High CourtsSingle Bench

S. Saraswathi Ammal (deceased) and Others vs R.S. Mallikarjun Raja and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 20 January 1997 · Citation: (1997) 1 CTC 280 : (1997) 2 LW 287 : (1997) 2 MLJ 474

HON’BLE JUDGES
K. Govindarajan, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
C.R.P. No. 1193 of 1992

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

77 paragraphs · 1,744 words

K. Govindarajan, J.—The legal representatives of the tenant have filed the above revision challenging the order of eviction. One

Packialakshmiammal filed R.C.O.P.No. 136 of 1980 on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsif), Madurai Taluk. Madurai to direct the

tenant to deliver possession of the premises bearing Door No. 38, Pappankinatru Lane, Madurai Town. This eviction petition was filed on the

ground that the demised premises is a very old building and it has only a light roofing sheets for the roof. She has got three sons and they intended

to divide the properties by putting up additional constructions after demolition. It is also stated in that petition that they have submitted a plan and

estimate for demolition and reconstruction. On the basis of the said averments the landlady has submitted that she requires the premises for

immediate demolition and reconstruction and her intention is a bona fide one. Objecting this petition, the petitioner/tenant filed a statement of

objections stating that the building is not old and it is in good condition and the intention to demolish and reconstruct the same is not a bona fide

one. The Rent Controller after considering the oral and documentary evidence found that the requirement of the petition mentioned building for

demolition and reconstruction is bona fide Aggrieved against that finding, the tenant filed R.C.A.No. 215 of 1981. The appellate authority in his

order dated 30.3.1982 allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Rent Controller. The landlady filed C.R.P.No. 1656 of 1983 before this

Court. This Court in its order dated 4.3.1986 remanded the matter with the following observation:-

The Appellate Authority found that in Ex.A-1 the plan, there is no indication that the building has to be demolished and a new building has to be

built in the site, but that only the roof has to be replaced by a terrace and that therefore the petition would not lie u/s 14 (1) (b) of the Act. But the

evidence of P.W.1 the landlord, shows that a bathroom and a lavatory have to be constructed in the portion now in occupation of the tenant and

that the entire portion has to be divided into two equal parts for the occupation of the two sons of the landlord. There is no evidence also in this

case whether the building is required for immediate purpose of demolition. Further, there is no evidence as to whether the petition schedule

property which bears Door No. 4 is alone so old as to require immediate demolition even though in the counter the tenant has expressly stated that

the allegation that the building is old, is not true. From the plan alone submitted in this case, the Appellate Authority cannot come to the conclusion

that the petition u/s 14(1) (b) will not lie.

After remand, the landlady filed two documents, Exs.A-8 and A-9 to show the age of the building. Pending appeal the landlady and tenant died

and the respondents and petitioners are their respective legal representatives. The Appellate Authority in his order dated 23.3.1992 confirmed the

order of the Rent Controller, ordering eviction.

2.

The learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant submitted that the petition u/s 14 (1) (b) of the Act cannot be maintained as the landlady wants only

replacement of the damaged roofing and the Appellate Authority has not applied his mind with respect to para 5 of the remand order of this Court.

He further submitted that the Court has misconstrued Ex.A-3 and applied the substance of the document against his case. The learned counsel for

the respondents/landlady has submitted that it is not correct to state that the landlady is going to replace only the roofing, but as deposed by

P.W.1, after demolition, the landlady is going to construct a pucca building. Ex.A-1 plan will clearly prove the same. Exs.A-8 and A-9 sale deeds

will clearly prove the age of the building and the tenant has not examined any witness to discharge his burden regarding the condition of the

building. In support of his argument, the learned counsel for the respondent/landlady cited number of decision.

3.

The only question which has to be decided in this case is whether the petition u/s 14 (1) (b) of Act. 18 of 1980 is maintainable with reference to

the facts of this case and whether the requirement by the landlady of the premises for demolition is bonafide.

4.

In the petition, the landlady has clearly stated that she wants to put up additional construction by demolishing the premises in full. In support of

her case, Ex.A-1 and Ex.A-2 have been produced which show not only the replacement of roofing but also some additional construction after

demolition of the premises in question. P.W.1 has also deposed to that effect. On the contrary, the tenant did not let in any evidence to prove his

case. Not even in the counter the tenant has stated that the petition is not maintainable, by alleging that the landlady is going to replace only the

roofing and not going to reconstruct the building. So, in view of this fact, the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, viz., K.

