S. Altaf Hussain vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Another

Gopalakrisha Tamada, J

This writ petition is preferred by the petitioner invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking for a direction to set aside the judgment and order passed in O.A. No. 1859 of 2001 on 28-4-2001 by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal and to set aside the orders of the 1st respondent in G.O. Ms. No. 193 Revenue (Vig. II) Department, dated 16-3-2001, and also for a direction to the respondents to continue the petitioner in service as Inspector of Excise with all consequential benefits viz., seniority, payment of arrears of salary and allowances.

The case of the petitioner is that he was directly recruited as Excise Sub-Inspector in the year 1981 through the A.P. Public Service Commission and he joined in that post on 20-6-1981. He was rewarded with awards and increments to the best of his ability and performance during his career. He was promoted to the Post of Excise Inspector in the year 1992 and was posted to Vayalapadu in Chittoor District. While he was working as Excise Inspector, Ananthapur, one Soya Venkatesulu, having been found in possession of 27 liquor bottles, was arrested by the I-Town Police Station, Ananthapur in Cr.No. 53 of 1995 and was produced before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ananthpur along with the property recovered and was remanded to judicial custody. While so, on 4-5-1995, on point of jurisdiction, the I-Town Police Station, Ananthpur made over the case in Cr. No. 53 of 1995 to the Excise Station, Ananthpur. On receipt of the records, the concerned Excise Inspector registered the same as a case in Cr.No. 61 of 1995 u/s 34(a) of the A.P. Excise Act.

It is the further case of the petitioner that on registration of the case in Cr.No. 61 of 1995 by the Excise Police, one Smt. B. Nagendramma, wife of the said Venkatesulu bore grudge against the petitioner and the Excise of officials and lodged a false complaint against the petitioner that her husband was illegally detained by him. While so, on 2-6-1995, on the complaint, given by the said Nagendrammd alleging that for the release of her husband, an amount of Rs. 3,000/- was demanded as illegal gratification, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, A.C.B. Ananthapur, registered a case in Cr.No. 6/ACB/ATP, dated 2-6-1995 against the Inspector of Excise, Ananthapur. Basing on the same, the A.C.B. team along with the mediators and one Smt. Rajeswari, Senior Assistant, I.C.D.S. Project, Ananthapur, who was used as a decoy to observe and report the proceedings, laid a trap on 2-6-1995 at 6.45 p.m. During the raid, one K.Ganganna, Excise constable, who received the amount of Rs. 3,000/-disclosed that he received the amount at the instance of one Thamma Reddy, Head constable and that the said constable in turn handed over the said amount to one B. Ramesh Babu, Home Guard No: 152 who was alleged to have hid the amount at a Transport office situated apposite to the Excise Station. The Raid party recorded two proceedings, one relating to the seizure of the amount of Rs. 3,000/- from the Transport office and the other relating to the arrest and release of the Excise Constable, Ganganna and the Home Guard, Ramesh Babu. But, contrary to the facts revealed during the investigation, the A.C.B. Ananthapur sent a message requesting the 1st respondent to place the petitioner under suspension and basing on that, the 1st respondent ordered for the suspension of the petitioner and on the instructions from the 1st respondent, the Deputy Commissioner of Excise, Kurnool, through his proceedings R.C. No. A/1/2549/ 95, dated 23-8-1995, issued suspension orders and served upon him on 26-8-1995 while he was working as Excise Inspector at Kuppam in Chittoor District.

It is his further case, that when he was kept under suspension, challenging the action of the A.C.B. in registering the Crime No. 6 of A.C.B. ATP/2695 on the ground that on 2-6-1995 at 11.30 a.m. he was got relieved from Ananthapur Excise Station and he ceased to be the Inspector of Excise, Ananthapur and that neither the complaint nor the F.I.R. of the A.C.B. Ananthapur, contained his name, he preferred a writ petition in W.P. No. 25521 of 1995 before this Court and Stay of operation of the F.I.R. Registered by the A.C.B. Ananthapur in Cr.No. 6/ACB/ATP/95, dated 2-6-1995 and all further proceedings, was ordered on 14-11-1995 in W.P.M.P. No. 3145 of 1995 and that the said writ petition is still pending before this Court.

It is the further case of the petitioner that pursuant to the stay orders issued by this Court, he was reinstated into service vide proceeding dated 24-3-1996. Subsequently, the matter has been referred to the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings by the 1st respondent. Pursuant to the same, the Tribunal for Disciplinary proceedings has framed against him the following charge, which reads as under:

