R.N. Suman vs Union of India and Others

R.N. Suman, petitioner, is before this Court assailing the validity of the order dated 13th April, 2011 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad in Original Application No. 1406/2005 (R.N. Suman vs. Union of India and others) wherein claim petition of petitioner has been rejected.

Brief facts giving rise to the case are that petitioner was appointed as Civil School Master on 30.11.1963 in the pay scale of Rs. 130-300/- which is equivalent to the grade of UDC. He was, thereafter, appointed as L.D.C. in Grade Rs. 110-180/- and he worked there w.e.f. 19.11.1966 to 26.02.1981. He was promoted as U.D.C. w.e.f. 27.02.1981 and petitioner has been agitating his appointment as L.D.C. and ultimately he has filed Original Application No. 665 of 1989 and same was allowed on 16th September, 1994 by giving direction that petitioner shall be granted seniority in the cadre of Senior Store Keepers/U.D.C.s from the date of their initial appointment as Civilian School Masters in equivalent pay scales with all consequential benefits. The order passed by the Tribunal has been subjected to challenge by the Union of India before the Apex Court in SLP No. 545/1996 (Union of India and others vs. R.N. Suman) and the Special Leave to Appeal has been rejected on 19th February, 1996 and petitioner during this period has retired w.e.f. 31st January, 1996. This much is also reflected from the record that thereafter order has been passed in favour of petitioner on 6th June, 1996 for his promotion. After the said order in question has been passed, petitioner was not satisfied with the said order in question and Contempt Application in question was dismissed by the Tribunal concerned on 6th August, 1996. This much is also reflected that petitioner had filed another Original Application and the said Original Application No. 245 of 1999 was rejected on 2nd December, 1999 and then a miscellaneous application No. 479 of 2005 has been filed for recall of the order dated 2nd December, 1999 and same has been rejected on 27.05.2005 with liberty to file fresh Original Application. Petitioner thereafter has filed O.A. No. 1406 of 2005 and the Tribunal has passed judgment dated 13th April, 2001 and same has been subject matter of challenge before this Court.

Pleadings inter-se parties have been exchanged and thereafter the matter has been taken up for final hearing and disposal and specific detail has been furnished that petitioner has been granted seniority as UDC w.e.f. 30th November, 1963 and further promotion on the posts of OS II on 13.02.1972, OS I on 19.01.1978, A.O. on 15.12.1980 and SAO II on 06.08.1990. The petitioner had been considered in DPCs for 1985-89 held in UPSC for promotion to the grade of SAO-II but was not recommended by the DPC based on his record of service. He was found suitable and recommended for promotion by UPSC only in 1990 and the same was intimated to the petitioner through letter dated 26th January, 1996.

To the said Counter Affidavit, Rejoinder Affidavit has been filed and thereafter present matter has been taken up for final hearing and disposal.

Shri A.C. Tiwari, Advocate submitted with vehemence that, in the present case, in spite of the fact that petitioner has succeeded before the Tribunal and even before the Apex Court, requisite relief, as it ought to have been accorded to him, has not at all been accorded and in view of this, writ petition deserves to be allowed.

Shri S.K. Mishra, Advocate, on the other hand, submitted with vehemence that claim petition of petitioner was highly barred by laches on its face value, in view of this, petitioner is not at all entitled for any relief and coupled with this, even on merit claim of petitioner has rightly been non-suited.

In order to appreciate the arguments that has been so advanced, provision dealing with the limitation of filing of petition as contained under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is being looked into:

Section 21. Limitation:--

(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,--

(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;

(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where--

(a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and

(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period."

Apex Court in the case of S.S. Rathore Vs. Union of India & others, , AIR 1990 SC 10; Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. through its CMD and another Vs. K. Thangappan and another, , 2006 (4) SCC 322; Shri Bhoop Singh Vs. Union of India and others , 1992 (3) SCC 136; and Union of India & others Vs. M.K. Sarkar , 2010 (2) SCC 58 has taken the view that repeated representation does not extend the period of limitation and mere making of representations cannot justify the delay in question and the limitation has to be counted from the date of original cause of action and stale matters should not be entertained.

Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. A. Durairaj , JT 2011 (3) SC 254, has held as follows:

"It is well settled that anyone who feels aggrieved by non-promotion or non-selection should approach the Court/Tribunal as early as possible. If a person having a justifiable grievance allows the matter to become stale and approaches the Court/Tribunal belatedly, grant of any relief on the basis of such belated application would lead to serious administrative complications to the employer and difficulties to the other employees as it will upset the settled position regarding seniority and promotions which has been granted to others over the years. Further, where a claim is raised beyond a decade or two from the date of cause of action, the employer will be at a great disadvantage to effectively contest or counter the claim, as the officers who dealt with the matter and/or the relevant records relating to the matter may no longer be available. Therefore, even if no period of limitation is prescribed, any belated challenge would be liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches."

Once again Apex Court in the case of, B.S.N.L. vs. Ghanshyam Das (2), 2011 (4) SCC 374 has reiterated the stand taken in the case of Jagdish Lal vs. State of Haryana , 1997 (6) 538, and has proceeded to observe that as respondents preferred to sleep over their rights and approached Tribunal in the year 1997, they would not get benefit of said order.

On these parameters in the facts of the case, what we find that earlier judgment has been delivered in favour of petitioner on 16th September, 1994 with a direction to respondents to give seniority to the petitioner in the cadre of UDC/Sr. Store Keeper from the date of his initial appointment. This much is also accepted position that against the said judgment and order, Special Leave to Appeal No. 545/1996 has been filed and same has been dismissed on 19.02.1996. The Ministry of Defence issued order dated 8th January, 1996 implementing the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad. This much is also clear that a Contempt Petition in question has been filed and the said contempt petition in question has been dismissed by the Tribunal concerned on 6th August, 1996. Petitioner claims that he has been representing the matter and thereafter he filed Original Application No. 245 of 1999 before the Tribunal concerned and the said application in question was dismissed as petitioner has proceeded to withdrew the same. After this order in question has been passed, petitioner has proceeded to move a recall application in the year 2005 and the said recall application in question has been dismissed on 27th May, 2005 but with the liberty to file fresh Original Application.

Providing of liberty to file fresh Original Application does not mean that ipso facto all the delay that has so occurred stands condoned, in view of this, once the recall application in question has been filed and same has been dismissed on 27th May, 2005, then, on its face value, the claim petition in question was grossly time barred and beyond the period of one year. Such time barred claim could not have been entertained by the Tribunal but the Tribunal, in the present case, has proceeded not to go on the issue of limitation and has proceeded to dismiss the claim petition on merits. Claim petition should have been dismissed on being barred by limitation.

Even on the merits what we find that pursuant to the order passed by the Tribunal concerned, petitioner has been extended the benefit of UDC from the date of his appointment and this much is also clear that petitioner was considered for review DPC for 1985 to 1989 and was not at all found fit and for the first time, he was not found fit in the year 1990 and benefit was accorded to him. The Benchmark system was introduced from 9th February, 2002 and as petitioner has already attained his age of superannuation in the year 1996, no further benefit could have been awarded to him. Petitioner has been accorded with his dues as per the entitlement and the decision to promote him w.e.f. 6th August, 1990 cannot be faulted by any score, in view of this, no relief can be accorded to the petitioner.

Writ petition is dismissed accordingly.