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Judgment
S.C. Sharma, J.—Regard being had to the similar controversy involved in these cases, they have been heard analogously together with the consent of the parties and a common order is being passed in the matter. Facts of Writ Petition No. 1254/2014 are narrated as under:--
The petitioners before this Court have filed this present petition being aggrieved by non-disclosure of raw marks as well as the method and procedure adopted by the respondents in conducting Common Admission Test, 2003 which is a test conducted for admissions to various Indian Institutes of Managements.
The contention of the petitioners is that in the year 2013 the Common Test committee has authorised the Indian Institute of Management, Indore for conducting common admission test and a notification to that effect was issued by the respondent No. 2 in the month of May, 2013. The petitioners have appeared in the Common Admission Test, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the " CAT, 2013") and the result was declared on 14.1.2014. The petitioners have enclosed their score card as Annexure-P/2. The petitioners have further contended that a method has been adopted by the respondents which includes the process of scaling the raw marks of the students, which the students have obtained, and finally after scaling the result is declared. The contention of the petitioners is that there are many flaws which have taken place while scaling the marks and the students are certainly entitled to know the raw marks obtained by them. The petitioners have further stated that the process of selection which has taken place is not a transparent process and the respondents are required to reveals the raw marks, to publish the normalization of process establishing as to how the raw marks are the scaled. It has been further stated that the petitioners have done very well in the examination and were hoping to receive higher percentile, however on account of faulty process of evaluation, the petitioners and other several brilliant students have received the less percentile. The petitioners in short have raised various grounds in respect of process and procedure adopted by the respondents in the matter of grant of percentile and finally have prayed for following reliefs:--
"(A) The respondent No. 1 to 3 may kindly be directed to disclose the Raw marks of the petitioners and other CAT Aspirants obtained by them in CAT Exam 2013 and further the respondents may kindly be directed to disclose the Right answer keys, Method of scaling/ normalization of Raw scores and answer sheets.
(B) Kindly struck down the online examination conducted by the respondents as their process of Scaling/Normalization is against the settled principles of the Natural Justice and right to equality and further respondents be directed to hold or Conduct re-examination transparently."
A detailed and exhaustive reply has been filed by the respondent No. 4- IIM, Indore and it has been stated that IIM, Indore has certainly conducted the CAT, 2013 and they have followed the Item Response Theory (IRT). It has further been stated that raw scores are used in traditional examination system based upon the Classical Test Theory (CTT) while in computing the CAT scores in order to enhance sensitivity of the results, the respondents have applied the raw scores to a process of equating and scaling using highly sophisticated mathematical modeling called as the Item Response Theory (IRT). The respondents have further stated that raw scores cannot be accurately used to assess candidates inter se ability in an examination formate such as CAT, which involves numerous exam forms and requires testing over multiple sessions spread over a number of days. It has further been stated that the Item Response Theory is more reliable and an accurate tool in the process of selection and the CAT Committee in charge of holding the examination, is a body expert in the field of academic valuation. It has further been stated that the evaluation process based on Item Response Theory rather than the Classical Test Theory is purely a matter of academic policy and cannot be subjected to a challenge in a writ petition. It has further been stated that in light of the various judgments the scope of interference by this Court in respect of correctness, suitability or appropriateness of an education policy is quite limited. The courts are neither equipped nor have the academic or technical background to substitute themselves in place of professional technical bodies and to take decisions in academic matters involving the process of evaluation, ranking and selection of candidates for admission with reference to their performance. It is a purely a technical matter in the academic field. It has further been stated that there has been no violation of any enactment, statutory rule or regulation or notification in the matter nor the procedure adopted is arbitrary or capricious. The respondents have explained the procedure in respect of the Common Admission Test, 2013.
It has been stated Common Admission Test is an entrance test for admission to Post-Graduate Management Programmes of the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) and other participating institutions. It is reputed to be one of the toughest entrance test for admission to management and business schools worldwide.
It has further been contended that Indian Institutes of Management are autonomous institutions independent of each other. They variously use CAT scores in conjunction with other criteria such as written assessment tests, group discussions and interviews. Thus CAT scores are often used as the primary shortlisting criterion for admissions.
The CAT examination is divided into two sections of thirty questions ("items")- (i) Quantitative Ability and Data Interpretation (QA and DI) and (ii) Verbal Ability and Logical Reasoning (VA and LR) each section carrying 225 marks, aggregating 450 marks. The two sections evaluate the candidates in two distinct sets of knowledge and skills; the two sections from mutually-exclusive compartments, and the scores do not correlate across the sections. Contrary to the suggestion made in the writ petition, a high score in one section may not entail a high score in the other section.
The respondents have further contended that they have a large item bank from which questions (items) are drawn. In each examination session, 60% or 18 out of 30 questions are the same, but in each candidate''s test from they are shuffled in a randomly-generated sequence. In other words, question No. 2 for one candidate may be question No. 17 for another candidate appearing in the same session. 40% or 12 out of 30 items are different for each candidate in the same session, generated by the computer by ''Linear On the Fly Testing'' (LOFT). This process drastically reduces the likelihood of candidates using unfair means.
It has been further contended that to the year 2008 the CAT examination was a single-session pencil-and-paper examination where all the candidates attempted the same question paper. However, over the years, the number of candidates taking the examination rose steeply, and conducting CAT in its existing format began causing a severe strain on the administrative system of the IIMs.
It has been further contended that from 2009 the CAT test began to be held as a Computer-Based Test (CBT) in multiple sessions. In the year 2013, 173,738 candidates appeared for the CAT examination. The examination was held in 39 sessions across 19.5 days from 16.10.2013 to 11.11.2013.
Respondents have further stated that holding the examination in a large number of sessions spread over a number of days gives students choice and enables the students from all over India and abroad to appear in the test on the date of their preference without there being a clash with local examination dates. It also eases the logistical strain of holding the computer-based examination, as the examination can only be held in specially designed centers rigorously inspected for security and with computers which have been disinfected of viruses and linked to the central server.
The respondents have further stated that there are various difficulties in evaluating candidates inter se in multiple item and multiple forms tests and in a testing system having diversity of questions (items) for each candidate and involving multiple sessions and different forms over time, various difficulties become apparent at once. It has been stated that questions often differ significantly in level of difficulty. A candidate answering an easy question correctly cannot be awarded the same marks as a candidate answering a difficult question correctly. Secondly, scores obtained from different sessions or forms of a test are required to be compared as if they came from the same test, but test held in multiple sessions will obviously differ in level of difficulty and therefore, it will be apparent that "raw scores" cannot be used to accurately determine candidates'' inter se ability in a multi-session examination, as demanded by the petitioner in this writ petition.
The respondents have also thrown light over the necessity of equating and scaling and the same reads as under:--
"(a) The equating is the statistical process of determining comparable scores across different forms of an examination. The purpose of equating is to adjust for differences in test from difficulty so that the forms can be used interchangeably.
(b) For instance, if a candidate scored 60% on form A and another candidate scored 70% on from B, it will be difficult to know which candidate has a better grasp of over the other. It may will be that from A has very difficult items, while form B is somewhat easy. Equating analysis are performed to address this very issue, so that the scores are as fair as possible."
The respondents have further stated that there are two types of test scores-raw scores and scaled scores. A raw score is a score without any sort of adjustment or transformation, such as the simple number of answers, difficult or easy, answered correctly. A scaled score is the result of the appropriate transformation applied to the raw score.
The respondents have further contended that purpose of scaled scores is to report scores for all candidates on a consistent scale. The respondents have further stated that in case a test has two forms or sessions, and one is more difficult than the other, it has been determined by equating that a score of 65% on form A is equivalent to a score of 68% on form B. Scores on both forms can be converted to a single linear scale so that these two equivalent scores have the same reported scores. For example, they could both have a score of 350 on a scale of 100 to 500. Scaling does not affect the psychometric properties of a test, but takes place after the assessment of raw scores and equating is completed.
The process adopted by the respondents includes various steps, detailed as under:--
"(a) Scoring
The scoring process for CAT 2013 is outlined below :
Step 1 : Raw score is calculated
The candidates''s raw score is calculated for each section based on the number of questions answered correctly (+3 points), incorrectly (-1 point) or left unanswered (0 point).
Step 2 : Raw score is equated
Equating, as stated above, is the statistical process used to adjust score on two or more alternate forms of an assessment so that the scores may be used interchangeably.
Step 3 " Equated raw score is scaled
In order to ensure appropriate interpretation of an equated raw score, the scores are placed on a common scale or metric. A linear transformation is used for this scaling process.
IIM Scaling Model
Section scores = 0 to 225
Total exam score 0 to 450.
(b) Three scaled scores are presented to each candidate - an Over-all scaled score and two separate scaled scores for each section, i.e. (I) Quantitative Ability and Data Interpretation (QA and DI) and (ii) Verbal Ability and Logical Reasoning (VA and LR).
(c) Once scaled scores are established, the final step in the scoring process is to rank candidates according to their inter-se performance. A percentile rank is the percentage of scores that fall below a given score. With the total scaled scores arranged in a rank order from the lowest to the highest, in 100 equally-sized groups, a table with the total scale scores to percentile ranks will be created. This ranked list of candidates will allow for the identification and selection of candidates from the highest performers at the very top of the list. The entire process is performed by a computer and there is no human element in the evaluation."
The respondents have further described the item response theory in detail and the same reads as under:
"Item Response Theory
Item Response Theory, the psychometric theory underlying the above processes, is also known as latent trait theory, strong true score theory, or modern mental test theory. It is a paradigm for the design, analysis and scoring of tests, questionnaires, and similar instruments measuring abilities, attitudes, or other variables. Unlike simpler alternatives for creating scales evaluating questionnaire responses, it does not assume that each item is equally difficult. This, distinguishes IRT. From, for instance, the assumption in other systems of scaling that " All items are assumed to be replications of each other", or in other words, items are considered to be parallel instruments. By contrast, item response theory threats the difficulty of each item as information to be incorporated in scaling items."