"That you, Sri Altaf Hussain, Excise Inspector while working in Prohibition and Excise Station, Ananthapur, confined Sri B. Venkatesulu, husband of the complainant Smt B. Nagendramma of Ananthapur to extract illegal gratification. That you, as Excise Inspector two weeks prior to 2-6-1995 actuated by corrupt motive and in abuse of your official position demanded Rs. 5,000/-to release Sri B. Venkatesulu without foisting any case against him and ultimately the amount was bargained at Rs. 3,000/-. Again on 2-6-1995, you got Sri B. Venkatesulu confined in the lockup of Prohibition and Excise Station through Sri G. Thamma Reddy, Excise head constable and you renewed your demand and directed the wife of Sri B. Venkatesulu, namely Smt. B. Nagendramma to pay the amount to Sri G. Thamma Reddy, Excise Head Constable. On the same day, you again demanded the amount from Smt. B. Nagendramma and directed her to pay the amount to Sri Ganganna, Excise Constable. Accordingly, Smt. B.Nagendramma paid the amount to Sri K. Ganganna, Excise Constable at the instance of G. Thamma Reddy, Excise Head constable. Sri. K.Ganganna, Excise constable received the amount and passed on to one Sri. B. Ramesh Babu, Home Huard to secret the amount somewhere. The said Ramesh Babu received the amount and concealed the same with the clerks of Private Transport company called Murali Krishna Transport Office situated opposite to Prohibition and Excise Station, Ananthapur."

After recording the evidence on both sides and marking the documents, the Tribunal For Disciplinary Proceedings found that the petitioner was guilty of the charge framed within the meaning of Rule 2(b) of A.P. Civil Servants (Disciplinary Proceedings) Amendment Act, 1993 and submitted the report to the 1st respondent for taking necessary action. On receipt of copy of the report, the petitioner submitted his explanation denying the charge and pointing out that the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal For Disciplinary Proceedings are illegal, perverse and arbitrary. Basing on the report of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings and the Director General, A.C.B., the 1st respondent without considering his explanation, issued the impugned G.O., dated 16-3-2001 dismissing the petitioner from service. Having aggrieved by the same and the findings of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, the petitioner preferred O.A.1859 of 2001 before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal The Tribunal having clubbed the O.A.1859 of 2001 filed by the petitioner and the O.As.2214 and 3184 of 2001 filed by one Ganganna, Excise Constable and one Thamma Reddy, Excise Head Constable, delivered a common order dismissing the O.As. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner.

Head Sri. N. Ramamohanarao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned G.P. for Services II.

While reiterating the facts mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, it is mainly contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that since one K.V. Prasad was arrested by the petitioner in connection with Crime No. 67 of 1995 on 8-5-1995 of Ananthapuram Excise Station he bore grudge against the petitioner and therefore, he got implicated him with the assistance of Boya Venkatesulu and his family members. It is also further contended that it is pertinent to note that neither the complaint nor the F.I.R. contained the name of the petitioner and that when there was no demand and acceptance of the bribe amount by the petitioner at any point of time the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings and as well as the Tribunal, are improper, perverse and arbitrary and therefore, the order of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings and the Tribunal as well as the 1st respondent are liable to be quashed.

The learned G.P. for Services-II has reiterated the same facts as contended before the Tribunal. It is further contended that the order of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings and the Tribunal, would not warrant any interference by this Court.

As directed by this Court the learned G.P. for Services II has produced the record before this Court.

We have perused the record produced before this Court and the material available on record. The question that calls for consideration in this writ, petition is whether the disciplinary authority has recorded the finding of guilt against the delinquent employee on the basis of available material on record. Before entering into the discussion about the subject-matter in this writ petition, it is necessary to discuss the judicial review vested with the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India.

In a catena of decisions, the Apex Court expressed its views and the law on this aspect is very well settled.

It is beyond pale of controversy that the disciplinary proceedings conducted against an employee should conform to the relevant rules/regulations as also the principles of natural justice. While much difficulty is not experienced to scrutinise the disciplinary proceedings with reference to the rules, but a great amount of care and caution has to be put into operation to ascertain whether the proceedings were vitiated for non-observance of principles of natural justice.

As is known for centuries, the principles of natural justice play a vital role both in administrative as well as quasi-judicial acts. Though these principles have not been codified, nor statutorily defined in any legal text, yet, they are considered to be inevitable and inseparable requirement in the decision making process. Therefore, right from the issue of charge sheet till the final Orders are passed, the catalytical thread of principles of natural justice always run through out to ensure fair play in action, fair consideration and reasonable Order which are basic foundational structures of the principles of natural justice.

However, these principles are not capable of being described with exact definition. But, the doctrine of fair procedure was tried to be explained as what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances (Ridge v. Baldwin 1964 AC 40). This definition still holds field even today with certain refinements. But, however, the principle is elastic and depends upon factual matrix at the relevant time. Tucker Learned Judge said in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk 1949 (1) All ER 109. "The requirement of natural justice depends on the circumstances of the case, the nature of enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with and so forth." In India also we observe the said principles with same wavelength. In A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , the Supreme Court said that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court in The Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , tracing the attributes of the doctrine stated thus:

"Thus second question, however, as to what are the principles of natural justice that should regulate an administrative act or order is a much more difficult one to answer. We do not think it either feasible or even desirable to lay down any fixed or rigorous yard-stick in this manner. The concept of natural justice cannot be put into a straight-jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. See, for instance, the observations of Lord Parker in Re H.K. (an infant) (1967) 2 QB 617. It only means that such measure of natural justice should be applied as was described by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin case 1964 AC 40 (supra) as "insusceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances". However, even the application of the concept of fair-play requires real flexibility. Every thing will depend on the actual facts and circumstances of a case. As Tucker, LJ observed in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk (1949) 1 All ER 109:

"The requirement of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with and so forth."

