S. Dalmer Singh vs State of Pepsu

Chopra, J.—This is an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ or direction quashing certain departmental proceedings and the consequential order of the petitioner''s dismissal from State service.

The petitioner was appointed substantively in P.U.A.S. Class I Grade II and posted as Assistant Commissioner (Rehabilitation), Patiala, on 7-2-1949. On 17-4-1949 he was deputed to keep his headquarters at Jullundur in connection with the rehabilitation work. He remained there till 13-5-1949, when he was transferred to Bhatinda as an Assistant Commissioner (Revenue). From there he was transferred to Nalagarh in the middle of June, 1950, and thence to Sangrur on 2-2-1951. On 21-5-1951, the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet to the effect that while posted as S.D.M. Nalagarh, the petitioner received Rs. 8000/- from one Arjan Singh promising to use his influence with Sardar Mehar Singh, the then Sessions Judge, Patiala, for securing acquittal of Arjan Singh''s relations involved in a murder case pending trial before the said Sessions Judge; that the accused were convicted, and that the petitioner thereafter returned Rs. 4000/- but kept back the balance to himself.

The petitioner submitted his explanation denying the allegations. On 20-6-1952, the petitioner, when posted as Land Acquisition Officer (P.W. D.) Patiala, was placed under suspension pending departmental inquiry. The inquiry was entrusted to S. Lal Singh, Financial Commissioner and also Revenue Secretary. The Inquiry Officer served the petitioner an identically worded charge-sheet and asked him to submit his explanation and appear before him in person on 5th July. Before the inquiry proceeded any further, the Inquiry Officer drew up an amended charge-sheet and delivered it to the petitioner on 25-9-1952. The accusation against the petitioner was the same as before. The modified charge, however, specified the place and dates of the alleged transactions. According to this charge, the negotiations for acquittal of Arjan Singh''s relations and settlement of its price at Rs. 8000/- took place on 1-5-1949, the amount was paid to the petitioner on 8-5-1949, the accused in the murder case were convicted by the Sessions Judge on 13-5-1949, and on demand for refund of the amount, Rs. 4000/- were re turned on 22-5-1949. All this was done at Patiala.

The charge further stated that the petitioner was still withholding the balance of Rs. 4000/-. The petitioner was directed to furnish this explanation within ten days. The explanation was duly submitted. As the charge was totally denied the Inquiry Officer started the oral inquiry in the presence of the petitioner. He concluded the recording of prosecution evidence on 19-2-1953 and the defence on 11-5-1953. The petitioner then submitted a detailed written statement. The case was finally argued on 3-6-1953. At this stage, S. Lal Singh moved for transfer of the inquiry from him. His request was accepted and the inquiry was transferred to Shri R.S. Randhawa, development Secretary.

On 29-7-1953, the petitioner made a statement before the new Inquiry Officer that lie had no objection to the inquiry being conducted by Shri R.S. Randhawa and to the same being proceeded with from the particular stage. It was further clarified that the petitioner had no objection to the report being based on the evidence recorded by Sardar Lal Singh, that he did not want to produce any additional evidence or to recall any of the witnesses already examined and also that he did not want to add anything to the written-statement that he had already filed. Arguments were then heard. Shri Randhawa submitted his report on 29-8-1933 holding that the charge was fully established. The Government accepted the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer and provisionally decided to dismiss the petitioner. A show-cause notice under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution was served upon the petitioner. He submitted his explanation. The petitioner was finally dismissed on 27-11-1953.

The present petition presented on 14-12-1953. challenges almost all the proceedings which culminated in the petitioner''s dismissal, and consequently the order of dismissal, on the ground that they were without authority, against the procedure laid down by the Rules and the principles of natural justice, illegal ultra vires and unconstitutional.

Each of the ground taken in the petition is controverter and specifically denied by the respondent. Affidavits of the officers concerned are submitted in support of the allegation in the reply. Lengthy arguments covering all, the points have been advanced by learned, counsel for the parties.

Mr. Isaacs, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, at the outset contends that the alleged misconduct of the petitioner, which had no connection with his official duties and amounted to a criminal offence, should not have been made the subject of a departmental inquiry and dealt with summarily, but ought to have been entrusted to a criminal Court for judicial inquiry and decision. The argument is that the petitioner is alleged to have got the money for exerting his personal relations with-the Sessions Judge in order to secure acquittal in the case pending before him he did not in that way act as a public servant, nor did he undertake-to do anything in that capacity. He was thus no-better than an ordinary citizen and if anything done by him in his private capacity amounted to an offence, he should have been regularly tried for the same by a criminal Court. Counsel maintains that the option to send a public servant for trial or to hold departmental inquiry against him rests with the Government, only when the charge relates to an act or omission of the public servant in his official capacity.

