Roop Chand vs Union of India and Others

Mansoor Ahmad Mir, C.J—Challenge in this writ petition is to the judgment and order, dated 13.08.2009, made by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench (Circuit at Shimla) (for short "the CAT"), whereby O.A. No. 682/HP/2007, titled as Shri Roop Chand versus Union of India and others, filed by the writ petitioner came to be dismissed (for short "the impugned judgment").

Writ petitioner was employee of respondents-department, was found involved in indiscipline and forgery, thus, has committed a misconduct. The respondents, after noticing the conduct, actions and the fact of forgery, decided to conduct departmental inquiry against him. Preliminary inquiry was conducted by the appointing authority and memorandum of charge sheet containing three article of charges was issued to him on 14.10.2005 (Annexure P-1), details of which have been given in the opening para of the impugned judgment.

Writ petitioner denied the charges, Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed on 25.10.2005, and inquiry under Rule 10 of the Gramin Dak Sevak (Conduct and Employment) Rules, 2001 (for short "the Rules") was conducted. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 30.10.2006, who, after concluding the inquiry, came to the conclusion that all the charges were proved against the writ petitioner. Writ petitioner was asked to file representation vide letter, dated 24.11.2006, who filed representation on 04.12.2006. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority, vide order, dated 03.01.2007 (Annexure P-3) awarded the penalty of removal from service upon the writ petitioner.

Writ petitioner, feeling dissatisfied with the said order of the disciplinary authority, i.e. order of removal from service, filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, i.e. Superintendent of Post Offices, Rampur Bushahr Division, Rampur, on 22.01.2007 (Annexure P-4), was dismissed by the said authority vide order, dated 13.03.2007 (Annexure P-5).

Writ petitioner also invoked the jurisdiction of the revisional authority by filing revision petition before the Director Postal Services, HP Circle, Shimla on 16.05.2007 (Annexure P-6), which too was dismissed vide order, dated 10.09.2007 (Annexure P-7). All the said orders are the subject matter of the writ petition.

Writ petitioner has assailed all the said orders on the grounds taken in the writ petition, particularly, in paras 7 (a) to 7 (m) of the writ petition.

The respondents have filed reply and resisted the writ petition on the grounds taken in the memo of objections.

Learned counsel for the writ petitioner argued that the Inquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the charges are partly brought home to the writ petitioner, which is not correct as per the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer. He has also questioned the proportionality of the punishment.

Learned Assistant Solicitor General of India argued that the writ petitioner has committed a grave misconduct, i.e. forgery, indiscipline, arrogance and was also giving names to his superiors as ''Shakuni, Duryodhan and Dhritrashtra'', thus, was disrespectful towards his superiors.

Learned counsel for the writ petitioner was asked to show as to how the writ petitioner was not involved in forgery as it is established on record that on so many occasions, he had forged the signatures of the Head of Village, was not able to demolish the said evidence and the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority. Virtually, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner was not able to satisfy the Court that the writ petitioner was not involved in forgery.

Learned counsel for the writ petitioner was also asked to show as to whether the Writ Court can appreciate the evidence and whether the writ petitioner has carved out a case for appreciating the evidence, which already stands appreciated by the authorities supra. He tried to argue, but was not able to, prima facie, carve out a case.

It is not a case of perversity or a case of mis-appreciation or misreading of the evidence.

While going through the record, it appears that the writ petitioner was involved in indiscipline and has acted in such a way, which amounts to undermining the authorities and disgrace them, to whom he was subordinate. If an employee is found committing forgery, to us, only on this count, the employee can be dismissed from service, as it is a grave misconduct.

The Apex Court in a case titled as R. Vishwanatha Pillai Vs. State of Kerala and Others, AIR 2004 SC 1469 : (2004) 2 CTC 196 : (2004) 1 JT 88 : (2004) 1 SCALE 285 : (2004) 2 SCC 105 : (2004) SCC(L&S) 350 : (2004) 2 SCR 360 : (2004) AIRSCW 419 : (2004) AIRSCW 4826 : (2004) AIRSCW 3038 : (2004) 4 Supreme 77 : (2004) 6 Supreme 306 : (2004) 1 Supreme 436 , held that if an employee has acted unfairly and has managed the documents, which are fictitious, by fraud or has committed forgery, is not entitled to any relief and cannot be even heard.