It has been further contended that Items Response Theory is based on the application of related mathematical models to testing data. It is generally regarded as superior to the Classical Test Theory, and it is the preferred method for developing scales, especially when optimal decisions are demanded, as in so-called high-stakes test e.g. the IIM CAT examination, or the American Graduate Record Examination (GRE), Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT), Law School Admission Test (LSAT) and Medical College Admission Test (MCAT).
The respondents have also made an attempt to establish before this Court that the item response theory is a better option than the Classical Test Theory. Their contention is that the subject of candidate evaluation using IRT has been studied extensively and its conclusions have proven validity. Two articles explaining the mathematical and theoretical basis of the Item Response Theory are annexed as Annexure-R4/1 and Annexure R4/2.
It has been further contended that the evaluation based on the Item Response Theory is generally considered to be more reliable, subtle, sensitive and an improvement over that based on the Classical Test Theory. For tasks that can be performed using CTT, IRT brings greater flexibility and provides more sophisticated information. Some applications such as computerised adoptive testing, are enabled by IRT and cannot reasonably be performed using only the Classical Test Theory.
The respondents have further stated that the tests based on IRT are well established, and tests using equating and scaling and not raw scores are being used worldwide in highly-regarded academic aptitude testing examinations. The respondents have enclosed certain excerpts from independent websites and articles on the internet in respect of the (I) Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Annexure R4/3, (ii) Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) Annexure R4/4, (iii) Graduate Record Examination (GRE) Annexure R4/5, (iv) Law School Admission Test (LSAT), Annexure R4/6 (v) Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) Annexure R4/7, etc. Prometric Testing Pvt. Ltd./ETS
It has been further contended that the respondent No. 3 Prometric Testing Pvt. Ltd. is a subsidiary of Educational Testing Service, founded in 1947 and the world''s largest private non-profit educational testing and assessment organisation. The respondent No. 2 was selected for carrying out the CAT 2013 examination by a specially-constituted Committee of the experts, the composition of the same has been enclosed as ANX.P/8.
It has been further contended that the respondent No. 3 has long experience as well as an infrastructural set up for conducting similar examinations world-side. Its holding company Educational Testing Service has had a vital role in developing the theoretical framework for modern techniques of ability-evaluation including the Item Response Theory. An internet excerpt providing information about the respondent No. 3 and its holding company is on record as Annexure R-4/8.
The respondents have further stated that they have adopted the method of testing described above with the sole object of creating a more accurate, reliable and sophisticated testing system for admissions to the Indian Institutes of Management and other institutes. Its bona fide and reasonable decision ought not be overturned and substituted by an order to all the Indian Institutes of Management in India to apply only "raw scores" for the purpose of admissions to the Indian Institutes of Management. It has been further stated in the reply that raw scores cannot reflect the true ability of a candidate in a multiple testing window examination such as CAT 2013. Apart from being contrary to principles of academic independence, such a step will be seriously detrimental to the interests of meritorious students and will unjustly affect numerous candidates of very high caliber, who have already gained admission to the Indian Institutes of Management on the strength of merit. The respondents have prayed that the present writ petition be dismissed, with costs.
A rejoinder has been filed by the petitioners and it has been stated that the respondent No. 4 has not disclosed as to how the respondents have applied the Item Response Theory to raw-marks of the CAT 2013 aspirants. It has been stated that until and unless the respondents disclose the manner and method of their own application of Item Response Theory while calculating the CAT score, its correctness cannot be judged. It has also been stated that tabulation sheet has not been furnished in respect of scale and actual marks. It has also been stated that the respondents cannot compare various other examinations with the CAT Examination as done by them. The petitioner has placed heavy reliance upon a judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Singh and Another Vs. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad and Another, AIR 2007 SC 950 : (2007) 2 JT 534 : (2007) 2 SCALE 1 : (2007) 3 SCC 720 : (2007) 1 SCC(L&S) 870 : (2007) 2 SCR 235 : (2007) AIRSCW 707 : (2007) 1 Supreme 639 . The petitioners have placed heavy emphasis upon the aforesaid judgment and have stated that the respondents should have produced actual marks and should have disclosed methodology before this Court.
This Court while hearing the matter has directed the respondents on 21.8.2014 specifically to the respondent No. 3 to hand over the raw score to the second respondent in sealed cover. It was also directed by this Court that the respondent No. 2 shall file a reply to the rejoinder explaining in detail the process of scoring and the examination. The same has been done and a detailed affidavit has been filed furnishing all minute details in respect of the process adopted by the respondents.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. The matter is being disposed of at the motion hearing stage with the consent of the parties.
In the present case, CAT 2013 and the procedure adopted by the respondents in conducting the process of examination is the subject matter of dispute before this Court. The petitioners are aggrieved by non-disclosure of raw-score and the method and procedure used by the respondents to evaluate the candidate inter-se ability in the CAT 2013, which is conducted for admission to the Indian Institutes of Management and other participating institutions across the country.
The Indian Institutes of Management are autonomous institutions independent of each other. They variously use CAT scores in conjunction with other criteria such as written assessment tests, group discussions and interviews. Thus CAT scores are usually used as the primary short-listing criterion for admissions, but they are not the sole or conclusive criterion.
The primary submission of the petitioners is that the respondents ought to declare and rely upon only "raw scores" and not "scaled scores" of candidates who had appeared for the CAT 2013 examination. On the other hand, the respondents do not agree that raw scores can be accurately used to evaluate candidates appearing in the CAT 2013 examination, due to certain special features inherent in the CAT examination.
The material placed before this Court establishes that there are two kinds of examination (A) An examination may consist of a single session, where all the candidates appear on the same day and answer the same examination paper. Thus is called a ''single-from examination''. Raw scores can reliably be used in such traditional examination systems, which are based on what is called the Classical Test Theory (CTT). (B) In contrast, the IIM CAT examination consists of numerous examination sessions, and the candidate has the option to appear in any one of these examination sessions. Moreover, even in a particular examination session, each candidate gets a unique question paper having a different mix of questions. This is called a ''multi-form examination''. All these candidates, appearing in different examination sessions spread over different days, and answering different sets of questions varying in terms of item difficulty, have to be accurately evaluated inter se as if they had all appeared for a single examination with the same question paper. In such an examination, raw scores cannot accurately be used for inter se evaluation, since every candidate will get a set of questions having somewhat different level of difficulty. In order to bring all the candidates at par and to enhance sensitivity of the results while computing the CAT scores on a linear scale, the respondents apply to the raw scores a process of equating and scaling, using highly sophisticated mathematical modelling based on the Item Response Theory (IRT).
In Item Response Theory, each question is treated as the primary unit of evaluation and is called an "item''. The particular examination paper that a candidate may be required to answer, having a unique mix of questions (items) is called as "form".
The CAT examination is divided into two sections of thirty questions ("items"0- (i) Quantitative Ability and Data Interpretation (QA and DI) and (ii) Verbal Ability and Logical Reasoning (VA and LR), each section carrying 225 marks, aggregating 450 marks. The two sections evaluate the candidates in two distinct sets of knowledge and skills; the two sections from mutually-exclusive compartments, and the scores do not correlate across the sections. Contrary to the suggestion made in the writ petition, a high score in one section may not entail a high score in the other section.
The facts on record reveal that respondents have a large item bank from which questions (items) are drawn. In each examination session, 60% or 18 out of 30 questions are the same, but in each candidate''s test from they are shuffled in a randomly-generated sequence. In other words, question No. 2 for one candidate may be question No. 17 for another candidate appearing in the same session. 40% or 12 out of 30 items are different for each candidate in the same session, generated by the computer from the item bank ''Liner On the Fly Testing'' (LOFT). This process drastically reduces the likelihood of candidates using unfair means.
The IIM CAT 2013 examination was conducted for 19 1/2 days with 39 sessions. Each candidate even in the same examination session had a unique computerized test from (question paper).
Application of the Item Response Theory:--
Under this head, the respondents have furnished simplified illustrative examples to explain the application of the Item Response Theory. The relevant extraction of the explanatory note filed by the respondent No. 4 from para 9 onwards reads as under:--
"(a) The actual scoring is highly complex, subtle and can only be performed using advanced computerized mathematical applications.
Let us say that there are 5 candidates and 5 items i.e. questions. Further these 5 candidates have attempted the 5 items in the following manner: 1 is used for right answer and 0 is used for wrong answer. This may be arranged in the form of Table 1 below:
(b) From the above, candidate 1, who has answered all the questions correctly, tentatively can be considered having 100% raw score (or index of 1). Similarly, candidate 2 has a raw score index of 80%, candidate 3 has a raw score index of 60% etc.
Item 1 seems to be the most difficult because only 1 person out of 5 could answer it correctly. It is tentatively asserted that the difficulty level in terms of the failure rate for Item 1 is 0.8, meaning 80% of students were unable to answer the item correctly. In other words, the item is so difficult that it can "beat" 80% of students. The difficulty level for Item 2 is 60% Item 3 is 40% etc. Please note that for person proficiency we will count the number of successful answers, but for item difficulty we will count the number of failures.
(c) As we can observe, we cannot judge a person''s ability merely based on the number of correct items he or she obtained. For more accurate inter se evaluation, the item difficulty, as observed above, should also be taken into account. In this highly simplified example, no examinees have the same raw scores. But what would happen if there is an examinee, say candidate 6, whose raw score is the same as that of candidate 4? See Table 2 below.
(d) In the above illustration, we cannot draw a firm conclusion that Candidate 4 and Candidate 6, though having the same raw score, have the same level of proficiency. That is because candidate 4 answered two ''easy'' items correctly, whereas candidate 6 scored the same marks in two difficult questions instead. Thus, in this case, the raw scores do not accurately reveal the candidate''s true proficiency.