Reference in this connexion is made to proviso (a) to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution, the preamble to the Pepsu Public Servant''s (Inquiries) Ordinance, 2006 Bk. (No. 28 of 2006 Bk.) and its S. 3, Appendix 5, Pepsu Services Regulations (Volume 1), and R. 25, Pepsu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952. Counsel frankly concedes that none of these provisions expressly creates a bar to the starting of departmental proceedings in a case like the one in context. He, however, contends that the tenor of these provisions docs indicate that in a case like this the Government should as a matter of course launch criminal proceedings instead of starting departmental inquiry and taking action on the basis of the findings therein. So far as the propriety of the action, in certain cases, is concerned I may be prepared to agree with the Learned Counsel. But that does not mean that the Government had no right or authority in the present case, to take the action they did. The provisions referred to by him go no further than saying that an action in the way of dismissal, removal or reduction-in-rank need not he preceded by a show-cause-notice or departmental inquiry, if the public servant concerned has, on the facts alleged against him, been tried and convicted by a criminal Court. The converse of it is not prescribed by any of these provisions. The Government may in a fit case institute departmental inquiry even though the charge is one which can also be tried by a criminal Court. Even where there has been a regular trial, judgment of the criminal Court is not necessarily decisive as regards departmental or disciplinary action. The prosecution may fail for technical reasons, sometimes the Court notes the facts as suspicious but gives the accused the benefit of doubt and sometimes the prosecution fails for the patent reason that the witnesses have been bought over. Rule 8 of Appendix 5, Pepsu Services Regulations (Volume I) provides that in all such cases it may well be decided that the circumstances are so suspicious that the Government servant can no longer be safely trusted and that though the official is acquitted on the main charge departmental action should yet be taken against him. The choice between departmental inquiry or criminal trial, on a charge brought against one of its officials, lies with the Government and it is not a matter where Court can force its own opinion. Moreover, in the present case, the petitioner never represented that he would prefer a regular trial, rather than undergo a departmental inquiry.

By way of analogy, Learned Counsel referred to certain decisions under the Legal Practitioners Act, wherein it is held that when the allegations against a legal practitioner amount to a charge rendering him liable to a criminal prosecution the correct procedure to be followed is that proceedings under the Act should not be taken. This view was taken in some of its decisions by the Calcutta High Court and consequently proceedings under the Legal Practitioners Act were dropped. All the same, it was observed that that could not be regarded as an inflexible rule. - ''In re Hari Prosunno Mookerjee'', AIR 1918 Cal 196 (A), the same High Court dismissed a Mukhtear, who was found to have received a sum of money from one of the persons against whom some police cases were pending for the purpose of bribing the police, and who acted in the matter as a go-between.

In - AIR 1931 112 (Privy Council) ), the Allahabad High Court had found a legal practitioner guilty of certain charges made against him under Art. 8, Letters Patent of the Court, and ordered his name to be struck off the rolls of Vakils practicing before them. Their Lordships of the Privy Council dismissed his application for special leave to appeal against this order with the following observation-

Their Lordships think it right to add that while they do not take the view that it is incompetent for the High Court to deal under Art. 8, Letters Patent with charges of a criminal nature against a practitioner unless and until these have been investigated by a criminal Court, they regard it as eminently fitting that in such cases the criminal prosecution should precede any disciplinary decision.

The consensus of opinion on the point is that a reference under the Legal Practitioners'' Act is not necessarily to be dropped so long as the legal practitioner charged with a criminal offence has not been regularly tried and convicted for the same. It cannot be suggested that, in the absence of it, an action taken under the Legal Practitioners'' Act shall be regarded as illegal or without jurisdiction.

In this connection, I do not see any material difference in the misbehavior of a public servant as such or in his private capacity. In either case the Government has the option to start criminal proceedings or to institute a departmental inquiry. The civil servant is not only required conscientiously to discharge his office and all the duties directly appertaining thereto but also to behave worthily of the respect accorded to his office. Extraordinary weight is necessarily to be laid upon the impartiality and incorruptibility of the official. Even in his extra-official life he must have regard to the special obligations which his official position imposes upon him, and must conform to the prevalent opinion on virtue, manners and morals. His master, the State, is entitled to demand that he shall not only be honest in fact but beyond the reach of suspicion of dishonesty. With his private-life activities the State may not always be concerned, but if his conduct therein is such as to bring discredit upon the service of which he is a member, or to indicate that in his official capacity as well his honesty may not be above suspicion, the State shall be vitally concerned. In a case of the land in question, no rule or law enjoins that departmental action against the public servant must be preceded by a regular trial resulting in his conviction. The contention is consequently overruled.

Objections regarding the preliminary inquiry which preceded the departmental inquiry are of no practical value. Even if it were to be assumed that the preliminary inquiry was in some way defective that by itself would not vitiate all the substantial proceedings and the dismissal order. Rule 1 of Appendix 5 of the Pepsu Services Regulations (Volume I), which admittedly was then in force, requires a Head of the Office to hold a preliminary inquiry, whenever he deems it necessary, with a view to find out if a prima facie case is made out The rule further provides that the Held of the Office may at his discretion dispense with a preliminary inquiry in certain cases, and that where one is held it should be secretly conducted. The purpose of this preliminary inquiry is to satisfy the officer whether there is or is not sufficient material to order a departmental inquiry. The inquiry, if any, has to be a secret one and the person concerned is not required to take any part in it. A memorandum containing the allegations against him and informing him of the charge was delivered to the petitioner on 21-5-1951. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the Chief Secretary. The latter being the head of the Home Department was competent to hold a preliminary inquiry and to decide if a prima facie case was made out. In doing this he could at his discretion get assistance from any of his subordinates including the C.I.D. The petitioner''s contention that the whole thing was done by the police is not substantiated. I do not, therefore, find anything wrong in the preliminary inquiry.

