R.K. Builders vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Another

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.—Both these writ petitions have been filed by the same petitioner and arise in respect of property tax assessment

done by the Deputy Assessor and Collector qua adjoining buildings which have been constructed by the petitioner. Both the assessment orders

which are the subject matter of challenge were passed on the same day, that is, on 31.03.1991 and are virtually identical in terms. It is for this

reason that we are taking up the consideration of these two petitions together.

Two issues have been raised by the petitioner. The first issue is with regard to valuation and the computation of actual cost of construction. The

second issue pertains to the date from which the liability for property tax arises. With regard to the issue of valuation, the learned Counsel

submitted that in both the cases the valuation reports of the registered valuer Mr. S.B. Bajpai had been submitted by the petitioner for computation

of the total cost of construction. The Deputy Assessor and Collector had rejected the valuation reports on the ground that they were on the lower

side. Thereafter, he computed the cost of construction based on CPWD rates. According to the petitioner, no reasons for rejecting the valuation

reports have been given in the impugned assessment orders apart from merely observing that they were on the lower side. Consequently, it was

contended that in such an eventuality the Deputy Assessor and Collector ought to have got a fresh valuation done and ought not to have merely

computed the cost of construction on the basis of estimation.

As regards the second issue of the date from which the liability of property tax commenced, the learned Counsel submitted that both the

properties were completed on 31.03.1988 and a notice was issued by the petitioner on 04.04.1988. The said notice was in terms of Section 129

of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. It was further contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the property was also

occupied from 01.04.1988. According to the learned Counsel, the factum of occupation has been accepted by the Deputy Assessor and Collector

as would be apparent from the last sentence of the impugned orders. The only question that needs to be sorted out in this context is the issue as to

when the building was completed. According to the impugned orders, an inspection was carried out on 14.03.1986 and the inspection report

indicated that the building was partly occupied and partly vacant. Thus, according to the Deputy Assessor and Collector, the building stood

completed on 14.03.1986 and, therefore, the property tax was being assessed on and from 01.03.1986 and not from 01.04.1988. The learned

Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Deputy Assessor and Collector wrongly relied upon the inspection report when the petitioner had not

been given any notice of inspection nor had a copy of the inspection report being supplied to the petitioner.

Considering the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the stand taken by the respondent, we are of the view that

these petitions involve determination of disputed questions of fact. The query as to whether the building was completed on a particular date is

certainly a question of fact. There is a dispute with regard to this date. It can only be sorted out either by considering evidence in the first instance

or in an appeal. It is for this reason that, despite the fact that these are the matters which have been pending since 1991, we are of the view that the

petitioner should be relegated to the alternative remedy of an appeal u/s 169 of the said Act.

Consequently, we are not inclined to entertain these writ petitions and dismiss the same. However, we are granting liberty to the petitioner to

prefer appeals against the impugned orders of assessment provided such appeals are filed within thirty days. We have not expressed any opinion

on the merits of the matter and it would be open to the petitioner to raise all issues, both of fact and law, before the appellate authority, in case the

petitioner decides to file the appeals.

There shall be no order as to costs.