, as even under Mohammedan Law, possession of one co-owner is presumed to be the possession of all co-owners, unless it is established that the possession of co-owner is by denial of title of other co-owners or the possession is in hostility against other co-owners by exclusion of them. Here, ouster is an unequivocal act of assertion of title, but upon denial of title to the notice of parties, who are entitled to it by excluding and ousting them, without which, no limitation to set up adverse possession shall commence, much less run.

From the above analogy, even taken from the claim by plaintiffs, that to their knowledge, the defendant No. 1 applied to the Panchayat in claiming as his own the entire property, though it is of him and his two brothers, including as per Revenue records and in joint, from what their objection application to the Panchayat not to approve layout as claimed by him as his own land thereby, to commence the adverse possession for claiming ouster, it is only from the year 1985-86 and by the date the suit O.S. No. 4 of 1996 filed, the suit claim is within 12 years, leave apart the suit O.S. No. 76 of 1985 filed within no time after filing of the objections to the Panchayat and in their approving the plan without considering the objections. Thus, the suit schedule property is joint property of plaintiffs and defendants and plaintiffs are entitled to a share along with defendants 3 to 8, as a branch of late brother of defendants 1 and 2, for their 1/3rd, out of it for inter se partition in between them of each 2/45th or the like among plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 7 and with 8th defendant, out of their 1/3rd with each 1/3rd of defendants 1 and 2.

It is needful to say from the additional evidence sought to be adduced by plaintiffs, the above observations further strengthen their case. Likewise to say, from the additional evidence sought to be adduced by the legal representatives of the 1st defendant, if they could prove that by virtue of family settlement and equally from so called declarations of 2nd defendant and plaintiffs father of 1980 (all are subject to admissibility, proof and relevancy, including to decide any requirement of stamp duty and penalty for admission to decide instantaneously and then to decide for any collateral purpose to admit for want of registration), it is then to decide whether there is any scope for finding of transfer of rights or at least for setting up animus from any possession therefrom with exclusion of right of others, else no question of ouster, much less for more than 12 years to date of suit and as such without deciding from such additional evidence no more finding can be given in this regard on any ouster or adverse possession.

In this background, coming to the claim of right over part of the suit property by the alienees as per their respective purchased plots saying for bona fide consideration from the 1st defendant concerned, the evidence of D.W. 3 to 6 among D.9 to D.14 the purchasers for some of the plots out of the plaint schedule being the alienations pending suit, cannot claim much less pretend lack of knowledge or bona fide purchasers for the value, but for at best to claim equity to allot what they purchased to the share of 1st defendant.

From the above, needless to say, but for clarity, that there is nothing even to presume from ''Ex. A.5 and A.6 or from any word of 1st defendant for reliance by them of his right from oral partition, much less in the year 1980, from not even the case of the defendant (D.W. 1) or through his witness D.W. 2 but for his say of the partition way back in 1971 and even cannot rely upon P.W. 2 evidence of any admission from any inadvertent version from his mouth of alleged partition during life time of Burhanuddin in the year 1963; needless to say the plaintiffs need not ask for setting aside the alienations made by 1st defendant out of the plaint schedule for not binding on them besides hit by doctrine of lis pendence under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, but for to say in addition to what is discussed supra to save their right to claim equities of what they purchased from 1st defendant to allot to the share of 1st defendant following the Division Bench expression of this Court in Seethamahalakshmamma v. Ramachandra Rao, AIR 1957 AP 572 (DB), wherein it was held at paras-46 to 56 that "the law is well settled that an alienee or transferee of a specific item of the joint family property from a coparcener for consideration is entitled in equity to stand in his vendor''s shoes and to work out his rights by means of partition (which situation arises when there is no pious obligation) in working out the equities, such property, set apart will be allotted to the transferor in the partition action. Where such property is not possible to set apart for such coparcener''s share, in such a case, the (alienee is entitled at his option to recover from the alienor, property of an equivalent value out of the properties allotted to the alienor in substitution of the property alienated or to claim damages for breach of contract. The doctrine of ''substituted security'' which applies to the case of mortgage of a co-sharer of a specific share of property is equally applicable to the case of transfer by a co-sharer of a specific item of property. Thus, those alienations are binding only on the first defendant and not on the plaintiffs and also the other defendant; but for to allot from such right of equity, on first come first serve basis in applying the equity for the prior alienations covered first i.e., one after another from the respective dates of alienation in oldest priority to these alienee-defendants and for anything remaining out of the property of the first defendant for those other alienees, who are not parties to the suit to claim by joining in working out that equity right in final decree proceedings. The trial Court in dismissing the plaintiffs'' suit ignored all these important aspects and as such the trial Court''s dismissal decree and judgment is liable to be set aside and the plaintiffs'' suit is to be decreed, subject to the above for partition preliminary decree to work out the rights in the final decree proceedings.

