Risshi Siddhi Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd vs Amarnath Choudhary and Anr

Sanjay Dhar, J

The petitioner-company has filed the instant application under Section 29A (5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1996 ) seeking extension of the time period for making the arbitral award.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused record of the case.

It appears that the petitioner-company had filed a petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking appointment of an arbitrator for adjudication of the disputes and differences that had arisen between the parties. The said petition was registered as Arb.P No. 45/2021 and came to be decided by Hon"ble the Chief Justice vide order dated 27.05.2022, whereby Shri Suresh Sharma, Former District and Sessions Judge, was appointed as the sole arbitrator.

It seems that the learned Arbitrator could not make the arbitral award within the stipulated period. Thereafter, with the consent of the parties, the period for making the award was extended by six months, which expired on 11.12.2023. Subsequently, an application under Section 29A of the Act of 1996 came to be filed by the respondents before this Court seeking extension of time by a further period of six months. The said application, bearing CM No. 7603/2023, was allowed by Hon"ble the Chief Justice vide order dated 14.03.2024 and the time for making the award was extended by another six months.

However, as the learned Arbitrator could still not make the award within the extended period, another application bearing CM No. 5365/2024 came to be filed by the respondents seeking further extension of time by six months. The said application was allowed by Hon"ble the Chief Justice vide order dated 19.09.2024 and the time for making the award was again extended by another period of six months. Upon expiry of the extended period on 13.03.2025, the learned Arbitrator once again failed to make the award, which constrained the petitioner herein to file the present application seeking extension of time for making the arbitral award.

Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present petition on the ground that the Supreme Court, in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124, has recently held that an application under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking extension of the mandate of an arbitral tribunal lies before the Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1996 and not before the Chief Justice or his designate exercising powers under Section 11 of the Act.

In the above context, a perusal of the provisions contained in Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 reveals that sub-section (5) thereof provides that the period for making the arbitral award may be extended by the Court on an application made by any of the parties, subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Court. The expression court has been defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1996 as the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration. Therefore, it does appears that expression court as appearing in Section 29A of the Act of 1996, does not include the Chief Justice or designate exercising power under section 11 of the Act of 1996. Thus, it is only the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district or the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction that is competent to exercise power under Section 29A of Act of 1996.

The aforesaid position of law has been explained by the Supreme Court in Jagdeep Chowgule"s case (supra) in the following manner:

As we move away from the process of Appointment of Arbitrators under Section 11 and arrive at the Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings and Making of Arbitral Award and Termination , which procedures are articulated in Chapters V and VI, we notice the Parliament"s endeavour to introduce principles of integrity and efficiency in working of the alternative remedy by prescribing time limits. This is an important feature, introduced through Section 29A, w.e.f. 23.10.2015. The Section in its entirety has already been extracted for ready reference, but a holistic reading of the provision with other parts of the Act mandates as follows;

(i) Sub-Section (1) of Section 29A mandates that the award shall be made within 12 months of the completion of pleadings before the Arbitral Tribunal. While sub-Section (2) incentivises expeditious making of the Award, proviso to sub-Section (4) and sub-Section (8) authorises the Court to impose penalty for delay in making the award.

(ii) Sub-Section (3) enables parties, by consent, to extend the period of 12 months for making the award by a further period not exceeding 6 months.

(iii) If the award is not made within the stipulated period of 12 months or the extended period of 6 months, the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate.

(iv) This termination is subject to the power of the Court to extend the period.

(v) The Court" under Section 29A shall be the Civil Court of ordinary original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction under Section 2(1)(e), and shall not be the High Court or the Supreme Court under Section 11(6) of the Act. Equally, Section 42 of the Act relating to jurisdiction for application will not apply to Section 11 of the Act xxx xxx xxx

In view of the foregoing analysis of the legal position, it is manifestly clear that the Chief Justice or his designate exercising powers under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not have the jurisdiction or authority to extend the time period for making the arbitral award in exercise of powers under Section 29A of the Act of 1996. Such power can be exercised only by the Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1996. Therefore, this Court while exercising powers as a designate of the Chief Justice under Section 11 of the Act of 1996 is not vested with power to extend the time for making the award in terms of Section 29A of the Act of 1996. The application, as such, is not maintainable before this forum.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that, at the time of filing of the present application before this Court, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jagdeep Chowgule"s case (supra) had not been delivered and, therefore, the petitioner has approached this Court keeping in view the position of law as was prevailing prior to the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court. The said argument is of no help to the case of the petitioner, because it is a settled position of law that declaration of law made by the Supreme Court applies retrospectively unless the past transactions/acts are specifically saved while making such declaration. (Refer CBI v. Raj Kishore, reported as 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 770). In view of this, the law declared by the Supreme Court in Jagdeep Chowgule s case (supra) would hold the field even to pending applications under Section 29A of the Act of 1996.

For the foregoing discussion, the present application before this Court is held to be not maintainable. Accordingly, the same is dismissed, leaving it open to the petitioner to avail the appropriate remedy by approaching the competent forum in accordance with law.