R.K. SHARMA vs MANOJ SETHI AND SMT. KIRAN SETHI

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''), is directed against order dated 13.6.2003, passed by District Forum-II, Udyog Sadan, Institutional Area, Mehrauli, New Delhi in Complaint Case No. 1875/2001entitled Shri R.K. Sharma v. Shri Manoj Sethi and Smt. Kiran Sethi, Managing Directors of Shivam Institute of Medical Transcription.

THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, briefly stated, are that the appellant Shri R.K. Sharma had filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Act before the District Forum, averring therein that lured by the advertisements issued by the respondents in the daily "Nav Bharat Times" in August 2000, the appellant got his son admitted in five months ''Medical Transcription Course'' after paying Rs. 22,500/- as fees against receipt Nos. 218 and 281, dated 16.8.2000 and 15.9.2000 respectively. It was alleged that after the completion of the course neither the certificate was given nor the job was provided. Alleging deficiency in service and unfair trade practice on the part of the respondents, it was prayed that the respondents be directed to refund the amount of Rs. 22,500/-, paid as fees together with a compensation of Rs. 30,000/-. The claim of the appellant in the District Forum was resisted by the respondents and in the reply/written version, filed on behalf of the respondents, it was stated that there was no privity of contract between the appellant and the respondent and there was no hiring of services by the appellant. It was stated that fees was paid by the appellant to Besto-Med Solutions and not to the respondents and the appellant has not impleaded the said Besto-Med Solutions as one of the parties. It was stated that in the test conducted no student could pass the test and, therefore, no certificate was issued. It was stated that on the request of the son of the appellant the respondent agreed to issue certificate after the test and also agreed to provide employment if the son of the appellant successfully passed the test as per norms. It was stated that the son of the appellant never turned up. It was stated that there was no deficiency in service on the part of the respondents and the complaint, filed by the appellant, was liable to be dismissed.

The learned District Forum vide impugned order has held that the respondents had adopted unfair trade practice and there was deficiency in service on the part of the respondents and on the basis of the above finding has directed the respondents to issue the certificate and if it is not possible to issue the certificate, in that event Rs. 22,500/-, paid by the appellant, as fees for his son, be refunded to him with interest @ 10% p.a. w.e.f. 15.9.2000 till payment.

NOT feeling satisfied with the relief granted by the District Forum, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act. We have heard the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. During the course of arguments the only contention advanced by the appellant before us is that the relief granted to the appellant by the District Forum is inadequate and as employment was not provided by the respondent to the son of the appellant, which was the prime condition, the respondent was liable to pay compensation of Rs. 30,000/-. It is contended by the appellant that the learned District Forum should have awarded a compensation of Rs. 30,000/- also in addition to the relief already granted by the learned District Forum vide impugned order.

INSOFAR as the above aspect is concerned, the position is that relief to a ''consumer'' by a redressal agency, established under the Act, can be granted only in terms of Section 14 of the Act. Sub-clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act deals with compensation that can be awarded to a ''consumer'' by a redressal agency established under the Act. The above said provision of the Act reads as under- "(d) to pay such amount as may be awarded by it as compensation to the consumer for any loss or injury suffered by the consumer due to the negligence of the opposite party." On a plain reading of the above provision of the Act, it is apparent that a ''consumer'' may be awarded compensation for any loss or injury suffered by the ''consumer'' due to the negligence of the opposite party. The Hon''ble National Commission in a recent decision in case Standard Chartered Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. H.B. Impex Pvt. Ltd., reported as I (2004) CPJ 13 (NC)=2002 CTJ 106 (CP) (NCDRC), has held in clear-cut terms that where a consumer sues for damages, the loss he suffered as a result of breach of contract, must not be too remote and a distinction has to be drawn between normal and abnormal or unusual loss. In other words, a ''consumer'', in terms of the above provision, can be compensated only for normal loss and not for any abnormal or unusual or remote loss. With a view to satisfy ourselves, we have put a specific query to the appellant, asking him to satisfy us as to how the relief granted to the appellant by the District Forum can be treated or termed as inadequate in terms of the provisions of Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. No satisfactory reply could be given by the appellant to our above query. The appellant also could not produce any document wherefrom it could be inferred that in case the employment was not provided to the son of the appellant, the respondent was liable to pay a compensation of Rs. 30,000/- to the appellant. Moreover, as already stated the learned District Forum vide impugned order has already awarded interest @ 10% p.a. on the awarded sum w.e.f. 15.9.2000 till payment. Double benefit of compensation and interest cannot be awarded to a ''consumer'' by a redressal agency established under the Act. In our above views, we stand fortified by a decision of the Hon''ble National Commission in case Laxmi Vilas Bank Ltd., and Anr. v. P.R. Krishnan and Anr., reported as I (1995) CPJ 43 (NC)=1986-96 Consumer 3234 (NS). In the above said decision the Hon''ble National Commission has held: "In our opinion all that the complainants were entitled to was to be compensated for the loss sustained by them by reason of the failure on the part of the bank to pay the amount due under the fixed deposit on the date when it matured for payment. This could be done either by awarding them interest in lieu of damages or by awarding a lumpsum compensation based on the evidence, if any, adduced by the complainants regarding the actual loss sustained by them. The conferment of a double benefit by awarding both interest as well as lumpsum compensation in our opinion is not justified in law." (Emphasis supplied)

THE above decision of the Hon''ble National Commission clinches the issue finally and placing reliance on the above decision of the Apex Commission, we have no hesitation in holding that the above contention, being advanced by the appellant, regarding payment of compensation in addition to the relief of interest already granted by District Forum, is devoid of merit and, therefore, is rejected summarily. No other point has been urged or pressed.

IN view of the above discussion, the above mentioned appeal, filed by the appellant, is devoid of substance. The same merits dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.