Having regard to the above, as it requires permitting of additional evidence received of both sides and in particular on behalf of the legal representatives of 1st defendant and to decide therefrom only as to any transfer of rights by father of plaintiffs and defendants 3-7 and husband of 8th defendant on one hand and late 2nd defendant on the other hand to the 1st defendant and or from any material to set up animus for adverse possession by claim proof ouster for a period of more than 12 years to date of suit, to prove by 1st defendant and since died by his legal representatives and alienees/assignees and as it is requiring decision on admissibility, relevancy, proof, subject to stamp duty and registration also, the matter at the cost of life to litigation this court inevitably to send to the trial court, by limiting the scope of remand as detailed supra, by setting aside the trial courts decree and judgment and by remanding the matter for adducing additional evidence and to give finding a fresh on any transfer of rights or otherwise ouster of right and title of the two brothers of 1st defendant to claim rights by 1st defendant and his legal representatives and alienees. Accordingly, the points 1 to 3 are answered.

In Re. Point No. 4:

In the result, the appeal is allowed, however with no costs throughout, setting aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 07.09.2001 in O.S. No. 4 of 1996 of the trial Court and by restoring the plaintiffs'' suit for partition to the file of the trial Court, and by remanding the matter to the trial court to permit additional evidence of both sides with reference to the documents covered by ASMPs 3020 & 3029/2013; viz., {the appellants additional evidence viz., two declarations Dt. 10-03-1980 given by the three brothers including defendants 1&2 of the plaint schedule land in S. No. 435 of Ac. 1-12 gts jointly belongs to them and owed Rs. 72,000/- and agreed to dispose of the same to clear the same and distribute whatever the sale proceeds remain and else to bear any balance insufficient equally; copy of application Dt. 17-10-1984 given by the 1st plaintiff and 2nd defendant to Panchayat, not to approve the layout submitted by the 1st defendant as it is their joint property and not exclusive of him (In fact the same was exhibited as Ex. A7 in the suit as per memo of evidence of lower Court''s judgment); Copy of Registered sale deed in name of father of defendants 1 & 2, No. 381/dt. 16-02-1963; Copy of sanctioned layout, Dt. 09-05-1977 and copies of revenue pahanies for the schedule land of the Years 1974-75, 1978-79 & 1980-81 & the respondents additional evidence viz., certified copy of pattadar pass book standing in the name of defendants 1&2 of the plaint schedule land in S. No. 435 of Ac. 1-12 gts; five land revenue receipts in the name of 1st defendant; copies of revenue pahanies for the schedule land of the years 1983 & 1984; notice received by 1st defendant from the Panchayat; copy of approved layout (In fact the same was it appears exhibited as Ex. B2 in the suit as per memo of evidence of lower Court''s judgment); copy of objections filed by 1st defendant before the Panchayat; family settlement said to be between the three brothers including defendants 1&2 and declarations given by defendant No. 2 and father of plaintiffs Dt. 10-03-1980; petition Dt. 12-04-1985 filed by 1st defendant before the Tahsildar for correction of revenue records; copy of plaint in OS No. 133 of 1987 (In fact the same was exhibited as Ex. B4 in the suit as per memo of evidence of lower Court''s judgment); copy of written statement in OS No. 133 of 1987; copy of deposition of P.W. 1 in OS No. 133 of 1987 (In fact the same was exhibited as Ex. B5 in the suit as per memo of evidence of lower Court''s judgment), needless to say living persons deposition is not admissible to read in evidence but for subject to confronting any aspects therefrom in cross examination under Sections 145 & 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act; copy of deposition of D.W. 1 in OS No. 133 of 1987, needless to say living persons deposition is not admissible to read in evidence but for subject to confronting any aspects therefrom in cross examination under Sections 145 & 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act and the 1st defendant having been alive in the suit trial and also after that appeared in the appeal, for the suit purpose it is not admissible either under Sections 32 or 33 of the Indian Evidence Act for not confronted in his life time on any aspects specifically therefrom in cross examination under Sections 145 & 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act, to use even for purpose of corroboration under Sections 157 of the Indian Evidence Act and the other is judgment and decree in OS No. 133 of 1987 (In fact the same was exhibited as Ex. A8 in the suit as per memo of evidence of lower Court''s judgment)} and further from the findings in the appeal already given of previous suit decree and judgment no way a legal bar of res judicata to the maintainability and as on date of trial Court''s judgment from the material on record discussed supra, there is no ouster of the rights of the two brothers of 1st defendant by 1st defendant as on date of filing of the suit, but for from additional evidence to be adduced and in particular on behalf of the legal representatives of 1st defendant, to decide therefrom is only as to any transfer of rights'' by father of plaintiffs and defendants 3-7 and husband of 8th defendant on one hand and late 2nd defendant on the other hand to the 1st defendant and or from any material to set up animus for any claim and proof of ouster for a period of more than 12 years to the date of suit, to prove by 1st defendant and since died by his legal representatives and alienees/assignees and as it is requiring decision on admissibility, relevancy, proof, subject to stamp duty and registration also, the matter at the cost of life to litigation this court inevitably to send to the trial court, remanded accordingly; by limiting the scope of remand as detailed supra.

It is made clear that the interim injunction granted in favour of the appellants pending appeal and also granted stay of execution for recovery of costs awarded by the lower court to the defendants 1 & 9-14 by the dismissal decree and judgment, in CMP Nos. 2479 and 11649 of 2002 Dt. 12-02-2002 against the defendants 1, 2 & 9-14, and the injunction order that was made absolute on Dt. 12-02-2002 and including later by dismissing the vacate petition on Dt. 20-07-2005 in ASMP No. 1158 of 2005, which are in force will continue its force till the trial Court answers the lis within the limited scope of remand supra by this observation.