R.N. Singh Chauhan vs Madhyanchal Gramin Bank

Sujoy Paul, J.—1. The petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the charge-sheet dated 22.06.2010. In addition, the petitioner has also challenged the suspension order dated 21.08.1999. The petitioner has prayed for grant of consequential benefits.

Shri Naman Nagrath, learned senior counsel urged that the charge-sheet is based on an alleged incident of 22.11.1997. A criminal case bearing No. 336/2000 was registered on the basis of such incident. The petitioner was placed under suspension w.e.f. 21.08.1999 (Annexure-P/2). The criminal trial was initiated on 11.04.2000. The respondents did not take any disciplinary action till 22.06.2010 when the impugned charge-sheet (Annexure-P/3) was issued. The departmental inquiry proceeded to great extent and the Inquiry Officer submitted its findings before the Disciplinary Authority. However, the Disciplinary Authority did not accept those findings and by order dated 05.11.2014 directed to institute a de novo inquiry. Shri Nagrath further submits that the petitioner was acquitted in the said criminal case by judgment dated 07.02.2015 (Annexure-P/1).

The charge-sheet and disciplinary proceedings are challenged on the ground that there is inordinate delay in issuing the charge-sheet. The continuation of departmental inquiry after 17 years from the date of incident is highly belated and liable to be quashed. It is strenuously contended that the witnesses in the criminal case and the departmental inquiry are same. Once the petitioner stood acquitted in the criminal case, the department cannot be permitted to conduct the departmental inquiry. It is further submitted that the petitioner is due for his retirement within four months. Thus the departmental inquiry may be set aside. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in , (2015) 2 SCC 365 (S. Bhaskar Reddy and another v. Superintendent of Police and another) and judgments of this Court reported in the case of Bhagwan Singh Gurjar v. State of M.P. and others, (2013 SCC Online MP 4686).

Per contra, Shri Ashish Shroti, learned counsel for the Bank contended that initially the department waited for the outcome of the criminal case. However, when the department realized that criminal case is taking a long time, they decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings. For this reason, it cannot be said that there is unjustified delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings. It is further urged that the petitioner is not acquitted on merits. In other words, the petitioner''s acquittal is not an honourable acquittal. Indeed, he was acquitted on benefit of doubt. In that situation, the employer is at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings. He submits that even if witnesses in both the proceedings are common, the degree of proof required in both the proceedings are totally different. Hence, no interference is warranted by this Court. In support of his contention, he relied on various judgments of the Supreme Court.

The parties confined their arguments to the extent indicated above.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

The pivotal question in this case is whether the disciplinary proceedings can be mechanically set aside solely on the ground of delay in initiation and completion of disciplinary inquiry. This point is no more res integra. The Apex Court after considering the Constitution Bench judgment of Supreme Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, , (1992) 1 SCC 225 opined in State of Punjab and others v. Chaman Lal Goel, , (1995) 2 SCC 570 that the proposition emerging from the judgment of A.R. Antuley (supra) can be broadly applied in cases of disciplinary proceedings. It is observed that ultimately the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors "balancing test or balancing process" and determine in each case whether the right of speedy trial has been denied in a given case. At the same time, it is observed that it is not the only course open to the Court to set aside such belated proceedings. In a given case, the nature of facts and other circumstances may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it has been observed that it is open to the Court to make such other appropriate order as it finds just and equitable in the circumstances, of the case. If charge-sheet of present case is perused, it shows that there are serious allegations of financial irregularities on the petitioner.

