S. Thippanna vs The State of Karnataka

Anand Byrareddy, J.—None appears for the petitioner. Heard the learned Government Advocate.

The facts are that the petitioner claims to have purchased the property bearing Survey No. 490 measuring 12 acres 58 cents at Hurulihalli village, Bellary District, which originally belonged to Madigar Madeppa. After the death of Madigar Madeppa, the respondent No. 4 is said to have sold a portion of land measuring 6 acres 29 cents in favour of the petitioner under a registered sale deed dated 5.6.1976 and the petitioner claims to have been in possession of the property eversince. The property was subdivided and assigned a separate survey No. 490/2 insofar as the portion purchased by the petitioner was concerned. With the coming into force of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (Hereinafter referred to as the ''PTCL Act'', for brevity), Assistant Commissioner at the instance of the Tahsildar, had instituted suo motu proceedings for resumption and restoration of the land and after issuing notice to both the parties and on perusal of the records, the Assistant Commissioner had concluded that the case did not attract the provisions of the PTCL Act. After lapse of 20 years from the date of the order dated 27.10.1983, the respondent No. 4 is said to have filed a writ petition questioning the correctness and legality of the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner in WP 36923/2003. The said petition was disposed of by order dated 22.8.2003, with an observation that respondent No. 4 should have first availed the remedy of an appeal. It is thereafter that an appeal was filed before the Deputy Commissioner, Bellary. The appeal having been allowed by an order dated 16.1.2006, the present petition is filed.

The primary contentions are that the initiation of the proceedings in the first instance having been set at naught by the very authority on a finding that the provisions of the PTCL Act was not attracted and the said order having been challenged after much lapse of time, was barred by delay and laches. In any event, this court having dismissed the petition with an observation that the remedy of appeal was available, it did not provide a license to the respondent No. 4 to prefer an appeal. The appeal was clearly barred by delay and laches and therefore, the appeal having been considered at all is unlawful and ought not to have been entertained. In any event, the authority has failed to address the reasoning assigned by the Assistant Commissioner in the first instance as to the provisions of the PTCL Act not being attracted to the land in question.

The learned Additional Government Advocate would point out that insofar as the ground urged as regards delay and laches is concerned, this court has, in several cases, held that insofar as the provisions of the PTCL Act is concerned, it does not provide for the period of limitation and when the Legislature has thought it fit not to fetter any proceedings that may be initiated in respect of the granted land, there is no substance in the contention that the proceedings are barred by delay and laches. Admittedly, the circumstance that the original records which were examined by the Deputy Commissioner had indicated that the land in question was granted land and there was no indication of any permission having been obtained for alienation of the land in favour of the petitioner and since the definition of granted land covers a wide range of lands, conferred on cultivators belonging to a particular community, which would come within the scope of the PTCL Act, the finding by the Deputy Commissioner that the land could not be alienated is in order, where as the reasoning of the Assistant Commissioner was without reference to the Assistant Commissioner having closed the suo motu proceedings initiated in the first instance, was on the understanding that there was inordinate delay in considering whether the lands could be restored in favour of the original grantee or his legal representatives. As the question of delay and laches is not attracted in respect of the lands covered under the PTCL Act, the reasoning of the Deputy Commissioner cannot be faulted.

Accordingly, there is no substance in this petition and the same is dismissed.