(e) This issue will be further complicated when some items have the same difficulty index but are correctly attempted by candidates of different levels of proficiency. See Table 3 below
(f) In Table 3, Item 1 and Item 6 appear to have the same difficulty level. However, Item 1 was answered correctly by a person who has high proficiency (83%) whereas Item 6 was not (the person who answered it has 33% proficiency). It is possible that the text in Item 6 tends to confuse good candidates. In other words, that item does not have a good "discriminative value" or the ability to distinguish and set apart a good candidate from one who is not so good. The weight to be assigned to such question should not be the same as that attached to a question having high discriminative value, and the item may even be required to be removed from the evaluation process and not taken into reckoning.
(g) ''Equating'' is the process by which these difficulties are solved, by assigning an adjusted value to each item, so as to bring each item at par with every other item, so that scores over diverse items or item forms can be meaningfully used to compare results. ''Scaling'' is the process by which these scores are placed on a common scale or metric using linear transformation.
(h) The actual process of equating and scaling in the CAT 2013 examination involved extremely complex mathematical operations carried out on the entire examination database, using highly sophisticated computers. Contrary to the expectations of the petitioners, it cannot practicably be demonstrated manually, and does not lend itself to simpler explanation, using lay terminology.
Scoring
Thus the scoring process for CAT 2013 is outlined below:
Step 1: Raw score is calculated
The candidate''s raw score is calculated for each section based on the number of questions answered correctly (+3 points), incorrectly (-1 point) or left unanswered (0 point).
Step 2 : Raw score is equated
Equating, as stated above, is the statistical process used to adjust values of diverse items or forms of an assessment so that the scores may be used interchangeably.
Step 3: Equated raw score is scaled
In order to ensure appropriate interpretation of an equated raw score, the scores are placed on a common scale or metric. A linear transformation is used for this scaling process.
IIM Scaling Model
Section scores = 0 to 225
Total exam score = 0 to 450.
(i) Three scaled scores are presented to each candidate - an Over-all scaled score and two separate scaled scores for each section, i.e. (I) Quantitative Ability and Data Interpretation (QA and DI) and (ii) Verbal Ability and Logical Reasoning (VA and LR).
(j) Once scaled scores are established, the final step in the scoring process is to rank candidates according to their inter se performance. A percentile rank is the percentage of scores that fall below a given score. With the total scaled scores arranged in a rank order from the lowest to the highest, in 100 equally-sized groups, a table with the total scaled sores to percentile ranks will be created, allowing for the identification and selection of candidates from the highest performers at the very top of the list.
(k) The entire process is performed by computers using highly complex mathematical applications and there is no human intervention in the evaluation. The Item Response Theory is an established statistical method for comparing education testing scores and has been used internationally for decades in examinations such as SAT, GRE, GMAT, TOFT, LSAT, etc. From the above examples, it will be clear that the Item Response Theory has rightly been used for equating and scaling the scores of candidates in the CAT 2013 examination, and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed, with cost for the answering respondents."
Learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioners has placed heavy reliance upon a judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Singh (supra) and his contention is that in light of the aforesaid judgment the respondents are required to disclose the raw-marks obtained by the candidates in the examination. Heavy reliance has been placed upon in paragraphs 35, 36, 37, 41 and 43 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads as under:--
"35. The illustrations given above with reference to the 2003 examinations clearly demonstrate the arbitrariness and irrationality of scaling, particularly in cases falling at the two ends of the spectrum. We, therefore, hold that scaling system as adopted by the Commission is unsuited for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Examination.
We may now summarise the position regarding scaling thus:
(i) Only certain situations warrant adoption of scaling techniques.
(ii) There are number of methods of statistical scaling, some simple and some complex. Each method or system has its merits and demerits and can be adopted only under certain conditions or making certain assumptions.
(iii) Scaling will be useful and effective only if the distribution of marks in the batch of answer-scripts sent to each examiner is approximately the same as the distribution of marks in the batch of answer-scripts sent to every other examiner.
(iv) In the linear standard method, there is no guarantee that the range of scores at various levels will yield candidates of comparative ability.
(v) Any scaling method should be under continuous review and evaluation and improvement, if it is to be a reliable tool in the selection process.
(vi) Scaling may, to a limited extent, be successful in eliminating the general variation which exists from examiner to examiner, but not a solution to solve examiner variability arising from the "hawk-dove" effect (strict/liberal valuation).
The material placed does not disclose that the Commission or its expert committee have kept these factors in view in determining the system of scaling. We have already demonstrated the anomalies/absurdities arising from the scaling system used. The Commission will have to identify a suitable system of evaluation, if necessary by appointing another committee of experts. Till such new system is in place, the Commission may follow the moderation system set out in para 23 above with appropriate modifications.
37 We may now refer to the decision of this Court in S.C. Dixit. The validity of scaling was considered in paras 31 to 33 of the judgment extracted below: (SCC p. 716)
"31. There is a vast percentage difference in awarding of marks between each set of examiners and this was sought to be minimised by applying the scaling formula. If scaling method had not been used, only those candidates whose answer-sheets were examined by liberal examiners alone would get selected and the candidates whose answer-sheets were examined by strict examiners would be completely excluded, though the standard of their answers may be to some extent similar. The scaling system was adopted with a view to eliminate the inconsistency in the marking standards of the examiners. The counsel for the respondents could not demonstrate that the adoption of scaling system has in any way caused injustice to any meritorious candidate. If any candidate had secured higher marks in the written examination, even by applying the scaling formula, he would still be benefitted.
The Division Bench of the High Court observed that the process of scaling was done examiner wise only and the scaling formula did not take into consideration the average of mean of all the candidates in one particular paper but took the mean of only that group of candidates which has been examined by one single examiner. The counsel for U.P. PSC submitted that the observation made by the High Court is incorrect. The scaling formula was adopted to remove the disparity in the evaluation of 14 examiners who participated in the evaluation of answer-sheets and the details have also been furnished as to how the scaling formula was adopted and applied. Therefore, we do not think that the observation of the Division Bench that the Commission did not take care of varying standards which may have been applied by different examiners but has sought to reduce the variation of the marks awarded by the same examiner to different candidates whose answer-sheets had been examined, is correct. The Division Bench was of the view that as a result of scaling, the marks of the candidates who had secured zero marks were enhanced to 18 and this was illegal and thus affected the selection process. This finding is to be understood to mean as to how the scaling system was applied. 18 marks were given notionally to a candidate who secured zero marks so as to indicate the variation in marks secured by the candidates and to fix the mean marks.
In that view of the matter, we do not think that the application of scaling formula to the examinations in question was either arbitrary or illegal. The selection of the candidates was done in a better way. Moreover, this formula was adopted by U.P. PSC after an expert study and in such matters, the court cannot sit in judgment and interfere with the same unless it is proved that it was an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power and the selection itself was done contrary to the Rules. Ultimately, the agency conducting the examination has to consider as to which method should be preferred and adopted having regard to the myriad situations that may arise before them."
S.C. Dixit, therefore, upheld scaling on two conclusions, namely, (i) that the scaling formula was adopted by the Commission after an expert study and in such matters, the Court will not interfere unless it is proved to be arbitrary and unreasonable; and (ii) the scaling system adopted by the Commission eliminated the inconsistency arising on account of examiner variability (differences due to evaluation by strict examiners and liberal examiners). As scaling was a recognised method to bring raw marks in different subjects to a common scale and as the Commission submitted that they introduced scaling after a scientific study by experts, this Court apparently did not want to interfere. This Court was also being conscious that any new method, when introduced, required corrections and adjustments from time to time and should not be rejected at the threshold as unworkable. But we have found after an examination of the manner in which scaling system has been introduced and the effect thereof on the present examination, that the system is not suitable. We have also concluded that there was no proper or adequate study before introduction of scaling and the scaling system which is primarily intended for preparing a common merit list in regard to candidates who take examinations in different optional subjects, has been inappropriately and mechanically applied to a situation where the need is to eliminate examiner variability on account of strict/liberal valuation. We have found that the scaling system adopted by the Commission leads to irrational results, and does not offer a solution for examiner variability arising from strict/liberal examiners. Therefore, it can be said that neither of the two assumptions made in
S.C. Dixit can validly continue to apply to the type of examination with which we are concerned. We are therefore of the view that the approval of the scaling system in S. C Dixit 1 is no longer valid.
The petitioners have requested that their petitions should be treated as being in public interest and the entire selection process in regard to Civil Judge (Junior Division) Examination, 2003 should be set aside. We are unable to accept the said contention. What has been made out is certain inherent defects of a particular scaling system when applied to the selection process of the Civil Judges (Junior Division) where the problem is one of examiner variability (strict/liberal examiners). Neither mala fides nor any other irregularities in the process of selection are made out. The Commission has acted bona fide in proceeding with the selection and neither the High Court nor the State Government had any grievance in regard to selections. In fact, the scaling system applied had the seal of approval of this Court in regard to the previous selection in S.C. Dixit. The selected candidates have also been appointed and functioning as Judicial Officers. Further as noticed above, the scaling system adopted by the Commission has led to irrational and arbitrary results only in cases falling at the ends of the spectrum, and by and large did not affect the major portion of the selection. We, therefore, direct that our decision holding that the scaling system adopted by the Commission is unsuited in regard to Civil Judge (Junior Division) Examination and directing moderation, will be prospective in its application and will not affect the selections and appointments already made in pursuance of the 2003 examination.
The petitions are allowed in part accordingly."
On the other hand, respondents have placed reliance upon a judgment delivered in the case of University Grants Commission and Another Vs. Neha Anil Bobde (Gadekar), (2013) 6 ABR 900 : (2013) 10 AD 174 : (2013) 11 SCALE 593 : (2013) 10 SCC 519 : (2014) 1 SCC(L&S) 842 : (2014) 1 SCT 295 . Para 30 and 31 of the aforesaid judgment read as under:--
"30. We are of the considered view that the candidates were not misled in any manner. Much emphasis has been made on the words declaring the National Eligibility Test". "Clearing" means clearing the final results, not merely passing in Paper I, Paper II and Paper III, which is only the initial step, not final. To clear the NET Examination, as already indicated, the candidate should satisfy the final qualifying criteria laid down by the UGC before declaration of the results.
