S. Devan/V. Krishnan/K. Salim Ahmed vs N. Palaniappan (Landlord)

Jagadeesan, J.—The respondent is the landlord. He has filed R.C.O.P. Nos. 5 to 7 of 1993 on the file of the Rent Controller (District

Munsif), Tambaram for eviction of the tenants on the ground that the building is required for owner''s occupation, i.e., the building is required for

the business of the respondent''s sons. So far as the R.C.O.P. No. 6/93 is concerned, the additional ground for eviction is that the tenant had sub-

leased the premises.. The petitioners herein filed counter contending that the petition u/s 10 (3) (a) (iii) for owner''s occupation is not maintainable

and only petition u/s 10 (3) (c) for additional accommodation is maintainable. Further, they contended that there is no bona fide in the requirement

of the landlord for owner''s occupation since the respondent''s sons are not carrying on any business. The petitions had been filed due to the

strained relationship, as the petitioners had filed certain criminal cases against the respondent.

The Rent Controller had carefully considered all the points raised by the tenants and ultimately found that the requirement of the landlord is bona

fide and the petition u/s 10 (3) (a) (iii) is maintainable and ultimately allowed all the R.C.O.Ps., by order dated 29.6.1994. So far as R.C.O.P. No.

6/93 is concerned, the additional ground of sub-lease had been found against the landlord.

The petitioners herein filed appeal in R.C.A.Nos. 24 to 26 of 1994 before the Appellate Authority (Sub Judge), Poonamallee. The Appellate

Authority also concurred with the finding of the Rent Controller and dismissed the appeals by his judgment dated 27.10.1995. The Petitioners have

filed the present revisions against the eviction ordered by both the authorities.

The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that both the authorities below have totally failed to consider the contradictions in the evidence

and also the contradiction with regard to the requirement stated in the notice and in the R.C.O.Ps. He further contended that the petitioners are

tenants in respect of three shops in the building which is having five shops lying contiguously in a row. If that be so, it should be considered as one

building as oneness of the building is to be taken into consideration and not oneness of the ownership. He further contended that the Appellate

Authority has totally failed to consider the enmity pleaded by the petitioners in filing the petitions by the landlord.

I have carefully considered the arguments of the counsel for the petitioners. A perusal of the judgment of the Appellate Authority would clearly

reveal that these points have been raised before that forum. The Appellate Authority had elaborately discussed the matter and also referred to the

judgments cited on behalf of the petitioners by their counsel and found that the petition under Sec. 10 (3) (a) (iii) is maintainable and there is no

need for the respondent to file an application u/s 10 (3) (c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as

''the Act''). The counsel for the petitioners was not in a position to point out any error in the finding of the Appellate Authority on this issue except

that once again he cited the same authorities before me. I do not find any error in the finding of both the authorities below with regard to the

maintainability of the R.C.O.Ps. u/s 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. There is no need to discuss elaborately the judgments referred to by the counsel for

the petitioners, since the judgments have been considered by the Appellate Authority. But any how I refer to two judgments in order to explain the

position. The Counsel referred to the Judgment reported in Children''s Choice Vs. G.K. Adiseshiah and Another, It is the case the landlord filed

eviction petition to evict the tenants in respect of two shops wherein two different door numbers, though they are in the same building. The petition

was filed u/s 10 (3) (c) of the Act. The contention raised therein was that the petition filed u/s 10 (3) (c) of the Act is not maintainable. The learned

Judge has held as follows:-

It is also common ground that the entire building does not belong to the respondents - landlords, since shops 3 and 4 were admittedly sold to third

parties who are in occupation of the same. Both the Courts below found that since the shops in question are also situated in the same building, the

landlords are entitled to file a petition u/s 10 (3) (c) for additional accommodation. For this proposition reliance was placed by the landlords on the

decision reported in Veerappa Naidu v. Gopalan (1961) 1 MLJ 223). Therefore, the mere fact that the shops are separately numbered by the

Corporation for purposes of assessment is not a bar for the maintainability of the application of the landlords u/s 10(3)(c). It cannot be said that the

shops 5 and 6 viz., the premises in question constitute a separate building disentitling the landlord to apply u/s 10 (3) (c). I agree with the findings

of the lower Courts on the question of maintainability.

