S Ravinder Reddy vs State Of Telangana

Heard learned counsel for petitioners Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue and though notices are served on

respondents 5 and 6, no appearance is entered.

This writ petition is filed seeking relief as under:

….to issue a writ or order/s more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the order passed in Case No D5/1174/2017 dt 30 03

2019 passed by the 2nd respondent and order passed in Case no A2/4685/2015 dated 10/05/2016 passed by the 3rd respondent as being illegal

arbitrary and unconstitutional and be pleased to pass…

To the extent necessary, the facts as averred in the affidavit and material placed on record, reflect as under.

3.1. Mohd Abdul Raheem and 10 others were Inamdars of land to the extent of Ac.0.34 guntas and Ac. 12.06 guntas in Survey Nos. 821 and 822

along with road area admeasuring Ac.0.25 guntas in Survey No. 822 of Mankal village, Maheshwaram mandal, Ranga Reddy district. Smt.Chunnu

Begam purchased the said extent of land. From Smt.Chunnu Begam, petitioners purchased the land by way of registered sale deed Nos 7526 of 2015

and 7527 of 2015 dated 7.4.2015 respectively. That being so, Sri Gunti Yadaiah and Sri Gunti Narsing Rao- respondents 5 and 6 herein claimed that

this very land was sold to them by Smt.Chunnu Begam by way of unregistered agreement of sale and vested possession in them. They applied to the

Revenue Divisional Officer, Ranga Reddy District (East Division) [Inams Tribunal], to grant Occupancy Rights Certificate (for short ORC). The

Revenue Divisional Officer, issued orders on 29.10.1991 granting ORC to them. Based on the said ORC, their names were mutated in the revenue

records. Alleging that the said certificate was granted beyond her back, without notice and opportunity, Smt.Chunnu Begam filed appeal under Section

24 of the A.P (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955. The said appeal was numbered as F1/692/2009. By order dated 7.7.2009 the Appellate

Authority allowed the appeal on the ground that the appellant was not afforded opportunity of hearing and set aside the ORC granted on 29.10.1991 in

favour of respondents 5 and 6 herein and remitted the matter to the Revenue Divisional officer for fresh consideration to grant ORC.

3.2. On remand, the Special Deputy Collector and Revenue Divisional Officer, Ranga Reddy District, East division, vide proceedings dated 11.1.2010

held that Smt.Chunnu Begam is entitled to ORC on the above extent of land and ordered accordingly. This order was challenged by respondents 5 and

6 in the appeal under Section 24 of the Act, 1955. By order No.F/667/2010 dated 6.1.2011 the appellate authority observed as under:

“In the instant case ORC had been issued to a person who claims to have purchased the land by agreement of sale which is not a valid transfer in

accordance with law. The vendor by way of agreement of sale had transferred to theappellants and now the vendor (respondent) is disputing the

same and is claiming for ORC based on registered sale deed. It is not clear whether the vendor to this respondents had a valid ORC at the time of

sale.

Thus, on perusal it is seen that both the claimants are disputing the sale deeds and the issue had assumed the nature of a civil dispute and the inam

angle had disappeared with lapse of time. Third party interests have come on the subject land. Hence, both the parties are agitate their claims before

competent Civil Court.â€​

3.3. However, the appellate authority has not disturbed the ORC granted to Smt.Chunnu Begam on 11.1.2010. Vide proceedings No.B/1242/2011

dated 30.1.2014 the Tahsildar ordered amendment of revenue records and to record name of Smt.Chunnu Begam on land to an extent of Ac.34

guntas in survey No.821 and Ac.3.11 guntas in survey No.822. It is appropriate to note at this stage that in the mean time, Government acquired land

to an extent of Ac.9.13 guntas from out of the original extent of land of about Ac.13.00 and therefore only the above extent of land remained in

contest.

3.4. Challenging the orders of Tahsildar granting mutation in favour of Smt.Chunnu Begam, respondents 5 and 6 preferred appeal under Section 5-B

of A.P. Rights in land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 before the Special Grade Deputy Collector and Revenue Divisional Officer. By order dated

10.5.2016 the appellate authority allowed the appeal setting aside the order of Tahsildar granting mutation and advised the parties to agitate the claim

over the subject land before the competent Civil Court. Challenging the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Smt.Chunnu Begam preferred

revision under Section 9 of Act, 1971 which was assigned No. D5/2691/2016. During the pendency of the above revision Smt.Chunnu Begam died.