It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the Enquiry Officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the Appellate Authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to the Supreme Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictate of the superior authority.

In Nand Kishore Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and Others, , it was held that the disciplinary proceedings before a domestic Tribunal are of quasi-judicial character and, therefore, it is necessary that the Tribunal should arrive at its conclusions on the basis of some evidence, that is to say, such evidence which, and, that too, with some degree of definiteness, points to the guilt of the delinquent and does not leave the matter in a suspicious state as mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. If, therefore, there is no evidence to sustain the charges framed against the delinquent, he cannot be held to be guilty as in that event, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer would be perverse.

The findings, recorded in a domestic enquiry, can be characterised as perverse if it is shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence on record or is not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of that evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Sree Rama Rao, , in which the question was whether the High Court, under Article 226, could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. Prakash Chand Jain, and Bharat Iron Works Vs. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel and Others, . In Rajinder Kumar Kindra Vs. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour) and Others, , it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial Tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are his mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated.

In Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Bhola Nath Singh and other, , the Supreme Court held thus:

"The Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. In this case, no such errors were pointed out nor any finding in that behalf was recorded by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court examined the evidence as if it is a Court of first appeal and reversed the finding of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate Court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained."

In High Court of High Court of Judicature at Bombay through ite Registrar Vs. Udaysingh Nimbalkar and Others, , the Supreme Court observed thus:

"Law on the nature of the imposition of the penalties, it has been summed up on Paragraph 18 thus:

"A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/ Tribunal, while exercising the power of the judicial review cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."

Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal in reversing the imposition of the penalty was set aside. In another judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. S. Subramaniam (1996) 7 SCC 509 : AIR (1996) SCW 1272 this Court has considered the scope of the power of judicial review vis-a-vis re-appreciation of evidence and concluded under (Paras 3 and 4 of AIR):

"The Tribunal appreciated the evidence of the complainant and according to it the evidence of the complainant was discrepant and held that the appellant had not satisfactorily proved that the respondent had demanded and accepted illegal gratification. The Tribunal trenched upon appreciation of evidence of the complainant, did not rely on it to prove the above charges. On that basis, it set aside the order of removal. Thus this appeal by special leave.

The only question is; whether the Tribunal was right in its conclusion to appreciate the evidence and to reach its own finding that the charge has not been proved. The Tribunal is not a Court of appeal. The power of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was taken away by the power under Article 323A and invested the same in the Tribunal by Central Administrative Tribunal Act. It is settled law that the Tribunal has only power of judicial review of the administrative action of the appellate on complaints relating to service conditions of employees. It is the exclusive demain of the disciplinary authority to consider the evidence on record and to record findings whether the charge has been proved or not. It is equally settled law that technical rules of evidence have no application for the disciplinary proceedings and the authority is to consider the material on record. In judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessary correct in the view of the Court or Tribunal, when the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence. Tribunal is devoid of power to reappreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. They only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. This is the consistent view of this Court vide B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others, , State of T.N. Vs. T.V. Venugopalan, ; Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Upendra Singh, , Government of Tamil Nadu and another Vs. A. Rajapandian, and B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others, . In view of the settled legal position, the Tribunal has committed serious error of law in appreciation of the evidence and in coming to its own conclusion that the charge had not been proved. Thus we hold that the view of the Tribunal is ex facie illegal. The order is accordingly set aside/ OA/TP/WP stands dismissed."

The Supreme Court further laid down the degree of interference over the findings of the Enquiry Officer. It is held thus:

"The test laid down by various judgments of this Court is to see what there is evidence on record to reach the conclusion that the delinquent has committed misconduct and whether as a reasonable man, in the circumstances, would be justified in reaching that conclussion."

In B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others, , the Supreme Court dealing with the power of the Tribunal of interfere with the punishment observed thus:

"The next question is whether the Tribunal was justified in interfering with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Orissa Vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, , held that having regard to the gravity of the established misconduct, the punishing authority had the power and jurisdiction to impose punishment. The penalty was not open to review by the High Court under Article 226. If the High Court reached a finding that there was some evidence to reach the conclusion, it became unassessable. The order of the Governor who had jurisdiction and unrestricted power to determine the appropriate punishment was final. The High Court has no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty. It was further held that if the order was supported on any finding as to sub-stantial misconduct for which punishment "can lawfully be imposed", it was not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court had no jurisdiction, if the finding prima facie made out a case of misconduct, to direct the Governor to reconsider the order of penalty. This view was reiterated in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Sardar Bahadur, . It is true that in Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, , a Bench of two Judge of this Court, while holding that the High Court did not function as a Court of appeal, concluded that when the finding was utterly perverse, the High Court could always interfere with the same. In that case, the finding was that the appellant was to supervise felling of the trees which were not hammer marked. The Government had recovered from the contractor the loss caused to it by illicit felling of tress. Under those circumstances, this Court held that the finding of guilt was perverse and unsupported by evidence. The ratio, therefore, is not an authority to conclude that in every case the Court/Tribunal is empowered to interfere with the punishment imposed by the @ page-SC 489 disciplinary authority. In Rangaswami Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, , a Bench of three Judges of this Court, while considering the power, to interfere with the order of punishment, held that this Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, is empowered to alter or interfere with the penalty; and the Tribunal had no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. It would be seen that this Court did not appear to have intended to lay down that in no case, the High Court/ Tribunal has the power to alter the penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the appellate authority. The controversy was again canvassed in State Bank of India''s case (AIR 1994 SCW 1465) (supra), where the Court elaborately reviewed the case law on the scope of judicial review and powers of the Tribunal in disciplinary matters and nature of punishment. On the facts in that case, since the appellate authority has not adverted to the relevant facts. It was remitted to the appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment.

