Reena Ashish vs Govt. Of NCT Of Delhi And Anr.

Nita Chowdhury, Member (A)

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

By filing this RA, the applicant is seeking review of Order dated 23.12.2014 in OA No. 4143/2011, the operative portion of the same reads as under:-

"6. In the circumstances, the orders passed by the disciplinary authority is found vitiated. In the wake, the order passed by the appellate authority upholding the vitiated order of disciplinary authority also turn decrescent. The impugned orders are accordingly quashed. The respondents would be at liberty to issue fresh disagreement note to the applicant/order further enquiry in the matter, by appointing an Enquiry Officer different from one who submitted the report dated 07.09.2001. In the facts of the case, the applicant would not be entitled to any back wages for the intervening period and a decision regarding treatment of said period i.e. whether the same should be treated as part of service or dies-non would be taken by the disciplinary authority after the fresh/final view is taken in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant by charge sheet dated 30.04.2001 (ibid). OA stands disposed of. No costs."

Counsel for the review respondents submitted that the Order passed by the Tribunal under review is a perfect and legal one and the present Review Application is not maintainable in view of judgment of the Hon"ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. Upendra Singh, 1994 (3) CC 357.

We have perused the grounds A. to F. as raised by the review applicant in this Review Application and the applicant"s counsel also emphasized on the same. However, this Court finds that the said grounds do not come within the ambit of provisions of review, as it is quite clear that this Tribunal in the said Order under review had categorically held that "the report of enquiry officer is as absurd as it could be" and also observed that "when the disciplinary authority remitted the matter back to the enquiry officer for further enquiry, she refused to do so and emphasize that the charges levelled against the applicant are not substantiated" and further observed that "Once the disciplinary authority had already found the charge against the applicant was proved, the disagreement note remained a mere formality and eye wash. In the above circumstances and having regard to the submissions of the counsel for the review applicant, this Tribunal observed in the concluding para as quoted above. As such the grounds alleged in this Review Applications are not sustainable in the eyes of law. Rather it can be said that the review applicant is trying to re-ague the whole case, which is not permissible under the provisions of review.

So far as the contention of the review applicant that there was tremendous delay in passing a disagreement note and the impugned order by the disciplinary authority is concerned, the same is also not sustainable to be taken into consideration in review in view of categorical finding of this Tribunal as noted above.

In view of the above, this Court finds that the grounds taken in the present Review Application are not based on any error apparent on the face of record. In fact, the review applicant is questioning the conclusion arrived at by this Tribunal in the said Order. If we agree to her prayer, we would be going into the merits of the case again and re- writing another judgment of the same case. By doing so, we would be acting as an appellate authority, which is not permissible in review. In the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma, [AIR 1979 SC 1047], the Hon"ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-

"It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which is inherent in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all matters or errors committed by the Subordinate Court."

Again in the case of Ajit Kumar Rath vs. State of Orissa and others, 1999 (9) SCC 596, the Hon"ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-

"The provisions extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. The power can be exercised on the application of a person on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. It may be pointed out that the expression "any other sufficient reason" used in Order 47 Rule 1 means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the rule.

Any other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment."

[Emphasis added]

In the case of Gopal Singh vs. State Cadre Forest Officers' Assn. and others, (2007 (9) SCC 369), the Hon"ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-

"The learned counsel for the State also pointed out that there was no necessity whatsoever on the part of the Tribunal to review its own judgment. Even after the microscopic examination of the judgment of the Tribunal we could not find a single reason in the whole judgment as to how the review was justified and for what reasons. No apparent error on the face of the record was pointed, nor was it discussed. Thereby the Tribunal sat as an appellate authority over its own judgment. This was completely impermissible and we agree with the High Court (Justice Sinha) that the Tribunal has traveled out of its jurisdiction to write a second order in the name of reviewing its own judgment. In fact the learned counsel for the appellant did not address us on this very vital aspect."

Thus, on the basis of the above citations and observations made hereinabove, we come to the conclusion that it was not open to the review applicant to question the merits of the decision taken by this Tribunal in Review Application. In fact, he could have only pointed out any error apparent on the face of record, which has not been shown in any of the grounds taken in the Review Application rather trying to re-argue the case again. As such this Review Application is devoid of merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.