Krishnan v. Munusamy, 1978 2 M.L.J. 510 and T. Thiruppathi Vs. Maimoon Bibi and Others, will not support their contention. In the decisions

cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is held that for a change of roof, petition cannot be maintained u/s 14 (1) (b) and it should be u/s

14(1) (a) of the Act. As discussed earlier, here in this case, after demolition, the landlady is going to not only replace the roofing but also to

construct structure in the demolished portion. So I find that the petition u/s 14 (1) (b) of the Act is maintainable.

5.

Regarding the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there is no bona fide intention on the part of the landlady regarding the

demolition and reconstruction of the building as the building is in good condition and it does not require immediate demolition. To maintain the

petition u/s 14 (1) (b) of the Act, the landlady should satisfy three conditions, namely, (1) bona fide intention of the landlady, far from the sole

object only to get rid of the tenants; (2) the age and condition of the building; and (3) the financial position of the landlady to demolish and erect a

new building. It is well settled that the building need not be in a dilapidated condition or in a dangerous state of affairs for ordering a petition u/s 14

(1) (b) of the Act. In this case, the landlady has proved that she is having sufficient money to construct the building and she has filed necessary plan

to show that she is going to construct the building in the demolished portion so as to enable the sons to divide the properties. To deny this pleading

and evidence, the petitioners did not let in any evidence regarding the condition of the building or to prove that the intention of the landlady to

demolish and reconstruct the premises in question is a mala fide one and only for the purpose of evicting him. The very same issue came up for

consideration before this Court and this Court in the decision reported in Central Hameedia Stores and Others Vs. Valliammmal @ Rajammal,

held that.

though the burden is on the landlady to prove the condition of the building when the tenants also got into the box to give evidence, they should

have let in evidence contra that the condition of the building is such that it does not require demolition. In the absence of any contra evidence, there

is nothing wrong in accepting the evidence of the landlady. Both the authorities below had categorically found that the requirement of the landlady

u/s 14 (1) (b) is bonafide

6.

The landlady has filed documents, Exs.A-8 and A-9 to prove the age of the building. The existing condition of the building far from being totally

irrelevant is a factor in considering the bonafide requirement u/s 14 (1) (b) of the Act. While dealing with similar matter, this Court, in the decision

reported in K.J. Sivalingam Vs. S. Guruswamy and Another, held as follows:-

While the age and the condition of the buildings are relevant factors to be taken into account, it is not possible to insist that the condition of the

buildings must be such that there is an imminent threat of the same crumbling down in the near future and only in such a contingency, the landlord

could resort to the process u/s 14 (1) (b) of the Act. There is no warrant for applying such stringent tests to discountenance the plea of the landlord

for requiring the building for demolition and reconstruction of a better structure either to get a better return or to accommodate himself

comfortably.

Bona fides have to be assessed with reference to the facts and circumstances of each particular case. In this case, the landlady has given an

undertaking that she will demolish the building and commence the construction of building within a particular period. If she fails to do so, the tenant

can seek restitution under the Act.

7.

Looked at from any point of view the landlady has proved her bona fide intention to demolish the building for reconstruction. It cannot be said

that after remand the appellate authority has decided the case only on the basis of the plan. The oral and other documentary evidence had been

taken into consideration to assess the intention of the landlady. The authorities below have applied their mind regarding the condition of the building

and other relevant factors and have correctly come to the conclusion that the building requires demolition and reconstruction and the intention of

the landlady is bonafide I do not find any illegality, impropriety or irregularity in the orders passed by the authorities below and as such the revision

petition is dismissed. No costs.

8.

After delivering the order, counsel for the petitioners-tenants requested time to vacate the premises. Though the counsel for the respondents

resisted, ultimately agreed for the grant of three months'' time. Time is granted to vacate the premises, on condition that the tenants should file an

affidavit of undertaking within two weeks from today, that the petitioners will vacate the premises within the period of three months from today,

failing which the order of eviction already passed will come into force immediately.