S. Ganapathi Pandian vs Sheik Mohammad and Brothers through Abdul Razack

Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.—C.M.P. No. 290 of 1956 is filed by one J. Ramasubramania having some musical stores in two rooms at one end of the first floor of a lodging house containing 14 rooms in the possession of the respondent who represents the landlord. He has been occupying the premises for 9 years at a rent of Rs. 30 per month. Ganapathi Pandian, the petitioner in C.R.P. No. 1335 of 1956 keeps a photo studio in two rooms on the other wing of the same first floor of the same building, for the last 9 years at a rent of Rs. 30 per month. These people have filed these petitions for revising and setting aside the order of the District Judge, Tirunelveli, in revision reversing the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge, the appellate authority, who had set aside the orders of the Rent Controller, directing the eviction of these two petitioners from their two rooms respectively on the ground that these four rooms formed part of the same "building," in which the landlord-respondent occupied the other ten rooms, and that the respondent required these four rooms in good faith for the expansion of his lodging house, ''''the Nell''s Loge" started in 1954 and growing day by day. The only question which arises for decision and the question which the learned District Judge in revision differed from the appellate authority, the learned Subordinate Judge is, whether the respondent-landlord could be said to occupy the "part of the same building " as that occupied by these two peptide''s and could therefore take advantage of S. 7 (iii) (c) of the Rent Control Act and apply for a direction to the two petitioners, occupying portions of the same building to put him in possession as he required the potions in good faith to serve as additional accommodation for the business namely, the lodging business which he was carrying on. There is no doubt whatever from the evidence that the landlord did require these four rooms as additional accommodation for his business. The learned Counsel for the petitioners have not cared to dispute that finding, which is, in my opinion, correct and conclusive

Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the two rooms rented out to these petitioners would be separate buildings, ''''as they were parts of a building," and "a part of the building" will be "building" as defined in S. 2 of the Act. They urged that the same word "building" should not be interpreted in two different ways, one for the purpose of S. 2, and the other for the purpose of S. 7 (iii) (c) They also relied on the ruling in Arunachala Naicker v. Gopal Stores (1955) 2 M.L.J. 206 =68 L, W. 655..

Mr. M. S. Venkatarama Iyer, learned Counsel for the respondent the landlord, strenuously contested both these propositions. He said that the ruling in question would not apply to this case, and that the definition of a "building'' as including "a portion of a building" in S. 2, will not prevent ''''the building" in S. 7 (iii) (c) being construed in a different way. There is no doubt whatever in my mind that he is right. Under our laws, which are becoming larger and larger every day, it is often the case that the same word is given different meanings in different places according to the context and in order to meet the exigencies of the situation. To give the word the same meaning everywhere will lead to chaos and contusion. Thus, in the Indian Penal Code, S. 8 says that "he " may mean any person Malory female but to apply that definition to all the sections will be meaningless and disband and will lead to confusion So too, "'' man " includes woman for the purposes of the penal Code. But, when it comes to " adultery " only the man for the male sex is liable to be punished and the woman for the femurs sex, without whose cooperation it can never be committed cannot be punished. It is clear therefore, to me that the word " Building" which is defined in S. 2 as meaning '' any building or portion of a building let or to be let separately" cannot have the same meaning as the word '''' building" in S. 7 (iii) (c), where the phrase" who is occupying only a portion of a building "will have a wider connotation. It is absurd to say that a " building " should always mean '' a portion of a building " 1 Each case has to be decided on its own facts That is why there is need for Judges In case the portion let out to a tenant is a separate self-contained portion, with separate independent entrance and egress capable of being considered to be a building by itself, in other words where it is a separate block or plot having nothing to do with the rest of the building the mere fact that it forms part of the same " structure" in the engineering sense will not make the landlord get the advantage of S. 7 (iii) (c), and he cannot ask for the eviction of the tenant from the portion That was the case in Arunoohala Naicker v. Gopal Stores (1955) 2 M. L. J. 206=68 L.W. 655 where there was separate entrance and egress lock and key and the tenant had in fact a separate self contained flat In this case however, the two rooms on either wing, claimed by the petitioners lie cheek by jowl with the other ten rooms occupied by the landlord and are not separate self-contained flats as in the case relied on. They had to be entered or quitted through the landlord''s portion. Of course, they are capable of being separately looked as urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. But so too is every room in a big hotel like Taj Mahal Hotel or Dasaprakash. The fact that they lie at one end is only an accident and will "not affect the merits when we consider the meaning of the term " building " in S. 7 (iii) (c) The fact that these two petitioners have been tenants for years will not make any difference either for the purpose of S. 7 (iii) (c); nor the fact that the lodging house of the respondent was being carried on comfortably in the initial days and (1954 and 1955) in the ten rooms and is only now pressed for additional accommodation on account of the growing business. Indeed, S. 7 (iii) (c) provides for such growing expansion and the only time that the landlord can ask for eviction of the tenant, acting under it, is when the business has already expanded I am, therefore of the opinion that the learned District Judge was perfectly correct in his interpretation of S. 7 (iii) (c), and in his construction on the definition in S. 2, and in setting aside the erroneous interpretations put by the appellate authority, the learned Subordinate Judge.

Then it was urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that this is a very hard case of long standing and regularly paying tenants where there was no real justification for awarding costs to the respondent-landlord, and where the petitioners deserve to be given at least a year for vacating the portions seeing the long number of years they have been occupying the premises and the great difficulty in procuring alternative suitable accommodation. There is some force in this. This is certainly not a case where costs ought to have been awarded against these unfortunate tenants who are thrown out into the streets, because of the operation of S. 7 (iii) (c) and the expansion of the longing business This is also a case for granting some sufficient time, though not the excessive period of one year asked for by the petitioners. After hearing the learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. M. S. Venkatarama Aiyar for the respondent-landlord I am of opinion that six months from today should be granted to the petitioners for vacating the premises and handing over peaceful possession to the landlord, failing which the landlord will be entitled to take legal proceedings for eviction acting under this very order. In the end, therefore, I modify the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge in two respects; firstly, by directing all the parties to bear their own costs in both Courts below deleting direction to the petitioners to pay the respondent''s costs throughout, and secondly, by granting the petitioners six months from today for vacating the premises peacefully, proceedings in Court for eviction being allowed only after the expiry of that period. In all other respects; the lower Court''s order ''will stand, and this civil revision petition will stand dismissed. In this civil revision also, I direct all the parties to bear their own costs.