A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider, the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."

Hansaria J., while in concurring judgment observed thus:

"What has been stated above may be buttressed by putting the matter a little differently. The same is that in a case of dismissal, Article 21 gets attracted. And, in view of the inter-dependence of fundamental rights, which concept was first accepted in the case commonly known as Rustom Cavasjee Cooper Vs. Union of India (UOI), , which thinking was extended to cases attracting Article 21 in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, , the punishment/penalty awarded has to be reasonable; and if it be unreasonable, Article 14 would be violated. That Article 14 gets attracted in a case of disproportionate punishment was the view of this Court in Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, , also. Now if Article 14 were to be violated, it cannot be doubted that a High Court can take care of the same by substituting in appropriate cases, a punishment deemed reasonable by it."

In Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra, , while reiterating the parameters of judicial review observed thus:

"The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole Judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since, the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power to judicial review, the High Court cannot normally speaking substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or the Departmental Appellate Authority, is either impermissible or such (hat it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though Judicial Review of administrative action must: remain flexible and its dimension not close yet the Court in exercise of the power of judicial review is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial Review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Lord Haltom in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141, observed:

"The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, on a matter which it is authorized by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court.

Judicial Review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the Court while exercising the power of Judicial Review must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative Authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the Court cannot substitute, its judgment for that of the Administrative Authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority."

The Supreme Court in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Sardar Bahadur, , held thus:

"Where mere are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials.

If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court."

After a detailed review of the law oh the subject, the Supreme Court while dealing with the jurisdiction of the High Court or Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters and punishment in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Parma Nanda, held thus:

"We must unequivocally State that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Enquiry Officer or Competent Authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of Legislature or Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter of exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority."

In B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others, , the Supreme Court opined, AIR SCW 4379

"The disciplinary authority is the sole Judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a Disciplinary Enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/ Tribunal."

Further it was held (at P.4380 of AIR SCW):

"A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/ Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/ appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment '' with cogent reasons in support thereof."

Again in Government of Tamil Nadu and another Vs. A. Rajapandian, , the Supreme Court opined (at p.4834 of AIR):

"It has been authoritatively settled by string of authorities of this Court that the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a Court of appeal over a decision based on the findings of the inquiring authority in disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant material which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material reasonably supports the conclusion reached @ page SC 632 by the disciplinary authority, it is not the function of the Administrative Tribunal to review the same and reach different finding than that of the disciplinary authority. The Administrative Tribunal, in this case, has found no fault with the proceedings held by the inquiring authority. It has quashed the dismissal order by re-appreciating the evidence and reaching a finding different than that of the inquiring authority." (Emphasis ours)

In Food Corporation of India, Hyderabad v. A Prahalada Rao AIR 2001 SC 51, the Supreme Court observed thus:

"It is settled law that Court''s power of judicial review in such cases is limited and Court can interfere where the authority held the enquiry proceedings in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry and imposing punishment or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence or is such that no reasonable person would have ever reached."

In Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Limited v. Girja Shankar Pant AIR 2001 SC 24, the Supreme Court again reiterated the doctrine of natural justice with reference to disciplinary proceedings and observed thus:

"19. While it is true that in a departmental proceeding, the disciplinary authority is the sole Judge of facts and the High Court may not interfere with the factual findings but the availability of judicial review even in the case of departmental proceeding cannot be doubted. Judicial review of administrative action is feasible and same has its application to its fullest extent in even departmental proceedings where it is found that the recorded findings are based on no evidence or the findings are totally perverse or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of evidence is not permitted but in the event of there being a finding which otherwise shocks the judicial conscience of the Court, it is a well-neigh impossibility to decry availability of judicial review at the instance of an affected person. The observations as above however do find some support from the decision of this Court in the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra, .

It is a fundamental requirement of law that the doctrine of natural justice be complied with and the same has, as a matter of fact, turned out to be an integral part of administrative jurisprudence of this country. The judicial process itself embraces a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend though, however, we may hasten to add that the same is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. The facts in the matter under consideration is singularly singular. The entire chain of events smacks of some personal clash and adaptation of a method unknown to law in hottest of haste: this is however, apart from the issued of bias which would be presently dealt with hereinafter. It is on this context, the observations of this Court in the case of Sayeedur Rehman Vs. The State of Bihar and Others, , seem to be rather apposite. This Court observed (Para 7):

"The omission of express requirement of fair hearing in the rules or other source of power claimed for reconsidering the order, dated April 22, 1960, is supplied by the rule of justice which is considered as an integral part of our judicial process which also governs quasi-judicial authorities when deciding controversial points affecting rights of parties."

