Registrar vs Dr. G. Usha Lavanya

Both these Writ Appeals are disposed of by way of common order as the issue raised in these two Appeals are one and the same.

Heard Sri V.Jagapathi, Counsel for the appellants in both the appeals, Sri S.Krishna Sharma and Sri Hari Sreedhar, Counsel for 1st respondent in

W.A.No.917 of 2010 and Sri Mohammed Imran Khan, Counsel for the respondent in W.A.No.838 of 2010.

W.A.No.838 of 2010 is filed aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.156 of 2004 dt.09-09-2010. W.A.No.917 of

2010 is filed aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.11185 of 2004 dt.09-09-2010

For the sake of convenience, the facts in W.A.No.917 of 2010 are hereunder discussed.

It has been contended by the appellant-Prachar Sabha that the 1st respondent has filed Writ Petition challenging the acceptance of his resignation

by the appellant and the learned Single Judge was pleased to allow the Writ Petition with costs of Rs.10,000/- and directed that the appellant shall

forthwith reinstate the 1st respondent into service. Learned counsel for the appellant had contended that the 1st respondent having tendered the

resignation on 10-11-2003 with a request to accept the resignation on the same day, the appellant has accepted the resignation on 10-11-2003 and the

same was placed before the Executive Committee on 18-01-2004 and the Executive Committee has approved the action taken by the Secretary and

thereafter, the appellant has also paid the benefits to the 1st respondent and the 1st respondent having accepted all the benefits arising out of

acceptance of resignation proceedings, the 1st respondent cannot turn around and challenge the action of the Executive Committee in accepting the

resignation of the 1st respondent. Learned counsel for the appellant had further contended that the learned Single Judge has erroneously interpreted

the Regulation 20 of the Service Regulations of Prachara Sabha (for short ‘the Regulations’). Regulation 20 of the Regulations reads as follows:

“Notice of leaving Service:

(a) If any employee of the Sabha wishes to leave service on his own behalf, he should give a notice of three months if he is a permanent employee

and of one month if he is a temporary employee, in the same way Sabha also gives a notice of three months to terminate permanent employees and

one month for temporary employees.

(b) Violation of this rule, entitles a candidate to repay the salary and conveyance for the stipulated period as compensation. In the same way, if the

violation of rule is caused by the Sabha, the Sabha too will pay compensation to the employee.

(c) In avoidable circumstances, the compensation from the employee can be waived partially or totally as per the orders of the Executive

Committee.â€​

From the perusal of the above Regulation, it is clear that whenever an employee wishes to leave his service on his own behalf, he should give a notice

of three months, if he is a permanent employee and of one month, if he is a temporary employee. Learned counsel for the appellant had contended

that the learned Single Judge has allowed the Writ Petition stating that there is no waiver incorporated in the Regulation 20 and the appellant could not

have accepted the resignation of the 1st respondent, moreover, when the 1st respondent has withdrawn the resignation submitted by him even before

it was accepted by the Executive Committee. Learned counsel for the appellant had contended that the learned Single Judge has relied upon the

judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in S.M.Srikantha v. M/s.Bharath Earth Movers Limited 2005 (8) SCC 314 and the said judgment has no

application in the instant case.

Learned counsel for the appellant had further contended that the 1st respondent having accepted the benefits in the month of March 2004, the 1st

respondent could not have challenged the acceptance of resignation by the appellant. Therefore, appropriate orders be passed in the Writ Appeal by

setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge passed in W.P.No.11185 of 2004 dt.09-09-2010.

Learned counsel for the 1st respondent had contended that the 1st respondent was subjected to humiliation and in a spur of moment, tendered

resignation on 10-11-2003 and immediately. On 14-11-2003 itself, the 1st respondent submitted a letter seeking permission to withdraw the resignation.

But the appellant has not acted upon the letter of withdrawal of resignation and the Executive Committee has accepted the resignation of the 1st

respondent on 18-01-2004 by which time, the 1st respondent has already given a letter on 14-11-2003 requesting the appellant to permit the 1st

respondent to withdraw the resignation. But the appellant has not taken into consideration of the letter of withdrawal of the 1st respondent and

accepted the resignation vide proceedings dt.18-01-2004.