The stand of the employer is that initially they waited for the outcome of the criminal case but the said case took lot of time and, therefore, decided to proceed with the matter departmentally. The question is whether such a course is improper? The Apex Court in , 1991 Supp (2) SCC 143 (Food Corporation of India v. George Varghese and another) considered the similar point. In the said case, the employee was placed under suspension on 14.03.1975. Before disciplinary proceedings could be initiated against him, a FIR was lodged on 23.06.1975. The employer stayed its hands on disciplinary proceedings awaiting the outcome of the criminal case. The criminal Court delivered the judgment later on. The Apex Court opined that the employer fairly stayed its hands as soon as the prosecution was initiated. It did not proceed with the departmental inquiry lest it may be said that it was trying to overreach the judicial proceedings. If employer had insisted on proceedings with the departmental inquiry, the respondents would have been constrained to file reply which could have been used against him in criminal proceedings. The action of employer in proceeding with the inquiry at belated stage was approved by the Supreme Court.

This is also settled in law that the degree of proof required in criminal case and in domestic inquiry are different. In Ajit Kumar Nag v. G.M. (PJ) Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., , (2005) 7 SCC 764, the Apex Court opined as under:

"11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused ''beyond reasonable doubt'', he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of ''preponderance of probability''. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside."

This judgment was followed in , (2006) 2 SCC 255 (T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. and others v. K. Meera Bai) Their Lordships held as under:

"21. Similarly, the learned Single Judge was patently misconceived in reaching the conclusion that the acquittal of the respondent by the Court of CJM clinched the issue in the departmental enquiry, while losing sight of the well-settled law that the scope of criminal proceedings in the court of criminal law and the scope of disciplinary proceedings in a departmental enquiry are quite distinct and exclusive and independent.

The learned Single Judge has also failed to appreciate that the standards of proof required in the criminal proceedings and the departmental disciplinary actions are not the same."

It is thus clear that purpose of initiating departmental inquiry and criminal case are different. The degree of proof required in both the cases are totally different. Accordingly, the right of the employer to conduct the domestic inquiry cannot be foreclosed on the assumption that the prosecution witnesses will not be able to bring home the misconduct. In other words, the witnesses will not be able to establish the case of the prosecution.

In the instant case, the gravity of offence cannot be ignored. The allegations are very serious and accordingly this petition cannot be allowed on the ground of delay.

In , (2014) 3 SCC 610 (State of West Bengal and others v. Sankar Ghosh), the Apex Court held that even if charges in the departmental inquiry and criminal case are same, upon acquittal on benefit of doubt, there is no right of automatic reinstatement. In the present case also, the petitioner is exonerated on benefit of doubt. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the employer cannot continue with the departmental inquiry because of judgment of criminal Court.

So far the question of de novo inquiry is concerned, it is seen that the petitioner has not chosen to challenge the relevant order dated 05.11.2014 (Annexure-P/5). In absence of any challenge to this order, no interference on this aspect is warranted. Apart from this, it is clear from the order that earlier inquiry conducted was held to be void because principles of natural justice were not properly followed by earlier Inquiry Officer.

The petitioner relied on the judgment of this Court in Bhagwan Singh Gurjar (supra). However, in the said case, the respondents have not chosen to assign a single reason about the delay in issuing the charge-sheet. For this reason, interference was made. In the present case, the respondents have given plausible reasons for belatedly issuing the charge-sheet. Hence, the said judgment is of no assistance to the petitioner. Similarly, in Pramod Kumar Gupta v. State of M.P. and others, , (2011) 1 MPLJ 666, the delay was not properly explained. In absence of plausible reason and explanation, interference was made. In the peculiar facts of this case, the said judgment is not applicable.

Similarly, in S. Bhaskar Reddy (supra), the appellant was honourably acquitted by the trial Court, whereas the present petitioner was acquitted on benefit of doubt. Hence, this judgment cannot be pressed into service.

On the basis of foregoing discussion, I deem it apposite to apply the principle of balancing the process [See: State of Punjab and others (supra)]. In the interest of justice, it is directed that the respondents shall continue and complete the inquiry expeditiously preferably within six months. This direction is subject to co-operation by the petitioner.

As analysed above, no case is made out for interference on the charge-sheet. Petition is dispose of with the aforesaid observations. No costs.