Incidentally, Hidyatullah, C.J. in Channabasappa Basappa Happali Vs. The State of Mysore, , recorded the need of compliance of certain requirements in a departmental enquiry at an enquiry facts have to be proved and the person proceeded against must have an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to give his own version or explanation about the evidence on which he is charged and to lead his defence on this State of law of simple question arises in the contextual facts, has this being complied with? The answer however on the factual score is an emphatic "no".

The sixty-five page Report has been sent to the Managing Director of the Nigam against the petitioner recording therein that the charges against him stand proved -what is the basis? Was the Inquiry Officer justified in coming to such a conclusion on the basis of the charge-sheet only? The answer cannot possibly be in the affirmative. If the records have been considered, the immediate necessity would be to consider as to who is the person who has produced the same and the next issue could be as regards the nature of the records - unfortunately there is not a whisper in the rather longish report in that regard. Where is the Presenting Officer? Where is the notice fixing the date of hearing? Where is the list of witnesses? What has happened to the defence witnesses? AH these questions arise but unfortunately no answer is to be found in the rather longish Report. But if one does not have it - can it be termed to be in consonance with the concept of justice or the @ page-SC 33 same tantamounts to a total miscarriage of justice. The High Court answers it as miscarriage of justice and we do lend our concurrence therewith. The whole issue has been dealt with in such a way that it cannot but be termed to be totally devoid of any justifiable reason and in this context a decision of the King''s Bench Division in the case of Denby (William) and Sons Limited v. Minister of Health (1936) 1 KB 337 may be considered Swift, J., while dealing with the administrative duties of the Minister has the following to state:

"I do not think that it is right to say that the Minister of Health or any other officer of the State who has to administer an Act of Parliament is a judicial officer. He is an administrative officer, carrying out the duties of an administrative office, and administering the provisions of particular Acts of Parliament. From time to time, in the course of administrative duties, he has to perform acts which require him to interfere with the rights and property of individuals, and in doing that the Courts have said that he must act fairly and reasonably; not capriciously, but in accordance with the ordinary dictates of justice. The performance of those duties entails the exercise of the Minister''s discretion, and I think what was said by Lord Halsbury in Sharp v. Wakefield, (1891) AC 173 is important to consider with reference to the exercise of such discretion. He there said :" ''Discretion'' means when it is said that something is to be down within the discretion of the authorities that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion: Rooke''s case (1598) 5 Co Rep 99b 100a; according to law, and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular. An it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself."

Turning on to issue of bias and for which the show cause notice-cum-charge-sheet has been set out in extenso, be it noted that the same does reflect a state of mind. Sufferance of loss on interest insofar as Nigam is concerned and resulting in reduction in working capital with total dereliction of duty has been specifically attributed to the respondent herein. The inclusion of the last charge, however, clinches the issue, the same is set out hereinbelow:

"Lastly, it is concluded that you never kept in mind the interest of the Nigam due to your personal vested interess, Due to your corrupt conduct, you had no control over your subordinates. You never submitted suggestion in the interest of the Nigam and never shown interest in the implementation of the schemes due to which the Nigam was unable to get the success as much as it should have, keeping in view the natural beauty of this place. The tourism section was suffering loss due to your activities. You always misused the Nigam''s tourism section for your personal vested interest and gains. Your conduct and integrity is highly doubtful."

Even the element of bias in the proceedings would vitiate the action. It was further observed that even in cases of real likelihood of bias also the doctrine gets attracted. The Supreme Court observed thus:

"Bias'' in common English parlance mean and imply - predisposition or prejudice. The Managing Director admittedly, was not well disposed of towards the respondent herein by reason wherefor, the respondent was denuded of the financial power as also the administrative management of the department. It is the selfsame Managing Director who levels thirteen charges against respondent and is the person who appoints the Inquiry Officer, but affords a pretended hearing himself late in the afternoon on 26-11-1993 and communicates the order of termination consisting of eighteen pages by early evening, the chain is complete. Prejudice apparent Bias as stated stands proved.

The concept of ''Bias'' however has had a steady refinement with the changing structure of the society. Modernisation of the society, with the passage of time, has its due impact on the concept of Bias as well. Three decades ago this Court in S. Parthasarthi Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, proceeded on the footing of real likelihood of ''Bias'' and there was in fact a total unanimity on this score between the English and the Indian Courts.

Mathew, J., in Parthasarthi''s case observed:

"16. The tests of "real likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion" are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before, it whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The Court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must riot only be done but seen to be done. If right minded persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiry officer, he must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless, there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the Inquiring Officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The Court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision (see per Lord Denning, H.R. in Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.), Ltd. v. Lannon (1968) 3 WLR 694. We should not, however, be understood to deny that the Court might with greater propriety apply the "reasonable suspicion" test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings."

Lord Thankerton however in Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning (1948) AC 87 had this to state:

"I could wish that the use of the word ''bias'' should be confined to its proper sphere. Its proper significance, in my opinion, is to denote a departure from the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires for those who occupy judicial office, or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi -judicial office, such as an Arbitrator. The reason of this clearly is that, having to adjudicate as between two or more parties, he must come to his adjudication with an independent mind, without any inclination or bias towards one side or other in the dispute."

