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Judgment
113 paragraphs · 2,525 wordsP. Chandra Reddy C.J.
In these revision cases filed by the aggrieved landlords against the judgment of the Court of Small Causes at Madras in H.R.A. Nos. 122 and
123 of 1963 the controversy centres round Section 14 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and the Rules. The Petitioners
purchased the ground and premises Nos. 111 and 112, Kodambakkam High Road, Madras on 16th February 1961, from the former owner for a
sum of about three lakhs of rupees. Thereafter they required by a notice the tenants in occupation of the building standing on the land, including the
Respondent, to deliver vacant possession of the premises in their occupation for the reasons mentioned therein, the chief of it being that they were
required for demolition and rebuilding. As they did not succeed in obtaining vacant possession of the same they initiated the proceedings giving rise
to these appeals before the House Rent Controller, Madras.
It was inter alia stated in the petition that after the purchase the Petitioners applied to the Corporation of Madras for sanction of the lay out plan
for premises Nos. 111 and 112, Kodambakkam High Road preliminary to the construction of new buildings. But the Corporation had written to
say the plan would be sanctioned only after the existing buildings were demolished. It was in such a situation, with the idea of demolishing the
buildings for reconstruction, that the Petitioners called upon the Respondent by their notice, dated 14th August 1961, to vacate the premises.
The petitions were opposed on the objection that the rent for the buildings in question being in excess of Rs. 250, it was beyond the jurisdiction
of the Rent Controller to entertain the petitions and that in any event as the allegation regarding demolition and reconstruction having been put
forward for the first time in the present petition it was not bona fide. This opposition of the Respondent did not prevail with the Rent Controller. On
the materials before him he came to the conclusion that there were two tenancies for Rs. 250 and Rs. 100 respectively and as such it did not fall
within the ambit of Section 30 of the Act, and that being so, the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller was not ousted in this behalf, and that the
building was bona fide required by the landlord for demolition and reconstruction.
Against that judgment the tenant carried an appeal to the Court of Small Causes, Madras. The appellate authority while agreeing with the
conclusion of the Rent Controller that the rent paid for each of the tenancies did not exceed Rs. 250 came to the conclusion that the matter foil
within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. However, he reversed the decision of the Rent Controller in the view that in the petition for eviction
the landlords had not averred that the buildings were old and required for demolition and reconstruction, and that further they had not fully decided
as to whether they should construct a cinema theatre or a hotel on the site of the present building and that a part of the new building may be used
for residence. Says the learned Judge:
It is improbable that the Respondents without even finally deciding about the nature of the construction to be put up by them on the site of the
present building whether a cinema theatre or a hotel would require the building for demolition.
Consequently he found that, the Respondents'' request was not true and bona fide.
In these revision petitions filed by the landlords this opinion of the appellate authority is impugned by Sri Tiruvenkatachari. It is urged by learned
Counsel that as the buildings were required for demolition and reconstruction it was not necessary to prove that they were old and decrepit and as
such have to be pulled down. All that was necessary to make out was that the landlords genuinely required the buildings for demolition and
reconstruction. He also assailed the view of the learned Judge as to bona fides on the ground that it is opposed to the evidence on record and also
unsustainable in law.
Before we deal with the merits of these contentions it is useful to read Section 14 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,
hereinafter called the Act, the correct interpretation of which furnishes an answer to the questions raised in these revision cases. That section,
omitting the unnecessary portions, reads thus:
Recovery of possession by landlord for repairs or for reconstruction--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but subject to the
provisions of Sections 12 and 13, on an application made by a landlord, the Controller shall, if he is satisfied--
(a) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the building being vacated or;
(b) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the
purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished; pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of
the building to the landlord before a specified date.
(2) No order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building under this section shall be passed--
(a) on the ground specified in clause (a) of Sub-section (1), unless the landlord gives an undertaking that the building shall on completion of the
repairs, be offered to the tenant, who delivered possession in pursuance of an order under Sub-section (1) for his re-occupation before the expiry
of three months from the date of recovery of possession by the landlord, or before the expiry of such further period as the Controller may, for
reasons to be recorded in writing, allow; or
(b) on the ground specified in clause (6) of Sub-section (1), unless the landlord gives an undertaking that the work of demolishing any material
portion of the building shall be substantially commenced by him not later than one month and shall be completed before the expiry of three months
from the date he recovers possession of the entire building or before the expiry of such further period as the Controller, may, for reasons to be
recorded in writing, allow....
We are concerned here mainly with Section 14(1)(6) of the Act. It is manifest that the only requirement of Section 14(1)(6) is the honest desire
of the landlord to demolish the building and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building
sought to be demolished. There is nothing in the language of this clause to warrant the view that the building should be old and decrepit. The
expression bona fide occurring in that clause cannot sustain the opinion that it is only when a building is old and in a dilapidated condition that it
could be demolished for the purpose of putting up a new construction so as to attract clause (b) of Section 14(1). The import of that section is that
the desire or the intention to demolish and rebuild should be honestly entertained by the landlord. It should not be a device to evict the tenant.