It is beaten law of land that a person, who claims equity, must do equity. A person, who is not fair, cannot claim equity. It is apt to reproduce para 19 of the judgment in R. Vishwanatha Pillai''s case (supra) herein:

"19............ A person who seeks equity must come with clean hands. He, who comes to the Court with false claims, cannot plead equity nor the Court would be justified to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour. A person who seeks equity must act in a fair and equitable manner. Equity jurisdiction cannot be exercised in the case of a person who got the appointment on the basis of false caste certificate by playing a fraud. No sympathy and equitable consideration can come to his rescue. We are of the view that equity or compassion cannot be allowed to bend the arms of law in a case where an individual acquired a status by practising fraud."

(Emphasis added)

In another case titled as U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Suresh Chand Sharma, (2010) 126 FLR 157 : (2010) 6 JT 320 : (2010) 6 SCALE 87 : (2010) 6 SCC 555 : (2010) 5 SLR 128 , fare was recovered from the passengers but they were not issued tickets by the bus conductor, charge was proved, he was dismissed from service. The Apex Court, while upholding the punishment of dismissal from service, held that misappropriating the public money is a grave misconduct. It is apt to reproduce para 20 of the judgment herein:

"20. We do not find any force in the submissions made by Dr. J.N. Dubey, learned Senior counsel for the employee that for embezzlement of such a petty amount, punishment of dismissal could not be justified for the reason that it is not the amount embezzled by a delinquent employee but the mens rea to mis-appropriate the public money."

It is a duty of the State/Government/Department to weed out the dead wood. A person who indulges in illegal activities and commits fraudulent or frivolous acts by deceitful means, is to be dealt with iron hands and is to be weeded out.

The Apex Court in a case titled as U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Dehradun Vs. Suresh Pal, AIR 2006 SC 3227 : (2006) 111 FLR 851 : (2006) 12 JT 412 : (2006) 3 LLJ 967 : (2006) 9 SCALE 481 : (2006) 8 SCC 108 : (2006) SCC(L&S) 1905 : (2006) 7 SCR 534 Supp : (2007) 2 SLJ 32 : (2006) AIRSCW 4903 : (2006) 7 Supreme 408 , held that misconduct should be dealt with iron hands and not leniently. It is apt to reproduce paras 7 to 9 of the judgment herein:

"7. Short question for our consideration in the present case is whether the punishment which has been modified by the learned Single Judge is justified or not? The learned Single Judge found that the punishment awarded in the present case is disproportionate to the guilt of the delinquent. So far as, the guilt of the petitioner is concerned, in the domestic enquiry it has been found that the petitioner is guilty of not issuing tickets to the twenty passengers and the same finding of the domestic enquiry has been upheld by the Labour Court and High Court. The petitioner was a conductor and holding the position of trust. If incumbent like the petitioner starts misappropriating the money by not issuing a ticket and pocketing the money thereby causing loss to the Corporation then this is a serious misconduct. It is unfortunate that the petitioner was appointed in 1988 and in the first year of service he started indulging in mal practice then what can be expected from him in the future. If this is the state of affair in the first year of service and if such persons are allowed to let off to the light punishment then this will be a wrong signal to the other persons similarly situated. Therefore, in such cases the incumbent should be weeded out as fast as possible and same has been upheld by the Labour Court. We are firmly of the view that such instances should not be dealt with lightly so as to pollute the atmosphere in the Corporation and other co-workers.

Normally, courts do not substitute the punishment unless they are shockingly disproportionate and if the punishment is interfered or substituted lightly in the punishment in exercise of their extra-ordinary jurisdiction then it will amount to abuse of the process of court. If such kind of misconduct is dealt with lightly and courts start substituting the lighter punishment in exercising the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution then it will give a wrong signal in the Society. All the State Road Transport Corporations in the country have gone in red because of the misconduct of such kind of incumbents, therefore, it is the time that misconduct should be dealt with iron hands and not leniently.

Learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to a decision of this Court in the case of Regional Manager, U.P.S.R.T.C., Etawah and Others Vs. Hoti Lal and Another, AIR 2003 SC 1462 : (2003) 96 FLR 1076 : (2003) 2 JT 27 : (2003) 2 LLJ 267 : (2003) 2 SCALE 54 : (2003) 3 SCC 605 : (2003) SCC(L&S) 363 : (2003) 1 SCR 1019 : (2003) 2 SLJ 56 : (2003) AIRSCW 801 wherein, this Court has very categorically held that a mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice to substitute a lighter punishment. This Court held as under :

"The court or tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment was not commensurate with the proved charges. The scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. A mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. It is not only the amount involved but the mental setup, the type of duty performed and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision-making process while considering whether the punishment is proportionate or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court are not proper."

In S.R. Tewari Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, (2013) 6 AD 444 : (2013) 138 FLR 375 : (2013) 9 JT 31 : (2013) LabIC 2810 : (2013) 2 LLN 563 : (2013) 7 SCALE 417 : (2013) 6 SCC 602 : (2013) 2 SCC(L&S) 893 : (2013) 3 SCT 461 , the Apex Court held that judicial review in the cases of disciplinary proceedings is very limited and the Courts cannot substitute its findings for the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is apt to reproduce para 22 of the judgment herein:

"22. The role of the court in the matter of departmental proceedings is very limited and the court cannot substitute its own views or findings by replacing the findings arrived at by the authority on detailed appreciation of the evidence on record. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference by the court is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. The court has to record reasons as to why the punishment is disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. (Vide: Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Bodupalli Gopalaswami, (2011) 10 SCALE 275 : (2011) 13 SCC 553 : (2011) 11 SCR 326 : (2011) 5 UJ 3234 : (2011) AIRSCW 5331 and Sanjay Kumar Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 2012 SC 1783 : (2011) 131 FLR 1095 : (2011) 13 JT 70 : (2011) 11 SCR 182 : (2012) AIRSCW 2361 ."

It is also apt to reproduce para 9 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case titled as G.M. (Operations) S.B.I. Vs. R. Periyasamy, (2015) 1 LLN 31 : (2015) 1 SCJ 7 , herein:

"9. It is not really necessary to deal with the judgment of the learned Single Judge since that has merged with the judgment of the Division Bench. However, some observations are necessary. The learned Single Judge committed an error in approaching the issue by asking whether the findings have been arrived on acceptable evidence or not and coming to the conclusion that there was no acceptable evidence, and that in any case the evidence was not sufficient. In doing so, the learned Single Judge lost sight of the fact that the permissible enquiry was whether there is no evidence on which the enquiry officer could have arrived at the findings or whether there was any perversity in the findings. Whether the evidence was acceptable or not, was a wrong question, unless it raised a question of admissibility. Also, the learned Single Judge was not entitled to go into the question of the adequacy of evidence and come to the conclusion that the evidence was not sufficient to hold the respondent guilty."

The Apex Court in a case titled as State Bank of India and Others Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, (2006) 110 FLR 1159 : (2006) 7 JT 383 : (2006) 3 LLJ 563 : (2006) 8 SCALE 11 : (2006) 7 SCC 212 : (2006) SCC(L&S) 1573 : (2006) 4 SCR 511 Supp : (2007) 2 SLJ 78 , after discussing the facts in paras 10 to 13, which are similar to the case in hand, has taken note of the principles and the ratio laid down in a series of judgments, reproduced in paras 14 to 19. It is apt to reproduce para 21 of the judgment herein:

"21. Confronted with the facts and the position of law, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that leniency may be shown to the respondent having regard to long years of service rendered by the respondent to the Bank. We are unable to countenance with such submission. As already said, the respondent being a bank officer holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning and it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. The respondent was a Manager of the Bank and it needs to be emphasised that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer so that the confidence of the public/depositors is not impaired. It is for this reason that when a bank officer commits misconduct, as in the present case, for his personal ends and against the interest of the bank and the depositors, he must be dealt with iron hands and he does not deserve to be dealt with leniently."