Petitioners claiming to be purchases of very same land also filed revision under Section 9 of the Act, 1971 which was assigned No. D-5/1174/201.

Learned counsel appearing for Smt.Chunnu Begam, reported her death to the Revisional Authority and sought leave to withdraw the review No.

D5/2691/2016. Accordingly, revision filed by Smt.Chunnu Begam was closed and revision preferred by petitioners herein was considered. Revisional

authority affirmed the view taken by the appellate authority and dismissed the revision. This writ petition is filed challenging the said decision.

3.5. To complete the narration, respondents 5 and 6 instituted O.S.No.501 of 2015 on the file of the Court of VII Additional Senior Civil Judge at

L.B.Nagar, Ranga Reddy district praying to grant decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with peaceful possession

and enjoyment of Ac.3.27 guntas in survey Nos.821 and 822 of Mankhal village, Maheshwaram mandal, Ranga Reddy district/subject land herein. In

the said suit, they have also filed I A No. 336 of 2015 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC praying to grant ad-interim

injunction restraining the respondents/defendants, their henchmen, agents etc from interfering with the petitioners peaceful possession and enjoyment.

The said I. A was dismissed by order dated 27.4.2016. Court is informed that said order has become final.

Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned counsel appearing for petitioners made the following submissions:

4.1. Vendor of petitioners Smt.Chunnu Begam purchased the subject land from the original Inamdar by way of registered sale transaction and her

name was mutated in the revenue records as successor to the original Inamdar and she was entitled to secure ORC as held by division bench of this

court in S. Veera Reddy and Ors. Vs. Chetlapalli Chandraiah and Ors 1995 (2) ALT 172. While that being so, the Revenue Divisional Officer could

not have granted ORC to respondents 5 and 6 based on unregistered agreement of sale. As a corollary, since petitioners purchased the land by way of

registered sale deed from smt. Chunnu Begum, they are entitled to succeed to Smt.Chunnu Begam and respondents 5 and 6 have no manner of right

on the subject land. This fact is not appreciated by the Appellate and Revisional authorities and erroneously they observed that it is civil dispute.

4.2. According to learned counsel based on an agreement of sale respondents 5 and 6 illegally obtained ORC behind the back of Smt.Chunnu Begam.

Thus, ORC granted to respondents 5 and 6 was rightly set aside and ORC was validly granted to Smt.Chunnu Begam.

4.3. He further submitted that though Appellate Authority observed that there is civil dispute and parties have to avail the civil law remedy to resolve

the inter se disputes, he has not set aside the ORC granted on 7.7.2009 to late Smt.Chunnu Begam and therefore, her right and title to the property

was crystallized long ago. It is his further submission that mere observation by the Appellate Authority that there is interse civil dispute does not

amount to setting aside the ORC.

4.4. As Smt.Chunnu Begam is ORC holder, she is entitled to mutation of her name in the revenue records. Thus, there was no illegality in the decision

of the Tahsildar granting mutation to her and from her to petitioners. He therefore submits that the Appellate Authority as well as the Revisional

Authority mis-directed themselves in setting aside the mutation granted in favour of petitioners and advising the parties to avail civil law remedy.

According to learned counsel for petitioners, ORC is not disturbed and since law supports the claim of Smt.Chunnu Begam to secure ORC having

succeeded to the right and interest in the property by way of registered sale transaction from the original Inamdar and ORC was granted to her on

7.7.2009, she need not avail civil law remedy to assert her right and title to the property and as petitioners succeeded to her, they need not avail civil

law remedy. If respondents 5 and 6 are disputing the claim of Smt.Chunnu Begam and they are asserting their right and title over the property, they

have to avail civil law remedy.

4.5. He further submitted that in O.S.No.501 of 2015 filed by respondents 5 and 6, they only sought for bare injunction against interference by

Smt.Chunnu Begam and her son claiming that they are in legal possession by placing reliance on the agreement of sale. They also prayed to grant

temporary injunction. On detailed consideration, their claim to grant temporary injunction was rejected by the trial Court. This would clearly show that

respondents 5 and 6 are not even in possession. The Appellate Authority erred in assuming that there is a civil dispute and mechanically the Revisional

Authority upheld the decision of the Appellate Authority. There was no application of mind by both authorities. Thus, both orders are not sustainable in

law.