Next in time comes the suspension order dated 20-6-53. Objections of the petitioner to this order are two fold - (1) that it was not made by a competent authority, and (2) that the Public Service Commission was not consulted as required by Art. 320(3) of the Constitution. The contention is that as the petitioner was appointed by the Rajpramukh he could not be dismissed or suspended by any authority subordinate to the Rajpramukh. As regards dismissal we have got the constitutional provision in Art. 311(1), but the same cannot be said with respect to suspension. Reliance in this connection is placed on Rr. 22 and 24, Pepsu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952, framed under Art. 309 of the Constitution. Rule 22 enumerates the various penalties that may, for good and sufficient reasons and as provided in the rules, be imposed upon members of the public service in the State. "Suspension" as one of. the penalties is mentioned at No. (v). Rule 24 inter alia provides that His Highness the Rajpramukh may impose any of the penalties specified in R. 22 on members of Class I Service. The petitioner admittedly belonged to this class and it is, therefore, contended that the suspension order could only be made by the Rajpramukh.

The position of the respondent is that since the order of suspension is expressed in the name of the Rajpramukh and is duly authenticated, its validity on the ground of incompetence cannot be questioned. In any case, it is urged the Chief Minister was the appropriate authority to make that order and the order was as a matter of fact made by him.

Article 154(1) read with Art. 238 of the Constitution lays down that the executive power of a Part B State shall vest in the Rajpramukh and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him. Article 163(1) provides for the appointment of a council of Ministers, with the Chief Minister as the head, to add�and advise the Governor or the Rajpramukh in the exercise of his executive functions.

Article 166(1) read with Art. 238 requires all executive actions of the government of a Part B State to he expressed in the name of the Rajpramukh. If it is so expressed and is authenticated in such manner as may be specified in the rules-framed by the Rajpramukh, the order becomes immune from being questioned on the ground that it is not an order made or executed by the Rajpramukh, vide Art. 166(2). Strict compliance with the requirements of Art. 166(1) gives an immunity to the order in that it cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not an order made by the Rajpramukh. The order of suspension in this case is expressed in the name of the Rajpramukh. Rule 16 of the Rules of Executive Business framed by the Rajpramukh in exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (2) of Art. 166 read with Art. 238, says that every order of the Government of the State shall be signed by a Secretary, an Additional Secretary, a Joint Secretary, a Deputy Secretary, an Under Secretary or an Assistant Secretary, and that such signature shall be deemed to be the proper authentication of such order. An order within the executive functions of the State Government, when it is expressed in the name of the Rajpramukh and is properly authenticated, cannot be attacked on the ground that it is not made by the person who purports to have made it. In such a case it is immaterial if in fact it was made only by a Minister. It is not disputed that the order in question falls within the executive functions of the State. As already observed it is expressed in the name of the Rajpramukh and is issued under the signature of the Chief Secretary. The order, therefore, enjoys the constitutional immunity from an attack on the ground of incompetence.

Assuming, but not holding, that such an objection is permissible, I proceed to decide it on merits as well, for the reasons that such questions are generally raised and the one before me has been argued at some length by Learned Counsel of, the parties. The order, as I see it from the record with the Advocate General, and, is also affirmed by Shri A.N. Kashyap, Deputy Secretary to Government in his affidavit, was made by the Chief Minister. A composite order suspending the petitioner and appointing S. Lal Singh as the Inquiry Officer, made on a note put up by the Chief Secretary, bears the signature of the Chief Minister.

The question then arises whether the Chief Minister was competent to make the order or the papers were necessarily to be submitted to the Rajpramukh. In the present democratic state of affairs it would not be possible to carry on the day to day administration if every executive function were to be done by the Rajpramukh and if every case were to go to him for decision or orders. Article 163, therefore, makes provisions for the institution of a Council of Ministers, with the Chief Minister at the head, to aid and advise the Governor or the Rajpramukh, as the case may be, in the exercise of his functions.

Article 166(3) further authorizes the Governor or the Rajpramukh to make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of his government, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under the Constitution required to act in his discretion. The present is not a "business" that comes under the exception created by the above clause of the article. The Rajpramukh may, therefore, delegate his powers in this respect, by making appropriate rules to any of his Ministers or some other subordinate authority. In exercise of the powers conferred by Art. 166(2) and (3) read with Art. 238, the Rajpramukh of this State framed Rules of Executive Business in 1951. Rule 4 of these Rules says that business of the Government shall be transacted in the departments specified in the First Schedule, and shall be classified and distributed between those departments as laid down therein.

