S. Jayaraman vs M. Singaravelu and Others

S.S. Subramani, J.—Second defendant in O.S. No. 53 of 1993, on the file of Principal District Munsif''s Court at Karaikal, is the appellant

herein.

Suit filed by plaintiffs, who are respondents 1 to 3 in this Second Appeal, was one to recover possession of the plaint schedule property from

the appellant and 4th respondent herein (defendants in the suit) and also for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from

interfering with their possession after taking possession. In the plaint, it was stated that the property originally belonged to one Muthuramalingam

Pillai, and on his death, it de-volved on his widow and children, who among themselves executed a release deed on 21.7.1986 under which the

plaintiffs alone became the absolute owners of the suit property.

It is further said that even while Muthuramalingam Pillai was alive, there was an agreement for sale in respect of the plaint schedule property

whereby the first defendant agreed to purchase the same for a total consideration of Rs. 13,000 (thirteen thousand) for which Rs. 5,000 was paid

as advance. In the revenue records, the plaint schedule property was described as a poromboke land and, therefore, there was some doubt in the

mind of the first defendant to purchase the same. After the death of late Muthuramalingam Pillai, a suit had to be filed against the village Commune

and also the Union of India for declaration that the suit property belonged to the plaintiffs absolutely and also to convey the tenure of the land as

one of patta land. The said suit O.S. No. 157 of 1985, on the file of Principal District Munsif''s Court, Karaikkal. After elaborate trial, the said suit

was decreed, and patta has also been grated in favour of the plaintiffs.

But the first defendant was not satisfied with the title and, therefore, he was not interested in getting the sale deed. It is said that the first

defendant made arrangements with some of his relations to be in possession of the property, and ultimately through his brother, second defendant

entered into possession, and he is now looking after the same on behalf of the first defendant. It is said that the second defendant is only a

trespasser so far as the plaintiffs are concerned, having no right over the property. It is also said that the first defendant refused or did not come

forward to get the sale deed, and the agreement itself was cancelled and the entire money consideration received as advance was also returned to

him. But the first defendant did not hand over possession though he promised to do so. Therefore, a demand was made to the defendants to

handover possession and for the relief of injunction as stated above.

After receipt of summons, first defendant remained silent and, therefore, he was declared ex parte. Second defendant, the appellant alone

contested the suit, taking inconsistent pleas. In his pleadings, it was stated that the property belonged only to the Commune and, therefore, plaintiffs

have no title. He also contended that since the first defendant was in possession of the property on the basis of an agreement for sale, which is

admitted in the plaint, second de-fendant is entitled to the benefits of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore, not liable to be

dispossessed. It was further contended that without a suit for declaration of title, the suit cannot be maintained. The further contention is regarding

prescription of title by adverse possession.

On the above pleadings, trial court took both oral and documentary evidence, and, after elaborately dis-cussing the evidence, it came to the

conclusion that the appellant''s contention cannot stand even for a moment. The trial court held that there is no necessity to join any other person as

a party to the suit, nor is there any necessity to have a declaration granted. It also came to the conclusion that the first defendant has not cared to

enter appearance or contest the suit. The appellant who has claimed only under the first defendant, is also barred from disputing the title of the

plaintiff. It was further found that the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 157 of 1985 binds the defendants also since the claim raised by the second

de-fendants also since the claim raised by the second defendant is that the property still continues to belonging to the commune, which is part of the

earlier proceedings. The suit was, therefore, decreed allowing the plaintiffs to recover the same without mesne profits.

Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court, second defendant preferred A.S. No. 9 of 1995, on the file of Additional District

Judge''s Court also confirmed all the findings of the trial court and dis-missed the appeal with costs.

It is the concurrent judgment of both the courts below, which is challenged in this second appeal.

In the memorandum of appeal, appellant has raised as many as eight questions of law. In my opinion, they are not questions of law at all. None

of them can be considered as a substantial question of law that arises for consideration in this second appeal.

Since respondents 1 and 3 also entered appearance by filing caveat, at the time when the second appeal came up for admission, by consent of

learned Counsel on both sides, the main second appeal itself was heard for final disposal.

I will first consider the question regarding Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, which was seriously urged by learned Counsel for

appellant in the course of his arguments.

It is well-settled that the principle of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is a provision made to prevent the owner of the land from

recovering possession, if, on the basis of any agreement of sale and in pursuance thereof, the purchaser has performed his part of the contract and

is in possession of the same. The provision therein can be used only as a shield and not as a sword, so as to prevent owner from recovering the

property. It does not confer title on the defendant. It is purely an equitable remedy.

In a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Mohan Lal (Deceased) through his Lrs. Kachru and Others Vs. Mirza Abdul Gaffar and

Another, , in paragraph 6 of the judgment, their Lordships have said thus:

... Under Sectopm 16(c) of Specific Relief Act, 1963, the plaintiff must plead in the plaint, his readi-ness and willingness from the date of the

contract till date of the decree. The plaintiff who seeks enforcement of the agreement is enjoined to establish the same. Equally, when the transferee

seeks to avail of Section 53-A to retain possession of the property which he had under the contract, it would also be ""incumbent upon the

transferee to plead and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. He who comes to equity must do equity. The

doctrine of readi-ness and willingness is an emphatic way of expression to establish that the transferee always abides the terms of the agreement

and is willing to perform his part of the contract. part performance, as statutory right, is conditioned upon the transfere''s continuous willingness to

perform his part of the contract in terms covenated thereunder.

