Ruokuolhoulie Angami vs State of Nagaland and Others

H.K. Sema, J.—Heard Mr. Meruno, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. E.Y. Renthungo, Learned Junior Government Advocate for the Respondents No. 1 and 2 and Mr. B.N. Sarma, Learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 3.

In this writ petition, the Petitioner has assailed the impugned order dated 14.2.96 posting 3rd Respondent as Assistant Commissioner of Taxes to Mobile Squad at Dirnapur in supersession of the previous transfer order dated 5.12.95.

This case has chequered history and factual matrix may be briefly stated. By an order dated 17th October ''95, the Government of Nagaland, Finance Department transferred as many as 3 officers including the 3rd Respondent in public interest.

In the aforesaid order the 3rd Respondent, Assistant Commissioner of Taxes, Dimapur Zone, Dimapur was transferred and posted to Mokokchung Zone. This order was modified by another order dated 5th December 95 keeping in abeyance of the transfer of the 3rd Respondent to Mokokchung. The order dated 5.12.95 modifying the order dated 17.10.95 has an important bearing and it is extracted:

In partial modification of this Department''s order of even number dt. 17.10.95. In the interest of Public Service the Governor of Nagaland is pleased to keep in abeyance the transfer of Shri. M. Ajem, Assistant Commissioner Taxes, Dimapur and Shri. K. Patton, Assistant Commissioner of Taxes, Dimapur is transferred and posted to Mokokchung Zone with immediate effect.

The aforesaid order dated 5th December 95 has been assailed by one of the effected Government servant in Civil Rule No. 62 (K) 95. Tins Court on 12.12.95 issued rule and suspended the modification order dated 5.12.95 in terms of the following:

This Court has held repeatedly that for cancellation, modification or kept in abeyance of the transfer order passed in Public interest must be supported with sufficient reasons. From the impugned order dated 5.12.95, it clearly appears no reasons whatsoever has been assigned necessitating the passing of the modification order.

The present impugned order dated 14.2,96 which has been assailed in this writ petition has been passed again in supersession of the order dated 5.12.95. The impugned order dated 14.2,96 reads:

The Governor of Nagaland is pleased to order the transfer and posting of Shri, M. Ajem Jamir, Asstt. Commissioner of Taxes to Mobile Squad at Dimapur with immediate effect.

This supersedes the previous transfer order issued vide No. FIN/7AX/23/75 dt. 5.12.95.

From the facts as alluded above it clearly shows that within the span of almost 4 months, as many as 3 transfer order has been passed in respect of the 3rd Respondent without assigning any reason. Therefore, it cannot be said to be in public interest.

From the impugned order dated 5th December 95 which has been assailed in another Civil Rule No. 162 (K) 95 and the order dated 14.2.96 which has been assailed in this Civil Rule, it clearly appears that no reasons has been assigned necessitating the modification or supersession of the transfer order dated 17th October 95 passed in Public interest.

This Courrin a catena of decision has held that, for cancellation, modification or keeping in abeyance of the transfer order passed in Public interest must be supported with sufficient reasons necessitating for passing such order. The view taken by this Court has rationale behind it. Once the transfer order is made in public interest Court normally do not interfere unless the order is passed with malafide or against the statutory rules. The only way open to the aggrieved Government servant is to file a representation before the competent authority to redress his grievances. But this Court insist that for cancellation/modification or keeping it in abeyance of such order must be supported with sufficient reasons, because transfer of officers are always made in public interest and after elaborate exercise as to who should be transferred where in the exigency of the administration. While processing the transfer order, various factors are taken into consideration. One such factors being the duration of the stationing of one officer in a particular station for a long time. If an officer is posted in a particular station for a long time, no doubt, that he also acquires a considerable knowledge about the administration of the area, but at the same time he also often establishes vested interest in the area because of his long association and to avoid such eventualities timely posting is always called for. Therefore, if the transfer order made in public interest is allowed to be taken away by another cryptic order modifying/cancelling or keeping in abeyance of the transfer order without assigning any, reasons, it ceases to be in public interest. Therefore, it must be held that the order has been passed at the whims and caprice of the authorities exercising the power. Public interest would not be allowed to be sacrificed at the altar of the whims and caprice of the authority exercising the power. It must be grasped that public authority possesses power to use for public interest.

Mr. B.N. Sarma, Learned Counsel appearing for the 3rd Respondent at the outset contended that the basic foundation of the issuance of writ of mandamus is an infringement of legal right and since the Petitioner has no legal right to continue in the post of Asstt. Commissioner (MS), this writ petition is not maintainable. This question has been answered by this Court on 22.2.96. While suspending the impugned order dated 14.2.96 assailed in this writ petition, this Court observed, that the issuance of a rule and interim order would not preclude the competent authority for passing necessary posting order in respect of the Petitioner. This apart, there is a specific prayer in this writ petition for quashing the impugned order dated 14.2.96 as being arbitrary, illegal and malafide. Under the above circumstances, the contention of Mr. B.N. Sarma cannot be accepted.

As already said, the impugned order dated 14.2.96 and the impugned order dated 5.12.95 as quoted above lacks reason, let alone sufficient reasons and therefore, it cannot stand the scrutiny of the law. The impugned order dated 14.2.96 is accordingly quashed and set aside.

With the aforesaid direction, this petition is allowed. Parties are asked to bear their costs.