Roshan Lal vs U.T.Chandigarh

G.S. Chahal, J.

Roshan Lal petitioner by means of this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Articles 226 of he Constitution of India seeks quashing of the complaint Annexure P2 and all consequent proceedings.

The petitioner is being tried for offence under Sections 7 and 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (37 of 1954). The allegations made against the petitioner in brief are to the effect that on 23rd March, 1984, Balbir Singh Inspector visited the premises of Duni Chand, who was found in possession of sixty kilograms of mirch kutti for sale. After serving notice in form VI, the Food Inspector purchased 450 grams of mirch kutti for Rs. 1.85 p. The same was divided into three equal parts, bottled in three dry clean bottles, which were duly labelled, stoppered and sealed. On examination by the Public Analyst it was found that the sample contained rice starch and rice husk and was also coloured with added oil soluble red coaltar dye.

The present petitioner alongwith others was summoned he being the partner of M/s. Diamond Spices.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that rice starch and rice husk are not articles injurious to health and the Public Analyst having not specified as to the exact quantity of these items, no prosecution is competent and further that the paper chromotography test is not a true test to determine the dye found present in the soluble. The Public Analyst has also not specified that red coaltar dye was one of the dyes the use of which as prohibited in the food.

The above contention of the learned counsel has force. In Municipal Committed, Amritsar v. Arjan Singh, 1973 Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases 241 (DB), their Lordships observed that where the foreign substance is not injurious to human health or its presence is not absolutely prohibited in a particular article of food, it will (not ?) be necessary for the Public Analyst to state the quantity of the foreign substance present in the sample.It is only if the foreign substance is injurious to health and its presence is prohibited in particular food and that determination of exact foreign matter will become necessary.

With respect to the second argument, the learned counsel has referred to the following observations in Maya Ram v. The State of Punjab, 1989(2) Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases 320.

"....So far as paper chromatography is concerned, the same could not bring forward whether the coaltar dye used was permissible or nonpermissible. The ordinary dictionary meaning of chromatography is that it is a method of separating substances in a mixture which depend on selective absorption, partition between nonmixing solvents, etc., and which present the substances as a chromatogram, such as a series of visible bands in a vertical tube. And the word "Chromatic'' is a meant to pertain to, or consisting of colours. Thus, paper chromatography would reveal that there is present food colouring on coaltar dye. But on that test to conclude that it was permitted or nonpermitted is rather begging the question. No other data is available on the Public Analyst''s report as to how he had come to the conclusion that the coaltar dye was nonpermitted. It has already been noticed that rule 28 permits use of coaltar dye. The Public Analyst should have excluded in his opinion the possibility of all five permitted coaltar dyes pertaining to red colour. As is plain, no such effort was made. Thus, the report of the Public Analyst cannot be taken as the gospel truth to out weigh normal judicial balancing. If the courts were to blindly follows the report of the Public Analyst, then to my mind it would be in the nature of abdication of judicial functions. It is to be borne in mind that the Public Analyst is just an expert and his opinion evidence should normally be clear and unambiguous so that it is understandable, if not to all, atleast a sizable Section of the people who are nonexperts."

I thus conclude on the basis of the report of the Public Analyst, no charge can be successfully proved against the petitioner. The continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner will be abuse of process of the Court. I hereby, allow this petition and quash complaint Annexure P2 and all consequent proceedings.