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Rudrappa Layappa alias Harijan Kamble vs Riyaz Ahamed

Karnataka High Court · Decided on 1 June 2016 · Citation: (2016) 3 AirKarR 675

HON’BLE JUDGES
Raghvendra S. Chauhan, J.
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 39 Rule 1, Order 39 Rule 2 · Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 201716 of 2016
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Judgment

10 paragraphs · 658 words

Raghvendra S. Chauhan, J.—The petitioner, Mr. Rudrappa, challenged the legality of order dated 21.03.2016 passed by the Principal Civil Judge Vijaypur, whereby the learned Civil Judge directed the Circle Police Inspector, Rural Circle Vijaypur to implement his order dated 03.11.2015 and to give police help to the plaintiff Mr. Riyaz Ahamed.

2.

Briefly the facts of the case are that Mr.Riyaz Ahamed had filed a civil suit, namely O.S.No.612/2015, against the petitioner, Mr. Rudrappa, and against respondent No. 2, Mr. Hanamant, for permanent injunction. Along with the plaint Mr. Riyaz Ahamed had filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. By order dated 03.11.2015, the learned Trial Court had allowed the temporary injunction application and had directed the petitioner not to disturb the plaintiff''s peaceful possession. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the said order, he had filed a Miscellaneous Appeal. However, by order dated 02.01.2016, the Lower Appellate Court dismissed the said appeal, and confirmed the order dated 03.11.2015. Aggrieved by the order dated 02.01. 2016, the petitioner filed a writ petition before this Court. The writ petition is presently pending before this Court.

3.

Meanwhile, the plaintiff filed an application under Section 151 of C.P.C., before the learned Trial Court and prayed for both police protection to his life, and to his property, and prayed that the police be directed to implement the order dated 03.11.2015 passed in his favour. The petitioner filed his objections to the said application. However, by order dated 21.03.2016, the learned Trial Court allowed the said application in the aforementioned terms. Hence, this petition before this Court.

4.

Sri. Ashok S. Kinagi, the learned counsel for petitioner submits that, in case the petitioner violated the temporary injunction, the plaintiff had an alternate remedy of filing an application under Order 39, Rule 2A of C.P.C. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was not justified in directing the police to implement the order of temporary injunction. In order to support the said plea the learned counsel for petitioner relied on the case of Manchegowda and another v. M. Madaiah 1987 (1) Kar 119.

5.

Heard the learned counsel for petitioner and perused the impugned order.

6.

A bare perusal of the impugned order clearly reveals that the plaintiff had pleaded before the learned Trial Court that the petitioner and respondent No. 2 are flauting the order dated 03.11.2015 as they are powerful men with political connection. The plaintiff had also pleaded that both his life and property are in jeopardy. Therefore, he sought not only police protection, but also sought direction from the learned Trial Court for implementing the order dated 03.11.2015.

7.

Once an order been passed by the Trial Court injuncting the defendant from disturbing the peaceful possession of plaintiff, the Trial Court inherent power to ensure the implementation of this injunction order.

8.

Although, in the case of Manchegowda and another (supra) this Court did hold that the Trial Court could not direct the police to implement the order of terhporary injunction, but subsequently in the case of Papanna v. Nagachari and others, 1996 (2) Kar LJ 74 and in the case of Smt. Karisiddamma and others v. Smt. Sanna Kenchamma, KCCR SN 170, this Court clearly opined that the Trial Court inherent power under Section 151 of C.P.C., to ensure that its injunctory orders are duly implemented. Thus, (he Trial Court can direct the police to ensure that the injunction order is carried out.

9.

Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner is unjustified in claiming that the Trial Court is prevented from issuing any direction to the police for implementing the temporary injunction order. Such contention is belied by judgments of this Court in the case of Papanna (supra) and in the case of Smt. Karisiddamma and others (supra).

10.

For the reasons stated above this Court does not find any merit in the present writ petition. It is, hereby, dismissed. No order as to costs.