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Judgment
J.M. Tandon, J.
A dispute having arisen between the Rohtak Central Cooperative Bank Limited, Rohtak (petitioner) with Ismaila BrickKilncumProduction Cooperative Industrial Society Limited (respondent), the matter was referred for arbitration under the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, (hereinafter the Act), to Shri K.K. Kundra, Industrial Inspector, Cooperative Societies for adjudication, who vide his award held the respondent liable to pay Rs. 33778.39 to the petitioner. The petitioner initiated proceedings to execute the award. The respondent filed an objection petition under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The executing Court framed the following issues:
(1) Whether the objections cannot be taken in execution application at this stage ?
(2) Whether the award can be set aside on the grounds mentioned in the objection petition ?
(3) Whether the judgmentdebtor is estopped from raising objections as alleged ?
The Senior Subordinate Judge, Rohtak, vide order dated May 28, 1977, found all the issues in favour of the respondent and consequently dismissed the objection petition. The petitioner has assailed the order dated May 28, 1977, in the present revision.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the respondent was debarred from filing the objection petition under section 82(3) of the Act and the impugned order is liable to be set aside on this ground. The contention is without merit.
The relevant part of section 82 reads :
"82. Bar of jurisdiction of Courts (1) Save as provided in this Act, no civil or revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of :
(a) the registration of a cooperative society or its byelaws or of an amendment of a byelaw;
(b) the removal of a committee;
(c) any dispute required under section 55 to be referred to the Registrar or any matter in which proceedings under section 55A have been initiated; or
(d) any matter concerning the winding up and the dissolution of a cooperative society. (2) ... ... .
(3) Save as provided in this Act, no order, decision or award, made under this Act, shall be questioned in any Court on any ground whatsoever".
A similar objection was raised in Ran Singh v. The Gandhar Agricultural Cooperative Service Society, Gandhar, A.I.R. 1976 Punjab and Haryana 94 : 1984 R.R.R. 415(Full Bench) and it was held:
"It is needless to point out that the civil Courts view with strong disfavour a tendency to oust their jurisdiction to entertain civil disputes. At the same time, if there are clear indications in an Act of the Legislature, which either expressly or impliedly bar the jurisdiction of a Civil Court, such a Court will decline to overstep the limits set by law. Again, the jurisdiction of a Civil Court may be excluded for the purpose of the initial determination of the dispute but the same may be kept intact for the purpose of execution. Section 63 of the Act provides that every decision or award duly passed under sections 54, 56, 62, 68 or 69 shall, if not carried out, on a certificate signed by the Registrar, be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court and shall be executed in the same manner. When the bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court created by section 82 of the Act is seen in the light of this provision it becomes obvious that the jurisdiction regarding the initial determination of the liability has been vested in the Registrar or the arbitrator, but the subsequent matter regarding recovery and enforcement of the award, which is equally important by the process of execution has been specifically left within the jurisdiction of a Civil Court. ... ...
The intimation of the date, time and place of hearing the dispute to the parties is an essential preliminary to the arbitrator assuming jurisdiction to decide the dispute and has to be observed by the arbitrator. Should he fail to perform this duty, his action is not only to be regarded as procedurally ultra vires, but also without jurisdiction."
The observations of the Full Bench reproduced above are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. The executing Court has found that the arbitrator did not issue any notice to the respondent nor did he afford any opportunity of hearing to it before he gave the award. The executing Court, therefore, rightly held that the award is a nullity. The provision contained in section 82(3) of the Act will not debar the respondent from raising the objection that the award is a nullity in the executing proceedings.
No other point has been argued.
In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.