In this schedule "all matters affecting the Patiala Union Administrative Service" is mentioned at No, 2 of the allocation of business relating to the Home Department. Rule 13 makes the Minister incharge of a Department primarily responsible for the disposal of the business appertaining to that department. Under R. 25, cases, with the exception of those otherwise provided for in the Rules, shall ordinarily be disposed of by or under the authority of the Minister Incharge. He may, by means of standing orders, also give such directions as he thinks fit for the disposal of cases in his department.

Rule 34 enumerates the classes of cases which have necessarily to be submitted to the Rajpramukh and the Chief Minister before the issue of orders. Sub-clause (7) of this rule only refers to "proposals for dismissing, removing or compulsorily retiring any officer belonging to a Class I or Class II Service." An order of suspension obviously does not fall under this head and there is no other clause which may be applicable. The matter in question related to "Patiala Union Administrative Service" and was, therefore, to be dealt with by the Home Department. It need not have been referred to the Rajpramukh as it did not fall under R. 34. It could, therefore, be finally disposed of by the Minister Incharge Home Department. The Chief Minister holding the portfolio of that Department had thus the authority finally to deal with the case and make necessary orders therein.

Pepsu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952, on which reliance is placed, do provide that certain penalties may be imposed on members of a particular class of service by the Rajpramukh. But these Rules do not limit the Rajprarmukh''s powers under Art. 166(3) of the Constitution to delegate that authority to one of the Ministers or any other officer of the State, with whose assistance he is to carry on the administration. Under the Rules of Executive Business framed by the Rajpramukh, with the exception of cases reserved for disposal to himself in R. 34, the rest of the cases are to be disposed of by the Minister Incharge and need not be referred to him. The order of suspension in the present case, therefore, could be validly made by the Chief Minister.

My decision in - ''Baldev Singh v. Govt. of Pepsu'', AIR 1954 Pepsu 98 (C) is relied upon as an authority to the contrary. The order of suspension in that case was made by the Adviser during the period when, under the proclamation of 4-3-1953, all functions of the Government of Pepsu and also the powers vested in or exercisable by His Highness the Rajpramukh were assumed to himself by the President of India. By an order of the same date the President vested those powers in the Rajpramukh as his delegate subject to two conditions-

(1) that he will exercise the powers subject to the superintendence, directions and control of the President, and

(2) that he will act on the advice of the Adviser.

It was in view of these facts that I observed-

The order thus makes it abundantly clear that the powers which under the prevalent laws of the State were to be exercised by His Highness the Rajpramukh still vest in him; the only difference being that the powers are to be exercised as a delegatee of the President and with the advice of the Adviser. The order does not authorize the Adviser to exercise the powers which under any of the laws of the State were to be exercised by the Rajpramukh. The functions of the Adviser are confined to render advice and the Rajpramukh is required to act on that advice. The advice is to be one of the links in the chain of the working of administration, but it does not constitute the chain itself.

Here I am not concerned with the situation that may arise if in any particular case the Rajpramukh does not agree with the advice made by the Adviser, but the Order does not leave any doubt that matters which lay in the exclusive power of the Rajpramukh are still to be dealt by him. Unless any sub-delegation under the Order was possible the Rajpramukh could not further delegate his powers to the Adviser. It is not even the case of the respondent that any sub-delegation was made, nor has my attention been drawn to any subsequent order of the President whereby the powers to be exercised by him (President) in place of the Rajpramukh were delegated to the Adviser.

Rules of Executive Business framed by the President sometimes after the order in question was made, but to which retrospective effect was given, were then considered and it was found that they too did not help the respondent. Orders in cases to be dealt with by the Rajpramukh could only be made by the Rajpramukh himself or by an authority to whom that power way delegated. The Rules of Executive Business framed by the Rajpramukh did not come into play as the Adviser did not and could not figure anywhere in those rules. The judgment does not show if the order was expressed in the name of the President. Even if it was, the respondent did not take up the position that the order deserved immunity from any attack on the ground of incompetence under Art. 166(3) of the Constitution.

The respondent on the other hand simply contended that the order was made by the Adviser and that the Adviser was fully competent to make it. The authority of the Adviser vis-a-vis the Rajpramukh was considered and it was held that the Adviser was not competent to�make the order which ought to have been made by the Rajpramukh. It is thus evident that the facts of that case were widely different and the observations made therein have no application to the present case. Here the order was made by the Chief Minister, and he under the Rules of Executive Business had the final say in the matter.

The second objection to the suspension order is that the Public Service Commission was not consulted as required by Art. 320(3) of the Constitution. Proviso appended to this sub-article empowers the Governor or the Rajpramukh as the case may be, to frame regulations with respect to the services of the State specifying the matters in which it shall not be necessary for the Public Service Commission to be consulted. Regulations under this proviso were framed by the Rajpramukh on 3-11-1951 and they were published in the Pepsu Government Gazette dated 18-11-1951.