We are of the view that, in academic matters, unless there is a clear violation of statutory provisions, the Regulations or the Notification issued, the Courts shall keep their hands off since those issues fall within the domain of the experts. This Court in The University of Mysore and Another Vs. C.D. Govinda Rao and Another, AIR 1965 SC 491 : (1964) 4 SCR 575 , Tariq Islam Vs. Aligarh Muslim University and Others, AIR 2001 SC 3058 : (2001) 8 JT 459 : (2002) LabIC 566 : (2001) 7 SCALE 86 : (2001) 8 SCC 546 : (2002) 1 SLJ 343 : (2001) AIRSCW 4128 : (2001) 7 Supreme 401 and Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal Vs. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa and Another, (2008) 8 JT 621 : (2008) 11 SCALE 211 : (2008) 9 SCC 284 : (2008) 2 SCC(L&S) 887 : (2009) 1 SLJ 109 : (2009) 8 SLR 640 , has taken the view that the Court shall not generally sit in appeal over the opinion expressed by expert academic bodies and normally it is wise and safe for the Courts to leave the decision of academic experts who are more familiar with the problem they face, than the Courts generally are. UGC as an expert body has been entrusted with the duty to take steps as it may think fit for the determination and maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and research in the University. For attaining the said standards, it is open to the UGC to lay down any "qualifying criteria", which has a rational nexus to the object to be achieved, that is for maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and research. Candidates declared eligible for lectureship may be considered for appointment as Assistant Professors in Universities and colleges and the standard of such a teaching faculty has a direct nexus with the maintenance of standards of education to be imparted to the students of the universities and colleges. UGC has only implemented the opinion of the Experts by laying down the qualifying criteria, which cannot be considered as arbitrary, illegal or discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India."
The contention of the respondents is that in light of the aforesaid judgment until and unless there is a clear violation of statutory provisions of law or regulation, question of judicial interference in the academic matter is not warranted. The respondents have placed reliance upon a judgment delivered in the case of Sajeesh Babu K. Vs. N.K. Santhosh and Others, AIR 2013 SC 141 : (2012) 10 JT 617 : (2012) 10 SCALE 546 : (2012) 12 SCC 106 and the respondents have placed heavy emphasis on paragraph 19 and 20, which reads as under:--
"19. In the High Court as well as in this Court, the University filed affidavit stating that the Expert Committee consisting of highly qualified 5 distinguished experts evaluated the qualification, experience and the published works of the appellants and found them eligible and suitable. In such circumstance, this Court observed in paragraph Nos. 20 and 21 as under:
It is abundantly clear from the affidavit filed by the University that the Expert Committee had carefully examined and scrutinised the qualification, experience and published work of the appellants before selecting them for the posts of Readers in Sericulture. In our considered opinion, the Division Bench was not justified in sitting in appeal over the unanimous recommendations of the Expert Committee consisting of five experts. The Expert Committee had in fact scrutinised the merits and demerits of each candidate including qualification and the equivalent published work and its recommendations were sent to the University for appointment which were accepted by the University."
It is the settled legal position that the courts have to show deference and consideration to the recommendation of an Expert Committee consisting of distinguished experts in the field. In the instant case, the experts had evaluated the qualification, experience and published work of the appellants and thereafter recommendations for their appointments were made. The Division Bench of the High Court ought not to have sat as an appellate court on the recommendations made by the country''s leading experts in the field of Sericulture.
20) It is clear that in a matter of appointment/selection by an Expert Committee/Board consisting of qualified persons in the particular field, normally, the Courts should be slow to interfere with the opinions expressed by the experts, unless there is any allegation of mala fides against the experts who had constituted the Selection Committee. Admittedly, in the case on hand, there is no allegation of mala fides against the 3 experts in the Selection Committee. In such circumstances, we are of the view that it would normally be wise and safe for the courts to leave the decision of selection of this nature to the experts who are more familiar with the technicalities/nature of the work. In the case on hand, the Expert Committee evaluated the experience certificates produced by the appellant herein, interviewed him by putting specific questions as to direct sale, home delivered products, hospitality/service industry etc. and awarded marks. In such circumstances, we hold that the High Court ought not to have sat as an appellate Court on the recommendations made by the Expert Committee."
Contention of the respondents is that judicial review or interference in selection process in absence of malafide is not permitted.
The respondents have also placed reliance upon a judgment delivered in the case of Sanchit Bansal and Another Vs. The Joint Admission Board (JAB) and Others, AIR 2012 SC 214 : (2011) 11 SCALE 593 : (2012) 1 SCC 157 : (2011) 6 UJ 4303 and heavy reliance has been placed upon paragraphs 17 to 33, 38 and 39 and once again the Apex Court dealing with IIT and JEE examination has held that the complicated procedure followed in selection does not render the said procedure arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory.
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of State of H.P. and Others Vs. Himachal Pradesh Nizi Vyavsayik Prishikshan Kendra Sangh, (2011) 5 JT 153 : (2011) 4 SCALE 801 : (2011) 6 SCC 597 : (2011) 5 SCR 533 and the paragraphs 20 and 23 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"20. It is seen that the Cabinet considered the proposal of the State Council for Vocational Training and after deliberation, the decision has been taken to continue various courses under SCVT except for the courses at Sl. No. 1 (Art and Craft), Sl. No. 4 (Library Science) and Sl. No. 7 (PTI). Though in the supplementary affidavit, the State has not highlighted the reason for discontinuing the three courses in the State of Himachal Pradesh, the High Court presumed that the State is precluded from taking fresh/revised policy in the matter of imparting technical education. In fact, in the said decision, the State has not barred all the institutions from continuing the courses already notified under SCVT. The Cabinet decided to discontinue only three courses. Inasmuch as the said Cabinet decision dated 18.07.2009 not being the subject matter or issue of the writ petition, the State was not in a position to highlight all the details before the Court. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the Cabinet decision dated 18.07.2009 which was not the issue or challenge in the writ petition. We are also unable to accept the conclusion of the High Court that the petitioner''s association (respondent herein) is entitled to run all the courses under the principle of ''legitimate expectation''.
Under these circumstances, the impugned order of the High Court quashing the Cabinet decision dated 18.07.2009 and issuing various directions including awarding cost of Rs. 25,000/- in favour of the respondent-association are set aside. As observed earlier, the respondent''s association or its members are free to challenge the order of the Government in the High Court by way of an appropriate writ by projecting valid grounds, if any. In such event, the State Government is equally entitled to highlight its policy, need for the change, and demand of the society insofar as courses prescribed under SCVTs are concerned With the above observations, the civil appeal is allowed with no order as to costs."
The contention of the respondents is that a policy decision can be interfered with only if it is against the constitutional mandate.
The respondents have also placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of Visveswaraya Technological University and Another Vs. Krishnendu Halder and Others, AIR 2011 SC 1429 : (2011) 3 JT 187 : (2011) 3 SCALE 359 : (2011) 4 SCC 606 : (2011) 2 SCR 1007 : (2011) AIRSCW 2180 and the paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"14. The respondents (colleges and the students) submitted that in that particular year (2007-2008) nearly 5000 engineering seats remained unfilled. They contended that whenever a large number of seats remained unfilled, on account of nonavailability of adequate candidates, para 41(v) and (vi) of Adhiyaman would come into play and automatically the lower minimum standards prescribed by AICTE alone would apply. This contention is liable to be rejected in view of the principles laid down in the Constitution Bench decision in Dr. Preeti Srivastava and the decision of the larger Bench in S.V. Bratheep which explains the observations in Adhiyaman in the correct perspective. We summarise below the position, emerging from these decisions :
(i) While prescribing the eligibility criteria for admission to institutions of higher education, the State/University cannot adversely affect the standards laid down by the Central Body/AICTE. The term ''adversely affect the standards'' refers to lowering of the norms laid down by Central Body/AICTE. Prescribing higher standards for admission by laying down qualifications in addition to or higher than those prescribed by AICTE, consistent with the object of promoting higher standards and excellence in higher education, will not be considered as adversely affecting the standards laid down by the Central Body/AICTE.
(ii) The observation in para 41(vi) of Adhiyaman to the effect that where seats remain unfilled, the state authorities cannot deny admission to any student satisfying the minimum standards laid down by AICTE, even though he is not qualified according to its standards, is not good law.
(iii) The fact that there are unfilled seats in a particular year, does not mean that in that year, the eligibility criteria fixed by the State/University would cease to apply or that the minimum eligibility criteria suggested by AICTE alone would apply. Unless and until the State or the University chooses to modify the eligibility criteria fixed by them, they will continue to apply in spite of the fact that there are vacancies or unfilled seats in any year. The main object of prescribing eligibility criteria is not to ensure that all seats are in colleges are filled, but to ensure that excellence in standards of higher education is maintained.
(iv) The State/University (as also AICTE) should periodically (at such intervals as they deem fit) review the prescription of eligibility criteria for admissions, keeping in balance, the need to maintain excellence and high standard in higher education on the one hand, and the need to maintain a healthy ratio between the total number of seats available in the state and the number of students seeking admission, on the other. If necessary, they may revise the eligibility criteria so as to continue excellence in education and at the same time being realistic about the attainable standards of marks in the qualifying examinations."
The primary reason for seats remaining vacant in a state, is the mushrooming of private institutions in higher education. This is so in several states in regard to teachers training institutions, dental colleges or engineering colleges. The second reason is certain disciplines going out of favour with students because they are considered to be no longer promising or attractive for future career prospects. The third reason is the bad reputation acquired by some institutions due to lack of infrastructure, bad faculty and indifferent teaching. Fixing of higher standards, marginally higher than the minimum, is seldom the reason for seats in some colleges remaining vacant or unfilled during a particular year. Therefore, a student whose marks fall short of the eligibility criteria fixed by the State/University, or any college which admits such students directly under the management quota, cannot contend that the admission of students found qualified under the criteria fixed by AICTE, should be approved even if they do not fulfil the higher eligibility criteria fixed by the State/University.
