High CourtsSingle Bench

Rishab Gupta vs State & Anr

Delhi High Court · Decided on 7 September 2018 · Citation: (2018) 09 DEL CK 0047

HON’BLE JUDGES
R.K.Gauba, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 82, 173, 439(2) · Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 34, 120B, 406, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 474, 506
RESULT
Diposed Off
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Miscellaneous Case No.3544 Of 2016 & Criminal Miscellaneous Case Appeal No. 14954 Of 2016
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Judgment

44 paragraphs · 871 words

R.K.GAUBA, J.

1.

On the basis of report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C) submitted on conclusion of investigation into FIR No.

219/2014 of police station Amar Colony involving offences punishable under Sections 420/467/468/471/120B/34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), the

second respondent (accused) is facing trial in the court of Metropolitan Magistrate, the gravamen whereof in a nutshell is that he had purportedly sold

to the petitioner (the complainant of the case) certain parcel of land, for consideration, receiving in the process Rs. 2.10 crore directly or indirectly, the

later revelations showing the land did not vest in him, it rather belonging to Delhi Development Authority (DDA). Â

2.

It appears that the second respondent (accused) had earlier been arrested and was released on interim bail. He, however, jumped bail and

eventually came to be declared a proclaimed offender after publication under Section 82 Cr.P.C. After his presence had been secured, a

supplementary charge-sheet was laid in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate leading to the trial. He had earlier applied for bail before this Court by

moving bail application no. 919/2016, which was however, withdrawn and dismissed accordingly by order dated 19.07.2016, he having taken the liberty

to approach the trial court/Sessions Court instead. He approached the Metropolitan Magistrate by bail application which was dismissed by order

dated 23.03.2016. He then moved the court of Sessions by bail application (CF 1399/2016) which was dismissed by a detailed reasoned order dated

18.04.2016 taking note, inter alia, of the dismissal of the earlier bail application and the past conduct. After the dismissal of his bail application by the

court of Sessions he moved yet another application before the same Magistrate. This fresh application was allowed by a very cryptic order dated

11.08.2016:-

“11.08.2016

Bail Application moved on behalf of accused Dheeraj Prasad.

Present:Â Ld. APP for State.

Accused not present.

Arguments on the bail application already heard. Arguments on behalf of the complainant were heard on last date of hearing.

Accused has already spent more than 300 days in custody. All the other accused persons have already been granted bail. Considering that accused

has not engaged any counsel and is fighting his own case, in order to afford him an opportunity of a fair trial so that he may be able to gather evidence

in his defence and also considering the grounds on parity, this court deems it fit to grant bail to the accused on furnishing of bail bonds in the sum of

Rs. 50,000/- with one surety in like amount. However, he is to appear in court on each and every date of hearing and no exemption shall be

entertained on his behalf till the conclusion of trial in the present case.

Copy of the order be sent to Jail Superintendent, Tihar Jail for intimation to the inmate/accused Dheeraj Prasadâ€​.

3.

Challenging the above mentioned order and seeking cancellation of the bail, invoking the jurisdiction under Section 439 (2) Cr.P.C., the complainant

of the case has approached this court by the petition at hand. It has been, inter alia, pointedout that the impugned order dated 11.08.2016 not only

suffers from the vice of it being cryptic but also that it omits reference to any of the incriminating facts nor takes note of the gravity of the offences

involved, failing conspicuously to take into account the objection of the State that the petitioner is involved in a series of such crimes, his role having

come to light (by then) in at least three other such cases, their particulars (as given in the status report dated 07.10.2016) being case FIR No. 146/12

under Sections 420/465/468/471/474 IPC, PS Pandav Nagar, Delhi; case FIR No. 20/14, under Sections 406/420/506 IPC, PS Kotwali Nai Mandi,

Mujaffarnagar, UP; and case FIR No. 87/15 under Sections 420/468/471/120-B IPC, PS C.R. Park, New Delhi. The learned senior counsel appearing

for the petitioner submitted that there is yet another case in which the accused is involved it being FIR 3/2017 police station EOW involving offences

under Sections 406/120B/34/420 IPC.

4.

After some hearing, the learned counsel for the second respondent, on instructions from the second respondent, who is present in person, submitted

that he fairly concedes that the impugned order dated 11.08.2016 is deficient in above aspects, it not having been passed by taking comprehensive note

of the facts and circumstances. He submitted that the second respondent is ready and willing to forgo and forfeit the benefit of the impugned order

dated 11.08.2016 which, he concedes, may be cancelled under Section 439 (2) Cr.P.C. though he seeks liberty to apply afresh to the Court of

Sessions or this Court, if need be thereafter, for release on regular bail. He undertakes that the second respondent is ready to surrender to custody

forthwith and that he shall make an application to this effect by presenting himself in person before the trial court on or before 12th September, 2018.

5.

Binding the second respondent with this undertaking and setting aside the impugned order dated 11.08.2016, the petition is disposed of.Â

Needless to add, the trial court would take all consequent measures in light of this decision.

6.

Copy of the order be given dasti to all sides.Â