Rohini Kumari vs State Of H.P

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 14/2025 dated 01.09.2025 registered at Police Station, Dharamshala, District Kangra for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 177, 181 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the petitioner is daughter of late Sh. Digraj Singh, who was posted as a peon in the Government Middle Secondary School, Majra, Tehsil Indora, District Kangra, H.P He died, and the petitioner obtained the job on compassionate grounds. The police seized the record and found that the petitioner was appointed as a clerk on a contract basis. The petitioner’s family members filed affidavits stating that the employment should be given to the petiti ner on compassionate grounds. The petitioner swore an affidavit on 20th September 2012 in which she claimed that she was unmarried. She also filed an affidavit at the time of her joining on 3rd November 2014, in which the w rd unmarried was scored out to read married. She filed an application on 12th April 2019 stating that she was married to Deepak on 21st September 2009, and his name should be entered in the service record. The petitioner f led a false affidavit and obtained the job by concealing her marital status. The police registered an FIR against the petitioner and commenced investigations.

Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the petitioner was entitled to employment on compassionate grounds, as per the law. Digraj Singh was not survived by any male member. The petitioner’s mother was unable to undertake the employment, and she requested that the department to employ the petitioner on compassionate grounds. The other legal heirs of Digraj Singh executed no-objection certificates (NOC) and filed affidavits stating that they had no objection to the grant of employment to the petitioner on compassionate grounds. The petitioner never made any misrepresentation. She did not withhold any material information. Married daughters are also entitled to compassionate appointment as per the law laid down by this Co rt and the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The petitioner was married n 27th November 2009 to Deepak. The marriage of the petitioner had no connection to the grant of employment on compassionate grounds. The petitioner never tampered with any document, and the allegations against the pet tioner are false. The petitioner is taking care of her mother. Registration of FIR amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed.

I have heard Mr Ajay Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

Mr Ajay Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that a married daughter is entitled to a compassionate appointment. The allegations in the FIR, even if taken to be true, do not constitute the c mmission of any cognizable offence. The con inua ion of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. He relied upon Court on its own Motion vs State of HP CWPIL no. 114 of 2017, decided on 14.08.2018, Mamta Devi vs State of HP CWP no. 3100 of 2020 decided on 28.10.2020, and Savita vs State of HP CWP no. 3070 of 2023, decided on 05.09.2025, in support of his submission.

Mr Jitender K Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the investigation is at an initial stage. The allegations in the FIR show that the petitioner claimed herself to be unmarried, whereas she was married. She swore a false affidavit and interpolated her service record. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an rder of a Magistrate within the purview f Secti n 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first in ormation report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do n t prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), whe e the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police fficer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situati ns : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of he legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made ou ; ( iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the disp te amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).

This p siti n was reiterated in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 S OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:

“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.”

The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

It is undisputed that the petitioner was married to Deepak on 27.11.2009. This fact was mentioned in paragraph 7

(b) of the present petition. The FIR mentions that the petitioner swore an affidavit on 20.09.2012. She had mentioned her marital status as unmarried in an affidavit filed at the time of her joining, which was sco ed out to read married. These allegations prima facie show that the petitioner had executed a false affidavit and made a false representation regarding her marital status. The police are investigating the matter to determine who has made the alteration, and nothing can be said about it at t is stage.

It was submitted that the petitioner’s marital status had nothing to do with her employment on compassionate grounds. This submission will not help the petitioner. The petitioner relied upon the judgments passed by this Court showing that the employment was being denied to the married daughter, and they had to approach the Court. The earliest case (Mamta Devi, supra) related to the employment cited on behalf of the petitioner was decided on 28.10.2020, whereas the petitioner joined on 03.11.2014. Thus, not much advantage can be derived from the cited case.

In any case, prima facie, the petitioner had given a false information and swore a false affidavit and she cannot escape from its consequences by saying that married daughter is entitled to a compassionate appointment. If that were so, she should have filed the correct info ma ion and sworn an affidavit mentioning her correct marital status. The police are investigating the matter to determine whether any person was misled by the false information or false affidavit. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed at this stage.

No other point was urged.

In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.