It is established principle of law that High Courts or other Courts cannot act as Appellate Court while dealing with the writ petitions or appeals, outcome of disciplinary proceedings, and cannot substitute their own views unless the view expressed by the disciplinary authority shocks the conscience or is not supported by record.

It is apt to reproduce para 6 (III) of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in a case titled as Nirmala J. Jhala Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, (2013) 4 AD 144 : AIR 2013 SC 1513 : (2013) 138 FLR 227 : (2013) 6 JT 407 : (2013) LabIC 2113 : (2013) 2 LLN 25 : (2013) 4 SCALE 579 : (2013) 4 SCC 301 : (2013) 2 SCC(L&S) 270 : (2013) 2 SCT 740 : (2013) AIRSCW 1800 , herein:

"6..........................

III. Scope of Judicial Review :

(i) It is settled legal proposition that judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review, is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. The adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings. (Vide: State of Tamil Nadu and another Vs. S. Subramaniam, (1996) 1 AD 1024 : AIR 1996 SC 1232 : (1996) 2 JT 144 : (1996) LabIC 1046 : (1996) 1 SCALE 810 : (1997) 7 SCC 509 : (1996) 7 SCC 509 : (1996) 1 SCR 968 ; R.S. Saini Vs. State of Punjab and Others, AIR 1999 SC 3579 : (1999) 6 JT 507 : (1999) 2 LLJ 1415 : (1999) 5 SCALE 427 : (1999) 8 SCC 90 : (1999) SCC(L&S) 1424 : (1999) AIRSCW 3587 : (1999) 7 Supreme 612 ; and Govt. of A.P. and Others Vs. Mohd. Narsullah Khan, AIR 2006 SC 1214 : (2006) 108 FLR 1108 : (2006) 2 JT 82 : (2006) 1 LLJ 1108 : (2006) 2 SCALE 12 : (2006) 2 SCC 373 : (2006) SCC(L&S) 316 : (2006) 1 SCR 911 : (2006) 2 SLJ 294 : (2006) AIRSCW 734 : (2006) 1 Supreme 569 .

(ii) In Zora Singh, AIR 1971 SC 1537 : (1971) 3 SCC 834 , this Court while dealing with the issue of scope of judicial review, held as under:

"The principle that if some of the reasons relied on by a Tribunal for its conclusion turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable, its decision would be vitiated, applies to cases in which the conclusion is arrived at not on assessment of objective facts or evidence, but on subjective satisfaction. The reason is that whereas in cases where the decision is based on subjective satisfaction if some of the reasons turn out to be irrelevant or invalid, it would be impossible for a superior Court to find out which of the reasons, relevant or irrelevant, valid or invalid, had brought about such satisfaction. But in a case where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such a difficulty would not arise. If it is found that there was legal evidence before the Tribunal, even if some of it was irrelevant, a superior Court would not interfere if the finding can be sustained on the rest of the evidence. The reason is that in a writ petition for certiorari the superior Court does not sit in appeal, but exercises only supervisory jurisdiction, and therefore, does not enter into the question of sufficiency of evidence."

(Emphasis added)

(iii) The decisions referred to hereinabove highlights clearly, the parameter of the Court''s power of judicial review of administrative action or decision. An order can be set-aside if it is based on extraneous grounds, or when there are no grounds at all for passing it or when the grounds are such that, no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion. The Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal but, it merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. The Court will not normally exercise its power of judicial review unless it is found that formation of belief by the statutory authority suffers from malafides, dishonest/corrupt practice. In other words, the authority must act in good faith. Neither the question as to whether there was sufficient evidence before the authority can be raised/examined, nor the question of re-appreciating the evidence to examine the correctness of the order under challenge. If there are sufficient grounds for passing an order, then even if one of them is found to be correct, and on its basis the order impugned can be passed, there is no occasion for the Court to interfere. The jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. This apart, even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the Court must exercise its discretionary power with great caution keeping in mind the larger public interest and only when it comes to the conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the Court should intervene."

