S. Ravichandran vs The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board

V. Dhanapalan, J.—Challenging the order of the 1st Respondent dated 04.11.2004, the order of the 2nd Respondent dated 21.06.2004, and the charge memo issued by the 3rd Respondent dated 08.08.2003, the Petitioner has filed this writ petition.

The Petitioner has stated that he joined the services of the Respondent Board as a Helper on 25.01.1988. Initially, he was working in the Nagapattinam Electricity Distribution Circle and thereafter, he was transferred to the Tiruvannamalai Electricity Distribution Circle and was promoted as Commercial Assistant and posted at Vet-tavalam, O & M Section. While so, he was suspended and issued a Charge Memo dated 08.08.2003 by the 3rd Respondent. The Petitioner submitted his explanation to the said Charge Memo on 21.08.2003 denying the charges. According to the Petitioner, in the enquiry conducted by the Assistant Executive Engineer (O & M), Mangalam, he was not given opportunity to defend himself. Thereafter, the 2nd Respondent issued a second show cause notice dated 02.04.2004, stating that the Enquiry Officer had submitted his report holding that the charges levelled against the Petitioner is proved and proposed a penalty of stoppage of next increment for a period of one year with cumulative effect. To the said show cause notice, the Petitioner submitted his explanation dated 14.05.2003 and the 2nd Respondent, by his order dated 21.06.2004 imposed the punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect. Against the said order, the Petitioner went on appeal before the 1st Respondent on 02.08.2004, but, the appeal was rejected by the 1st Respondent, by an order dated 04.11.2004.

2a. According to the Petitioner, the sum and substance of the allegation in the Charge Memo dated 10.07.2003 was that on 10.07.2003 at 8.30pm, he went along with Arumugam, Accountant to a hotel belonging to one Deenadayalan, Vettavalam Tirukoilur Road and assaulted Kathirvel (Accounts Inspector), who was taking food, and attempted to murder him and abused him with unparliamentary words, which according to the Board would amount to misconduct under Clause 30 (xxiii) of the Standing Orders applicable to clerical staff. While misconduct under Clause 30 (xxiii) of the said Standing Orders relate to spreading of rumours, spreading false information with an intention to disrepute the Board or employees of the Board or to create unrest, it is the case of the Petitioner that the allegation made against him in the charge memo dated 10.07.2003 would not amount to misconduct under the said clause and that neither the alleged assault and abuse had taken place in the premises of the Respondent Board nor does it relate to his employment with the Respondent Board; hence, the Charge Memo dated 10.07.2003 is wholly without jurisdiction! and illegal.

2b. The Petitioner further submitted that his appointing authority is the Superintending Engineer, viz, the 1st Respondent herein and as per Clause 8 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulation, only the competent authority, i.e. the:1st Respondent herein can initiate disciplinary proceedings against him and as per Clause 8(f) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulation, only on authorisation of the competent authority any other officer superior to him can initiate disciplinary proceedings against him by issuing charge memo. According! to the Petitioner, the 3rd Respondent has not been authorised to initiate proceedings; further, the 2nd Respondent cannot impose punishment on him; therefore, the charge memo issued by the 3rd Respondent, the order of punishment issued by the 2nd Respondent and the order of confirmation of punishment passed by the 1st Respondent are wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the rules and regulations of the Respondent Board.

2c. In the explanation dated 21.08.2003, the Petitioner has clearly stated that on 10.07.2003, while he was going to hospital, he Witnessed Kathirvel and Arumugam standing on the road and talking in a high pitched voice and when he requested them not to shout, Kathirvel did not take it in the right spirit and asked him to mind his business; thereafter, the Petitioner returned back home. It is the further case of the Petitioner that his request to the Enquiry Officer during the enquiry held on 05.11.2003 to permit him have the assistance of R. Sivakumar, General Secretary of the Union to which he belongs was rejected and that the Enquiry Officer was not acting independently, and he was acting as per the direction of a person who had brought him in the Enquiry as his assistant.