Necessity of consulting the Public Service Commission in a disciplinary case of suspension pending inquiry is exempted by regulation 4. Mr. Isaacs canvasses the enforceability of these Regulations on the score of sub-Art. 5 of Art. 320 of the Constitution. The sub-article enjoins that Regulations framed under proviso to sub-Art. 3(c) shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before the House or each House of the Legislature of the State, as the case may be, as soon as possible after they are made and shall be subject to such modifications, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as the House or both the Houses of the Legislature of the State may make during the session in which they are so laid.

Petitioner''s contention is that these Regulations were not laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State before or during its first session held on 16-4-1952 or its second session on 5-5-1952, and, therefore, they should not be regarded as to have any force on 20-6-1952, when the order of suspension was passed. The stand taken by the respondent in this connection is that the Regulations were framed when there was no Legislative Assembly in the State and the legislative functions were vested in the Rajpramukh by Art. 10 of the covenant entered into between the integrating States.

Shri A.N. Kashyap, Deputy Secretary to Government, has submitted an affidavit affirming that a copy of the aforesaid Regulations was forwarded to the Secretariat of His Highness the Rajpramukh, vide endorsement No. HD/16 (66) 51-B dated 23-11-1951. The Legislative Assembly in the State came into Existence on 16-4-1952. Till then the powers and duties of the House of Legislature of the State were to be exercised and performed, as required by Art. 385 of the Constitution by the body or the authority functioning immediately before the commencement of the Constitution as the Legislature of the State. The suggestion, therefore, is that sending a copy of the Regulations to the Secretariat of His Highness on 23-11-1951 was a sufficient compliance of Art. 320(3) of the Constitution; and once that was done it was not necessary to place the Regulations before the House, when it was formed a few months later. I doubt if it was a strict compliance with the constitutional provision in a way it amounts to circumventing it.

Regulations were framed by the Rajpramukh as the executive head of the State. It is true that until the House of Legislature of the State was duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session, the Rajpramukh was carrying on the functions of the Legislature of the State as well. But as the Regulations were framed by the Rajpramukh, though in another capacity, and the House was constituted and came into existence only a few months later, the Government would have been well advised to lay those Regulations before the House as Required by the sub-article. Moreover, the endorsement, referred to above, forwarding a copy of the Regulations to the Secretariat of the Rajpramukh does not show that it was intended to comply with the provisions of the article.

However, I see much force in the alternative contention of the learned Advocate General that the provisions of Article 320(5) of the Constitution are merely directory and not mandatory. The language and purpose of its provisions make me think that the sub-article is meant to be a directory one. The Regulations are only to be laid before the House for fourteen days "as soon as practicable after they are made. They are not to be formally approved by the House, but they are to be subject to any modifications the House may choose to make during the session in which they are so laid. The use of the word "shall" is not very such material. Article 166(1) also uses the word "shall" while requiring the executive orders to be expressed in the name of the Governor. But in the latter case it has been held in - Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar Vs. The State of Bombay and Others, that an omission to comply with its provisions does not render the executive action a nullity. The principle to be followed in determining whether a particular statutory provision is directory or mandatory is laid down by S.R. Das J. in the above decision as follows:

It is well settled that generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of the Courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done.

Similar provisions are also made in some other articles of the Constitution. Article 151 requires that the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India relating to the accounts of the Union shall be submitted to the President, "who shall cause them to be laid before each house of the Parliament." Their reports relating to the accounts of a State are to be submitted to the Governor or Rajpramukh of the State, "who shall cause them to be laid before the Legislature of the State."

Article 281 says: "The President shall cause every recommendation made by the Finance Commission under the provisions of the Constitution together with an explanatory memorandum as to the action taken thereon to be laid before each house of the Parliament. Under Art. 323 copies of the reports of the Union Commission or the State Commission presented to the President or the Governor, are to be laid before each House of the Parliament or before the Legislature of a State. Though the word "shall" is used in each of these-articles it cannot be said that all these provisions are mandatory and that their non-compliance renders the reports or recommendations concerned illegal or ineffective.�

Provisions to the same effect, which are intended to be mandatory, are expressed in a different rent language, and the effect of their non-compliance is specifically stated. An Ordinance promulgated by the President during recess of Parliament is to be laid before both Houses of Parliament, vide Art. 123 of the Constitution. The article further provides that such an Ordinance shall cease to be operative at the expiration of six weeks from the re-assembly of the Parliament, or earlier if and when resolutions disapproving it are passed by both the Houses. Article 213 makes identical provisions with respect to Ordinances promulgated by the Governor of a State during recess of Legislature of the State. In my judgment, therefore, the Regulations had not ceased to be operative on 20-6-1952, simply because they were not laid before the Legislative Assembly in its first or the second session held on 16-4-1952 and 5-5-1952 respectively.