The proliferating unaided private colleges, may need a full complement of students for their comfortable sustenance (meeting the cost of running the college and paying the staff etc.). But that cannot be at the risk of quality of education. To give an example, if 35% is the minimum passing marks in a qualifying examination, can it be argued by colleges that the minimum passing marks in the qualifying examination should be reduced to only 25 or 20 instead of 35 on the ground that the number of 15 students/candidates who pass the examination are not sufficient to fill their seats? Reducing the standards to ''fill the seats'' will be a dangerous trend which will destroy the quality of education. If there are large number of vacancies, the remedy lies in (a) not permitting new colleges; (b) reducing the intake in existing colleges; (c) improving the infrastructure and quality of the institution to attract more students. Be that as it may. The need to fill the seats cannot be permitted to override the need to maintain quality of education. Creeping commercialization of education in the last few years should be a matter of concern for the central bodies, states and universities.
No student or college, in the teeth of the existing and prevalent rules of the State and the University can say that such rules should be ignored, whenever there are unfilled vacancies in colleges. In fact the State/University, may, in spite of vacancies, continue with the higher eligibility criteria to maintain better standards of higher education in the State or in the colleges affiliated to the University. Determination of such standards, being part of the academic policy of the University, are beyond the purview of judicial review, unless it is established that such standards are arbitrary or ''adversely affect'' the standards if any fixed by the Central Body 16 under a Central enactment. The order of the Division Bench is therefore unsustainable."
The contention of the respondents is that the academic policy is beyond the purview of judicial review.
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of Dr. Basavaiah Vs. Dr. H.L. Ramesh and Others, (2010) 127 FLR 888 : (2010) 7 JT 558 : (2010) 7 SCALE 529 : (2010) 8 SCC 372 : (2010) 9 SCR 227 : (2011) 1 SLJ 170 : (2010) 5 SLR 105 : (2010) AIRSCW 5907 : (2010) 6 Supreme 18 and the paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"20. It is abundantly clear from the affidavit filed by the University that the Expert Committee had carefully examined and scrutinized the qualification, experience and published 13 work of the appellants before selecting them for the posts of Readers in Sericulture. In our considered opinion, the Division Bench was not justified in sitting in appeal over the unanimous recommendations of the Expert Committee consisting of five experts. The Expert Committee had in fact scrutinized the merits and de-merits of each candidate including qualification and the equivalent published work and its recommendations were sent to the University for appointment which were accepted by the University.
It is the settled legal position that the courts have to show deference and consideration to the recommendation of an Expert Committee consisting of distinguished experts in the field. In the instant case, experts had evaluated the qualification, experience and published work of the appellants and thereafter recommendations for their appointments were made. The Division Bench of the High Court ought not to have sat as an appellate court on the recommendations made by the country''s leading experts in the field of Sericulture.
A similar controversy arose about 45 years ago regarding appointment of Anniah Gowda to the post of Research Reader in English in the Central College, Bangalore, in the case of The University of Mysore and Another Vs. C.D. Govinda Rao and Another, AIR 1965 SC 491 : (1964) 4 SCR 575 , in which the Constitution Bench unanimously held that normally the Courts should be slow to interfere with the opinions expressed by the experts particularly in a case when there is no allegation of mala fides against the experts who had constituted the Selection Board. The court further observed that it would normally be wise and safe for the courts to leave the decisions of academic matters to the experts who are more familiar with the problems they face than the courts generally can be"
The contention of the respondents is that the Courts should not endeavour to sit in appeal over decisions of experts and the review of expert committee not justified.
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of All India Council for Technical Education Vs. Surinder Kumar Dhawan and Others, AIR 2009 SC 2322 : (2009) 5 JT 216 : (2009) 11 SCC 726 : (2009) 3 SCR 859 : (2009) 4 SLR 520 and the paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 31 and 32 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"14. There is considerable force in the submission of the appellant. Having regard to clauses (i) and (k) of section 10 of the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 [''Act'' for short], it is the function of the AICTE to consider and grant approval for introduction of any new course or programme in consultation with the agencies concerned, and to lay down the norms and standards for any course including curricula, instructions, assessment and examinations.
The decision whether a bridge course should be permitted as a programme for enabling diploma holders to secure engineering degree, and if permitted, what should be the norms and standards in regard to entry qualification, content of course instructions and manner of assessing the performance by examinations, are all decisions in academic matters of technical nature. AICTE consists of professional and technical experts in the field of education qualified and equipped to decide on those issues. In fact, a statutory duty is cast on them to decide these matters.
The courts are neither equipped nor have the academic or technical background to substitute themselves in place of statutory professional technical bodies and take decisions in academic matters involving standards and quality of technical education. If the courts start entertaining petitions from individual institutions or students to permit courses of their choice, either for their convenience or to alleviate hardship or to provide better opportunities, or because they think that one course is equal to another, without realizing the repercussions on the field of technical education in general, it will lead to chaos in education and deterioration in standards of education.
The role of statutory expert bodies on education and role of courts are well defined by a simple rule. If it is a question of educational policy or an issue involving academic matter, the courts keep their hands off. If any provision of law or principle of law has to be interpreted, applied or enforced, with reference to or connected with education, courts will step in. In Dr. J.P. Kulshreshtha and Others Vs. Chancellor, Allahabad University and Others, AIR 1980 SC 2141 : (1980) 41 FLR 318 : (1980) LabIC 692 : (1980) 2 LLJ 175 : (1980) 3 SCC 418 : (1980) 3 SCR 902 this Court observed :
"Judges must not rush in where even educationists fear to tread... While there is no absolute bar, it is a rule of prudence that courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies."
In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and Another Vs. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and Others, AIR 1984 SC 1543 : (1984) 2 SCALE 30 : (1984) 4 SCC 27 : (1985) 1 SCR 29 : (1984) 16 UJ 1107 this court reiterated :
"................ the Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to what is wise, prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in preference to those formulated by professional men possessing technical expertise and rich experience of actual day-to-day working of educational institutions and the departments controlling them."
The decision of AICTE not to permit bridge courses for diploma holders and its decision not to permit those who have passed 10+1 examinations (instead of 10+2 examination) to take the bridge course, relate to technical education policy which fall within their exclusive jurisdiction.
Courts will not interfere in matters of policy. This Court in Directorate of Film Festivals and Others Vs. Gaurav Ashwin Jain and Others, AIR 2007 SC 1640 : (2007) 5 JT 394 : (2007) 5 SCALE 565 : (2007) 4 SCC 737 : (2007) 5 SCR 7 : (2007) AIRSCW 2497 : (2007) 3 Supreme 855 pointed out:
"Courts do not and cannot act as Appellate Authorities examining the correctness, suitability and appropriateness of a policy, nor are courts advisors to the executive on matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. The scope of judicial review when examining a policy of the Government is to check whether it violates the fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution, or opposed to any statutory provision or manifestly arbitrary. Courts cannot interfere with policy either on the ground that it is erroneous or on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial review."
The above observations will apply with added vigour to the field of education.
These being educational issues, they cannot be interfered, merely because the court thought otherwise. If the AICTE was of the view that only those diploma holders with 10+2 (with PCM subjects) should be permitted to upgrade their qualification by an ad hoc bridge course or that such bridge course should not be a regular or permanent feature, there is no reason to interfere with such a decision. The courts cannot be their orders create courses, nor permit continuance of courses which were not created in accordance with law, or lower the minimum qualifications prescribed for admissions. The High Court''s decision to permit candidates who have completed 10+1 plus four years post diploma course to take the bridge course, cannot be sustained.
This is a classic case where an educational course has been created and continued merely by the fiat of the court, without any prior statutory or academic evaluation or assessment or acceptance. Granting approval for a new course or programme requires examination of various academic/technical facets which can only be done by an expert body like AICTE. This function cannot obviously be taken over or discharged by courts. In this case, for example, by a mandamus of the court, a bridge course was permitted for four year Advance Diploma holders who had passed the entry level examination of 10+2 with PCM subjects. Thereafter, by another mandamus in another case, what was a one time measure was extended for several years and was also extended to Post Diploma holders. Again by another mandamus, it was extended to those who had passed only 10+1 examination instead of the required minimum of 10+2 examination. Each direction was obviously intended to give relief to students who wanted to better their career prospects, purely as an ad hoc measure. But together they lead to an unintended dilution of educational standards, adversely affecting the standards and quality of engineering degree courses. Courts should guard against such forays in the field of education."
The contention of the respondents is that the Courts cannot be substituted in place of technical bodies. Courts cannot interfere with policy.
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of Guru Nanak Dev University Vs. Sanjay Kumar Katwal and Another, (2008) 11 JT 543 : (2008) 13 SCALE 760 : (2009) 1 SCC 610 and the paragraphs 15 and 16 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"15. The first respondent has passed his M.A. (OUS) from Annamalai University through distance education. Equivalence is a technical academic matter. It cannot be implied or assumed. Any decision of the academic body of the university relating to equivalence should be by a specific order or resolution, duly published. The first respondent has not been able to produce any document to show that appellant university has recognized the M.A. English (OUS) of Annamalai University through distance education as equivalent to M.A. of appellant university. Thus it has to be held that first respondent does not fulfil the eligibility criterion of the appellant university for admission to three year law course.
The first respondent made a faint attempt to contend that the distance education system includes ''correspondence courses'' and therefore recognition of M.A. (correspondence course) as equivalent to M.A. course of appellant University, would amount to recognition of M.A. - OUS (distance education) course, as an equivalent. For this purpose, he relied upon the definition of "distance education system" in section 2(e) of Indira Gandhi National Open University Act, 1985. But there is nothing to show that Annamalai University has treated correspondence course and OUS (distance education) course as the same. What is more important is that the appellant university does not wish to treat correspondence course and Distance Education Course as being the same. That is a matter of policy. Courts will not interfere with the said policy relating to an academic matter."