2d. It is the further case of the Petitioner that the Enquiry Officer conducted ex-parte enquiry and examined witnesses in his absence and the proceedings of the enquiry was also not forwarded to him. Thereafter, the 2nd Respondent issued a second show cause notice dated 02.04.2004 stating that the Enquiry Officer had rendered a finding that the charge levelled against the Petitioner is proved and proposed a penalty of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect. According to the Petitioner, the Enquiry Report was not forwarded neither before issuance of the second show cause notice nor along with the same. He submitted his explanation to the second show cause notice on 14.05.2004, in which he has pointed out that the allegation would not amount to misconduct under the Standing Orders and that for the allegation of attempt murder, there cannot be any disciplinary proceedings by the Respondent and also pointed out that the alleged incident has nothing to do with the employment under the Respondent Board and therefore, the disciplinary proceedings is without jurisdiction. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the Respondent Board, the Petitioner is before this Court.

In the counter affidavit, the Respondents have stated that the Petitioner while working as Commercial Assistant at Vettavalam, Operation and Maintenance Section, Tiruvannamalai Electricity Distribution Circle, was suspended from service based on a complaint received by the Respondent Board from one Mr. Kathirvel, a Board employee for causing disrepute to the Board among public. A charge memo dated 08.08.2003 to that effect was issued by the Respondent Board and the Petitioner gave his reply on 21.08.2003. Since the explanation given by the Petitioner was not satisfactory, the 2nd Respondent ordered a domestic enquiry and the Petitioner participated in the enquiry proceedings conducted on 08.10.2003 and denied the said charges.

3a. The Respondents have further stated that at the request of the Petitioner to adjourn the enquiry proceedings, the 3rd Respondent who was appointed as Enquiry Officer adjourned the proceedings to 05.11.2003 and that on 05.11.2003, the Petitioner gave a letter seeking permission from the Enquiry Officer to permit Mr. R. Sivakumar, Union Member to assist him and the same was allowed by the Enquiry Officer. According to the Respondent, the Petitioner, deliberately with an intention to disturb the enquiry proceedings left in the midst of the enquiry proceedings without cross-examining the Board witnesses. In order to give sufficient opportunity to the Petitioner, the Enquiry Officer sent letters to him on 11.12.2003 and 04.02.2004 to cross-examine the Board witnesses, but the Petitioner despite acknowledgement of the said letters deliberately with a malafide intention failed to appear before the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry proceedings were held ex-parte and the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the 2nd Respondent herein on 20.03.2004. After careful consideration of the enquiry report, the 2nd Respondent imposed a punishment of stoppage of increment for a period of one year with cumulative effect and a show cause notice dated 02.04.2004 to that effect was issued to the Petitioner. Since the explanation submitted by the Petitioner on 14.05.2004 was not satisfactory, the 2nd Respondent passed a final order on 21.06.2004 imposing a punishment of stoppage of increment for one year with cumulative effect. Against the said punishment order, the Petitioner preferred an appeal dated 02.08.2004 before the Appellate Authority, i.e. the 1st Respondent and the 1st Respondent, after careful consideration of the appeal, rejected the same on 04.11.2004.

3b. The Respondents have also stated that on 10.07.2003, at 8.30pm, the Petitioner along with Mr. Arumugham, Accountant went to the Hotel belonging to one Deenadayalan, Vet-tavalam and assaulted Mr. Kathirvel, Ac-counts Inspector, who was taking food and attempted to murder him and abused him in unparliamentary words; Mr. Deenadayalan and others had protected Mr. Kathirvel from the Petitioner and the said Arumugham and such incident was witnessed by a large number of public in that road, which has resulted in causing disrepute to the Board among the public and accordingly a charge memo dated 08.08.2003 as per Clause 30 (xxiii) of the Standing Orders applicable to clerical staff was issued to the Petitioner. It is the case of the Respondents that though the incident had not taken place within the employment premises of the Respondent Board, the conduct of the Petitioner has caused disrepute to the Board among the public; being a TNEB employee, the Petitioner should have maintained discipline/conduct in his behaviour wherever he is and there is no restriction that an employee should maintain discipline within the premises of the employment alone. Therefore, the Charge Memo dated 08.08.2003 issued by the 3rd Respondent is in order.

