S.A. Seshadri Aiyangar vs Narayana Nair

Balakrishna Aiyar, J.—This is an appeal from the order of the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, dismissing an execution petition,

E.P. No. 1109 of 1946 on the file of his Court.

the relevant facts are these:

The property which forms the subject-matter of this controversy is a non-residential building in Besant Road, Triplicane. On 29th May, 1946, the

land-lord obtained from the House Rent Controller appointed under the Madras House Rent Control Order of 1945, an order for the eviction of

the tenant who was then in occupation of the premises. The tenant preferred an appeal to the Collector of Madras which was dismissed on 15th

July, 1946. On 2nd August, 1946, the landlord applied to the City Civil Court for execution of the order of eviction that had been made in his

favour. On the very same day, namely, 2nd August, 1946, the tenant presented a revision petition to the Government which he was entitled to do

under the Madras House Rent Control Order. This order ceased to be in force on 30th September, 1946, and its place was taken by the Madras

Act XV of 1946. On 13th March, 1947, that is to say, after the Madras House Rent Control Order of 1945 had ceased to be in force and the

Madras Act XV of 1946 had taken its place the Provincial Government allowed the revision petition of the tenant. When this fact was brought to

his notice the learned Judge in the City Civil Court dismissed the execution petition. Against that order the landlord now appeals.

The principal argument put forward on behalf of the landlord is that on 13th March, 1947, when the Government passed the order allowing the

revision petition of the tenant they had no power to do so since the Madras House Rent Control Order of 1945 which alone conferred on them the

requisite power was no longer in force. In substance the argument was that the source from which the Government derived their power had dried

up, and that, therefore, their order was incompetent. In this connection reference was made to certain passages in Craies "" Statute Law,"" 4th

edition at page 347, where the learned author says,

As a general rule, and unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired no proceedings can be taken

upon it, and it ceases to have any further effect In Spencer v. Hooton (1920) 4 M. App. 67., Roche, J., held that he had no jurisdiction to hear

appeals from Munitions Tribunals in proceedings taken under the Wages (Temporary Regulations) Acts by reason of the Act giving him jurisdiction

having expired before the appeals came on for hearing. There is difference between the effect of expiration of a temporary Act and the repeal of a

perpetual Act.

In support of. his contentions the learned advocate for the appellant also relied on. the decision in Canada Cement Co. v. East Montreal (Town

of) (1920) 4 Munitions Appeals 67. That was a case in-which a Tribunal to which appeals previously lay was abolished and another constituted in

its place. The Privy Council held that an appeal did not lie to the new Tribunal. Their Lordships observed,

This appeal had not been brought when the statute was passed, although the proceedings-before the circuit Court had been instituted.

Consequently, the Statutes giving whatever right of appeal may have existed were replaced by sections which gave none.

For the other side it was contended that by 30th September, 1946, when the Madras-House Rent Control Order of 1945 ceased to be in force

the tenant had already acquired a vested right to move the Government in revision and that there is nothing in the language of Act XV of 1946

taking away that right. The decisions in G. Narayanaswami Naidu and Others Vs. The Inspector of Police, and G. Narayanaswami Naidu and

Others Vs. The Inspector of Police, were also relied on. In the former case the question was whether a person who had been ordered to be

detained under Madras Act I of 1947 and who had preferred an application to the High Court u/s 491, Criminal Procedure Code, before Madras

Ordinance II of 1948 had been promulgated, had a right to have his petition disposed of by the High Court or whether that right of his was taken

away by the Ordinance. It was ruled that the right of a detained person to apply to the High Court u/s 491, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be

treated as a matter of procedure; but it is a substantive right and a very valuable right and that the ordinance would not apply to pending

proceedings u/s 491, Criminal Procedure Code, but only to petitions filed after the date of the promulgation of the ordinance. On the analogy of

this decision it was contended that the right of the tenant to move the Government in revision. under the Madras Rent Control Order of 1945 was

a substantive right which had accrued to him before the expiration of the order and that it had not been taken away by Act XV of 1946. In the

case Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (1905) A.C. 369, their Lordships observed that

to deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating

procedure.

