Ruldu Ram vs The State of Punjab

Swatanter Kumar, J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Special Judge, Bhatinda dated 21.7.1986. The appellant Ruldu Ram and one Goverdhan Dass were sent by the officer incharge of Police Station Sardulgarh to face trial u/s 7 of Essential Commodities Act. The case sought to be proved by the prosecution before the trial Court was that on 11.8.1983 at 2.00 P.M. Bakhshish Singh Dhillon, Agricultural Officer, Manjit Singh and Amrik Singh Duggal Inspectors of Agriculture went to the shop of Kansal Agriculture Store situated at Sirsa Road, Sardulgarh for checking of fertilizers. Ruldu Ram appellant was present at the shop and he was transacting business there. Ruldu Ram is stated to have produced stock register which contained balance of 223 bags of fertilizers of N.F.L. quality, but on physical verification no such bags were found at the shop. Stock registers did not show any Urea lying in the shop for sale, but 28 bags of such Urea were lying in the shop for sale. These were rebated bags. Ruldu Ram failed to produce any licence for storage of these fertilizers. The inspecting team had taken samples of Urea. Joginder Singh Sub-Inspector arrived at the shop in response to a telephonic call by Bakhshish Singh Dhillon and took these bags into custody by a recovery memo.

The appellant along with Goverdhan Dass were charge-sheeted for an offence u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. The prosecution examined five witnesses in support of its case. Upon recording of the evidence and completion of trial, the learned Special Judge found Ruldu Ram guilty of an offence u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for violating clauses 3, 5 and 14 of the Punjab Food Grains Dealers Licensing and Price Control Order, 1978, issued u/s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act and convicted him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, or in default of payment of fine to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for three months. However, Goverdhan Dass was acquitted. Aggrieved from this judgment and order of conviction the present appeal has been filed.

The basic and only submission made on behalf of the appellant is that the appellant was charged u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for committing violations of the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957, but lie has been convicted for violating the provisions of the Punjab Food Grains Dealers Licensing and Price Control Order, 1978.

To appreciate this submission of learned counsel for the appellant it will be relevant to notice that the learned Special Judge on the basis of F.I.R. No. 249 dated 11.8,1983, which was registered u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act but was for violation of Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957, framed the following charge on 11.10,1985:-

"That on 11.8.1983 at about 2 P.M., at Sardulgarh, accused Ruldu Ram and Goverdhan Dass were partners of Kansal Agricultural Store, Sardulgarh, and being incharge and responsible for the aforesaid firm, were dealing in the fertilizers without obtaining any licence from the competent licensing authorities, and you also did not maintain true accounts in respect of the stock and sale of the fertilizers, and you both violated the provisions of the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S.7, Essential Commodities Act, and within my cognizance."

The evidence adduced by all the witnesses recorded referred to the violation in regard to the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1985 i.e. not having the fertilizers in possession which were reflected in the stock register maintained under the said Order and as well as having in excess the fertilizers stocks which were not recorded in the stock registers. There is no doubt that both the above orders are issued u/s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. One is intended to govern the items ''Food Grains''. The ''Food Grains'' have been defined wider subsection (c) of Section 2 of the Punjab Food Grains Dealers and Price Control Order, 1978. Schedule I annexed to this Order does not indicate any commodity other than the food grains. While the Fertilizers (Control) Order operates in an entirely different field. The object of the Fertilizer Control Order is to maintain the proper standards and regulate supply and use of the fertilizers and to prevent sub-standard fertilizers being used by the dealers as described under the provisions of the said Order. Thus it is clear that both these orders of 1978 and 1985 respectively operate in a different, distinct and a field which is exclusive to each other and there is nothing common in this regard. Once the legislation has restricted the scope of each Order for a definite purpose and with a definite scheme under the said Orders, their intermingling and inter-exchange especially in criminal prosecution can neither be permissible nor proper.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has argued that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner as the charge was also u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and he has also been convicted u/s 7 of the Act. This argument hits the very root of criminal jurisprudence and need not detain the Court any longer. The purpose of framing a charge against the accused is to make him aware of the offence for which he is to be tried. This will be farfetched to say that an accused can be charged for one offence, and whether that charge is proved or not, he could not be convicted for another offence. The very purpose of providing protection to the accused by framing a charge would be frustrated if the contention of learned counsel for the State is accepted. The defences available to the accused under both these Orders are totally different and distinct. A serious prejudice is bound to be caused to the light of the appellant if such a practice is permitted to exist. In fact it will tantamount to convicting an accused without affording him opportunity of fair trial. It was expected of the trial Court that it should have gone through the contents of the charge before punishing the appellant for an offence other than the offence for which he was charged. A criminal trial upon presentation of the challan and upon framing of charge, till conviction, is a continuous process and cannot vary from stage to stage. The accused can be charged for an offence which the Court deems fit and proper on the basis of the record and report produced before it by the prosecution agency. But once such charge is framed the Court has no option but to convict or'' acquit the accused on the basis of that charge and cannot, in law, find the accused guilty of an offence for which he has not been charged and especially when the ingredients of such an offence and defence available to the accused are entirely distinct and different.

Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a judgment of this Court in case of Satish v. Kammuddin and Anr. 1992 (3) CLR 767. The Court held as under:-

"In the instant case as the petitioner was neither summoned to stand trial for an offence u/s 406 I.P.C., nor he was charged for that offence, he could not have been held guilty for the same and his sentence u/s 406 I.P.C. is liable to be set aside on this ground alone."

He further relies upon another judgment of Mysore High Court in the case of Bheemappa Bhemappa Korawar and Another Vs. State of Mysore, , wherein it was held as under:

"Although, the charge sheet stated that an offence u/s 414 of the Penal Code had also been committed by the accused, the Magistrate framed no charge with respect to that offence. That being so and since the ingredients of an offence punishable u/s 414 are not the ingredients of an offence punishable u/s 380 or 457 of the Penal Code, and since there can be no conviction "Under Section 414 of the Penal Code unless the accused voluntarily assist the concealment or disposal of property which they knew or had reason to believe to be stolen property, and the petitioners in the present case had no opportunity to meet any such charge. I allow this revision petition and set aside the conviction of the petitioners and the sentence imposed on them."

For the reasons recorded above, I allow this appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Special Judge and acquit the appellant of the charge(s) framed against him.