The Apex Court in a recent judgment in the case titled as Union of India (UOI) Vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2014) 310 ELT 417 : (2015) 1 ESC 101 : (2015) 144 FLR 219 : (2015) LabIC 268 : (2014) 10 SCJ 341 , has held that in disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal, the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence and laid down certain tests as to when findings of the disciplinary authority can be interfered by the High Court and what is the scope of the High Court. It is apt to reproduce para 13 of the judgment herein:

"13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i). re-appreciate the evidence;

(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."

The Apex Court in para 24 of the judgment rendered in S.R. Tweari''s case (supra) held that if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. It is apt to reproduce para 24 of the judgment herein:

"24. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra Vs. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour) and Others, AIR 1984 SC 1805 : (1984) 49 FLR 424 : (1986) LabIC 374 : (1984) 2 LLJ 517 : (1984) 2 SCALE 428 : (1984) 4 SCC 635 : (1985) 1 SCR 866 : (1984) 2 SLJ 492 : (1985) 17 UJ 465 ; Kuldeep Singh Vs. The Commissioner of Police and Others, AIR 1999 SC 677 : (1999) 81 FLR 630 : (1999) 8 JT 603 : (1999) 1 LLJ 604 : (1998) 6 SCALE 588 : (1999) 2 SCC 10 : (1999) SCC(L&S) 429 : (1998) 3 SCR 594 Supp : (1999) AIRSCW 129 : (1998) 9 Supreme 452 ; Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao and Others Vs. State of A.P. thr. Secretary, AIR 2010 SC 589 : (2009) 12 JT 416 : (2009) 12 SCALE 611 : (2009) 10 SCC 654(1) : (2009) 14 SCR 1 and Babu Vs. State of Kerala, (2010) 4 Crimes 119 : (2010) 8 JT 560 .

Hence, where there is evidence of malpractice, gross irregularity or illegality, interference is permissible."

In order to claim perversity, writ petitioner has to establish how it is perverse, which the writ petitioner, has miserably failed to do so, thus, cannot raise question of perversity.

The standard of proof in disciplinary inquiry and in criminal proceedings is on different footing. In disciplinary inquiry, the charge is to be proved by preponderance of probabilities and not proved beyond reasonable doubt, which is sine qua non in a criminal trial.

It is apt to reproduce para 10 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in R. Periyasamy''s case (supra) herein:

"10. It is interesting to note that the learned Single Judge went to the extent of observing that the concept of preponderance of probabilities is alien to domestic enquiries. On the contrary, it is well known that the standard of proof that must be employed in domestic enquiries is in fact that of the preponderance of probabilities. In Union of India (UOI) Vs. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) LabIC 627 : (1972) 1 LLJ 1 : (1972) 4 SCC 618 : (1972) 2 SCR 218 : (1972) 4 UJ 126 , this Court held that a disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial and thus, the standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. This view was upheld by this Court in State Bank of India and Others Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, (2006) 110 FLR 1159 : (2006) 7 JT 383 : (2006) 3 LLJ 563 : (2006) 8 SCALE 11 : (2006) 7 SCC 212 : (2006) SCC(L&S) 1573 : (2006) 4 SCR 511 Supp : (2007) 2 SLJ 78 . More recently, in State Bank of India and Others Vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey, (2013) 2 ABR 787 : (2013) 2 AD 8 : AIR 2013 SC 904 : (2013) 136 FLR 704 : (2013) 1 JT 409 : (2013) LabIC 957 : (2013) 2 LLJ 1 : (2013) 1 LLN 349 : (2013) LLR 211 : (2013) 1 SCALE 385 : (2013) 2 SCC 740 : (2013) 1 SCC(L&S) 459 : (2013) 1 SCT 745 : (2013) 114 SLJ 331 , this Court observed that a disciplinary authority is expected to prove the charges leveled against a bank-officer on the preponderance of probabilities and not on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Further, in Union Bank of India Vs. Vishwa Mohan, AIR 1998 SC 2311 : (1998) 79 FLR 327 : (1998) 3 JT 118 : (1998) LabIC 2514 : (1998) 1 LLJ 1217 : (1998) 2 SCALE 650 : (1998) 4 SCC 310 : (1998) SCC(L&S) 1129 : (1998) AIRSCW 2216 : (1998) 3 Supreme 550 , this Court was confronted with a case which was similar to the present one. The respondent therein was also a bank employee, who was unable to demonstrate to the Court as to how prejudice had been caused to him due to non-supply of the inquiry authorities report/findings in his case. This Court held that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this were not to be observed, the Court held that the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. Thus in that case the Court set-aside the order of the High Court and upheld the dismissal of the bank employee, rejecting the ground that any prejudice had been caused to him on account of non-furnishing of the inquiry report/findings to him."

