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Judgment
Cornish, J.—An insolvency petition was filed on 27th August 1929 against the debtors, who are the petitioners in this civil revision petition.
In the insolvency petition one Kochi S. Vaithina-thier is named as the petitioner. In para. 4 of the petition it is stated:
Petitioner is the managing partner of a family firm consisting of himself and his first paternal cousins K.Vaithinathier and Vishwanathier.
In para. 9 are set out various acts of insolvency by the respondents on dates ranging from 11th August to 13th August 1929. within the period
of three months from the date of the filing of the petition.
On 16th September, K. Vaithinathier made application u/s 16, Provincial Insolvency Act, to be substituted for Kochi S. Vaithinathier on the
ground of Kochi''s want of due diligence in proceeding with the petition, but this petition was dismissed as want of diligence had not been
established.
On 10th October Kochi applied to have his partner Viswanathier added as a party to the petition; and this man was added a respondent. On
20th December Kochi made a further application to have his other partner Vaithinathier made a party to the petition. This was dismissed on the
ground that a creditor could not be made a party to the petition after the expiry of three months from the date of the act of insolvency.
The insolvency petition came on for hearing in March 1930 and was dismissed; the Subordinate Judge holding that it was not maintainable on
account of the nonjoinder in the petition of all the partners of the firm to which the respondents were alleged to be indebted.
On appeal the lower Court''s order was set aside. The learned District Judge held that the power of the Court sue motu to add necessary
parties in a fit case was unfettered, and he remanded the insolvency petition for rehearing after the third partner Vaithinathier had been made a
party.
The principal question argued on behalf of the petitioners here (the debtors) is whether, having regard to Section 9, Provincial Insolvency Act,
the amendment of the petition could be made. Section 9(1), Clause (c), provides that a creditor shall not be entitled to present an insolvency
petition against a debtor unless the act of insolvency on which the petition is grounded has occurred within three months before the presentation of
the petition. Reliance is placed on In re Maund [1895] 1 Q.B. 194, where it was held by a Divisional Court consisting of Vaughan Williams and
Wright, JJ., that a petition will not be allowed to be amended by adding a petitioner after three months from the date of the act of bankruptcy. At
p. 197 Vaughan Williams, J., said:
It is perfectly clear that the Court ought not to allow, after three months have elapsed from the date of the committal of the act of bankruptcy, the
introduction of creditors, as petitioning, creditors, who could not themselves present a petition.
And a little further on he observed;
Our attention was called to several cases which, it was said, established that the power of amendment could be exercised after the three months
had elapsed. In all these cases, however it will be seen that the person added was not essential to the petition by virtue of the requirement of the
Act, but only by virtue of the rules of practice of the bankruptcy Court.
At p. 195, in a remark made by the learned Judge in the course of the argument, he again refers to the difference between allowing an
amendment in order to conform to some rule of practice and of allowing''an amendment which would have the effect of dispensing with the
statutory requirement that a creditor''s petition must be filed within three months of the act of bankruptcy. This distinction was again emphasized In
Re. a Debtor [1902] 86 L. T. 688, where a petition not properly attested under the rules of practice was allowed to be amended, Wright, J.,
observing:
This was not like a case where a new petitioning creditor is added.
The principle of In re Maund [1895] 1 Q.B. 194, was cited with approval by Sir Arnold White, C. J., in Gunnis and Co. v. Mohamed Ayyub
Sahib A.I.R 1914 Mad. 687-19 I.C. 19, though it Was not necessary to apply it in that case. Mr. Bhashyam Ayyangar has invited me to disregard
In re Maund [1895] 1 Q.B. 194 and to follow L C T R. M. S. Chettyar v. A. S. Chettyar Firm AIR 1929 Rang. 291 and Venkata Hanumantha
Rao v. Gangayya AIR 1928 Mad.608. But these cases in nowise disagree or conflict with Maund''s case [1895] 1 Q.B. 194. They distinguish it
on the ground that its principle would have no application to cases where the validity of the petition was not in question.
The argument is that, assuming the petition to be invalid, as I think it was on account of the non-joinder of all the creditor-partners, it is open to
the Court to allow it to be amended, notwithstanding Section 9(1)(c), Insolvency Act. It has therefore to be considered whether there is anything in
the Provincial Insolvency Act, or in the provisions of the CPC and of the Limitation Act which have been incorporated in the Insolvency Act,
which enables the Court to make the amendment and so to virtually override the enactment of Section 9, Insolvency Act. The learned Counsel for
respondents in the revision petition has relied first on Section 148, Civil P.C. But Section 148 in terms applies to an enlargement of a time limit
fixed by the Court and it can have no application to a time limit fixed by statute: Narasimha Ayyar v. Rangachari AIR 1926 Mad. 689. Nor do I
think that the power to add parties conferred upon the Courts by the CPC enables this amendment to be made, in view of the limitations placed by
Section 5, Insolvency Act upon the application of the CPC to proceedings in insolvency. Section 5 provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court, in regard to proceedings under this Act, shall have the same powers and shall follow the same
procedure as it has and follows in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction.
