Renu and Another vs State of U.P. and Others

S.N.H. Zaidi, J.—By means of this petition filed u/s 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioners have invoked the inherent powers of this Court with a prayer that the proceedings of Case No. 2278 of 2002 State v. Baby and Ors. arising out of Case Crime No. 149 of 1999, under Sections 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, for short D.P. Act, Police Station-Rampur Kalan, District-Sitapur, be quashed.

The relevant facts, in brief, are that one Arjun Lal Verma lodged a report under Sections 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and 3/4 D.P. Act on 17.6.1999 at the concerned police station, against his son-in-law Sunil and his relatives, including the petitioners, who are his sisters, with the allegations of demanding a motor cycle in dowry and harassing and subjecting his daughter to cruelty on account of non fulfilment of the said demand and ultimately causing her death.

The petitioners filed Writ Petition No. 3109 (M/B) of 1999 for quashing of that report and this Court, vide order dated 22.7.1999, stayed the arrest of the petitioners. The police, however, after concluding the investigation, submitted the charge sheet against all the five persons named in the report, including the petitioners.

As the petitioners were neither arrested during the investigation of the case nor did they appear before the Magistrate after the submission of charge sheet, therefore, their case was separated and the case of the remaining accused was committed to the Court of Sessions, which was tried as Sessions Trial No. 779 of 1999 State v. Sunil and Ors. and by judgment and order dated 31.7.2001 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, Sitapur, the accused persons were found not guilty of the charges levelled against them and were accordingly acquitted.

I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Additional Government Advocate, for short, A.G.A. for the State authorities and perused the record as opposite party No. 3 did not appear despite personal service of notice.

The only argument put forward by the learned Counsel for the petitioners challenging the proceedings of the case pending against the petitioners is that since the other accused of the incident have already been acquitted in the trial by the competent Court, therefore, there is no prospect of the case being end in conviction against the petitioners and the trial of the petitioners would be a wastage of valuable time of the Court and an abuse of process of Court. It is also submitted that even if the petitioners are tried separately, their role is not better than the husband of the deceased, who has been acquitted and, therefore, it would be an empty formality and a futile exercise in the void. In support of his contention, learned Counsel has referred to the copies of the statements of the prosecution witnesses examined in the said Sessions trial, Annexure No. 4 to 8, and the judgment, Annexure No. 9.

Learned A.G.A. pointed out that admittedly the petitioners have neither surrendered themselves before the Magistrate as yet nor they were arrested during the investigation of the case in view of the stay order of this Court nor the Magistrate issued any coercive process against them for procuring their presence. He further pointed out that in para 18 of the petition the petitioners have admitted that the writ petition (Writ Petition No. 3109 (M/B) of 1999) wherein the F.I.R. was challenged, had become infructuous after the filing of charge sheet and as such it has been dismissed by this Court. The learned A.G.A., on the strength of the observation of the Division Bench of this Court made in the case of Km. Rinki v. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in (63) 2008 ACC 476 submitted that the concerned trial was decided on the basis of the evidence adduced before the trial court and the acquittal of the co-accused in the trial would not necessarily entail acquittal of the petitioners, who are yet to be put on trial as it is the settled principle of law that every case turns on its own facts and evidence as may be adduced. He further submitted that the judgment of the acquittal of accused persons in the sessions trial, Annexure No. 9, is not relevant u/s 42 and 44 of the Evidence Act. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Km. Rinki v. State of U.P. and Anr. (supra) has squarely dealt with the issue involved in this case and on the basis of the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the cases of S.P.E. Madras v. K.V. Sundaravelu AIR 1978 1017 and K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police and Anr. 2003 (1) GIC 206 (SC) has held in para 11 that:

In the ultimate analysis, the Apex Court held that in view of the foregoing discussion, we are clearly of the view that the judgment of acquittal rendered in the trial of other four accused persons is wholly irrelevant in the appeal arising out of trial of appellant Rajan Rai as the said judgment was not admissible under the provisions of Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act. It was further observed that every case has to be decided on the evidence adduced therein. It was also observed that the case of the four acquitted accused persons was decided on the basis of evidence led there while case of the present appellant has to be decided only on the basis of evidence adduced during the course of his trial....

The Division Bench after referring to several decisions of this Court rendered by the learned Single Judges observed in para 12, 13 and 14 that:

...In almost all the cases, the learned Single Judge exercising its inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C. quashed the proceedings observing that there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction against the applicant and further if the trial is allowed to continue, it will amount to wastage of valuable time of the Court and will only be a hallow formality and the entire exercise will be rendered futile. Having considered the matter in all its ramification, we do not propose to delve into the details of all the cases cited across the bar and it would suffice to say that the said decisions have been rendered sans consideration whether the judgments of acquittal cited across the bar would be admissible under the provisions of Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act and, therefore, considering the ratio flowing from the decision in S.P.E., Madras Vs. K.V. Sundravelu, K.G. Premshanker Vs. Inspector of Police and Another, Karan Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, and Rajan Rai Vs. State of Bihar, the aforesaid decisions do not lay down correct law and therefore, can not be taken aid of for the relief of quashing the proceeding in exercise of power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a situation as obtaining in the case in hand.

The inference that is deducible from discussion of the above decisions that the judgment of acquittal rendered in the trial of other co-accused is wholly irrelevant as the said judgment would not be admissible under the provisions of Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act. It also leaves no manner of doubt that every case has to be decided on the evidence adduced therein and therefore, the case of the petitioner has to be decided on the basis of evidence which may be adduced during the course of trial.

The principles that are distilled from the discussion of the above decisions are:

(i) the acquittal of a co-accused in a separate trial can not be made basis for quashing the proceedings against another co-accused who is being separately tried on the principle that each case has to be decided on the evidence adduced in that case;

(ii) judgment of acquittal rendered in one case is not relevant in the case of co-accused separately tried inasmuch as Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act deal with relevancy of certain judgments in probate, matrimonial, admiralty and insolvency jurisdiction and, therefore, inapplicable to a criminal case.

In view of the above observations of the Hon''ble Division Bench of this Court, which are squarely applicable in the present case, there leaves no room for any further consideration. Considering the circumstances of the present case, there appears no ground for quashing the proceedings of the concerned case and the petition is liable to be dismissed being devoid of any merit.

The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

Office is directed to send a copy of this order to the Court concerned for proceeding with the case in accordance with law.