Learned counsel for the writ petitioner seriously argued that the punishment is not proportionate. We are of the considered view that in the given circumstances of the case, the punishment cannot be said to be disproportionate because the department has to come down heavily and also to show door to an employee, who is involved in indiscipline, mudslinging and forgery, which is a grave misconduct.

The punishment can be questioned on proportionality if it shocks the conscience of the Court, as held by the Apex Court in its judgment rendered in S.R. Tewari''s case (supra), which is lacking in the present case.

It would also be profitable to reproduce paras 20 and 24 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in P. Gunasekaran''s case (supra) herein:

"20. The impugned conduct of the respondent working as Deputy Office Superintendent in a sensitive department of Central Excise, according to the disciplinary authority, reflected lack of integrity warranting discontinuance in service. That view has been endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal also. Thereafter, it is not open to the High Court to go into the proportionality of punishment or substitute the same with a lesser or different punishment. These aspects have been discussed at quite length by this Court in several decisions including B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1996 SC 484 : (1995) 8 JT 65 : (1996) LabIC 462 : (1996) 1 LLJ 1231 : (1995) 6 SCALE 188 : (1995) 6 SCC 749 : (1995) 4 SCR 644 Supp : (1996) 1 UJ 80 , Union of India and another Vs. G. Ganayutham (Dead) by LRs., AIR 1997 SC 3387 : (1997) 7 JT 572 : (2000) 2 LLJ 648 : (1997) 5 SCALE 606 : (1997) 7 SCC 463 : (1997) SCC(L&S) 1806 : (1997) 3 SCR 549 Supp : (1997) AIRSCW 3464 : (1997) 8 Supreme 269 , Om Kumar and Others Vs. Union of India, (2000) 3 JT 92 : (2000) 7 SCALE 524 : (2001) SCC(L&S) 1039 : (2000) 4 SCR 693 Supp , Management of Coimbatore District Central Co-operative Bank Vs. Secretary, Coimbatore District Central Co-operative Bank Employees Association and Another, (2007) 114 FLR 236 : (2007) 5 JT 628 : (2007) 2 LLJ 724 : (2007) 6 SCALE 45 : (2007) 4 SCC 669 : (2007) 5 SCR 430 , Chairman cum Managing Director, Coal India Limited and Another Vs. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and Others, AIR 2010 SC 75 : (2009) 123 FLR 601 : (2009) 11 JT 472 : (2009) 4 LLJ 672 : (2009) 11 SCALE 608 : (2009) 15 SCC 620 : (2009) 13 SCR 487 : (2009) 7 SLR 546 : (2009) 7 SLR 251 : (2009) 9 UJ 4097 : (2009) AIRSCW 5596 and the recent one in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, AIR 2014 SC 1141 : (2014) AIRSCW 1142 : (2014) 2 JT 574 : (2014) 2 SCALE 163 : (2014) 4 SCC 108 .