3c. Alleging that the averments contained in the affidavit are misleading, the Respondents have further submitted that Clause 6(a) deals with the competent and appellate disciplinary authorities, i.e. who may impose penalties and to whom appeal lies and the competent authority to impose penalty on the employees of class III and IV is the immediate superior in class I or Class II service or any other higher authority. The expression immediate Superior Officer in class I or class II Service under whom the delinquent was working at the time when the lapses were committed includes his successor in office. The Petitioner was working as Commercial Assistant at Vettavalam Section and belongs to class III service. The Petitioner''s immediate superior officer is the Junior Engineer/O & M/Vettavalam as he belongs to class II service. The 3rd Respondent is the immediate superior officer in rank than the Junior Engineer/O & M/Vettavalam as he belongs to class II service. The 2nd Respondent is the immediate superior officer than the 3rd Respondent, who belongs to class I service. therefore, the charges framed by the 3rd Respondent against the Petitioner and the punishment imposed by the 2nd Respondent is in order.

3d. It is also submitted by the Respondents that the 2nd Respondent along with the show cause notice had sent the enquiry report and the Petitioner had given his explanation to the show cause notice and after considering his reply, the 2nd Respondent had imposed the punishment of stoppage of increment for one year with cumulative effect. Therefore, the order of the 2nd Respondent is correct and the order of the appellate authority rejecting the appeal filed by the Petitioner is also in order. According to the Respondents, the Petitioner had not shown that any prejudice was caused to him, on the other hand, he has filed an appeal land in the said appeal, he has not alleged that the enquiry report was not furnished.

Heard Mr. Balan Haridas, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. M. Vaidyanathan, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner would contend that the allegation made in the Charge Memo dated 10.07.2003 would amount to misconduct under Clause 30 (xxiii) of the Standing Orders applicable to clerical staff!, which relates to spreading rumours, spreading false information with an intention to cause disrepute to the Board or employees of the Board or to create unrest; whereas, the alleged incident is not connected with the employment of the Petitioner and the alleged assault and abuse had not taken place in the premises of the Respondent Board; therefore, the orders of the Respondents suffer from legal infirmity and they cannot be sustained. He would also contend that non-furnishing of the Enquiry Officer''s Report to the Petitioner and non-reliance of the same by the 2nd Respondent have caused grave prejudice to the Petitioner.

5a. Learned Counsel would also contend that as per Clause 8(f) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulation, only on authorisation of the competent authority any other officer superior to the rank of the Petitioner can initiate disciplinary proceedings by issuing charge memo. But, the 3rd Respondent has not been authorised by the 1st Respondent to initiate proceedings; further the 2nd Respondent cannot impose punishment on the Petitioner; therefore, the charge memo issued by the 3rd Respondent, the order of punishment issued by the 2nd Respondent and the order of confirmation of punishment passed by the 1st Respondent are wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the rules and regulation of the Respondent Board. According to the learned Counsel, enquiry was conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. In support of his case, learned Counsel has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut and Others, wherein, relevant paragraphs would read as under:

...the expression ''committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof can qualify only the expression ''any act subversive of discipline and efficiency and any act involving moral turpitude'' but not the earlier portion of the clause. Numerous acts of misconduct have been collocated in Clause 10 such as drunkenness, fighting, indecent or disorderly behaviour, use of abusive language, wrongfully interfering with the work of other employees etc.

...

these acts of misconduct are per se misconduct that each one of them cannot have any correlation to the time or place where it is committed and each one of it is an act of misconduct irrespective of the time and place where it is committed. Expanding of the submission, it was urged that drunkenness is such a socially reprehensible action that if it is committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof or anywhere else at any point of time it would none the less be an act of misconduct comprehended in cl.10 and punishable under standing order 23. If this construction were even to be accepted the employer will have more power than the almighty State because State chooses to punish drunkenness in public place. But on the construction canvassed for if a man consumes liquor in his own house with the doors closed and gets drunk, the employer can still fire him. If a man uses abusive language towards his close relation in his own house with closed door, the employer would be entitled to fire him, and this approach overlooks the purpose of prescribing conditions of service by a statute. To enable an employer to peacefully carry on his industrial activity, the Act confers powers on him to prescribe conditions of service including enumerating acts of misconduct when committed within the premises of the establishment. The employer has hardly any extra territorial jurisdiction. He is not the custodian of general law and order situation nor the Guru or mentor of his workmen for their well regulated cultural advancement. If the power to regulate the behaviour of the workmen outside the duty hours and at any place wherever they may be was conferred upon the employer, contract of service may be reduced to contract of slavery.