After referring to recent decision of English Courts in Locabail (Locabail) (UK) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. 2000 QB 451 and Reg, Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) (2000) (1) AC 119, the Supreme Court held thus:

"The test, therefore, is as to whether a mere apprehension of bias or there being a real danger of bias and it is on this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom. In the event however the conclusion is otherwise inescapable that there is existing a real danger of bias the administrative action cannot be sustained. If on the other hand, the allegations pertaining to bias is rather fanciful and otherwise to avoid a particular Court, Tribunal or authority, question of declaring them to be unsustainable would not arise. The requirement is availability of positive and cogent evidence and it is in this context that we do record our concurrence with the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in Locabail case (supra)."

From the survey of the aforesaid decisions, the following principles would emerge:

(a) When a departmental enquiry is held in accordance with the rules affording fair and reasonable opportunity to the delinquent employee, the High Court will normally be loath to exercise the power of judicial review and interfere with such enquiry sitting under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India.

(b) The principles of natural justice have no definite connotation, conformation or violation of such principles cannot be applied in a straight jacket formula. Facts and circumstances of each case inter alia with reference to the nature of the misconduct, status of employee, type of enquiry contemplated, category of witnesses to be examined and classification of documents to be marked etc., have to be taken into consideration.

(c) Mere observance of fair procedure is not only the sine qua non in departmental proceedings. The findings arrived by the enquiring authority should be reasonable and incapable of being inflicted with the perversity. The enquiring authority should arrive at the conclusion on the basis of some evidence relevant coupled with certain degree of definiteness leading to the guilt or otherwise of the employee.

(d) Finding recorded on mere suspicion or conjectures is a perverse finding. Similarly, as finding recorded without there being any evidence or on irrelevant and extraneous matters is not sustainable. Thus if there is non-application of mind viz., omission to consider relevant material or taking into consideration irrelevant evidence the findings of Enquiry Officer are tainted with perversity.

(e) If the findings are based on no legal and acceptable evidence and the findings are such that on the basis of material available on record, no reasonable man of ordinary prudence could come to such a finding, the finding so recorded would be perverse and invalid finding.

(f) Even in cases of malice or bias either inherent or apprehended with cogent evidence available on record resulting in miscarriage of justice, the power of judicial review can be invoked.

(g) The power of award of punishment is within the discretion of the disciplinary authority. Normally, the Courts would not interfere with the decision exercised by the authority. But, if it is found that the discretion was not exercised fairly, reasonably and in accordance with law, it is open for the Court to intervene and interfere under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India.

(h) In cases of unconscionable punishments viz., when the punishment awarded is too severe and grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct and shocks the conscience of the Court, the said punishments can be set aside. Either appropriate punishments could be awarded keeping in view the facts and circumstances or the matter could be remitted to the appellate/ disciplinary authority for awarding substituted punishments.

(i) The above principle culled out are only illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case has to be considered on its own merits.

Keeping in mind the above principles, let us test the case on hand. The contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that it is a case of no evidence and the findings arrived by the Enquiry Authority are wholly perverse.

Before the Tribunal For Disciplinary Proceedings, P.Ws. 1 to 13 were examined on behalf of the prosecution and D.Ws. 1 to 5 were examined on behalf of the defence. Exs.P-1 to P-18 were marked on behalf of the prosecution and Exs.D-1 to D-6 were marked on behalf of the defence. M.Os. 1 to 12 were marked.

According to the petitioner, one Boya Venkatesulu was arrested by I-Town Police Station, Ananthapur in Cr.No. 53 of 1995 on the ground that he was found in possession of 27 liquor bottles and produced before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ananthapur along with the property and the learned Magistrate remanded him to judicial custody. Subsequently, on point of jurisdiction, the I-Town Police Station, Ananthapur made over the case to the Excise Station, Ananthapur along with the F.I.R. and relevant records in connection with Cr.No. 53 of 1995 and the concerned S.I. of Excise registered the same as Crime No. 61 of 1995 u/s 34(a) of the A.P. Excise Act. In this regard, the counter filed by the respondents, is silent as to the facts, when Cr.No. 53 of 1995 was registered, when the accused therein was produced before the learned Magistrate and as to when he was released on bail.

Be that as it may. A perusal of Ex.P-1 report given by the wife of Venkatesulu, it is dated 2-6-1995. It is stated therein that two weeks back, one Thammareddy, Excise Constable and others came to her house and questioned about the possession of Brandi bottles and later took her and her husband to the Excise station and kept her husband for two days in lock up illegally. It is further stated therein that her husband informed her that the C.I. demanded him to pay Rs. 3,000/- or otherwise, he would be implicated in a false case. In the same breath, it- is stated in the complaint that again on Wednesday, the Excise Police brought her husband to Police Station and she could not get him released for about 3 days due to lack of money in her hands. On Friday, she brought her husband to her village and again on Sunday i.e., on 2-6-1995, they returned to the village. It is further stated that on 2-6-1995 at about 2.30 p.m., the Excise Police brought her husband to the Excise Station and the Excise C.I. and Thammaredddy demanded Rs. 3,000/- for release of her husband.

