AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
K. Chandru, J.—The Contempt is filed for the alleged disobedience of the order passed by this Court in W.P. No. 20237 of 1993 dated
30.3.2001. By the aforesaid order this Court held that the order of punishment imposed on the Petitioner was liable to be set aside and the
Petitioner was directed to be reinstated in the post of Lecturer within a period of three months. In the very same order, it was also stated that she
was not entitled to the monetary benefits during the period of absence from duty, however her services shall be counted for the purpose of
calculating her retirement benefits.
Aggrieved by the order dated 30.3.2001, the Respondents filed a Writ Appeal being Writ Appeal No. 1387 of 2001. During the pendency of
the Writ Appeal, the Petitioner was reinstated in service. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner also fairly states that she is still in service. The Writ
Appeal came to be disposed of by a final order dated 19.8.2008. In that order, the Division Bench in paragraph 10 noted about there instatement
of the Petitioner and her continued working in the Institute. The Division Bench confirmed the order passed by the learned Single Judge. It was
thereafter the Petitioner sent a legal notice dated 1.2.2011 claiming the benefit of reinstatement and also several other benefits, including seniority,
promotion, monetary benefits etc. The said legal notice was answered by the Respondent by reply dated 19.2.2011. In the reply, the stand taken
was that since the learned Single Judge''s order was confirmed by the Division Bench only for retirement benefits, she is not entitled to any
monetary benefits.
The short question that arises for consideration is whether there was any willful disobedience of the order passed by this Court dated
30.3.2001. But the Division Bench has passed the order only in the year 2008. But, nevertheless, there is no explanation from 19.8.2008 as to
why no steps were taken by the Petitioner. In any event, in the contempt, this Court cannot re interpret the orders passed by this Court. The
Division Bench broadly noted the Petitioner''s reinstatement and his continued work in the College. If according to the Petitioner, there are any
implied terms setout by the learned Judge, that cannot be a ground for punishing the Respondents in the contempt. In the case of contempt, there
must be willful disobedience of the order passed by this Court.
The learned Counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.M. Ramaul Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh
and Others, . In that judgment, the Court held that in the absence of any direction of the court to consider the case of the Petitioner therein for
promotion, there cannot be any presumption of willful disobedience. Nevertheless, in the exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court gave a direction to consider the case of the person for promotion. Such powers are not available under the Contempt of
Courts Act.
In this context, it is necessary to refer to a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar Gupta Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
and Others, , wherein it has been held in paragraphs 17, 23 and 24 as follows:
This now leads us to the next question and a more relevant one, as to whether a proceeding for contempt initiated against the Appellant can be
held to be sustainable merely on speculation, assumption and inference drawn from facts and circumstances of the instant case. In our considered
opinion, the answer clearly has to be in the negative in view of the well-settled legal position reflected in a catena of decisions of this Court that
contempt of a civil nature can be held to have been made out only if there has been a wilfuldisobedience of the order and even though there may be
disobedience, yet if the same does not reflect that it has been a conscious and willful disobedience, a case for contempt cannot be held to have
been made out. In fact, if an order is capable of more than one interpretation giving rise to variety of consequences, non-compliance with the same
cannot be held to be willful disobedience of the order so as to make out a case of contempt entailing the serious consequence including imposition
of punishment. However, when the courts are confronted with a question as to whether a given situation could be treated to be a case of wilful
disobedience, or a case of a lame excuse, in order to subvert its compliance, howsoever articulate it may be, will obviously depend on the facts
and circumstances of a particular case; but while deciding so, it would not be legally correct to be too speculative based on assumption as the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 clearly postulates and emphasises that the ingredient of willful disobedience must be there before anyone can be
hauled up for the charge of contempt of a civil nature.
Besides this, it would also not be correct to overlook or ignore an important statutory ingredient of contempt of a civil nature given out u/s 2(b)
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 that the disobedience to the order alleging contempt has to satisfy the test that it is a willful disobedience to
the order. Bearing this important factor in mind, it is relevant to note that a proceeding for civil contempt would not lie if the order alleged to have
been disobeyed itself provides scope for reasonable or rational interpretation of an order or circumstance which is the factual position in the instant
matter. It would equally not be correct to infer that a party although acting due to misapprehension of the correct legal position and in good faith
without any motive to defeat or defy the order of the Court, should be viewed as a serious ground so as to give rise to a contempt proceeding.
To reinforce the aforesaid legal position further, it would be relevant and appropriate to take into consideration the settled legal position as
reflected in the judgment and order delivered in Ahmed Ali v. Supdt., District Jail as also in B.K. Kar v. High Court of Orissa that mere
unintentional disobedience is not enough to hold anyone guilty of contempt and although disobedience might have been established, absence of
wilfuldisobedience on the part of the contemnor, will not hold him guilty unless the contempt involves a degree of fault or misconduct. Thus,
accidental or unintentional disobedience is not sufficient to justify for holding one guilty of contempt. It is further relevant to bear in mind the settled
law on the law of contempt that casual or accidental or unintentional acts of disobedience under the circumstances which negate any suggestion of
contumacy, would amount to a contempt in theory only and does not render the contemnor liable to punishment and this was the view expressed
also in State of Bihar v. RaniSonabati Kumari and N. Baksi v. O.K. Ghosh.
Therefore, there is no contempt made out. Hence, the Contempt Petition stands dismissed. However, this will not prevent the Petitioner from
instituting a fresh action, if she so desires.