S. Padmanabhan vs Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation

Ashok B. Hinchigeri, J.—The petitioner has called into question, the respondent''s order, dated 02.08.2013 (Annexure-A) suspending him from service.

Sri M.S. Bhagwat, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the suspension order is passed mechanically and without there being any application of mind. It is passed on the recommendations of the Lokayukta. In support of his submissions that the suspension order cannot be passed on the mere recommendations of Lokayukta, he relies on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Gwalior Bench) in the case of Suresh Kumar Purohit Vs. State of M.P. and another, . He also sought to draw support from this Court''s decision in the case of A. Puttarajaiah Vs. The Commissioner, Bangalore Mahanagara Palike and Another, wherein it is held that either for making the suspension or revoking the suspension already made, seeking of the recommendations from the Lokayuukta is not warranted.

Sri Bhagwat relies on the unreported decision of this Court in the case of Sri Pullayappa v. Bangalore Mahanagara Palike in W.P. No. 14817/2008 disposed of on 08.12.2008, wherein the suspension order came to be quashed, as there was no independent application of mind. He has also relied on this Court''s decision in the case of Dr. T.H. Prakashappa v. State of Karnataka and Another reported in CDJ 2014 Kar. HC 576 wherein the suspension order was held to be bad as it suffered from the vice of non-application of mind and the non-recording of satisfaction for passing the suspension order.

The learned counsel submits that the impugned order is without the authority of law and without jurisdiction, because the impugned order is passed by an officer who was only holding the additional charge of the respondent Corporation. According to him, it is only the regular and not the additional charge Managing Director of the respondent Corporation, who is clothed with the power to pass the suspension order.

Smt. H.R. Renuka, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the impugned order is passed by the competent authority. She submits that the officer who has passed the impugned order was holding the concurrent charge and not the additional charge, as contended by the petitioner. She submits that there is application of mind before passing the impugned order.

She submits that the FIR is registered against the petitioner which renders him liable to be suspended. She submits that the power to suspend the petitioner is contained in Regulation 21(1)(b) of the KSRTC Conduct and Discipline Regulations, 1971. It reads as follows:

"21. Suspension pending inquiry:-- (1) The Disciplinary Authority or any Authority to which it is subordinate or any other Authority empowered in that behalf by the Corporation by general or special order, may place a Corporation servant under suspension:

(a).............

(b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial."

The learned counsel submits that this petition is liable to be rejected on the short ground of the availability of the alternative remedy. She submits that under Regulation 30(i) of the said Regulations, the suspension order is made appealable. She submits that the appeal can be preferred before the Board of the respondent Corporation. She submits that in Regulation 34 of the said Regulations, the appellate authority is specifically clothed with the power either to confirm or to revoke the suspension order.

In the course of rejoinder, Sri Bhagwath submits that the objection as to the availability of alternative remedy is not taken by the respondent in the statement of objections. He submits that there is no appellate authority before whom the orders passed by the Managing Director can be challenged. Nowhere in the Regulations, it is shown that the Board of Corporation is the appellate authority.

Smt. H.R. Renuka, learned counsel for the respondent brings to my notice this court''s decision in the case of C. Andani Vs. Bangalore Mahanagara Palike and Another, . In the said case, suspension order was upheld in view of the serious allegation of having been in possession of properties disproportionate to the employee''s income. It was held therein that if such employees were not suspended, the purity of the administration will suffer.

The submissions of the learned advocates have received my thoughtful consideration. I am disinclined to throw out this petition on the short ground of the availability of an alternative remedy for the following reasons:--

"(i) When the matter is squarely covered, no useful purpose would be served to relegate the parties to the appeal remedy.

(ii) Such a specific contention is not taken in the statement of objections."

The only question that arises for my consideration is:

"Whether the impugned suspension order passed only on the recommendations of the Lokayuktha police is sustainable?"

No provision of law is pointed out to me to show that once the Lokayuktha police recommends the suspension of an official, the disciplinary authority has to automatically pass the order of suspension. The investigation report and recommendation of the police are to be used as the inputs for passing the order of suspension. The disciplinary authority has to examine whether the continuance of the delinquent would impede or adversely affect the enquiry proceedings, and whether the applicant''s suspension is warranted or not. That the disciplinary authority cannot act mechanically and pass an order of suspension is the ratio laid down in the cases of Suresh Kumar Purohit, Pulyappa and Dr. T.H. Prakashappa.

Thus the petitioner is entitled to succeed but on a technical ground. The impugned order is quashed. But the quashing of the impugned order does not mean that the petitioner cannot be suspended. It is always open to the disciplinary authority to consider all the facts, materials and circumstances and then take an informed decision in the matter of suspending the petitioner.

Accordingly this petition is disposed off. No order as to costs.