Coming to the evidence of the complainant and her mother and Venkatesulu, they are self contradictory as to the time of alleged detention by the Excise Police. P.W. 1 stated that her husband was taken away by the Excise Police at about 2.30 p.m. on 2-6-1995 whereas P.W.2, her mother stated that he was taken away by the Excise Police at about 6 p.m. and P.W.3, Venkatesulu stated that he was arrested at about 5.30. p.m. It is an admitted fact as could be seen from the evidence of P.W. 1 that the amount of Rs. 3,000/- was arranged by one Mr. Prasad who was examined as P.W.4. He voluntarily admitted in his cross-examination that he gave Rs. 3,000/- to P.W. 1 to her to foist these cases against the Excise Officials, as they registered cases against him. Apart from that, the contents of Ex.P-1 report itself, are ambiguous. In the facts and circumstances, it can be said that prior to 2-6-1995, the said Venkatesulu, the husband of the author of Ex.P-1 was involved in Crime No. 53 of 1995 of I-Town Police Station, Ananthapur and in that connection he was arrested and remanded to judicial custody and subsequently, on point of jurisdiction, the said crime was transferred to the Excise Station, Ananthapur wherein it was registered as Crime No. 61 of 1995 u/s 34(a) of A.P. Excise Act.

It is the main contention of the petitioner that on the date of incident i.e., on 2-6-1995, he was relieved at about 11.30 a.m. from the Excise Station, Ananthapur on the eve of his transfer to Kuppam and he handed over the charge to Sri C. Narayana Swamy, Excise S.I. Ananthapur. The investigation is also kept silent on this aspect as to the truth or otherwise. In this regard, in the counter filed before the Tribunal, it is explained at Page-7 thus:

"With regard to the contention of the applicant that he handed over the charge on 2-6-1995 at about 11.30 a.m., to the Prohibition and Excise Inspector and got relieved from his duties and his; name was not found in FIR/ Panchanama, it is submitted that two Weeks prior to 2-6-1995 Sri B. Venkatesulu, the husband of complainant was forcibly taken to Excise Station and confined for two days and on third day, Sri. S. Altaf Hussain demanded on illegal gratification of Rs. 5,000/-to release him without foisting any case against Sri B, Venkatesulu. When the said Sri Venkatesulu expressed his inability, Sri. S. Altaf Hussain bargained and agreed to accept Rs. 3,000/- and on promise to pay the amount he was released. As he did not fulfil the demand he was again taken to the station and confined a Week later. It is a fact that Sri S. Altaf Hussain in pursuance of his transfer orders handed over only General dairy to Sri C. Narayanaswamy, S.I. on 2-6-1995 at 11.30 a.m., but he was available in the station till 7.30p.m."

From the above marked portion, the petitioners cannot be presumed to be working in Ananthapuram Excise Station after 11.30 a.m., on 2-6-1995 since he was relieved by the then Excise Sub-Inspector on the eve of his transfer to Kuppam.

It is also pertinent to note that even prior to 2-6-1995, a crime was already registered by the local police and the same was transferred to the Excise Station, Ananthapur on point of jurisdiction and the same was registered for the offence u/s 34(a) of the A.P. Excise Act. In this view of the matter, no mala fides can be attributed against the petitioner that he demanded Rs. 3,000/- so as to save him without implicating in the crime inasmuch, the said Venkatesulu was already involved in Cr.No. 53 of 1995 for the offence u/s 34(a) of the A.P. Excise Act a few days prior to 2-6-1995 and was remanded to judicial custody. Therefore, the theory narrated in Ex.P-1 that three Weeks prior to 2-6-1995, the Excise Police have approached twice or thrice to the house of complainant and brought the said Venkatesulu to the Excise Station and demanded Rs. 3,000/-for his release without any case, cannot be placed much reliance in view of registering of Crime No. 53 of 1995 by the I Town Police Station, Ananthapur in the month of May, 1995 and transferring the same to the Ananthapur Excise Police Station on point of jurisdiction.

It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that by the time of the trap, the petitioner was not working as Inspector of Excise and he was transferred to Kuppam, that except the physical features of the Inspector of Excise, the name of the petitioner did not find place in Ex.P-1 report and at the same time, even the F.I.R. did not contain the name of the petitioner as one of the accused, that even the persons who were trapped did not disclose the participation of the petitioner in the alleged commission of offence, that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 which is contradicting each other, consists of improvements with that of Ex.P-1 and P.W.4 who is an accused in Excise case, is the prime person in foisting this case and P.W.10 is also an accused in an Excise case and they deposed against the petitioner out of grouse and that therefore, evidence of prosecution witnesses, which is not clear and consistent, is eschewed from consideration and thereby, the order of the 1st respondent and the order of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings and the Tribunal, are liable to be set aside.