...

The employer has both power and jurisdiction to regulate the behaviour of workmen within the premises of the establishment, or for peacefully carrying the industrial activity in the vicinity of the establishment. When the broad purpose for conferring power on the employer to prescribe acts of misconduct that may be committed by his workmen is kept in view, it is not difficult to ascertain whether the expression ''committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof would qualify each and every act of misconduct collocated in clause. 10 or the last two only, namely, ''any act subversive of discipline and efficiency and any act involving moral turpitude''. To buttress this conclusion, one illustration would suffice. Drunkenness even from the point of view of prohibitionist can at best be said to be an act involving moral turpitude. If the misconduct alleging drunkenness as an act involving moral turpitude is charged, it would have to be shown that it was committed within the premises of the establishment can be disregarded. This makes no sense. And it may be remembered that the power to prescribe conditions of service is not unilateral but the workmen have right to object and to be heard and a statutory authority namely, Certifying Officer have to certify the same. Therefore, the larger objective sought to be achieved by prescribing conditions of employment in certified standing orders, the only construction, one can put of clause 10 is that the various acts of misconduct therein set out would be misconduct for the purpose of Section 0.22 punishable u/s 0.23, if committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof. What constitutes establishment or its vicinity would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

12.... "In our opinion, on a plain reading of the clause, the words "within the premises or precincts of the establishment" refer not to the place where the act which is subversive of discipline or good behaviour is committed but where the consequence of such an act manifests itself. In other words, an act wherever committed, if it has the one effect of subverting discipline or good behaviour within the premises of precincts of the establishment, will amount to misconduct under Standing Order 24(1). We are unable to agree that Standing Order 24(1) leaves out of its scope an act committed outside though it may result in subversion of discipline or good behaviour within the premises or precincts of the establishment in question. Such a construction in our view would be quite unreasonable.

...

A statute is regarded as penal for the purpose of construction if it imposes fine, penalty or forfeiture other than penalty in the nature of liquidation of damages or other penalties which are in the nature of civil remedies. It is a general rule that penal enactments are to be construed strictly and not extended beyond their clear meaning.

...

If the expression ''committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof is given a wide construction so as to make the clause itself meaningless and redundant, the penal statute would become so vague and would be far beyond the requirement of the situation as to make it a weapon of torture.... If any misconduct committed anywhere irrespective of the time-place content where and when it is committed is to be comprehended in cl.10 merely because it has some remote impact on the peaceful atmosphere in the establishment, there was no justification for using the words of limitation such as ''committed within premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof. These are words of limitation and they must cut down the operation of the clause.

...

On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondents would submit that the enquiry proceedings were held as per TNEB regulations and that the enquiry officer had given number of opportunities to the Petitioner to defend his case. He also submitted that the 2nd Respondent along with the show cause notice: had sent the enquiry report and the Petitioner had given his explanation to the show cause notice and therefore, the order of the 2nd Respondent is correct.

From the facts, it is seen that while the Petitioner was working as Commercial Assistant at Vettavalam, O & M Section, he was suspended and issued a charge memo dated 08.08.2003 by the 3rd Respondent and the Petitioner had also submitted his explanation to the said charge memo on 21.08.2003 denying the charges. On the charges framed against the Petitioner, an enquiry was conducted and thereafter, the 2nd Respondent issued a second show cause notice dated 02.04.2004 stating that the Enquiry Officer had submitted his report holding that the charges levelled against the Petitioner as proved and proposed the penalty of stoppage of next increment for a period of one year with cumulative effect. To the said charge memo, the Petitioner submitted his explanation on 14.05.2003 and the 2nd Respondent by his order dated 21.06.2004 imposed the punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect, against which the Petitioner went on appeal before the 1st Respondent and the 1st Respondent rejected the same by an order dated 04.11.2004.