The contention of the respondents is that the Courts cannot interfere with the policy relating to an academic matter.
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of National Board of Examinations Vs. G. Anand Ramamurthy and Others, AIR 2006 SC 2484 : (2006) 4 CTC 264 : (2006) 6 SCALE 146 : (2006) 5 SCC 515 : (2006) 2 SCR 772 Supp : (2006) AIRSCW 3320 : (2006) 4 Supreme 411 wherein the Supreme Court has held that there should not be an interference in the academic matters and the paragraphs 7 and 9 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"7. We have carefully considered the submissions made by both the learned Senior Counsel. In our opinion, the High Court was not justified in directing the petitioner to hold examinations against its policy in complete disregard to the mandate of this Court for not interfering in the academic matters particularly when the interference in the facts of the instant matter lead to perversity and promotion of illegality. The High Court was also not justified in exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to merge a past practice with decision of the petitioner impugned before it to give relief to the respondents herein. Likewise the High Court was not correct in applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation even when the respondents herein cannot be said to be aggrieved by the decision of the petitioner herein. The High Court was also not justified in granting a relief not sought for by the respondents in the writ petition. The prayer of the respondents in the writ petition was to seek a direction to the petitioner herein to hold the examinations as per the schedule mentioned in the Bulletin of 2003. However, the High Court passed an order directing the petitioner herein to hold the examinations for the respondents according to the schedule mentioned in the Bulletin of 2003. The effect of this order is that the petitioner would have to permit the respondents to take the exam even if they do not meet the eligibility criteria fixed by the petitioner in its policy of 2003. Our attention was also drawn to the Bulletin of Information of 2003. In view of categorical and explicit disclosures made in the Bulletin, all candidates were made aware that instructions contained in the Information Bulletin including but not limited to examination schedule were liable to changes based on decisions taken by the Board of the petitioner from time to time. In the said Bulletin of Information, candidates are requested to refer to the latest bulletin or corrigendum that may be issued to incorporate these changes. Thus, it is seen that the petitioner has categorically reserved its rights in the Bulletin of Information to change instructions as aforesaid which would encompass and include all instructions relating to schedule of examinations. It is also mentioned in the Bulletin in no unascertain terms that the instructions contained in the Bulletin including the schedule of examinations were liable to changes based on the decisions taken by the Governing Body of the petitioner from time to time. Hitherto Examinations were being conducted twice a year i.e. in the months of June and December, 2006. There could be no embargo in the way of the petitioner bonafidely changing the Examination Schedule, more so when it had admittedly and categorically reserved its rights to do so to the notice and information of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In any event, the completion of three years training is a necessary concomitant for appearing in the DNB final examination.
No malafide has been alleged against the petitioner in the writ petition. The Governing Body of the petitioner in the larger interest of the candidates as well as of the petitioner, and medical education in general, has decided to change the current practice of conducting the examinations on biannual basis for all the disciplines of modern medicine with the revised policy to conduct the biannual examination only in those streams where number of candidates is more than 100, from June 2006 onwards to curtail its expenditure. The above policy decision, in our opinion, cannot at all be faulted with."
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of Aruna Roy v. Union of India [(2002) 7 SCC 368] and the paragraphs 96 and 97 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"96. As pointed out by learned counsel on behalf of petitioners, if there are certain offending portions in the curriculum, which are not historically correct or has a tendency to misrepresent, suppress or project a wrong information, they can be removed. The learned Solicitor General on behalf of the Union of India and the counsel appearing for NCERT have very candidly stated that if those portions are identified, there would be no objection to the Government to consider their deletion from the curriculum. It has been emphatically stated that the object of introducing ''study of religions'' in the education from primary stage is to ensure all round development of a child and with the object that he grows as citizen with respect for constitutional values. As has been stated by us above, while dealing with the first point, that a National Policy of school education having effect and implications upon children of whole of India should be prepared after careful and thoughtful deliberations. Learned Solicitor General stated that NCERT before finalising the curriculum has not only held symposiums, conferences, talks and debates, but also elicited opinions not only of members of NCERT, but also ex-officio members of CABE. It is stated that although a formal meeting of the members of CABE could not be called for seeking their advice, but each one of them individually was sent a copy of curriculum to elicit their views for and against it. It is after long deliberations, discussions and exchange of views that the curriculum has been finalised. It is submitted that any restraint puts on introduction of curriculum could harm the interest of the students, who have already started their academic session and a very large quantity of text books and literatures prepared by NCERT in conformity with the National Curriculum of 2002, would go waste. It is, therefore, stated that this Court should vacate interim order restraining introduction of National Curriculum on certain subjects as mentioned in the Order of this Court dated 1st March, 2002. We have looked into the Constitution and functions of CABE, copy of which has been provided to us. The Constitution and functions of NCERT are also given to us for perusal. From the language employed therein, we find that the functions of the two Bodies are not so clearly delineated as to put them in water tight compartments. In evolving a National Policy on Education and based thereon a curriculum, in accordance with long standing practice, it was desirable to consult CABE although for non-consultation the National Policy and the Curriculum cannot be set aside by the court. In a constitutional democracy, Parliament is supreme and policies have to be framed and approved by the Parliament. Parliament had constituted CABE and NCERT and if CABE has any objection to the National Curriculum nothing prevented it from expressing its opinion accordingly. It is ultimately for the Parliament to take a decision on the National Education Policy one way or the other. It is not the province of the Court to decide on the good or bad points of an Educational Policy. The Court''s limited jurisdiction to intervene in implementation of a policy is only if it is found to be against any statute or the Constitution. We have not found anything in the Educational Policy or the Curriculum which is against the Constitution. We have found no ground to grant any relief as prayed for by the Petitioners. We would, however, direct the Union of India to consider the matter of filling the vacancies in the membership of CABE and convening a meeting of CABE for seeking opinion on the policy and the curriculum.
All bodies created by executive power of the State, are answerable to Parliament which is the supreme legislative body with all powers in suggesting and formulating a National Education Policy. It is open to Parliament to fill nominations to CABE, re-constitute it or do away with it. The court can have no jurisdiction in that subject. This court can enforce constitutional provisions and laws framed by the Parliament. It cannot, however, compel that a particular practice or tradition followed in framing and implementing the policy, must be adhered to. The court has to keep in mind the above limitations on its jurisdiction and power. It is true that if a policy framed in the field of education or other fields runs counter to the constitutional provisions or the philosophy behind those provisions, this court must, as part of its constitutional duty, interdict such policy."
The contention of the respondents is that the educational policy is not province of courts. The courts must keep in mind its limitations.
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. Lata Arun, AIR 2002 SC 2642 : (2002) 5 JT 210 : (2002) 5 SCALE 233 : (2002) 6 SCC 252 : (2002) 3 SCT 667 : (2002) 2 UJ 1029 : (2002) AIRSCW 2966 : (2002) 5 Supreme 33 and the paragraph 13 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"13. From the ratio of the decisions noted above it is clear that the prescribed eligibility qualification for admission to a course or for recruitment to or promotion in service are matters to be considered by the appropriate authority. it is not for courts to decide whether a particular educational qualification should or should not be accepted as equivalent to the qualification prescribed by the authority."
The contention of the respondents is that the courts are not supposed to decide the educational qualifications in respect of a particular post and the same has to be looked into by the appropriate authority.
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of Punjab University Vs. Narinder Kumar and Others, AIR 2000 SC 3457 : (2000) 10 JT 545 : (1999) 9 SCC 8 : (2000) SCC(L&S) 156 : (2000) AIRSCW 2113 and the paragraphs 10 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"8. The first respondent has contended that if the post of a Lecturer in Gandhian Studies is given to a person who has obtained an M.A. degree in other subjects, the opportunities available to those like him, who have a specialisation in Gandhian Studies from M.A. level onwards, get reduced; and this would discourage people from taking a specialisation course in Gandhian Studies at the M.A. level. This argument, however, addresses itself on the policy relating to prescribing qualifications for the various posts. Such a policy has to be formulated by the University in accordance with the norms laid down by the University Grants Commission or any other Expert Body that may have been specified under the relevant statutes. We cannot examine such a policy or reframe it."
The contention of the respondents is that the courts cannot examine a policy or reframe it. It is the job of the expert bodies.
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of English Medium Students Parents Association Vs. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 1994 SC 1702 : (1993) 6 JT 634 : (1993) 4 SCALE 627 : (1994) 1 SCC 550 : (1993) 3 SCR 934 Supp : (1994) 1 UJ 291 and the paragraphs 23 and 24 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"23. As rightly contended by the learned Advocate-General where the State by means of the impugned GO desires to bring about academic discipline as a regulatory measure it is a matter of policy. The State knows how best to implement the language policy. It is not for the Court to interfere. In Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti v. Union of India this Court laid down as under: (SCR p. 592 : SCC p. 355, para 6)
"It may be that Hindi or other regional languages are more appropriate medium of imparting education to very many and it may be appropriate and proper to hold the examinations, entrance or otherwise, in any particular regional or Hindi language, or it may be that Hindi or other regional language because of development of that language, is not yet appropriate medium to transmute or test the knowledge or capacity that could be had in medical and dental disciplines. It is a matter of formulation of policy by the State or educational authorities in charge of any particular situation. Where the existence of a fundamental right has to be established by acceptance of a particular policy or a course of action for which there is no legal compulsion or statutory imperative, and on which there are divergent views, the same cannot be sought to be enforced by Article 32 of the Constitution. Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be a means to indicate policy preference."
In a matter relating to policy this Court should decline to interfere. In the result, we conclude the writ petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed."
The contention of the respondents is that the academic discipline a matter of policy and the Courts should not interfere with the same.