In a nut shell, facts as culled out from the material placed on record, it is apparent that from the original Inamdar, Smt.Chunnu Begam purchased

the land in issue and from Smt.Chunnu Begam, petitioners have purchased the land by way of registered sale deed. Smt.Chunnu Begam was granted

ORC on 7.7.2009. Even though, the Appellate Authority observed that parties have to avail the civil law remedy but it has not disturbed the ORC

granted to Smt.Chunnu Begam. As purchasers of land from ORC holder, petitioners’ names mutated in the revenue records, reversed by the

Appellate Authority as affirmed by the Revisional Authority, impugned herein.

Under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, an Inamdar can apply for ORC, subject to his compliance of the

requirements of the Act. The subsequent purchaser of Inam land can step into the shoes of the Inamdar and can apply to grant ORC.

In S.Veera Reddy, Division Bench of this Court considered the very issue. The Division Bench held as under:

“28. From the above discussion what follows is that, notwithstanding abolition of inams, an inamdar can transfer his rights in favour of any third

person and the transferee would be entitled to all those rights and that such a transfer is not prohibited by the provisions of the Act.

30 The same view is taken by a learned single Judge of this Court in Kodithala Keshavulu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1978(2) A.W.R.3.

Therein, the learned single Judge observed as follows:-

Had all the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, been brought into force in 1955, then there is no doubt

that the inamdar would have been recognised (subject to the requirements of Section 4 being satisfied) as an occupant and he would then have been

entitled to alienate or transfer the said lands. Merely because there has been a delay in implementing some of the provisions of the Act, such right of

inamdar should not be taken away. Rule 5 clearly provides for an application being made not only by an inamdar, but also by his successor- in-interest.

The word 'successor-in- interest is of wide amplitude. It need not be confined only to heirs. An interest can devolve either by succession or by private

treaty or by the operation of law. In all these cases the person upon whom the interest devolves would be a successor-in-interest.â€​

(emphasis supplied)

Having regard to the consistent view of this Court, per force, Smt Chunnu Begum having purchased the land in possession of original Inamdar, is a

‘successor-in-interest’ and therefore she was validly granted the ORC. At this stage, it is appropriate to note that the entitlement of original

Inamdar and as a purchaser, Smt Chunnu Begum to secure ORC is not disputed. From her, based on registered sale deed title was validly passed on

to petitioners.

Both the statutory authorities failed to appreciate that claim of respondents 5 and 6 to acquire right and title over subject property is traceable to

alleged agreement of sale executed in their favour by Smt Chunnu Begum. That being so, granting ORC to Smt Chunnu Begum no manner impacted

their claim to succeed to the subject property. It thus waters down to enforcement of agreement of sale.

No right or interest accrue, merely based on agreement of sale. To fructify into a right to secure ORC, perforce, they have to firm up their legal

relationship with Smt Chunnu Begum by enforcing the agreement of sale. That stage was not crossed by them when they obtained ORC behind the

back of Smt. Chunnu Begum. Therefore, it was rightly set aside.

At this stage, it is apt to note the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana,

(2012) 1 SCC 656. Hon’ble Supreme Court held,

“18. It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a

deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred.

Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of

Sections 54 and 55 of the TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted

under Section 53-A of the TP Act). According to the TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a

conveyance. Section 54 of the TP Act enacts that sale of immovable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale

does not create any interest or charge on its subject-matter.â€​ (emphasis supplied)

Smt Chunnu Begum executed registered sale deed in favour of petitioners. Again, it is apt to note at this stage that, respondents 5 and 6 never

sought enforcement of agreement of sale and have not filed suit for specific performance to enforce the agreement of sale stated to have been

executed by Smt Chunnu Begum. Further, they have not questioned the validity of the sale deed registered in favour of petitioners. The sale

transaction between Smt Chunnu Begum and petitioners holds and in terms thereof right and interest in the subject property hitherto vested in Smt

Chunnu Begum, devolves on petitioners.

The Appellate Authority has not gone into the merits, has not assessed the entire issue holistically, but proceeded to set aside the mutation granted

by the Tahsildar on the premise that respondents were in possession and have interest in the property and a person in possession was entitled to notice

and opportunity before accepting mutation claim of an applicant.

Having regard to this approach of the Appellate Authority and that for strange reasons respondents 5 and 6 are not contesting the writ petition, the

Court also tested the validity of the decision of the Tahsildar on the touchtone of ‘audi alteram partam’, the corner stone of rule of law, to prima

facie assess validity of the view taken by the Appellate Authority.