Learned counsel for the 1st respondent relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Punjab National Bank v. P.K.Mittal 1990 SCC

(L&S) 143, wherein in para No.7, it was held thus:

“7. …………. We are of the opinion that clause (2) of the regulation and its proviso are intended not only for the protection of the bank but also

for the benefit of the employee. It is common knowledge that a person proposing to resign often wavers in this decision and even in a case where he

has taken a firm decision to resign, he may not be ready to go out immediately. In most cases he would need a period of adjustment and hence like to

defer the actual date of relief from duties for a few months for various personal reasons. Equally an employer may like to have time to make some

alternative arrangement before relieving the resigning employee. Clause (2) is carefully worded keeping both these requirements in mind. It gives the

employee a period of adjustment and rethinking. It also enables the bank to have some time to arrange its affairs, with the liberty, in an appropriate

case, to accept the resignation of an employee even without the requisite notice if he so desires it. The proviso in our opinion should not be interpreted

as enabling a bank to thrust a resignation on an employee with effect from a date different from the one on which he can make his resignation

effective under the terms of the regulation. We, therefore, agree with the High Court that in the present case the resignation of the employee could

have become effective only on or about 21-4-1986 or on 30-6-1986 and that the bank could not have “accepted†that resignation on any earlier

date. The letter dated 7-2-1986 was, therefore, without jurisdiction.â€​

The learned counsel for the 1st respondent had contended that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the 1st respondent is entitled to

withdraw the resignation before it is accepted.

Learned counsel for the 1st respondent had further contended that as per the Regulations, the 1st respondent is entitled to withdraw the resignation

before it is accepted. Admittedly in the instant case, the resignation submitted by the 1st respondent was accepted by the Executive Committee, which

is the competent authority, on 18-01-2004. By which time, the 1st respondent has already submitted an application seeking withdrawal of resignation

on 14-11-2003 itself and the Executive Committee ought to have taken into account the letter of withdrawal of resignation submitted by the 1st

respondent and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. But the Executive Committee has mechanically accepted the resignation of the 1st

respondent and the learned Single Judge has rightly allowed the Writ Petition in favour of the 1st respondent. Therefore, there are no merits the Writ

Appeals and the same are liable to be dismissed.

Learned counsel for the 1st respondent had further contended that even in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shambhu

Murari Sinha v. Project & Development India 2000 (5) SCC 621, wherein the Supreme Court held as under:

“5. From the facts stated above, it would be seen that though the option of voluntary retirement exercised by the appellant by his letter dated 18-10-

1995 was accepted by the respondent Management by their letter dated 30-7-1997, the appellant was not relieved from service and he was allowed to

continue in service till 26-9-1997, which, for all practical purposes, would be the “effective date†as it was on this date that he was relieved from

service. In the meantime, as pointed out above, the appellant had already withdrawn the offer of voluntary retirement vide his letter dated 7-8-1997.

The question which, therefore, arises in this appeal is whether it is open to a person having exercised option of voluntary retirement to withdraw the

said offer after its acceptance but before it is made effective. The question is squarely answered by three decisions, namely, Balram Gupta v. Union

of India [1987 Supp SCC 228 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 126 : (1987) 5 ATC 246] , J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India [(1998) 9 SCC 559 : 1998 SCC (L&S)

1251] and Power Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Pramod Kumar Bhatia [(1997) 4 SCC 280 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 941] in which it was held that the resignation,

in spite of its acceptance, can be withdrawn before the “effective dateâ€. That being so, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High

Court is set aside with the direction that the appellant shall be allowed to continue in service with all consequential benefits. There will, however, be no

order as to costs.â€​

The learned counsel for the 1st respondent had contended that the Supreme Court has categorically stated that voluntary retirement as well as

resignation can be withdrawn before it is accepted by the authority. Therefore, on this ground also, the Writ Appeal is liable to be dismissed because

by the time the competent authority accepted the resignation, the 1st respondent has submitted letter seeking withdrawal of the resignation letter.

Therefore, there are no merits in both the Writ Appeal and the same are liable to be dismissed.

This Court having considered the rival submissions made by the parties is of the considered view that the learned Single Judge has rightly allowed

the Writ Petition by following the law laid down by the Supreme Court in P.K.Mittal (2 supra). In the instant case, the competent authority has

accepted the resignation of the 1st respondent on 18-01-2004, by which time, the 1st respondent has already withdrawn the resignation vide letter

dt.14-11-2003 which would mean that the 1st respondent has withdrawn the resignation even before it was accepted by the competent authority. By

following the law laid down by the Supreme Court referred to supra, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders of the learned

Single Judge in both the Writ Petitions. Accordingly, both the Writ Appeals fail and the same are dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any,

shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.