Roshan Prasad Sidar vs State of Chhattisgarh and Others

Satish K. Agnihotri, J.—The petitioners, in this batch of petitions, are aggrieved by the cancellation of their respective appointment orders, without affording an opportunity of hearing.

The question of law involved in this batch of petitions, i.e., W.P. (S) Nos. 6713, 6714, 6746, 6793, 7170 and 7335 of 2009 is whether the appointments of the petitioners, who have been appointed after due selection, can be cancelled on the ground of submission of alleged false and forged documents by some of the candidates, without affording an opportunity of hearing? Thus, these petitions are being considered and decided by this common order.

The indisputable facts, in nutshell, in the petitions, are that the petitioners were selected for appointment on the posts of Multipurpose Health Worker, Dresser & Assistant Grade III through proper selection process and they were accordingly appointed. The petitioners joined their respective posts at respective places on 26-8-2003, 26-8-2003, 26-8-2003, 25-8-2003, 26-8-2003 and the petitioner in W.P. (S) No. 7335 of 2009 was joined in the service pursuant to the order dated 1-10-2003, respectively. After some time, the Chief Medical and Health Officer, Raigarh, cancelled the appointment of the petitioners on the ground of submission of false and forged documents, by order dated 31-10-2009. The impugned order has been filed and marked as Annexure P-9 in Writ Petition (S) No. 6713 of 2009.

Being aggrieved, the petitioners have filed these petitions seeking a direction to quash the impugned orders, by which the services of the petitioners have been terminated, and to grant relief of continuation of their services on the respective posts and places.

Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that once the petitioners have been appointed after following proper selection process and after verification of the documents, their appointments cannot be cancelled without affording an opportunity of hearing. Learned Counsel would further submit that the petitioners ought to have been given at least an opportunity of hearing to establish the genuineness or bona fide of the documents, which were allegedly discovered, later on, after a period of about five years, by the authorities, as false and forged documents, after appointment of the petitioners.

Per contra Shri Bhatia, learned Counsel appearing for the State would submit that, in fact, after affording an opportunity of hearing, the termination orders have been passed. Shri Bhatia would next submit that in the appointment order itself, it has been specifically mentioned that at any point of time, if the documents submitted by the candidates are found to be false and forged, the services of the employees may be terminated. Therefore, the impugned termination orders have been passed by the respondent authorities in accordance with law.

I have heard learned Counsel appearing for the parties, perused the pleadings and documents appended thereto.

It is admitted that the petitioners were appointed after due selection process and after verification of their documents. Subsequently, it was found that some of the documents filed by some candidates/petitioners were not genuine; therefore, the appointment orders of the petitioners, which were made pursuant to the selection process, were cancelled.

In this batch of matters, it appears that a notice was issued on 3-10-2009 [Annexure P-8 to W.P. (S) No. 6713 of 2009] to produce the original documents. However, thereafter the petitioners were not afforded any opportunity of hearing to put forward their case before passing the impugned orders.

''Show-cause notice'' implies opportunity of submitting an explanation to a clear unambiguous notice. Thus, in the facts of the case an information was brought in the knowledge of the petitioners without giving show-cause notice to file response to prove genuineness or bonafide of the documents.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax and Others Vs. Subhash and Company, , observed as under :

The term "notice" originated from the Latin word "notice" which means "a being known" or a knowing and is wide enough in legal circle to include a plaint filed in a suit. "Notice" has been defined in various judicial dictionaries and dictionaries as follows:

The Judicial Dictionary, Words and Phrases Judicially Interpreted, 2nd Edn., by F. Stroud (p. 1299).

Notice is a direct and definite statement of a thing, as distinguished from supplying materials from which the existence of such thing may be inferred.

Webster''s Universal College Dictionary, 1997 Edn., (p. 543)

Information, warning or announcement of something impending; notification; to give notice of one''s intentions; a written or printed statement conveying such information or warning; as for renting or employment, that the agreement will terminate on a specified date-- ''She gave her employer two weeks'' notice''.

Oxford Concise Dictionary:

an intimation; intelligence, warning" and has the meaning in the expression like "give notice", "have notice" or "formal intimation of something or instruction to do something" and has the expression like "notice to quit", "till further notice".