Respondents 5 and 6 instituted O.S.No.501 of 2015 in the Court of XVI Additional Senior Civil Judge, L.B.Nagar, Ranga Reddy district praying to

grant decree of injunction from interference. Claim of possession by respondents 5 and 6 was elaborately considered by learned trial Judge in

I.A.No.336 of 2015. In the temporary injunction application, the trial Court has recorded that no manner of right vested in respondents 5 and 6 to claim

possession and enjoyment and were not in possession and rejected the prayer to grant temporary injunction.

It is appropriate to note the prima facie findings recorded by trial Court in I.A.No.336 of 2015:

“21. One prima facie thing that is so visible and apparent in this case is petitioners have not traced their title from any specific person and have not

disclosed the same further if they were the occupants of the Inam land then under what capacity they were the occupants. There are just not saying

the basis of their occupancy rights as earmarked by law or contemplated in law. Not only that the petitioner herein are just not narrating in this case

the relevance, joinder and requirement of respondent no.1 in this petition and have not disclosed the full facts and particulars of what all proceedings

happened and are in between them and the respondent no.1 in various Authorities and as to how respondent no.1 is connected with the petition

schedule land and the correct position of revenue pronouncements in between them by the Revenue Authorities. The petitioners present the

respondent no.1 as a rank outsider, no way concerned with the petition schedule land and that this temporary injunction is very much needed against

her as she is interfering in their possession without any basis and reason. The petitioners have done the same without disclosing the full facts before

this Court and approached this Court to claim the temporary injunction reliefs from this Court. The same represents a conduct which cannot be

condoned by while dealing with a discretionary equitable relief.

That apart Ex.R4 and R5 there are sale deeds in favour of the third persons executed by the respondent no.1 and the same is altogether a

different ground reality saying the possession too was delivered. Respondent says that the petitioners are even aware of the same but filed this suit

ignoring the same. Thus, prima facie what the petitioners are trying to project in the affidavit seeking the indulgence of this Court is not correct and

that the petitioners have not disclosed the true and correct facts to get the temporary relief as per the settled requirements of law.

One should note that petitioners are too tracing the origin of their title by virtue of an agreement of sale dated 12.8.1983 from respondent no.1

herein. The said fact is not disclosed herein but has come up in the revenue litigation between them and respondent no.1. Therefore, the petitioners

terming the respondent as trespasser cannot be justified even in this limited enquiry and the rival contention as put before this Court and the documents

Ex.R1 to R.14 goes to show that petitioners are coming with unclean hands and they cannot be afforded any protection by this Court as a temporary

measure.

27……..

Hence, this Court holds that petitioners are not having prima facie case and they are also not having any balance of convenience in their favour.

The mischief rule does not favour the petitioners in as much as more loss or harm will be caused to the respondent if the order is given than the loss or

harm to be caused to the petitioner if the order is not given in as much as petitioners have tried not to project the true and correct facts before this

Court and are not making any reference or mention of the revenue litigation in between them and the respondent no.1 and the setting aside of their

occupancy certificate. Further, prima facie there cannot be any protection afforded to the petitioners for the manner they have acted more particularly

in usurping the rights of rightful owners and title holders by their sheer brazenness and legal chicanery. The petitioner would not suffer any irreparable

loss and damage in as much as they are failing to prima facie seek the indulgence of this Court in seeking the protection of their possession. That there

is likely hood of genuine persons be troubled and harassed by the petitioners by way of threat of any orders from this Court in their favour which may

result in irreparable damage to third persons who are not party to this suit and who are in possession. Petitioners are not having elements to be given

the relief of temporary injunction as prayed in the petition. Prima facie, petitioners tracing their title are unable to establish that they are in possession

of the petition schedule property as on the date of the filing of the petition in as much as no prima facie proof as to possession of petitioners is there

before this court to afford any protection to petitioners. Hence, there are no elements in favour of the petitioners to get the relief of temporary

injunction as per settled law and as prayed by the petitioners. This point is answered against the petitioner.â€​

(emphasis supplied)

The order of the learned VII Additional Senior Civil Judge, L.B.Nagar, Ranga Reddy district in I.A.No.336 of 2015 makes it abundantly clear that

respondents 5 and 6 were not in possession. Their claim on interest in the property is based on agreement of sale. This nullifies the foundation on

which Appellate Authority granted relief to them.

Principle of natural justice is not an inflexible rule moulded into a water tight compartment. An order of a statutory authority need not be set aside

only on that ground if surrounding facts give clear dimension to the issue and points out to one conclusion.

