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Judgment
8 paragraphs · 881 wordsJ.V. Gupta, J.—This contempt petition u/s 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act has been filed on the basis that the Respondent has violated the undertaking given by him in this Court in C.R. No. 1467 of 1982 which was decided on 11th May, 1983. The copy of the said order has been filed as Annexure P.5. Therein the Respondent has given an undertaking that the property which was attached would not be alienated by him till the decretal amount is recovered. It has been alleged in the petition that in spite of that (Undertaking the car which was attached was sold by the Respondent on 7th August, 1983 and thus the Respondent has violated the said undertaking and was therefore liable for contempt of court. In the reply on behalf of the Respondent a preliminary objection has been raised that the petition for contempt was barred by time as it was filed after more than one year from the act of contempt alleged to have been committed by the Respondent and was therefore barred u/s 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Admittedly, the contempt petition was filed on 8th April, 1985 which is more than 1 year from the date i.e. 7th August, 1983 when the undertaking is said to have been violated.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the period of one year will run from the time when it has come to the notice of the Petitioner and the same was brought to the notice of this Court. Once it is brought to the notice of this Court then it is for this Court to take proceedings within one year thereof. In support of his contention he referred to Sudesh Kumar v. Jai Narain and Anr. 1974 PLR 23 Baradakanta Mishra Vs. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, . On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the period of one year runs from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed and therefore the petition was clearly barred by time when it was filed on 8th April, 1985 as the act of contempt is said to have been committed on 7th August, 1983. According to the learned Counsel, Limitation Act as such does not apply to these proceedings and therefore the question of extending the time, therefore, does not arise. In support of his contention he cited N. Venkataramanappa v. D.K. Naikar and Anr. AIR 1978 Karn 57 and Gulab Singh and Another Vs. The Principal, Sri Ramji Das, .
After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties on this preliminary objection, I find force in the contention reaisd on behalf of the Respondent. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act reads as under:
No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.
It was held in N. Vankataramanappa''s case (supra) that starting point of limitation is the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed and not date of knowledge of complaint. Similarly, in Gulab Singh''s case (supra) it was held that no provision stops running of the time of limitation of one year. The authorities relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner have no applicability to the facts of the present case. In Sudesh Kumar''s case (supra) the following observations in para 10 were made:
That as to the date on which the contempt can be alleged to be committed within the contemplation of Section 20 of the Act that has to be reckoned from the time when the Court becomes aware of the commission of its contempt and not from the date on which the act, comprehended to be contemptuous of this Court was committed by the contemner which apparently sounded innocuous till such time when its true nature became evident to the Court either on its own enquiry or otherwise.
There, in that case, the contemner had filed an affidavit which was found to be false later on, the question was that the period of one year will run from the time when the allegations made in the affidavit were found to be false by the Court and not from the date when the affidavit was filed. Thus the case is clearly distinguishable because it is the falsify of the affidavit which gives the cause of action and that will only be when it is determined that the facts stated therein are false. Prior to that the question of committing any contempt as such did not arise. The Supreme Court judgment referred to above, has no relevancy to the facts of the present case. In these circumstances, though the Respondent violated the undertaking given by him in this Court, but no proceedings could be initiated against him in view of the provisions of Section 20 of the Act as the application was filed after the expiry of the period of one year from the date i.e. 7th August, 1983 when the said undertaking was violated.
In this view of the matter, the petition fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.