As regards the departmental enquiry, it is contended that the order directing it and appointing S. Lal Singh as the Inquiry Officer was not made by a competent authority and that it was not in the prescribed form. It shall be remembered that it was by one and the same order dated 20-6-1952, that the petitioner was suspended, a departmental inquiry against him was directed and S. Lal Singh was appointed the Inquiry Officer. This order was made by the Chief Minister. The question with respect to his competency to pass the order has already been discussed and decided against the petitioner. It was in compliance with this order that the Chief Secretary issued Home Department Notification No. 402 regarding the petitioner''s suspension, and the same day he addressed a letter to S. Lal Singh informing him of the Government''s decision that he was to hold an enquiry against the petitioner. It is with respect to this letter that the petitioner contends that it should also have been in the name of the Rajpramukh.

I do not see any force in the contention. Every executive decision need not be formally expressed, particularly when one superior officer directs one of his subordinates to act in a specified manner or to carry out an order made by the Government. Even if the order was required to be so expressed, the omission cannot have the effect of vitiating the order or the proceedings taken there-under. The only effect of the omission, if it was one, is that the order shall not be immune from attack on the ground of incompetence, but it can be shown to have been made by a competent authority. That has been done in this case, and, therefore, the objection has to be rejected.

There is obviously no force in the next contention that the inquiry ought to have been conducted under the Pepsu Public Servants (Inquiries) Ordinance, 2006 Bk. (No. 28 of 2006 Bk.). That ordinance as stated in its section 3, relates only to "a formal and public inquiry." Section 24 of the Ordinance expressly saves the authority of the Government to take action against a public servant without holding any inquiry under the Ordinance. It is pointed out that the letter of the Chief Secretary dated 20-6-1952, addressed to S. Lal Singh directed him to hold the inquiry milder appendix 3 of the Pepsu Service Regulations, which in fact had ceased to hold the field and had already been superseded. That was simply due to a clerical inadvertence, which has been explained an the written reply and an affidavit of the Office-Superintendent. The Regulations were being reprinted when the letter was drafted. In the revised and reprinted Regulations the earlier Appendix 3 was numbered as Appendix 5 and the letter in fact meant the inquiry to be conducted under Appendix 5 of the revised Regulations.

In the meantime Pepsu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952, came into force on 19-6-1952, i.e., a day prior to the date of the letter. The Government then noticed that there was also a mistake in the charge-sheet sent along with his letter of the Chief Secretary. The charge stated that the negotiations with respect to securing acquittal of Arjan Singh''s relations in the murder case and the payment of rupees eight thousand for the purpose took place when the petitioner was posted at Nalagarh, while the allegation was that all this happened a little earlier when the petitioner was posted at Jullundur. The letter as well as the charge-sheet were, therefore, withdrawn and an amended charge-sheet was sent with a fresh letter. Without specifying the law or the rules under which it was to be conducted, the letter simply required S. Lal Singh to proceed with the enquiry. The fresh charge-sheet was delivered to the petitioner on 25-9-1952 and it is in the following terms:

That Chanan Singh son of Ishar Singh jat of Qadarpur, brother-in-law of S. Arjan Singh son of Sadda Singh jat of village Sansarwal and his (Chanan Singh''s) father namely Isher Singh son of Ghuala Singh were involved in a murder case under S. 302/34, I.P.C. which was pending trial before S. Mehar Singh then District & Sessions Judge, Patiala. Aforesaid Arjan Singh approached you on 19-1-2006/1-5-1949 at Patiala and asked for your help in order to secure the acquittal of Chanan Singh and Isher Singh. You offered to do so provided a substantial amount of money was made available to you for being delivered to S. Mehar Singh. The amount was ultimately settled at Rs. 8,000/-. In consequence on 26-1-2006/8-5-1949 Rs. 8,000/- were paid to you by said S. Arjan Singh. S. Mehar Singh convicted the accused on 31-1-2006/13-5-1949. Thereafter you returned Rs. 4,000/- to S. Arjan Singh on 9-2-2006/22-5-1949. In spite of demand several times by S. Arjan Singh you are still withholding the rest of the money i.e. Rs. 4,000/- ;

The above mentioned act on your part amounts to a serious misconduct which if established renders you wholly unfit to be retained in Government service. You are hereby required to furnish your explanation within ten days and to state further why in the event of your failure to do so sufficiently and satisfactorily you should not be dismissed,'' removed or reduced or subjected to such other disciplinary action as the competent authority may think fit to enforce.

On behalf of the petitioner, it is contended that the proceedings of the inquiry indicate that it was conducted under Appendix 5 of the Pepsu Service Regulations, while as a matter of fact the inquiry could only be held in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Pepsu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952, which had by then come into force. The contention has no force. In the first instance, neither the directions to the Inquiry Officer nor anything in the proceedings thereof indicate that the inquiry was to be or was actually held under the Regulations. Even if it were so, I do not think it is of any significance.