In Patel Natwarlal Rupji Vs. Shri Kondh Group Kheti Vishayak and another, , in para 6 of the judgment, their Lordships said that ''A person

who pleads equity must come to the court with clean hands and he alone is entitled to the benefit of this section (Section 53-A)''. It was further laid

down in the very same judgment in para 9 that ''the court would look into the conduct of the parties, the respective interests they had under the

contract and attending facts and circumstances. It was further laid down in the very same paragraph thus:

... Section 53-A confers no title on the transferee but imposes a statutory bar on the transferor to seek possession of the immovable property from

the transferee. Equally, Section 53-A does not confer any title on the defendant in possession nor can be maintain a suit on title. The benefit of

Section 53-A can be availed of as a shield retain possession.

In view of this settled legal position, let us consider whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of | Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property

Act. It is admitted even by the appellant that he has no agreement with the plaintiffs or their predecessor. He claims only derivative title from the

first defendant. He claims only as cultivating tenant under the first defendant and not even as an assignee of the contract. Being not a party to the

contract, nor as an assignee of the same, he cannot claim the benefit of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. So far as the plaintiffs are

concerned, the appellant is an utter stranger.

First defendant is the person who has taken an agreement. The agreement is of the year 1970. Till date, he has not come forward to express

his readi-ness and willingness to take a sale deed in terms of the agreement. The readiness and willingness must be pleaded and proved only by the

first defendant, and his case cannot be pleaded and proved by the second defendant. So far as the first defendant is con-cerned, there is an

allegation in the plaint that the contract is not in force, and even the advance amount has been returned. Even on receipt of the summons, the first

defendant has remained silent. So long as he has no case that the contract is subsisting, second defendant herein in cannot plead on behalf of the

first defendant or put forward a case which the first defendant did not have.

Being an equitable relief, the conduct of the parties is also a relevant matter to be considered. After an agreement has been taken by the first

defendant from the plaintiffs, second defendant, who claims under the first defendant, is also debarred from dis-puting the title of the plaintiffs or

their predecessor. It is, admitting the title of the plaintiffs, the agreement was taken. Apart from the same, plaintiffs themselves instituted O.S. No.

157 of 1985 against the Union of India and the Commune to have their title declared. After a hot contest, the title of the plaintiffs was declared by

competent court and patta has also been transferred in favour of the plaintiffs. In the plaint, these facts have been mention, and supporting

documents have also been produced and proved during trial. Even now the second defendant has takena contention that only the commune has got

title to the property and not the plaintiffs. When such a contention is taken, it shows that he is not recognising the title of the plaintiffs. In view of the

said contention, there is no equity in his favour.

The appellant has further taken a contention that the general public is making use of the property and they are to he made parties, though at the

same time he says that is possession is only under the first de-fendant. He also pleads adverse possession. All these contentions are inconsistent

with one another, and they show that the only intention of the second de-fendant is to retain possession some how or other. From his conduct and

also in view of the facts stated above, the appellant is not entitled to the benefits of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

A further contention was raised that without a declaration of title, plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief. The said contention is also without any

basis. As I have said already, first defendant is not disputing the title of the plaintiffs. Under the first defendant, Second defendant has stated that

only the Commune is the proprietor or of the land. It is against that proprietor, plaintiffs have obtained a decree, declaring their title. In that view of

the matter, there is no necessity for a further declaration.

In regard to the claim of the appellant that he is entitled to the benefits of Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, both the courts below have on

currently held that the appellant has not proved that he is a tenant. At any rate, whatever may be the relationship between first and second

defendants, so far as the plaintiffs are concerned, that is not binding on them. They are entitled to recover possession of the property as owners,

and even if the first defendant had any right as an agreement-holder, once it has been cancelled, the tenancy, if any of the second de-fendant is also

terminated.

The contention that a decree cannot be passed by a civil court in view of the Pondicherry Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, was not seriously

urged at the time of arguments. Even on merits, I do not think there is any force in the said contention, so long as the second defendant has no case

that he is a tenant under the plaintiffs, nor do the plaintiffs have a case that the second defendant is a cultivating ten-ant under them.

An argument was taken by learned Counsel for the appellant that the plaintiffs have to prove their title on the strength of their own case, and

not on the weakness of the case of the defendants. This legal position is settled, and I do not understand how the said principle has application to

the facts of this case.

Finally an argument was taken that the mesne profits awarded by the courts below is far in excess, and that the same is without any basis. the

said statement is also not correct.

I find that this aspect has been rightly discussed by the lower appellate Court and it has come to the correct conclusion.

All the question of law raised in the memorandum of appeal are, therefore, found against the appellant. Consequently, the second appeal is

dismissed with costs. C.M.P. No. 16359 of 1997 for stay is also dismissed consequently.