It was argued by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Enquiry Officer''s Report has not been furnished to the Petitioner and also not relied on by the 2nd Respondent. A perusal of the records would reveal that the Petitioner has been furnished with the Enquiry Officer'' s Report and based on the same, the Petitioner has submitted his explanation. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the Report of the Enquiry officer was not furnished to the Petitioner. It is also clear from the records that the Petitioner has been given an opportunity to defend his case and that no prejudice has been caused to him.

A question has been raised about the competency of the authority to impose penalties on the employees and it is seen that as per Clause 6(a), the competent authority to impose penalty on the employees of class III and IV is the immediate superior in class I or Class II service or any other higher authority. The expression immediate Superior Officer in class I or class II Service under whom the delinquent was working at the time when the lapses were committed includes his successor in office. The Petitioner herein was working as Commercial Assistant at Vettavalam Section and belongs to class III service. The Petitioner''s immediate superior officer is the Junior Engineer/O & M/Vettavalam as he belongs to class II service. The 3rd Respondent is the immediate superior officer in rank than the Junior Engineer/O & M/Vettavalam as he belongs to class II service. The 2nd Respondent is the immediate superior officer to the 3rd Respondent, who belongs to class I service. Therefore, the charges framed by the 3rd Respondent against the Petitioner and the punishment imposed by the 2nd Respondent are in order and they cannot be faulted with. Therefore, the contention of the Petitioner fails and this point is answered in favour of the Respondent Board.

The underlying circumstance leading to the framing of charges against the Petitioner as could be seen from the material records is that on 10.07.2003 at 8.30 pm, the Petitioner went along with Arumugam, Accountant to a hotel belonging to one Deenadayalan, Vet-tavalam Tirukoilur Road and assaulted Kathirvel (Accounts Inspector), who was taking food and attempted to murder him and abused him with unparliamentary words. Such incident was witnessed by a large number of public in that road which has resulted in causing disrepute to the Board among the public. According to the Respondent Board, the act of the Petitioner amounts to misconduct under Clause 30(xxiii) of the Standing Orders applicable to clerical staff.

Clause 30 (xxiii) of the Board''s Standing Orders reads as follows:

Spreading false rumours or giving false information which tends to bring in disrepute to the Board or spreading panic among them.

Therefore, the primary question that needs consideration in this case is whether the act of misconduct alleged to have been committed by the Petitioner herein would amount to misconduct committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof and whether such act of misconduct would be punishable notwithstanding where and when they were committed.

The Acts and Omissions constituting misconduct under Clause 30 of the Board''s Standing Orders are striking work suddenly, concerted or organised refusal to receive their pay, theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the Board''s property or business, taking or giving bribes, habitual late attendance, carrying on money-lending without the permission of the Management within the premises of the establishment, riotous or disorderly behaviour during working hours, habitual negligence or neglect of work, habitual indiscipline, smoking within the premises where it is prohibited, causing wilful damage to work in progress, distribution, exhibition, display or use within the premises of any newspapers, pamphlets or posters, gambling within the premises of the establishment, sleeping while on duty, malingering or slowing down of work, etc. These acts of misconduct are per se misconduct that each one of them cannot have any correlation to the time or place where it is committed and each one of it is an act of misconduct irrespective of the time and place where it is committed. It was urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that if the act is committed within the premises of the establishment, it would nonetheless be an act of misconduct comprehended in Clause 30 and punishable under Clause 31 of the Board''s Standing Orders.

The purpose of prescribing conditions of service by a statute is to enable an employer peacefully carry on his industrial activity. The employer has hardly any extra territorial jurisdiction. He is not the custodian of general law and order situation or mentor of his workmen for their well regulated cultural advancement. If the power to regulate the behaviour of the workmen outside the duty hours and at any place wherever they may be was conferred upon the employer, contract of service may be reduced to contract of slavery. The employer is entitled to prescribe conditions of service more or less specifying the acts of misconduct to be enforced within the premises where the workmen gather together for rendering services. The employer has both power and jurisdiction to regulate the behaviour of workmen within the premises of the establishment. The purpose for conferring power on the employer to prescribe acts of misconduct is kept in view to ascertain whether the expression ''committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof would qualify each and every act of misconduct collocated in elapse 30(xxiii).