The procedure laid down by R. 9 of Appendix 5 and R. 25, Pepsu Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1952, is very much the same, except that in the latter the person charged, in addition to the charge-sheet, is also to be supplied "a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case", and he is also entitled to give evidence in person. Petitioner''s grouse is that the statement of the allegations on which the charge was based was not communicated to him and also that he was not allowed to appear as his own witness. The charge-sheet reproduced above it self contains a statement of the allegations against the petitioner. Its para 1 states the mam allegations on which the charge was based and para 2 gives what the charge actually was Rule 25 docs not necessarily require that the charge and the "statement of the allegations" ought to be contained and served in two separate documents. Their combination in one document can be regarded as sufficient compliance with the rule. The only thing necessary is that "the allegations" must be communicated to the person concerned. There can be no doubt that these allegations were contained in the charge-sheet itself. The petitioner has not been and could not possibly be prejudiced by the procedure.

As regards the second grievance, the petitioner never expressed his desire to give evidence in person. The request, if made, could have been allowed. The petitioner examined his defense from 9th March to 11th May, 1953, and submitted a detailed written statement on the last date. Before the second Inquiry Officer, the petitioner stated that he had nothing to add and also that he did not want to adduce any more evidence. He simply demanded that the "arguments in writing" submitted by him, covering seven pages, be treated as his "statement in writing". The petitioner thus had ample opportunity to lead his defence. He fully availed of the opportunity and preferred to close his defence with" a statement in writing and written arguments. He could have, if he so desired, appeared as his own witness, but for that he never made a request. It was not for the Inquiry Officer to apprise him of his right to give evidence in person. In any case, I do not think the petitioner has, in any way, been prejudiced. The entire evidence was recorded in his presence, even facility to inspect the record, to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and to examine his defence was afforded and on three occasions be filed detailed written statements explaining the one charge against him.

Another complaint of the petitioner is that the Inquiry Officer did not supply him, in advance, a list of witnesses to be examined by the prosecution and copies of their previous statements. Nothing in the Regulations nor in the Pepsu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules requires that these should have been necessarily furnished to the petitioner.

Mr. Isaac contends that it is required by the rules of natural justice. The procedure to be followed in departmental inquiries, as laid down by the Pepsu Service Regulations or the Pepsu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, is in fact based upon the principles of natural justice. So long as the Inquiry Officer acts honestly, in good faith, with a sense of responsibility and in consonance with his own rules, his decision cannot be questioned on the ground of breach of any other supposed rule of natural justice. Copies of previous statements of the witnessed were supplied to the petitioner, when demanded,, during cross-examination, and the witnesses were in fact cross-examined with respect to them. The petitioner would not have been in any better position if he was being tried in a Court of law.

Under S. 162, Cr.P.C, as it at present stand even in a criminal trial copies of the police statements are allowed to the accused during cross-examination of the witnesses and at no time prior to it or in advance. The list of witnesses to be examined by the prosecution was placed on the record of the Inquiry Officer, to the inspection of which the petitioner was every time entitled. 1 have, therefore, no valid reason to think that any of the rules of natural justice was offended, or that the petitioner was in any manner prejudiced in his defence.

Counsel next contends that the inquiry could and should not have been transferred where it was complete in every respect and only thermal report remained to be prepared and submitted. The inquiry was transferred on a move by the Inquiry Officer himself. He wrote to the Government that for certain reasons he was not likely to take an unprejudiced view in the matter and, therefore, requested the inquiry to be transferred to some other officer, There can be no objection as to the Government''s authority to transfer the proceedings. When it could appoint an Inquiry Officer it could also withdraw the inquiry from him and entrust it to some one else. It was for the Government to accept or reject the request made by S. Lal Singh; and in these proceedings, I am not concerned with the reasons for the transfer.

Moreover, the petitioner did not take exception to it during the inquiry. Not only that he did not object, but on being precisely asked, he, without any reservation, stated that he had no objection to Shri Randhawa''s conducting the inquiry and that too from the stage where it was left by his predecessor.

Mr. Isaacs has taken me through Mr. Randhawa''s report, and contends that his conclusion on some of the points, are erroneous and against evidence on the record. Mr. Randhawa, it is urged, rejected the defence evidence purely of conjectures or, in any case, on insufficient grounds. The petitioner led evidence to prove that when posted at Jullundur he did not obtain any station leave so as to be at Patiala on the relevant dates.

Mr. Randhawa did not rely upon his evidence as, in his view, the petitioner might have left the-station without leave or simply on verbal permission. It may be mentioned that each of the three pertinent dates fell on a Sunday. S. Balwant Singh, petitioner''s landlord, was examined to show that the petitioner did not visit Patiala on those-dates and that the key of his (petitioner''s) residence, which used to remain with him, was not obtained from him by the petitioner. As regards this the Inquiry Officer observes that the petitioner probably had a duplicate key with him, and the witness could have been away to his field at the particular time. These and some such other observations are cited as instances where Shri Randhawa is said to have erred by substituting conjectures in place of positive evidence. Learned Counsel, however, forgets that I am not to go into the merits of the decision or the reasoning behind it. A writ of certiorari is not meant to correct an erroneous decision of an inferior tribunal. The High Court in such cases is not to act as an appellate Court and correct what it may consider to be an error in the decision, nor has it anything to do with the appreciation of evidence. In - Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. and Others, their Lordships of the Supreme Court dealing with the powers of the High Court in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution observed as follows:

"Such writs as are refereed to in Art. 226 are obviously intended is enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made.