When what is called a permanent Act, that is to say, an Act which is of indefinite duration is repealed, Section 8 of the General Clauses Act,

1891 (Madras) provides that unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability, acquired,

accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed or affect any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege,

obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment, as aforesaid and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted or

continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or regulation had not been passed.

The provision of this section will not directly apply when a temporary Act expires by efflux of time. What is to happen to pending proceedings in

such a case must depend upon the intention of the Legislature; and where clear words are not used the intention must be inferred from the relevant

circumstance. Thus, where a temporary Act sets up a special Tribunal and as the result of the expiration of Act, the special Tribunal ceases to exist

and no clear provision is made for continuing pending proceedings it will be reasonable to infer that the intention of the Legislature is that such

proceeding shall not be continued. The decision in Spencer v. Hooton (1920) 4 M.App 67 is not available but from the passage in Craies on

Statute law which refers to it, it is to be inferred that the decision of Roche, J., proceeded on this principle. In Canada Cement Co. v. East

Montreal (Town of) (1922) 1 A.C. 249, their Lordships very definitely found on the construction of the relevant sections of the statute before them

that the matter had otherwise been provided for. Where a right has become vested in a person and the authority through whom that right can be

enforced continues to exist the inference would be justified that there was no intention to deprive the person of that right. In the present case a

revision did lie to the Government at the time the petition was presented, the Government had then jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of it, and it

did dispose of it. In this connection reference may also be made to the decision in Keshoram Poddar v. Nundo Lal Mallick (1927) 52 M.L.J. 655

: L.R. 54 IndAp 152 : ILR 54 Cal. 508 (P.C.). The facts of that case were : the Calcutta Rent Act, 1920, enabled a landlord or tenant of premises

in Calcutta to obtain from the Controller of Rents a certificate of the standard rent of the premises. A right to apply for revision of his order to the

President of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal was also provided for. By section I, Sub-section (4) it was provided that the Act was to be in

force for a period of three years. In 1923, the Act was amended and the life of the Act extended upto the end of March, 1924. In 1924 the Act

was further amended and its life was extended upto 1927. When the life of the Act was extended in 1924 its scope was reduced by the insertion

of a proviso with the result that the Act ceased to apply to any premises the rent of which exceeded Rs. 250 a month. The tenant applied for the

fixation of the standard rent and on 23rd October, 1922, the Controller fixed the rent at Rs. 4,500 per month. On the 25th November, 1922, the

tenant appealed. to the President of the Improvement Committee to review that decision. The President who was fully occupied in hearing other

appeals was able to take up the case only on 3rd August, 1924. He then dismissed it on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to determine the

matter. This he did because of the two amending Acts which had been passed while the case was waiting and because of the amendment to the

original Act which rendered it inapplicable to premises the rent of which exceeded Rs. 250 per menses. The Privy Council overruled this view

which was concurred in by the High Court. Their Lordships observed that the Act was a living Act at the moment the application was made to the

President and that the proviso had to be read just as if the words had been Inserted in the original Act and that the President had jurisdiction to

dispose of the revision petition. It is possible to argue that the decision turns on the construction of the Act and is not therefore directly applicable :

but it does suggest that the solution to the problem lies in ascertaining the intention of the Legislature. The insertion of Section 18 of Madras Act

XV of 1946 indicates that the intention of the Legislature was that so far as possible all pending proceedings are to be continued. Regard being had

to the facts that the right which the tenant had was a vested right, that the authority before whom proceedings could be taken to enforce that right

continued to exist and Section 18 of Madras Act XV of 1946 suggests that the intention of the Legislature was that all pending proceedings, should

as far as possible be saved, it must be found that the decision of the Court below was right. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.