Moreover there are sufficient safeguards in the statute itself against such devices in the shape of Section 14(2)(6), Section 16 and Section 33(3)
(6). u/s 14(2)(b), to which we have already referred, an undertaking has to be given by the landlord that the work of demolishing any material
portion of the building would be substantially commenced by him not later than one month and that any violation of this undertaking will visit the
landlord with the penal consequences contemplated by Section 33(3)(b), viz., conviction and a punishment with a fine extending to one thousand
rupees. Additionally Section 16 of the Act enables the tenant to occupy the building after giving notice of his intention in that behalf if the landlord
fails to commence the work of demolition within the period of one month. In this situation it is difficult to agree with the conclusion of the learned
City Civil Judge that the landlord has also to prove that the building was too old and decrepit. In our opinion that requisite is not contemplated by
clause (6) of Section 14(1) of the Act.
There is abundant authority for this view of ours. In Neta Ram Vs. Jiwan Lal, it was ruled that in order to obtain an order for ejectment of his
tenant on the ground of its being required for reconstruction the landlord has only to satisfy the Rent Controller about the genuineness of his claim
and that this could be established by looking at all the surrounding circumstances such as the condition of the building, its situation, the possibility of
its being put to a more profitable use after construction, the means of the landlord and so on. In the course of the judgment it was observed by
Hidayatullah J., who spoke for the Court, that in deciding whether the building is required by the landlord for reconstruction, or for its replacement
by another building or for erection of other buildings, the Court must have regard to the bona fides of the request of the landlord, which meant that
the desire to rebuild the premises should be honestly held by the landlord, but that the condition of the building also played an important part in
determining whether the landlord had the intention genuinely and was not using this excuse as a device to get rid of the tenant.
Thus it is not essential to establish that the building is in a very old and dilapidated condition. That this is so, also appears from several
judgments of single Judges of this Court.
This matter was elaborately dealt with by Ramamurti J., in Badsha v. Manga Devi ILR (1965) 2 Mad. 53 and by Venkatadri J., in
Chandrasekara Chetty v. Kakumani Adikesavalu Chetty''s Charities (1965) 78 L.W. 326. The learned Judges, after referring to the decided cases
and after reviewing the case law on the subject, held that it was the genuineness of the desire to demolish and rebuild that was relevant and that it
was not essential to prove that the building was very old. The two judgments of Anantanarayanan J., in Mehsin Bhai v. Hale & Co. Madras (1964)
77 L.W. 194 and Sha Manakchand v. Sankarji Moolchand (1965) 78 L.W. 350 are not helpful to the Petitioners, as the learned Judge has not
laid as a universal proposition of law that the age of the building is the determining factor in relation to the application u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act.
The dictum in Bhulan Singh and Others Vs. Ganendra Kumar Roy Chowdhury, also strengthens our view. Construing an analogous provision in
the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1948 which lays down.
Nothing in this sub-section shall apply where the premises are bona fide required by the landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding, or
for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held,--
Harries C.J., delivering the judgment of the Bench, observed:
It was suggested that this provision giving the landlord a right to possession, if he established that he required the premises bona fide for rebuilding,
could have no application whatsoever unless the state of the premises was such that they required to be built. It is to be observed that proviso (f)
to Section 11(1) of the Act does not mention premises requiring rebuilding. What it states is that Sub-section (1) shall have no application if the
landlord requires the premises bona fide for rebuilding. The state of the premises therefore is not an essential factor in the case. However, it cannot
be overlooked that in this case the learned Judge has accepted the evidence of a witness which showed that these premises were very old,
dilapidated, dangerous and likely to fall if extensive repairs were not done to them quickly.
Thus having regard to the language of the relevant statutory provisions and the decided cases the conclusion is irresistible that it is not
necessary for the landlord to prove that the building was very old and unfit for occupation to succeed in obtaining orders u/s 14(1)(b).
There remains the question relating to the bona fides of the Petitioners. In this context it should be remembered that the first Petitioner
categorically stated in his evidence that he bought the building with land, for demolition and reconstruction and that he applied to the Corporation
for sanction of the lay out for the premises shortly after he purchased the property. But the Corporation wanted him to submit the plan after
completion of the demolition. He also filed a copy of the plan that was sent to the Corporation. This evidence of his stood uncontradicted. The
Respondent has not stated anything to the contrary. In fact he admitted that building No. 3 has been largely demolished which substantiates the
statement of the Petitioners that they needed this building for demolition and reconstruction. Further, it is not suggested that the Petitioner is not
possessed of sufficient means to carry out the demolition and the re-construction operations. Indisputably the Petitioners purchased this property
for about three lakhs of rupees and they are well-to-do men, having the where withal to demolish and put up new buildings. The fact that the
landlords have not decided as to what use they should put a part of the building after its reconstruction is not decisive. From that one tiling alone it
cannot be inferred that the Petitioners had not made up their minds as to whether the building should be demolished and a new construction put up
in its place. The finding of the Judge of the Court of Small Causes at Madras arrived at without any reference to the evidence on record and the
admission of the Respondent cannot be sustained. The Rent Controller, after careful consideration of the material before him reached a decision
that it was required for demolition and reconstruction and there was no material on the basis of which that finding could be disturbed. As we have
already said, the Judge of the Court of Small Causes gave the finding without any regard to the material on record and without appreciating the
scope and ambit of Sub-Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. In these circumstances, the decision of the appellate authority is unsustainable and has to be
set aside and that of the Rent Controller restored.
The Respondent requests us to grant him some time to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises and to be permitted to remove the
structures put up by him. The Petitioners are willing to give him nine months from 1st August 1965, that is, till 30th April 1966. They have also no
objection to the Respondent removing the structures put up by him, but within that time. Ordered accordingly.
The civil revision petitions are allowed with costs throughout in one.