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of Km. Nelima Misra Vs. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal and others, AIR 1990 SC 1402 : (1990) 2 JT 103 : (1990) 2 SCC 746 : (1990) 2 UJ 90 , wherein it has been held that in the matter of appointment, the courts should not interfere. Paragraph 32 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"32. It is not unimportant to point out that in matters of appointment in the academic field the Court generally does not interfere. In the The University of Mysore and Another Vs. C.D. Govinda Rao and Another, AIR 1965 SC 491 : (1964) 4 SCR 575 , this Court observed that the Courts should be slow to interfere with the opinion ex- pressed by the experts in the absence of mala fide alleged 2against the experts. When appointments based on recommendations of experts nominated by the Universities, the High Court has got only to see whether the appointment had contravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance. The High Court should show due regard to the opinion expressed by the experts constituting the Selection Committee and its recommendation on which the Chancellor has acted. See also the decisions in Dr. J.P. Kulshreshtha and Others Vs. Chancellor, Allahabad University and Others, AIR 1980 SC 2141 : (1980) 41 FLR 318 : (1980) LabIC 692 : (1980) 2 LLJ 175 : (1980) 3 SCC 418 : (1980) 3 SCR 902 and Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke and Others Vs. Dr. B.S. Mahajan and Others, AIR 1990 SC 434 : (1990) 60 FLR 172 : (1990) 2 LLJ 470 : (1990) 1 SCC 305 : (1990) 1 UJ 328 ."
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti and others Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1990 SC 851 : (1990) 1 JT 359 : (1990) 1 SCALE 433 : (1990) 2 SCC 352 : (1990) 1 SCR 588 : (1990) 1 UJ 647 , wherein the writ petition filed for holding examination in a particular language has been dismissed and it has been held that for mode of examination no judicial intervention is permissible. Paragraphs 5 and 9 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"5 We have examined the matter and have heard Mr. L.M. Singhvi. We are of the opinion that the prayers sought for herein are not such which can be appropriately, properly and legitimately dealt with under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The contention of the petitioners is, as mentioned hereinbefore, that pre-medical studies in medical and dental examination should be permitted in Hindi and other regional languages and not in English alone, and the admission to the Institutions should not be refused and/or examinations should not be held in English alone if the examinees or the entrants seek to appear in Hindi or other regional language.
In the background of the facts and the circumstances of the case and the nature of controversy that has arisen, we are of the opinion that proper and appropriate remedy in a situation where enforcement of the right depends upon the acceptance of a policy of examination for admission in any particular language to the Institution on that basis, is a matter of policy. Whether in particular facts and the circumstances of this case admission to medical or dental Institution by conducting examination in Hindi or other regional languages would be appropriate or desirable or not, is a matter on which debate is possible and the acceptance of one view over the other involves a policy decision. It cannot be appropriately dealt with by this Court, and order under Article 32 of the Constitution in those circumstances would not be an appropriate remedy."
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and Another Vs. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and Others, AIR 1984 SC 1543 : (1984) 2 SCALE 30 : (1984) 4 SCC 27 : (1985) 1 SCR 29 : (1984) 16 UJ 1107 and the paragraphs 29 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"Far from advancing public interest and fair play to the other candidates in general, any such interpretation of the legal position would be wholly defeasive of the same. As has been repeatedly pointed out by this court, the Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to what is wise, prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in preference to those formulated by professional men possessing technical expertise and rich experience of actual day-to-day working of educational institutions and the departments controlling them. It will be wholly wrong for the court to make a pedantic and purely idealistic approach to the problems of this nature, isolated from the actual realities and grass root problems involved in the working of the system and unmindful of the consequences which would emanate if a purely idealistic view as opposed to a pragmatic one were to be propounded. It is equally important that the Court should also, as far as possible, avoid any decision or interpretation of a statutory provision, rule or bye-law which would bring about the result of rendering the system unworkable in practice. It is unfortunate that this principle has not been adequately kept in mind by the High Court while deciding the instant case."
The contention of the respondents is that the courts should be extremely reluctant in interfering with academic matters and wholly wrong for the court to make an idealistic approach.
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of Dr. J.P. Kulshreshtha and Others Vs. Chancellor, Allahabad University and Others, AIR 1980 SC 2141 : (1980) 41 FLR 318 : (1980) LabIC 692 : (1980) 2 LLJ 175 : (1980) 3 SCC 418 : (1980) 3 SCR 902 , wherein it has been held that the Courts should not interfere in educational matters. Paragraphs 11 and 17 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"11. The second obscurantism we must remove is the blind veneration of marks at examination as the main measure of merit. Social scientists and educational avant garde may find pitfalls in our system of education and condemn the unscientific aspects of marks as the measure of merit, things as they now stand. But, however imperfect and obtuse the current system and however urgent the modernization of our courses culminating in examinations may be, the fact remains that F he court has to go by what is extent and cannot explore on its own or ignore the measure of merit adopted by universities. Judges must not rush in where even educationists fear to tread. So, we see no purpose in belittling the criterion of marks and class the Allahabad University has laid down, although to swear religiously by class and grade may be exaggerated reverence and false scales if strictly scrutinized by progressive criteria.
Rulings of this Court were cited before us to hammer home the point that the Court should not substitute its judgment for that of academicians when the dispute relates to educational affairs. While there is no absolute ban, it is a rule of prudence that courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies. But university organs, for that matter any authority in our system, is bound by the rule of law and cannot be a law unto itself If the Chancellor or any other authority lesser in level decides an academic matter or an educational question, the Court keeps its hands off; but where a provision of law has to be read and understood, it is not fair to keep the Court out. In Govinda Rao''s case (1) Gajendragadkar, J (as he they was) struck the right note:
"What the High Court should have considered is whether file appointment made by the Chancellor Had contravened any statutory or finding rule or ordinance, and in doing so, the High Court should have shown due regard to the opinions expressed by the Board and its recommendations on which the Chancellor has acted."
(Emphasis added)
The later decisions cited before us broadly conform to the rule of caution sounded in Govinda Rao. But to respect an authority is not to worship it unquestioningly since the bhakti cult is inept in the critical field of law. In short, while dealing with legal affairs which have an impact on academic bodies, the views of educational experts are entitled to great consideration but not to exclusive wisdom. Moreover, the present case is so simple that profound doctrines about academic autonomy have no place here."
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of Dr. M.C. Gupta and Others Vs. Dr. Arun Kumar Gupta and Others, (1979) LabIC 296 : (1979) 2 SCC 339 : (1979) 2 SCR 853 , wherein it has been held that judges should leave the decisions of academic matters to experts. Paragraphs 7 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"Before the rival comments are probed and analysed, it would be necessary to keep in view the twilight zone of Court''s interference in appointment to posts requiring technical experience made consequent upon selection by Public Service Commission, aided by experts in the field, within the framework of Regulations framed by the Medical Council of India under s. 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, and approved by the Government of India on 5th June 1971. When selection is made by the Commission aided and advised by experts having technical experience and high academic qualifications in the specialist field, probing teaching/research experience in technical subjects, the Courts should be slow to interfere with the opinion expressed by experts unless there are allegations of mala fides against them. It would normally be prudent and safe for the Courts to leave the decision of academic matters to experts who are more familiar with the problems they face than the Courts generally can be. Undoubtedly, even such a body if it were to contravene rules and regulations binding upon it in making the selection and recommending the selectees for appointment, the Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction to enforce rule of law, may interfere in a writ petition under Article 226. Even then the Court, while enforcing the rule of law, should give due weight to the opinions expressed by the experts and also show due regard to its recommendations on which the State Government acted. If the recommendations made by the body of experts keeping in view the relevant rules and regulations manifest due consideration of all the relevant factors, the Court should be very slow to interfere with such recommendations (see, The University of Mysore and Anr. v. C.D. Govinda Rao and Anr.,(1). In a more comparable situation in State of Bihar and Anr. v. Dr. Asis Kumar Mukherjee, and Ors.,(2) this Court observed as under:
"Shri Jagdish Swaroop rightly stressed that once the right to appoint belonged to Government the Court could not usurp it merely because it would have chosen a different person as better qualified or given a finer gloss or different construction to the regulation on the score of a set formula that relevant circumstances had been excluded, irrelevant factors had influenced and such like grounds familiarly invented by parties to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226. True, no speaking order need be made while appointing a government servant. Speaking in plaintitudinous terms these propositions may deserve serious reflection. The Administration should not be thwarted in the usual course of making appointments because somehow it displeases judicial relish or the Court does not agree with its estimate of the relative worth of the candidates. Is there violation of a fundamental right, illegality or a skin error of law which vitiates the appointment".
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of The State of Maharashtra and Another Vs. Lok Shikshan Sansatha and Others, AIR 1973 SC 588 : (1971) 2 SCC 410 : (1971) SCR 879 Supp , wherein it has been held that if there is no violation of fundamental rights, courts not to lay down its policy and to leave the State to decide policy matter. Paragraph 9 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:--
"Before we deal with the above contentions advanced before us on behalf of both sides, it is necessary to state that the High Court in the judgment under attack has made certain observations regarding what according to it should be the policy adopted by the educational authorities in the matter of permitting the starting of a new school or of an additional school in a particular locality or area. It is enough to state that the High Court has thoroughly misunderstood the nature of the jurisdiction that was exercised by it when dealing with the claims of the two writ petitioners that their applications had been wrongly rejected by the educational authorities. So long as there is no violation of any fundamental rights and if the principles of natural justice are not offended, it was not for the High Court to lay down the policy that should be adopted by the educational authorities in the matter of granting permission for starting schools. The question of policy is essentially for the State and such policy will depend upon an overall assessment and summary of the requirements of residents of a particular locality and other categories of persons for whom it is essential to provide facilities for education. If the overall assessment is arrived at after a proper classification on a reasonable basis, it is not for the courts to interfere with the policy leading up to such assessment."
