S. Saravanan vs The General Manager

S. Manikumar, J.—Challenge in this writ petition is to the charge memorandum dated 12.06.2013 issued by the General Manager, Tamil

Nadu State Transport Corporation (Madurai) Ltd., Madurai Zone, Madurai. The charges framed against the petitioner are that he has produced

bogus certificate at the time of joining the Transport Corporation; Cheated the Transport Corporation and joined the service; and hence violated

the Standing Rule 16 (5, 9, 38). Assailing the correctness of the charge memorandum, Mr. P. Rajkumar, learned counsel for the petitioner,

submitted that only after verifying the genuineness of the certificates, the petitioner''s educational particulars were registered in the District

Employment Office, Madurai. He also further submitted that only after providing training in the Institute of Road Transport between 12.08.1996 to

02.11.1996, and after scrutiny of the certificates, he was given appointment as driver by the respondent-Transport Corporation on 29.05.2007 in

Tiruppuvanam-Pudur Depot. According to the petitioner, when the genuineness of the certificates has already been verified by the Transport

Corporation and the District Employment Office, Madurai District, initiation of disciplinary proceedings, after seven years from the date of

appointment, is liable to be set aside on the ground of delay and laches. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the General

Manager, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Madurai) Ltd., Madurai Zone, Madurai, has failed to consider the explanation of the

petitioner in proper perspective.

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the materials available on record.

Securing employment by production of bogus certificates is certainly a matter to be enquired into, by the employer. The appointment if any,

secured by production of bogus certificates is illegal and therefore, the appointing authority can take appropriate steps to ascertain the genuineness

of the same and if there is any prima facie evidence, disciplinary action can be taken. There is no period of limitation prescribed under any statutory

rule, and there cannot be any embargo on the appointing authority to enquire into the act of the petitioner, securing employment by producing

bogus documents. Merely because the educational and other particulars have been registered in the District Employment Office, Madurai and that

the petitioner was also given appointment in the year 2007, as driver in the Transport Corporation, it cannot be said that the employer has no right

to conduct an enquiry into acts of misconduct in securing employment by production of bogus certificates. At this juncture, it should be noted that

at the time of registration of employment particulars, the District Employment Exchanges, do not normally verify the genuineness of the certificates

produced by the candidate who seeks to register the educational particulars, and an appointing authority also does not verify the genuineness of the

certificates, at the time of making appointment. Verification of the genuineness of the certificates will be only after appointment. Even though the

petitioner had worked for nearly seven years, since 2007, the length of service put in by the petitioner, is not an answer to the charge

memorandum. Period of limitation is not applicable in these type of matters. The petitioner is stated to have submitted his explanation on

21.06.2013. Material on record discloses that not satisfied with the explanation, an Enquiry Officer has been appointed and notice dated

24.07.2013 has also been issued to the petitioner proposing to conduct oral enquiry on 31.07.2013.

The Apex Court has consistently held that a charge memo or a show cause notice cannot be quashed at the threshold, unless in a very rare and

exceptional cases, where there is lack of jurisdiction. Useful reference can be made to few decisions on this aspect.

(i) In State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and Another, , held as follows:

When a show cause notice is issued to a government servant under a statutory provision calling upon him to show cause, ordinarily the government

servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that

stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any authority of law. ""The purpose of issuing show cause notice is to afford

opportunity of hearing to the government servant and once cause is shown it is open to the Government to consider the matter in the light of the

facts and submissions placed by the government servant and only thereafter a final decision in the matter could be taken. Interference by the court

before that stage would be premature, the High Court in our opinion ought not to have interfered with the show cause notice.

(ii) In Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Upendra Singh, the Central Administrative Tribunal examined the correctness of the charges against

the respondent therein, on the basis of the material produced by him and quashed the same. The Union of India preferred an appeal. The Supreme

Court, after considering the decisions in T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa and Another, which was followed in Smt. Ujjam Bai Vs. State of Uttar

Pradesh, and V.D. Trivedi v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC 55 and 6 of the judgment in Upendra Singh''s case, held as follows:

In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the tribunal or court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or

particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary

to any law. At this stage, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. The tribunal cannot take over the

functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after

the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to Court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges

or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be.

The jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal is akin to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore,

the principles, norms and the constraints which apply to the said jurisdiction apply equally to the Tribunal. If the original application of the

respondent were to be filed in the High Court, it would have been termed, properly speaking, as a Writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is

issued only when patent lack of jurisdiction is made out. It is true that a High Court acting under Article 226 is not bound by the technical rules

applying to the issuance of prerogative writs like certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in United Kingdom, yet the basic principles and norms

applying to the said writs must be kept in view.

(iii) The Supreme Court in The Special Director and Another Vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and Another, held as follows:

This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions questioning legality of the show-

cause notices stalling enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process to find actual facts with the participation and in the presence of the

parties. Unless the High Court is satisfied that the show-cause notice was totally non est in the eye of the law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the

authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of routine, and the writ petitioner

should invariably be directed to respond to the show-cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition. Whether the show-cause

notice was founded on any legal premises, is a jurisdictional issue which can even be urged by the recipient of the notice and such issues also can

be adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice initially, before the aggrieved could approach the court. Further, when the court passes an

interim order it should be careful to see that the statutory functionaries specially and specifically constituted for the purpose are not denuded of

powers and authority to initially decide the matter and ensure that ultimate relief which may or may not be finally granted in the writ petition is not

accorded to the writ petitioner even at the threshold by the interim protection granted.

(iv) In Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, the respondent therein was issued with a charge memo for availing

reservation against the post earmarked for ST, though he did not belong to the said category. Instead of submitting a reply to the charge memo, he

preferred Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, which disposed of the same with a direction to the respondents to submit

the explanation to the charge memo and on such reply, the disciplinary authority was directed to consider the same. Instead of filing the reply, the

respondent therein filed a Writ Petition, which was allowed. Testing the correctness of the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the Supreme

Court, at paragraphs 13, 14 and 16, held as follows:

It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge sheet or show-cause notice vide, Executive

Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramdesh Kumar Singh and Ors. [JT 1995 (8) SC 33], The Special Director and Another Vs. Mohd.

Ghulam Ghouse and Another, Ulagappa and Others Vs. Divn. Commr. and Others, ] State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and

Another, etc.

The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the

writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does

not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It

is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the

proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere

show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise

adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.

No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly

without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.

(emphasis supplied)

While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot go into the correctness of the allegations contained

in the charge memo on merits and assume the role of a Disciplinary Authority, particularly when the Supreme Court has time and again held that

interference by the Courts to the show cause notice or charge memo at the threshold, would be premature and mere charge-sheet or show-cause

notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order"". Admittedly, the General Manager, Tamil Nadu

State Transport Corporation (Madurai) Ltd., Madurai Zone, Madurai, has the competence to issue a charge memorandum. In view of the above

discussion and the decisions stated supra, this Court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition. Hence the writ petition is dismissed. Consequently,

the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. No costs.