In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364, Supreme Court examined the issue whether merely because a person is not afforded

reasonable opportunity should it automatically result in setting aside the decision of a competent authority unless the person also satisfies the writ court

that grave prejudice was caused and if only opportunity was afforded he would have satisfied that authority to take a view in his favour as against

him. In this case, Supreme Court introduced the test of prejudice principle to test the validity of a contention on denial of reasonable opportunity.

Supreme Court delineated the principles that should govern the issue of denial of reasonable opportunity. To the extent relevant they read as under:

“33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved

keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee):

(1) xxxx

(2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of

prejudice would not be applicable in such a case.

(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and

adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural

provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under â€" “no noticeâ€, “no opportunityâ€

and “no hearing†categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz.,

whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so

prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment.

If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there

may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on

proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the

evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the

enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of

prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing

considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined.

The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct

principle.

(4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint

of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has

occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee.

(b) xxxxx

(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice

â€" or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action â€" the Court or the Tribunal

should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained

in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between “no opportunity†and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between

“no noticeâ€​/“no hearingâ€​ and “no fair hearingâ€​.

(a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it ‘void’ or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases,

normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram

partem).

(b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in

other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a

fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. [It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the

case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.]

(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the

ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective

which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them.

(7) There may be situations where the interests of State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such

situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision.â€​

The same principle should also guide the quasi-judicial authorities.

In M.C.Mehta vs. Union of India and others (1999) 6 SCC 237, by referring to Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of A.P. AIR 1966 SC

828, Supreme Court observed,

“21. It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not

issue a writ merely because there is violation of the principles of natural justice.â€​

(emphasis supplied)

This principle is applied in all subsequent decisions by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

It is significant to notice that between the decision of Tahsildar dated 30.01.2014 and the decision of the appellate authority dated 10.05.2016,

respondents 5 and 6 knocked the doors of the Court of XVI Additional Senior Civil Judge, L.B.Nagar, Ranga Reddy district in O.S.No.501 of 2015.

The trial Court out rightly rejected the possessory claim of respondents 5 and 6, albeit at the interlocutory stage but observations made to reject the

claim are significant. Thus, by the time appeal was decided their possession was not established. Further, the claim of respondents 5 and 6 acquiring

right and title to subject property is traceable to agreement of sale. This agreement never fructified into a deed of conveyance in their favour. On the

contrary petitioners acquired the right and title over the same land by way of a registered sale deed executed by Smt Chunnu Begum. Under Act 26

of 1971, a person in possession of an agricultural land may be entitled to object to mutation claim even if he has no title to the land. As noticed above

the trial Court prima facie held that respondents were not in possession. Further, Act 9 of 2020 does not recognize claims of a person in possession

while considering the application for mutation. The sale deed executed in favour of petitioners is not assailed by respondents 5 and 6. As noticed by

trial Court this sale deed also incorporated delivery of possession. These facts are staring on the face of the record. Therefore, putting them on notice

and affording opportunity of hearing would not have made any impact on the outcome of decision by the Tahsildar.

The Revisional Authority though holds that the respondents 5 and 6 have not filed any record to support their claim and their rights over the land

were not ascertained, declines to grant relief to petitioners only on the ground that civil suit is pending and directs the parties to await the outcome of

civil suit.

This clearly shows total non-application of mind. He failed to note that in O.S. No. 501 of 2015 the prayer was only to grant decree of bare

injunction based on possessory claim. After elaborate consideration, the trial Court held that respondents 5 and 6 were not in possession and rejected

Interlocutory Application to grant injunction from interference. This order has become final. It appears that no suit is filed seeking decree of specific

performance of agreement of sale or/and challenging the deed of conveyance executed in favour of petitioners. The Revisional Authority failed to

note these glaring facts while holding that suit is pending.

Both authorities failed to notice that suit instituted by respondents 5 and 6 is for bare injunction from interference and no civil litigation is pending

on title dispute. It is thus apparent that the Appellate Authority misdirected in interfering with the order of Tahsildar granting mutation to petitioners

and the Revisional Authority failed to apply his mind to decide the issue. Both authorities misdirected in assessing the issue in right perspective vitiating

the decision making process and the decisions per-se.

For all the aforesaid reasons, the orders impugned are liable to be set aside. They are accordingly set aside. The writ petition is allowed. Pending

miscellaneous petitions if any shall stand closed.