Chamber''s 20th Century Dictionary, 1993 (p. 1154):

intimation; announcement; information; warning; a writing, placard etc. conveying an intimation or warning; time allowed for preparation, etc.

Chamber''s Dictionary vide Allied Chambers (India) Ltd., Reprint 1994, 1995 (p.1154):

intimation; announcement; a formal announcement made by one of the parties to a contract of his or her intention to terminate that contract; information, especially about a future event; warning; a writing; placard, board etc. conveying an intimation or warning; time allowed for preparation; cognizance; observation; heed; mention; a dramatic or artistic review; civility or respectful treatment; a notion etc.

Law Lexicon Dictionary-- A Legal Dictionary of Legal Terms and Phrases Judicially Defined, 4th Edn., Vol. II, 1989 (p. 226):

A person is said to have notice of a fact, when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for willful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made or gross negligence, he would have known it.

The Law Lexicon Dictionary, 2nd Edn., 1997 (p. 1322):

(1) Intimation; a writing; placard, board, etc. conveying an intimation or warning (Section 154, IPC and Article 61(2)(a), Constitution of India);

(2) Knowledge or cognizance (Section 56, Indian Evidence Act).

"Notice", in its legal sense, may be defined as information concerning a fact actually communicated to a party by an authorized person, or actually derived by him from a proper source, or else presumed by law to have been acquired by him, which information is regarded as equivalent to knowledge in its legal consequences. Dictionary further states: Co Lit 309 Tomlin''s Law Dictionary.

Notice is making something known, of what a man was or might be ignorant of before. And it produces diverse effects, for, by it, the party who gives the same shall have the same benefit, which otherwise he should not have had; the party to whom the notice is given is made subject to some action or charge, that otherwise he had not been liable to; and his estate in danger of prejudice.

"Notice is a direct and definite statement of a thing as distinguished from supplying materials from which the existence of such thing may be inferred." (Per Parke, B Burgh v. Legge).

The dictionary gives some other definitions of "notice" as:

--The legal instrumentality by which knowledge is conveyed, or by which one is charged with knowledge.

--The term ''notice'' in its full legal sense embraces a knowledge of circumstances that ought to induce suspicion or belief, as well as direct information of that fact.

--In its popular sense ''notice'' is equivalent to information intelligence, or knowledge.

Under the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that it cannot be held that proper opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioners before passing the impugned orders. In the present cases, it appears that no opportunity of hearing as required under the principles of natural justice and fair play in action was afforded.

It is well settled principle of law that if any order visits with civil consequences, the same is vitiated, if passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the employee(s). [See : Shrawan Kumar Jha and others Vs. State of Bihar and others, , D.K. Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., , Basudeo Tiwary Vs. Sido Kanhu University and Others, , Canara Bank and Others Vs. Shri Debasis Das and Others, , Viveka Nand Sethi Vs. Chairman, J and K Bank Ltd. and Others, , Mohd. Sartaj and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , Inderpreet Singh Kahlon and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, , Ashok Kumar Sonkar Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , State of Manipur and Others Vs. Y. Token Singh and Others, , Jaswant Singh Pratap Singh Jadeja v. Rajkot Municipal Corporation and Anr. (2007) 10 SCC 71 , Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan Vs. Mehbub Alam Laskar, , State of Punjab and Others Vs. Constable Avtar Singh (dead) through LRs., .

This Court, in the matter of Ku. Punam and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. (2008) 2 CGLJ 366, wherein an identical issue came up for consideration, observed as under:

It is well settled that the purpose of rules of natural justice is not to administer justice alone but to prevent miscarriage of justice and the principles of natural justice are applicable to the administrative order, if such order affects right of a citizen.

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Applying well settled principle of law to the facts of the cases, there is a common thread that the principle of natural justice is not unruly horse. The principles of natural justice are required to be complied with, having regard to the facts situation obtained therein. Thus, the principles of natural justice may not be required to be followed in the cases, where the facts are admitted. Secondly, that it is practically impossible or highly improbable to afford an opportunity of hearing, in the event, of quashing of selection on account of irregularity committed on mass scale, or en-masse cancellation. Thirdly, no useful purpose would be served by affording an opportunity of hearing.

Subsequently, the ratio laid down by this Court in Ku. Punam (supra), has been referred approvingly in Mrityunjay Shukla and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation Raipur and Ors. (2009) 1 CGLJ 97.