The Court has held that there is no bar in filing the application u/s 10 (3) (c). It has not been held that the petition is maintainable only u/s 10 (3)

(c). The other case which is cited by the counsel is reported in Gangaram Vs. N. Shankar Reddy, . In that case, the landlord filed an application

for eviction u/s 10 (3) (c) of the Act. The Rent Controller dismissed the petition on the ground that the land lord can seek for eviction only u/s to

(3) (a) (iii) of the Act. This order was set aside by the Appellate Authority and the same was con firmed by the High Court. Before the Apex

Court the question was not relating to the applicability of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) or Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act. The Supreme Court itself has

pointed out the controversy as follows :-

In this case, the controversy centers around the question whether a landlord can invoke Section 10(3) (c) of the Act to seek the eviction of a

tenant who is not occupying a portion of the building occupied by the landlord himself but is occupying another building be longing to the landlord.

The Supreme Court has further held as follows:

On a consideration of the matter, we find that the contention of Mr. Nambiar, which has found accordance with the appellate court and the High

Courts now at all a tenable one. What Section 10 (3) (c) envisages is the oneness of the building and not the oneness of ownership of two different

buildings, one occupied by the landlord and the other by the tenant The significant words used in Section 10 (3) (c) are ""the landlord why is

occupying only a part of a building "" and ""any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building."" Surely no one can

say that two adjoining buildings bearing different door numbers one occupied by the landlord, and the other by the tenant would make them one

and the same building if they are owned by one person, and separate buildings if they are owned by two different persons A practical test which

can be applied to find out if two adjoining building form part of the same building or two different buildings would be to see whether one of the two

building can be sold by the landlord and the purchaser inducted into possession of the premises sold without the land lord''s possession and

enjoyment of the premises in his occupation being affected.

If this principle is to be applied in this case it is not the case of the petitioners that each shop bearing separate door number cannot be sold by the

landlord independently and the purchaser cannot be put in possession without the landlords possession and enjoyment being affected. When each

shop is having separate door number and each had been treated as a separate unit, it is at ways open to the landlord to sell each shop as a

separate unit and hand over possession to the purchaser for his immediate occupation and enjoyment without affecting the landlord''s occupation of

another shop bearing separate door number Hence even on the basis of this judgment, the petitioner''s contention that the landlord has to file the

petition for eviction only u/s 10 (3) (c) of the said Act, cannot be accepted.

The requirement of the landlord u/s 10 (3)(a)(iii) of the Act can be made only if the landlord is carrying on the business. There is no dispute that

the joint family is carrying on business and now the father wants to settle his sons separately by dividing the joint family business. Hence it cannot

be said that the landlord is not carrying on the business on the date of petition, and further it cannot be said mat the father''s intention to settle his

sons separately during his life time is not bona fide one. Both the authorities below have found that the intention of the landlord to settle his sons is

in the Interest of the family and hence the need of the landlord for owner''s occupation is bona fide requirement.

So far as the enmity is concerned, the Rent Controller has elaborately considered in his order and found that the petitions have not been filed by

the landlord due to the enmity that had been developed, by the conduct of the petitioners in filing the criminal complaints. The Appellate Authority

in paragraph 38 of his judgment has concurred with the Rent Controller and found that there is no oblique motive for the landlord to file the

RCOPs.

So far as the plea of the counsel for the petitioners with regard to the contradictory nature of the pleadings and evidence, I am of the view that

both the authorities below have considered the plea raised by the landlord as well as the evidence available on record. Once the evidence has been

considered and the authorities below have given a finding, it is not open to this Court to reassess the evidence once again u/s 25 of the Act. In fact

it has been held by this Court in a recent judgment reported in N. Rengaiyan Vs. A.M. Noorullah, as follows:-

Even though the revisional powers of this Court u/s 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 is not similar to

Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, yet the revisional powers of the High Court are not wide enough to go into the question of fact in detail

and assess the evidence. Unless the evidence is proved to be false or incorrect this Court will not interfere with the finding of facts rendered

concurrently by the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority. In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy (1980 SC 1253), the

Supreme Court of India has laid down the principle in the following words with reference to Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and

Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960:-

Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section 25 the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely

because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority. The power conferred on the High Court under Sec. 25 of the Tamil Nadu

Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court u/s 115 of the CPC but in the words of

Untwalia, J in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate Vs. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval, ""it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second

court of first appeal''.

Therefore, I am not in a position to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the findings of the rent controller as

confirmed by the Appellate Authority deserve any interference.

I am in entire agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge.

Moreover the finding of both the authorities is purely a question of fact, based on evidence available on record. It is not the case of the counsel

for the petitioners that the authorities have failed to consider any material available on record. I do not find any infirmity warranting interference of

this Court in revision. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. The petitioners are given

three months time from to-day to vacate the premises on condition that they should file an affidavit before this Court within a week undertaking to

vacate: the premises immediately on the expiry of the period granted by this Court, failing which it is open to the respondent, to execute the order

of the R C.O.Ps. forthwith.