Therefore there is not a complete but only a limited power of applying the provision of the CPC to insolvency proceedings. To allow this
amendment would have the effect of enlarging the time limit fixed by Section 9, Insolvency Act. That would be to make the powers exercisable
under the CPC superior to and not subject to the provisions of the Insolvency-Act; and, having regard to the terms of Section 5, Insolvency Act, it
cannot be done. It may be observed that if the delay of the creditor-petitioner in applying for the amendment had been occasioned by fraud, then
there would be a case where it has been said the Court would strain its jurisdiction to the utmost: In re Maugham [1888] 21 Q.B.D. 21. But no
fraud is imputed hare. The failure of the creditor-petitioner to apply in time for the requisite amendment was due to his own dilatoriness. Then there
is Section 5, Lim. Act, which has been made applicable by Section 78, Insolvency Act, ""to appeals and applications under this Act,""i.e., the
Insolvency Act. I am clearly of opinion that an insolvency petition by a creditor or debtor is not an ""application.""A reference to Section 5, Lim.
Act, leaves no doubt upon the question; its language shows that the applications intended are applications of the description in Schedule 1, Divn. 3,
Lim. Act, which may arise in the course of or out of proceedings in insolvency. I hold therefore that it is not competent to the Court under the
Insolvency Act or the incorporated provisions of the CPC and Limitation Act to allow this insolvency petition to be amended by the addition of the
third creditor-partner when three months have expired since the act of insolvency.
But there is a further and alternative argument that the petition is sufficient as it stands. It is contended that inas much as the petition is
substantially a petition of all the creditor-partners, and the proposed amendment a formality, the bringing of Vaithinathier into the array of parties
would not amount to the adding of a new party to the petition. This would be so, no doubt, if the contention were well founded: see Muthu-krishna
Pillai v. Rajam Ayyangar [1916] 33 I.C. 357 and Rajam Ayyangar v. Muthu Krishna Pillai AIR 1915 Mad. 424. But the only place in the petition
where Vaithinathier''s name is mentioned is in para 4, where the petitioner says that he is the managing partner of a firm of which Vaithinathier is a
member. That statement does not make Vaithinathier a party to the petition. Nor is he made a party by . the fact that in the subsequent
interlocutory appllcations in October and December to have Viswanathier and Vaidyanathe Ayyar made parties, the petitioner stated that he had
instituted the insolvency proceedings as managing partner on behalf of his partners. Reference has been made to three cases by the learned
Counsel for the creditors, viz., Sheo Lal Sahu v. Sagar Mal [1917] 40 I.C. 108, Narayya Chetty v. Sami Chetty [1915] 28 I.C. 210 and Re.
Hobbs [1892] 63 L.T 114. But I do not think they serve to substantiate his point.
In Sheo Lal Sahu v. Sagar Mal [1917] 40 I.C. 108 where a partner sued for a debt due to the firm, making his partners defendants, it was
held that the suit was effectively a suit by the firm, but that the plaint should be amended by describing the partnership firm as plaintiff. There all the
partners were parties to the suit. In Narayya Chetty v, Sami Chetty [1915] 28 I.C. 210 the plaintiff had prefixed the firm name to his own, and it
was held that the suit should be regarded as a suit brought on behalf of the firm. In that case the firm name was clearly used to indicate that it was a
party, although in association with the name of one of the partners.
Re. Hobbs [1892] 63 L.T 114 was quite a different case. The petition was in the firm name and in the names of the two partners who had
constituted the firm though they had dissolved partnership, and the petition was signed on behalf of the firm by-one of its late members. Bowen,
L.J., described the position thus:
This petition is really a petition by two persons, and is signed by one of these two persons who asserts on its face that he is authorized to sign for
himself and for the other person, by signing both names.
In the present case the petition is not in the firm name; it is not in the names of all the members of the firm; nor does it purport to be signed on
behalf of the firm or its members by the petitioner signatory. In my opinion this petition cannot be regarded either in form or in substance as a
petition by the creditor partners. It was consequently unsustainable and was rightly dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge.
The conclusions I have come to render it unnecessary to discuss the argument which was addressed to me on the question whether the
dismissal of the petitioner-creditor''s interlocutory application in December to have Vsithinathier made a party was conclusive of this question, there
having been no appeal from the order made on that application.
The result is that the civil revision petition will be allowed with costs here and in the lower appellate Court, and the order of the Subordinate
Judge dismissing the insolvency petition will be restored.