The petitioner has not been able to point out any such error, omission, or excess, or to show that any manifest injustice has been done to him. For all these reasons I do not find anything wrong in the proceedings of the inquiry or die report.

I cannot fail to observe that most of the points urged on behalf of the petitioner are beyond the scope of Arts. 226 and 311(2) of the Constitution. I have dealt with them not because it was absolutely necessary, but partly because they were hotly stressed by the petitioner and with equal vehemence contested by the opposite side and partly because such objections are generally raised in these petitions in this Court. The purpose of a departmental inquiry is simply to enable the Government to arrive at a decision regarding the alleged misbehavior of a public servant. The report of the Inquiry Officer is to assist the Government to come to a definite conclusion whether any action on those allegations is absolutely necessary. The Government may adopt any method for inquiring into the matter and the final decision lies with the Government. After it has provisionally determined the punishment which has to be imposed, the public servant is served with a notice to explain his position. He is then given an opportunity to show cause why the proposed action be not taken against him. Article 310(1) of the Constitution lays down that, except as expressly provided by the Constitution itself, every person who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor or, as the case may be, the Rajpramukh of the State. Article 311 provides for two guarantees in favour of the public servant, (i) that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, and (ii) that he shall net be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. There is no dispute as regards the first in the present case. All that remains to be seen is-whether before the petitioner was dismissed he was given an opportunity of showing cause against his proposed dismissal, and if he was, whether that opportunity can be regarded as reasonable. Irregularities in the conduct of the departmental inquiry regarding the allegations against him or in reception of evidence therein, rejection of his defense as unreliable and the conclusion being based on insufficient evidence or conjectures are matters which do not fall for consideration of this Court in these proceedings. The prescribed proper authority of the Government had ample power to dismiss the petitioner if that authority was satisfied that the charge was established and that there were reasonable grounds for his dismissal. The fact that certain rules have been framed to safeguard the rights of civil servants in matters of disciplinary action does not mean that this Court has jurisdiction to quash the order of dismissal simply because the provisions of one or the other of those rules have not been strictly observed. So far as there is no contravention of Art. 311 of the Constitution this Court would have no jurisdiction to quash an order of dismissal.

As regards the main question, the Learned Counsel has very little to say. It has not been-urged that the petitioner was not given an opportunity to snow cause against the proposed action or that the opportunity was not reasonable. The objections in this connection as well are nothing but technical. It is contended the was notice was not in the prescribed form, viz., in the name of the Rajpramukh, the notice required the petitioner merely to show cause against the quantum 06 punishment and that a copy of the Inquiry Officer''s report was not supplied to the petitioner. I do not see force in any of these contentions. The notice is under the signature of the Chief Secretary. It informed the petitioner that the Government did not see any reason to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the Inquiry Officer and that the Government considered the petitioner unfit to be retained in service. The petitioner was, therefore, called upon to show cause why the proposed action of dismissal be not enforced against him. The fact that the notice is not in the pie-scribed from is not very much material. No objection as to the competency of the authority which-directed the notice to be issued and made the final order of dismissal was raised in the petition, nor has it been urged during arguments. The-order was passed by the Adviser, after approval'' of His Highness the Rajpramukh during the President''s regime. No objection on that score is, therefore, available. It is correct that a copy of Mr. Randhawa''s report was not sent along with the-notice or furnished to the petitioner. He was, however, allowed to inspect the record including the report and to take notes therefrom. He did avail of that opportunity and submitted a detailed explanation covering seventeen pages. There is nothing in the notice to restrict the petitioner''s explanation merely to the quantum of punishment. The notice after reproducing the charge against the petitioner, proceeded on to state:

Whereas the entire case has been examined by the Government and there appears no reason to differ from the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, the Government considers that you are unfit to be retained in service and that you should therefore be dismissed.

Now therefore, under the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, you, S. Dalmer Singh, Land Acquisition Officer, Bhakra Main Lines, Patiala (under suspension) are hereby called upon to show cause within 7 days of the receipt of this notice why the proposed action for dismissal should not be enforced against you. You are further informed that in case you fail to submit your explanation within the specified period it will be taken that you have none to offer.

The notice was delivered to the petitioner on 8-9-1953 and on getting the period extended he submitted his explanation on 25-9-1953. The petitioner did not confine his explanation merely to the quantum of punishment but, in his own way, tried to explain away the charge and the allegations against him. The fact that the explanation was not accepted as sufficient to explain away the charge would not be a valid cause for complaint in this petition.

The petitioner has had a fair inquiry and sufficient opportunity to meet the allegations against him. From all that has been urged I do not feel convinced that the opportunity afforded to the petitioner was in any way unreasonable.

In the result I dismiss this petition with costs. Counsel fee shall be Rs. 200/-.