If the misconduct alleged to have been committed by the Petitioner herein would bring disrepute to the Board, it would have to be shown that it was committed within the premises of the establishment, but if the misconduct charged would bring disrepute to the Board, then the limitation of its being committed within the premises of the establishment can be disregarded. The power to prescribe conditions of service is not unilateral but the workmen have right to object and to be heard and a statutory authority namely, Certifying Officer has to certify the same. Therefore, keeping in view the larger objective sought to be achieved by prescribing conditions of employment in certified standing orders, it could be seen that the alleged misconduct committed by the Petitioner appears not to be that of spreading false rumours or giving false information, which tends to bring disrepute to the Board or spreading panic among them.

In the instant case, the charge alleged against the Petitioner is that he along with an Accountant, namely Arumugam went to a Hotel and assaulted one Kathirvel (Accounts Inspector), attempted to murder him and abused him with unparliamentary words, which incident was witnessed by a large number of public. According to the Respondent Board, such act of the Petitioner has resulted in causing disrepute to the Board among the public as per Clause 30 (xxiii) of the Board''s Standing Orders. It is seen that the misconduct alleged to have committed by the Petitioner does not fit into the acts and omissions enlisted under Clause 30(xxiii). The employer has hardly any extra territorial jurisdiction. He is not the custodian of general law and order situation. Only the law enforcing authority of that area can regulate ways and means to maintain peace in that area.

It is true that an act of indiscipline, such as the act committed by the Petitioner outside the premises of the Respondent Board would attract severe consequences, but the Respondent Board has no power to act on the law and order situation. The Respondent Board has power only to regulate the acts and omissions contemplated under Clause 30(xxiii) of its Standing Orders and impose punishment accordingly as per Clause 31. If such is the object, no vague undefined notion about any act may be innocuous which from the employer''s point of view may be misconduct but not provided for in the standing order for which a penalty can be imposed, cannot be incorporated in the standing orders. When a misconduct vis-a-vis the officers of the management is committed outside the premises of the Management, certainly the same would be an act subversive of discipline, but, it would amount to misconduct, only when such act is enlisted under the acts and omissions of the certified Standing Orders of the Board.

Therefore, in reference to the peculiar facts and circumstances, the situation in which the act was alleged to have been committed by the Petitioner outside the premises of the Respondent Board, cannot be construed as an act of misconduct under the Board''s Standing Orders and it would be a law and order problem within the territorial jurisdictional limit of the law enforcing authority. No doubt, the act committed by the Petitioner is an act of indiscipline. But, such act could have been looked into by the law enforcing authority, when a complaint in respect of the Petitioner''s alleged misconduct is made by a proper person. In the absence of any specific prescribing condition under Clause 30(xxiii) of the Board''s Standing Orders in respect of the misconduct committed by the Petitioner, it cannot be construed that the act of the Petitioner has caused disrepute to the Respondent Board.

In Glaxo Laboratories case'' referred to above, the Supreme Court has held that everything which is required to be prescribed has to be prescribed with precision and it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing / orders, but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. Therefore, the contention of the Respondents that some other act of misconduct which would per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated in Clause 30(xxiii) of the Board''s Standing Orders can be punished under Clause 31, stands rejected.

In the light of the above discussion and also in view of the Supreme Court ruling referred to above, and considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is made clear that the act committed by the Petitioner outside the premises of the Respondent Board cannot be construed as misconduct in the absence of the expression ''outside the premises'' included in the certified Standing Orders of the Board under Clause 30(xxiii); otherwise, the act of alleged misconduct committed by the Petitioner would come under the purview of the act enforceable under law and order. It is clear that both the disciplinary authorities and the appellate authority have not applied their mind to see as to whether the alleged misconduct committed by the Petitioner is prescribed under the Board''s Standing Orders. Therefore, the order of the 1st Respondent dated 04.11.2004, the order of the 2nd Respondent dated 21.06.2004, and the charge memo issued by the 3rd Respondent dated 08.08.2003 suffer from legal infirmity and they stand quashed.

In fine, the writ petition stands allowed. No costs.