Another important aspect which cannot loose sight of this Court, is the evidence of D.W. 1 Kari Dasappa, who is the Senior Assistant Public Prosecutor for Excise. According to him, on 2-6-1995 at about 5.50. p.m., he was in the office of Assistant Excise Superintendent, Ananthapur and at about 6 p.m., the petitioner came to the office of Assistant Excise Superintendent Ananthapur and that the Assistant Excise Superintendent informed him that the petitioner was transferred and in that connection, tea would be arranged. It is further stated that after taking tea, the petitioner left the office of the Assistant Excise Superintendent. Thus, the evidence of D.W. 1 clearly supports the case of the petitioner that even he was not present at the time when the trap was arranged by the A.C.B. In this regard, it is also relevant to mention that Ex.P-1 report given by the complainant discloses that the Excise Inspector (Tall and Red chaff) demanded Rs. 3,000/- for release of her husband without implicating him in any case, but did not disclose the name of the petitioner. Likewise, the F.I.R. merely discloses in the accused column as "Circle Inspector, Prohibition and Excise, Ananthapur". A perusal of the proceedings in Crime No. 6/ACB/ATP under Sections 7 and 11 of P.C. Act, 1988 prepared by the Investigating agency itself, does not disclose the presence or participation of the petitioner in commission of the alleged offence and that the alleged trappers viz., Ganganna, Excise Constable or G.Thammareddy, the Excise Head Constable or Rameshbabu, Home Guard, also did not speak anything about the participation of the petitioner in the alleged commission of offence. At the same time it is not the case of the A.C.B. that the petitioner demanded money and subsequently, though he was absent, as per the trap, he was the person who was responsible for the said demand. Even the persons, who were allegedly caught red handed, did not speak about the participation of the petitioner. The alleged trap was conducted on 2-6-1995 at 6.45 p.m., whereas there is no dispute that the petitioner was relieved from Ananthapur Excise Station on 2-6-1995 at 11.30 a.m., on the eve of his transfer to Kuppam. In that background of the facts, it is not known as to how the petitioner was connected with the alleged crime by figuring him as Inspector of Excise and Prohibition, Ananthapur. Thus there is no material available for evidencing the participation and presence of the petitioner at the time of the trap. Similarly we find no material to establish demand and acceptance either directly or remotely. Therefore, we have to hold that the findings of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings are based on no evidence. Consequently such findings are perverse and accordingly they are set aside.

It is not out of place to mention that the petitioner filed a writ petition in W.P. No. 25521 of 1995 before this Court and while admitting the writ petition, stay of operation of the F.I.R. registered by the A.C.B. Ananthapur, in Crime No. 6/ACB/ ATP/95 dated 2-6-1995 and all further proceedings subsequent to the issue of the said F.I.R., was issued in W.P.MP. No. 3145, dated 14-11-1995. We have perused the copy of the order placed in the record produced before this Court by the G.P. for Services. The counter filed before the Tribunal is silent as to whether any steps had been taken for vacating the same or not. In this regard, the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings held:

"only when P.W.12 was in the box the C.O.''s Counsel confronted P.W.12 with reference to the orders of the High Court. It is the duty of the Counsel for the C.O. to place the said order before the Tribunal before the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 12 was recorded. He kept quite all these days and the C.O''s Counsel did not give an opportunity to the Investigating Agency to find out whether the stay granted by the Honourable High Court was subsequently vacated or not. The C.O''s Counsel should have taken necessary legal remedies based on the stay order granted by the Honourable High Court even before the commencement of the enquiry before the Tribunal and it is not open for the C.O.''s Counsel to come forward with this allegation against P.W.12 at this belated stage. Hence there is no force in the contentions raised by the C.O.''s Counsel"

We have perused the order passed in W.P.M.P. No. 31435 of 1995, dated 14-11-1995 wherein the Deputy Superintendent of Police, A.C.B. Ananthapur and the Director General of Police, A.C.B. Hyderabad are figured as respondents. P.W.12 is no other than the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, A.C.B. Ananthapur. If that being the case, the observations of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings that he kept quite all these days and the C.O.''s Counsel did not give an opportunity to the Investigating Agency to find out whether the stay granted by the Honourable High Court was subsequently vacated or not, that the C.O.''s Counsel should have taken necessary legal remedies based on the stay order granted by the Honourable High Court even before the commencement of the enquiry before the Tribunal and it is not open for the C.O.''s Counsel to come forward with this plea against P.W.12 at this belated stage, hold no water, inasmuch it is the duty of the Investigating Officer, who is one of the respondents in the W.P.M.P. to pursue whether the stay is existing or not, in order to proceed pursuant to the F.I.R registered against the petitioner. Apart from that, Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings and the Tribunal having accepted the contradictions in the evidence and lacunae in the investigation, proceed in its findings merely on assumptions and presumptions. It is not in dispute that the stay order in W.P.M.P. is in existence and as a consequence of which, in our considered opinion, the subsequent all-further proceedings including the impugned G.O. become immature, so that they cannot be acted upon and accordingly, they are also liable to be set aside yet on this ground also.

In the present facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that the orders impugned in this writ petition, do warrant interference of this Court and accordingly, they are liable to be set aside.

In the result, this writ petition is allowed setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal in O.A. No. 1859 of 2001 and the impugned G.O. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service as Inspector of Excise with all consequential benefits viz., seniority, promotion, arrears, of pay and allowances and other benefits which he would have earned but for the imposition of punishment. There will be no order as to costs.