The respondents have placed reliance upon another judgment delivered in the case of Prashant Remesh Chakkarwar v. Union Public Service Commission [(2013) 12 SCC 589] and the paragraphs 14, 15 and 17 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under :
"14. Dehors the above conclusion, we are convinced that the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity. In Sanjay Singh case the Court was called upon to decide the legality of the method of scaling adopted by the U.P. Public Service Commission for recruitment to the posts of Civil Judge (Junior Division). After examining various facets of the method adopted by the U.P. Public Service Commission and taking cognizance of the earlier judgment in U.P. Public Service Commission v. Subhash Chandra Dixit the three-Judge Bench observed: (Sanjay Singh case, SCC pp. 738-42, paras 20, 23 and 26)
"20. We cannot accept the contention of the petitioner that the words ''marks awarded'' or ''marks obtained in the written papers'' refer only to the actual marks awarded by the examiner. ''Valuation'' is a process which does not end on marks being awarded by an examiner. Award of marks by the examiner is only one stage of the process of valuation. Moderation when employed by the examining authority, becomes part of the process of valuation and the marks awarded on moderation become the final marks of the candidate. In fact Rule 20(3) specifically refers to the ''marks finally awarded to each candidate in the written examination'', thereby implying that the marks awarded by the examiner can be altered by moderation.
* * * 23. When a large number of candidates appear for an examination, it is necessary to have uniformity and consistency in valuation of the answer scripts. Where the number of candidates taking the examination are limited and only one examiner (preferably the paper-setter himself) evaluates the answer scripts, it is to be assumed that there will be uniformity in the valuation. But where a large number of candidates take the examination, it will not be possible to get all the answer scripts evaluated by the same examiner. It, therefore, becomes necessary to distribute the answer scripts among several examiners for valuation with the paper-setter (or other senior person) acting as the Head Examiner. When more than one examiners evaluate the answer scripts relating to a subject, the subjectivity of the respective examiner will creep into the marks awarded by him to the answer scripts allotted to him for valuation. Each examiner will apply his own yardstick to assess the answer scripts. Inevitably therefore, even when experienced examiners receive equal batches of answer scripts, there is difference in average marks and the range of marks awarded, thereby affecting the merit of individual candidates. This apart, there is ''hawk-dove'' effect. Some examiners are liberal in valuation and tend to award more marks. Some examiners are strict and tend to give less marks. Some may be moderate and balanced in awarding marks. Even among those who are liberal or those who are strict, there may be variance in the degree of strictness or liberality. This means that if the same answer script is given to different examiners, there is all likelihood of different marks being assigned. If a very well-written answer script goes to a strict examiner and a mediocre answer script goes to a liberal examiner, the mediocre answer script may be awarded more marks than the excellent answer script. In other words, there is ''reduced valuation'' by a strict examiner and ''enhanced valuation'' by a liberal examiner. This is known as ''examiner variability'' or ''hawk-dove effect''. Therefore, there is a need to evolve a procedure to ensure uniformity inter se the examiners so that the effect of ''examiner subjectivity'' or ''examiner variability'' is minimised. The procedure adopted to reduce examiner subjectivity or variability is known as moderation. The classic method of moderation is as follows:
(i) The paper-setter of the subject normally acts as the Head Examiner for the subject. He is selected from amongst senior academicians/scholars/senior civil servants/Judges. Where the case is of a large number of candidates, more than one examiner is appointed and each of them is allotted around 300 answer scripts for valuation.
(ii) To achieve uniformity in valuation, where more than one examiner is involved, a meeting of the Head Examiner with all the examiners is held soon after the examination. They discuss thoroughly the question paper, the possible answers and the weightage to be given to various aspects of the answers. They also carry out a sample valuation in the light of their discussions. The sample valuation of scripts by each of them is reviewed by the Head Examiner and variations in assigning marks are further discussed. After such discussions, a consensus is arrived at in regard to the norms of valuation to be adopted. On that basis, the examiners are required to complete the valuation of answer scripts. But this by itself, does not bring about uniformity of assessment inter se the examiners. In spite of the norms agreed, many examiners tend to deviate from the expected or agreed norms, as their caution is overtaken by their propensity for strictness or liberality or erraticism or carelessness during the course of valuation. Therefore, certain further corrective steps become necessary.
(iii) After the valuation is completed by the examiners, the Head Examiner conducts a random sample survey of the corrected answer scripts to verify whether the norms evolved in the meetings of examiner have actually been followed by the examiners. The process of random sampling usually consists of scrutiny of some top level answer scripts and some answer books selected at random from the batches of answer scripts valued by each examiner. The top level answer books of each examiner are revalued by the Head Examiner who carries out such corrections or alterations in the award of marks as he, in his judgment, considers best, to achieve uniformity. (For this purpose, if necessary certain statistics like distribution of candidates in various marks ranges, the average percentage of marks, the highest and lowest award of marks, etc. may also be prepared in respect of the valuation of each examiner.)
(iv) After ascertaining or assessing the standards adopted by each examiner, the Head Examiner may confirm the award of marks without any change if the examiner has followed the agreed norms, or suggests upward or downward moderation, the quantum of moderation varying according to the degree of liberality or strictness in marking. In regard to the top level answer books revalued by the Head Examiner, his award of marks is accepted as final. As regards the other answer books below the top level, to achieve maximum measure of uniformity inter se the examiners, the awards are moderated as per the recommendations made by the Head Examiner.
(v) If in the opinion of the Head Examiner there has been erratic or careless marking by any examiner, for which it is not feasible to have any standard moderation, the answer scripts valued by such examiner are revalued either by the Head Examiner or any other examiner who is found to have followed the agreed norms.
(vi) Where the number of candidates is very large and the examiners are numerous, it may be difficult for one Head Examiner to assess the work of all the examiners. In such a situation, one more level of examiners is introduced. For every ten or twenty examiners, there will be a Head Examiner who checks the random samples as above. The work of the Head Examiners, in turn, is checked by a Chief Examiner to ensure proper results.
The above procedure of ''moderation'' would bring in considerable uniformity and consistency. It should be noted that absolute uniformity or consistency in valuation is impossible to achieve where there are several examiners and the effort is only to achieve maximum uniformity.
The Union Public Service Commission (''UPSC'', for short) conducts the largest number of examinations providing choice of subjects. When assessing inter se merit, it takes recourse to scaling only in Civil Service Preliminary Examination where candidates have the choice to opt for any one paper out of 23 optional papers and where the question papers are of objective type and the answer scripts are evaluated by computerised scanners. In regard to compulsory papers which are of descriptive (conventional) type, valuation is done manually and scaling is not resorted to. Like UPSC, most examining authorities appear to take the view that moderation is the appropriate method to bring about uniformity in valuation where several examiners manually evaluate answer scripts of descriptive/conventional type question papers in regard to same subject; and that scaling should be resorted to only where a common merit list has to be prepared in regard to candidates who have taken examination in different subjects, in pursuance of an option given to them."
From the above extracted portion of the judgment in Sanjay Singh case, it is clear that the three-Judge Bench had approved the method of moderation adopted by the Commission.
The argument of Shri Tulsi that in the garb of moderation, the Commission has resorted to scaling of marks and thereby deprived more meritorious candidates of their legitimate right to be selected does not commend acceptance because no material has been placed before this Court to substantiate the same. The mere fact that some of the candidates like the petitioner who cleared the preliminary examinations but could not cross the hurdle of main examination cannot lead to an inference that the method of moderation adopted by the Commission is faulty.
The suggestive argument made by Shri Tulsi that the award of roll numbers was manipulated by the officers/officials of the Commission for ensuring selection of their favourites does not merit acceptance because the documents produced before the Court and the information obtained by the petitioner by making application under the Right to Information Act do not show that any candidate selected by the Commission had been deliberately given the particular roll number.
Equally meritless is the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that the selection of large number of candidates from the block of first 50,000 should lead to an inference that the entire selection made by the Commission is tainted by mala fides. The table produced before this Court does not show that in each and every examination, 50% candidates were selected from those who were having Roll Nos. 1 to 50,000. That apart, in the absence of cogent evidence, the Court cannot accept such a specious argument ignoring that between 4 to 5 lakhs candidates appear in the annual examination conducted by the Commission for recruitment to Indian Administrative Services and other Allied Services."
Keeping in view the aforesaid, the contention of the respondents is that moderation process in evaluation of marks is permitted for uniformity in results and merit list preparation.
In the aforesaid cases, it has been held that the courts are not equipped with experts and normally interference in technical and academic matters is allowed only if violation of law/malafide motive is proved.
This Court after careful consideration of the aforesaid judgments, is of the considered opinion that the selection process adopted by the respondents for selecting the candidates to various Indian Institutes of Management is fair and transparent process and highly sophisticated method has been adopted by the respondents in evaluating the candidates. The method selected and adopted by the respondents is based upon the valuation made by the academicians, who are the expert of the field and this Court in light of the judgment referred above would not like to sit in an appeal to test the wisdom of the academic experts in absence of any malafide or in absence of violation of any statutory provisions of law. The judicial review of academic matters is not permissible until and unless it is in clear violation of statutory provisions, regulations, etc.. The process adopted by the respondents, which is based upon the item response theory, is being used globally for all prestigious examination. A scaled score is the result of the appropriate transformation applied to the raw score has to be treated as final score and based upon the valuation of the candidates on the basis of Item Response Theory selection has been made by the respondents. Not only this, no malafide has been alleged against the respondent No. 3-Prometric Testing Pvt. Ltd., which is an independent Company and has conducted the examination in a most transparent manner.
Resultantly, this Court in light of the judgments referred above delivered in cases by the Apex Court, is of the considered opinion that no interference can be made in the matter. Ex-consequentia the present petition is dismissed and all other Writ Petitions are also dismissed.
A copy of this order be placed in the record of the connected Writ Petitions.
Shri Piyush Mathur learned Sr. Counsel with Shri Mohan Sharma and Shri Valmik Sakargayen learned counsel for the petitioner.
Shri A. Chitale learned Sr. Counsel with Shri Bharat Chitale learned counsel for the respondents-IIM Indore.
Arguments heard.
Reserved for orders.
Order passed separately, signed and dated.
