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Judgment
B. Rajendran, J.—The petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the order dated 30.04.2014 and after setting aside the said order, seeks for a consequential direction directing the respondents to supply paddy to his rice mill.
The case of the petitioner is that he was running a rice mill in the name and style of Shanmuga Rice Mill at Neelipalayam, Puliyampatti Via., Avinashi Taluk, Tiruppur District and he is also a hulling agent for the respondents corporation. It is the further case of the petitioner that he is authorised by the respondents to hull paddy. While so, on 25.05.2013, the Inspector of Police, CSCID, Tiruppur inspected the house of the petitioner, which is situate within the rice mill premises, and seized 65 bags of rice each weighing 50 kg by alleging that the rice meant for public distribution system were clandestinely hoarded by the petitioner. Consequently, the respondents stopped supplying paddy to the petitioner and he could not continue the hulling business. Thereafter, on 31.05.2013, the second respondent issued a show cause notice calling upon the petitioner to explain as to why the loss caused to the corporation be not recovered, why the hulling licence issued to him be not cancelled and as to why the name of the petitioner rice mill be not included in the blacklist maintained by the respondents corporation. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 10.06.2013 denying the charges. Inspite of such explanation, the second respondent, in his proceedings dated 22.07.2013, cancelled the hulling licence issued to the petitioner. As against the same, the petitioner preferred an appeal dated 02.09.2013 to the first respondent. According to the petitioner, the appeal filed by the petitioner was not considered for a considerable length of time and therefore he filed WP No. 27307 of 2013 before this Court seeking for a Mandamus to dispose of the statutory appeal pending on the file of the first respondent. This Court, by order dated 11.11.2013, directed the first respondent to dispose of the appeal within a period of four weeks. Thereafter, the first respondent taken up the appeal filed by the petitioner and passed an order dated 06.03.2014 allowing the appeal. On the basis of the order dated 06.03.2014, the petitioner sent a representation dated 28.04.2014 to the second respondent requesting to supply paddy to his mill so as to enable him to commence the hulling business. While the petitioner was anticipating to commence the hulling business, the second respondent passed the impugned order dated 30.04.2014 stating that the first respondent has instructed to say that claim of the petitioner for renewal of licence will be considered after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings and therefore, the petitioner''s request cannot be entertained.
The learned counsel for the petitioner attacked the impugned order by raising two grounds. First of all, the impugned order was passed by the second respondent without affording opportunity to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted a representation to the second respondent on 28.04.2014 and on 30.04.2014, without giving any opportunity to him, the impugned order came to be passed. Therefore, according to the counsel for the petitioner, the impugned order has to be set aside on the grounds of violation of principles of natural justice. The second ground of attack is that the impugned order has not been passed by the second respondent independently by applying his mind. In the impugned order, it was merely stated that the first respondent instructed the second respondent not to entertain the claim of the petitioner until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. Based on such instructions given by the first respondent, the second respondent rejected the claim of the petitioner. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the impugned order is also liable to be set aside on the ground of non-application of mind.
On the contrary, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent, relying on the counter affidavit, would contend that the second respondent relied on the Circular issued by the first respondent and rightly rejected the claim of the petitioner for renewal of the hulling licence. Further, when a criminal case is pending against the petitioner, the question of renewing the hulling licence in favour of the petitioner does not arise. In any event, the claim of the petitioner for renewing the hulling licence cannot be considered by the respondents at this stage and he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
I heard the learned counsel for both sides and perused the materials placed on record. Admittedly, the impugned order has been passed by the second respondent without affording an opportunity to the petitioner. It is to be noted that the petitioner sought for renewal of licence on the strength of the order dated 06.03.2014 of the first respondent allowing his appeal. When that be so, without affording an opportunity, the second respondent ought not to have passed the impugned order. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, soon after the appeal filed by the petitioner was allowed, he submitted a representation on 28.04.2014 and within two days thereafter, the impugned order was passed pm 30.04.2014 which is grossly in violation of the principles of natural justice. Such an argument of the counsel for the petitioner is well founded.
Similarly, in the impugned order, the second respondent merely relied on the instructions said to have been given by the first respondent to reject the claim of the petitioner. It is evident that the second respondent did not independently apply his mind and passed the impugned order. The impugned order was passed only on the basis of the instructions said to have been given by the first respondent without any independent consideration on the part of the second respondent. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the impugned order has been passed without application of mind.
In the result, the order dated 30.04.2014 passed by the second respondent is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the first respondent, who is the appellate authority, for fresh consideration. The first respondent is directed to consider the claim of the petitioner for renewal of hulling licence in his favour pursuant to the order dated 06.03.2014 allowing the appeal filed by the petitioner, afford an opportunity to him and thereafter pass orders on merits and in accordance with law. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