21.........................

22.........................

23..........................

The Central Administrative Tribunal, in the order dated 01.02.2001 in O.A. No. 521 of 2000, after elaborately discussing the factual as well as the legal position, has come to the conclusion that the punishment of compulsory retirement is not outrageous or shocking to its conscience, it was not open to the High Court to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings from stage one and direct reinstatement of the respondent with backwages."

One of the charges against the writ petitioner is that he was calling the officers by nick names and was also involved in mudslinging, is indiscipline and that stands proved during the departmental inquiry, is itself a misconduct.

The Apex Court in a case titled as State of Punjab and Others Vs. Ram Singh Ex. Constable, AIR 1992 SC 2188 : (1992) 4 JT 253 : (1992) 2 SCALE 76 : (1992) 4 SCC 54 : (1992) 3 SCR 634 defined the word ''misconduct'' in para 5 of the judgment. It is apt to reproduce para 6 of the judgment herein:

"6. Thus it could be seen that the word ''misconduct'' though not capable of precise definition, its reflection receive its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law and order."

The Apex Court in the cases titled as The Management of Tournamulla Estate Vs. Workmen, AIR 1973 SC 2344 : (1973) LabIC 1465 : (1973) 2 LLJ 241 : (1973) 2 SCC 502 : (1973) 3 SCR 762 , and Lalla Ram Vs. Management of D.C.M. Chemical Works Ltd. and Another, AIR 1978 SC 1004 : (1978) 36 FLR 258 : (1978) LabIC 716 : (1978) 1 LLJ 507 : (1978) 3 SCC 1 : (1978) 3 SCR 82 : (1978) 10 UJ 185 , held that misbehave towards superiors is misconduct, which justifies dismissal. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of para 9 of the judgment reported in Lalla Ram''s case (supra) herein:

"9. Though it is true that private quarrel between an employee and a stranger with which the employer is not concerned as in Agnani''s case (supra) (1963-1 Lab LJ 684) (SC) falls outside the categories of misconduct, it cannot be reasonably disputed that acts which are subversive of discipline amongst employees or misconduct or misbehaviour by an employee which is directed against another employee of the concern may in certain circumstances constitute misconduct so as to form the basis of an order of dismissal or discharge. It cannot also be disputed that the extent of jurisdiction exercisable by an approving authority under S. 33(2)(b) of the Act is very limited as has been clearly and succinctly pointed out by this Court in a number of decisions......... "

The Apex Court in the case titled as Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Narain Singh, AIR 2002 SC 2102 : (2002) 94 FLR 152 : (2002) 1 JT 109 Supp : (2002) LabIC 1709 : (2002) 4 SCALE 525 : (2002) 5 SCC 11 : (2002) 3 SCR 924 : (2002) 2 SCT 1104 : (2002) 3 SLJ 151 : (2002) 2 UJ 846 : (2002) AIRSCW 2172 : (2002) 4 Supreme 207 , held that disobeying the lawful commands, directions or orders of the superior officer is misconduct.

The Apex Court in a case titled as Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board Vs. Jagdish Chandra Sharma, AIR 2005 SC 1924 : (2005) 105 FLR 155 : (2005) 3 JT 102 : (2005) 2 LLJ 156 : (2005) 3 SCC 401 : (2005) SCC(L&S) 417 : (2005) 2 SCR 559 : (2005) 2 SLJ 325 : (2005) AIRSCW 1352 : (2005) 2 Supreme 497 , held that social order for the promotion of welfare of the State and role of discipline in general and especially at the workplace is sine qua non and its cardinality for the prosperity of the organization as well as of the employees is must and if an employee commits breach, is a misconduct and is to be dismissed from service.

Applying the test to the instant case, order of removal from service is reasoned one and cannot be said to be harsh or disproportionate.

While going through the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority read with the impugned judgment, it is crystal clear that the writ petitioner has not made out a case for any interference and has failed on all counts.

Having said so, the impugned judgment is upheld and the writ petition is dismissed alongwith all pending applications.