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Judgment
This is an appeal filed by the Insurance Company under
Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 challenging an interim
award dated 16.1.2012, passed by the Motor Vehicles Claims
Tribunal-cum-Addl. 9th Addl. District Judge, Patna in M.V. Claim
No.254 of 2009 under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988
and directing the Insurance Company to deposit the sum of
Rs.50,000/- by way of interim award, under no fault liability Clause.
The only objection raised in this appeal by the Insurance
Company is that the accident in question took place on 5.3.2009 and
in the policy issued with regard to insurance of the vehicle, the
period of insurance is shown between 7.3.2009 to 6.3.2010 and as
the period of policy commences from a date after the accident, the
Tribunal committed an error in rejecting the claim. It was argued by
the learned counsel for the Insurance Company that merely because
premium was tendered on 5.3.2009, that cannot be a ground for
granting coverage when the terms and conditions of the policy
indicates that the insurance was for the period between 7.3.2009 to
6.3.2010. Placing reliance on the judgments in the cases of New
India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Ram Dayal and Ors.,
, New India Insurance Co. Vs. Bhagwati Devi
and Ors., , New India Assurance Co. Ltd. V.
Smt. Sita Bai and others, AIR 1999 SC 3577 and Oriental Insurance
Co. Ltd. Vs. Porselvi and Anr., learned counsel for the Insurance
Company argues that once the period of insurance is indicated in the
insurance policy, the operation of the insurance coverage and the
liability of the Insurance Company commences from the date the
insurance policy is issued and if a particular time and period is
indicated in the policy from the time otherwise from the midnight at
12:00 from the date from which the coverage is indicated.
Emphasizing that in awarding the interim compensation in this
regard contrary to the principles laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme
Court an error has been committed, this appeal has been filed.
Refuting the aforesaid contention, learned counsel for the
respondent places reliance on a judgment of the Allahabad High
Court in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs.
Poonam Tripathi, (2015) 1 ADJ 15, to say that once premium has
been accepted and paid to the Insurance Company, the coverage
would be from the date of receipt of the premium.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length
and on going through the material available on record, I am of the
considered view that in this case the judgments relied upon by the
learned counsel for the Insurance Company cannot be made
applicable as the facts of this case are entirely different. Apart from
the fact that this is an interim award, in para 9 of the written
statement of the Insurance Company before the Tribunal, it is
admitted by them that the premium has been paid by the owner of
the vehicle to the Insurance Company on 5.3.2009 in cash, but in the
policy the period of coverage indicated is between 7.3.2009 to
6.3.2010. In fact, the statement made in the written statement in para
9 reads as under:
"9. That though the premium has been paid by the insured (owner of the vehicle, the O.P.No.2) on 05.03.2009 in cash but he has taken the policy period from 07.03.2009 to 06.03.2010 which is very much evident from the policy copy, and only insured can explain the situation that why he has taken the policy for the above period."
From the aforesaid, it is clear that the Insurance
Company admits the position that the premium was paid in cash to
the Insurance Company on 5.3.2009. Thereafter, the Insurance
Company in para 11 also referred to a vehicle inspection report to
say that it is in the name of the owner Rajeev Kumar who has
prepared the report and, therefore, it cannot be relied upon. The said
report is also available on record. It is signed by the authorized
signatory and it is recommendation made for insuring the vehicle
and it shows that inspection was done and the premium has also
been paid. Apart from the aforesaid, the Insurance Company along
with the memorandum of appeal has itself filed the certificate-cum-
policy vide Annexure-2 and on a perusal of this document it would
be seen that all the particulars of the vehicle and the owner etc. are
given, the period of insurance is shown to be between 7.3.2009 to
midnight of 6.3.2010, but immediately in the next line it is indicated
that vide collection Memo. No.CSH 4110005381 on 5.3.2009 the
premium has been deposited. Finally, in the second page of this
certificate in the right hand side column there is the signature of the
authorized representative of the Insurance Company and on the left
side is the place and date of issuance of the policy and if we go
through the date given in this place, the date is 5.3.2009.
It is surprising that the Insurance Company admitted in
the written statement that the premium amount was paid in cash on
5.3.2009, the policy document filed by them admits this position and
even shows issuance of the policy on 5.3.2009, but, surprisingly, the
period of coverage is shown as between 7.3.2009 to 6.3.2010. This
is a peculiar policy and it is not the case of the Insurance Company
that the premium was deposited after the accident and, therefore,
they are not liable. There is no whisper anywhere in the whole
written statement or in this memorandum of appeal that the premium
was paid after the accident or there is a fraud in obtaining the policy.
On the contrary, the vehicle inspection report and the bill for the
same goes to show that inspection of the vehicle took place on
5.3.2009 at 10:00 a.m. in Munger and the accident in question is said
to have taken place much after this time.
That being so, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case, when prima facie it is established that the premium was
paid on 5.3.2009 in cash to the Insurance Company, the Insurance
Company admitted receipt of the premium on the basis of the
averments made before me and the law laid down in this case when
only an interim award is passed based on prima facie material
available on record, I see no reason to make any indulgence into the
matter. It is made clear that all the legal questions involved in the
matter are kept open to be considered, in case not already done, after
recording the evidence in the trial and the assessment hereinabove is
only a provisional assessment for considering interference at this
interlocutory stage when only an interim award has been passed.
Taking note of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of
the case, I am not inclined to interfere into the matter at this stage of
passing of an interim award.
The appeal is therefore dismissed.